Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
Body:
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-533-4-8-7
TOP SECRET
WASHINGTON
THE WHITE HOUSE
DOS, OSD Reviews
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December 2, 197
National Security Decision Memorandum 142
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency
SUBJECT: Presidential Guidance on Mutual and Balanced
Force Reductions and a European Conference
As a result of the discussion at the December 1 NSC meeting, the
President has directed that the following guidance be followed in
consultations with our Allies on -the issues related to Mutual and
Balanced Force Reductions and preparations for a European
Conference.
After considering the discussions at the meeting, the President has
concluded that we are not prepared for definitive decisions with
respect to MBFR or CES and that our general approach should be
to proceed,slowly while developing consensus within the Alliance
on positions which clearly maintain our security.
It should be stressed to our Allies that the principal criterion for
judging any MBFR proposals must be maintenance of Western military
security. This will be the U. S. position in Alliance consultations on
preferred MBFR models that would serve as the basis for negotiation.
U. S. representatives should develop a maximum consensus on this
principle.
At this time, the U.S. cannot support any single approach to reductions.
We should urge-the Allies to continue analysis of possible reduction
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-533-4-8-7
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-533-4-8-7
TOP SECRET
models. Meanwhile, we should complete ongoing analysis and undertake
further studies of asymmetrical models that emphasize limitations and
reductions on Warsaw Pact offensive capabilities. We should also com-
plete a study on options dealing with nuclear weapons and pursue further
work on collateral constraints.
Our Allies should be told that the U. S. supports the concept of a
sequential approach to negotiation similar to that proposed by' the FRG.
This approach should be applied to further analysis of MBFR models.
In Allied consultations, U. S. representatives should provide reassurance
that we will not negotiate bilateral reductions with the USSR.
Until the Brosio mission to Moscow has been completed, the U. S. cannot
support other efforts towards MBFR negotiations. While we would
consider alternatives to the Brosio mission, if it proves unacceptable
to the USSR, it remains essential. that an exploratory phase similar to
that authorized for Mr. Brosio be undertaken before any multilateral
negotiations.
European Conference
We should insist that the final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin be signed
before agreeing to any multilateral preparations- for a European
Conference. Following the signing of the Berlin Protocol, the U. S.
should urge a meeting of NATO countries at the Deputy Foreign Minister
level to coordinate a common approach to the issues that may be raised
by the other" side before going into preparatory talks.
At present, Western preparations on substantive issues are insufficiently
developed to enter into multilateral East-West contacts. The U. S. will
be prepared to contribute to the work of the Alliance on substantive
points by submitting more concrete proposals for Western consideration.
In particular, security issues (other than MBFR) that might be topics in
a Conference will be given more emphasis.
The U. S. has no interest in a conference in 1972 and all preparatory work
within the Alliance and with Eastern and other European countries should
be geared to this consideration.
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No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-533-4-8-7
~ - J t
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-533-4-8-7
`The U. S. does not wish to alter its current position of keeping MBFR
and a European Conference separate.
Burdensharing
The U.S. should continue to stress to its Allies the importance of ,. ??
additional European force improvements meeting the objectives set by
NSDM 133. MBFR should in no way conflict with the force improvements
developed under the AD-70 programs; these two concepts must be
complementary.
Henry Al, Kissinger
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/15: LOC-HAK-533-4-8-7