ENEMY LOSSES IN CAMBODIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-553-6-6-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 25, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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- D &.2d
MEMORANDUM - Zs5 - N itq.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE]
SPOKE .
r i
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Enemy Losses in Cambodia
May 25, 1970
Attached are preliminary estimates by Director Helms and Secretary
Laird of the impact on the enemy of the operations in Cambodia thus
far. The CIA report (TAB A), which has been revised (TAB B) to
reflect the recent decrease in machine gun ammunition, makes the
following points of particular interest:
ARMY DIA OSD Review
Completed
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
The enemy's stockpiles in Cambodia probably contain
9 to 15 months' resupply requirements for lower II, III
and IV Corps, or between 9, 000 and 15, 000 tons of supplies.
As a percentage of estimated enemy stockpiles of food,
ammunition and weapons in Cambodia, the enemy has already
lost*:
food: 38% to 65%
ammunition: 55% to 92%
MORI C05105089 Pgs 6-37
ONLY.
i
d
t
3% t
6%-'
',
pmen
weapons an
:
equ
o
,
-- Even with the recent downward adjustment, the ammunition
captured compared to estimates of enemy ammunition stocks
is very substantial. The ammunition is equivalent to at least
154 days of resupply requirements for enemy forces in lower. II,
III and IV Corps.
Figures throughout have been adjusted to reflect latest MACV reporting.
x= This figure is somewhat misleading since only the weight of weapons_
captured in Cambodia is compared with weapons and equipment estimated
to be in caches. Equipment in the caches is believed to be about half
of the total weight in this category. Adjusted figures would be 6% to 12%.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/SPOKE
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/SPOKE _Z_
With respect to enemy food losses, it is significant that:
Although, a hugh amount of rice has been captured, this
item is more easily replaced than weapons or ammunition
since rice can be obtained in Cambodia and South Vietnam
where there are bumper crops this year.
The food captured is more than two-thirds of that seized
throughout South Vietnam in 1969.
More than a half year's requirement for enemy forces in
southern South Vietnam has been discovered.
The 93 tons of weapons found thus far is relatively low compared
with other items captured and is only 21% of the enemy weapons
seized throughout South Vietnam in 1969.
The only other large "strategic" stockpiles captured in the past
were found during two sweeps of the Plaine des Jarres in Laos
over a period of seven months in 1969. A comparison with the
Cambodian caches indicates that:
More than twice the food and weapons have already been
captured in Cambodia.
Although the weight of ammunition captured in Cambodia
is only half the Laotian totals, three times as many rounds
of rifle and machine gun ammunition have been captured in
Cambodia. However, a much smaller quantity of mortars
and large rockets has been uncovered. This may indicate
that substantial caches of mortars and rockets remain to be
discovered in the Cambodian base areas.
In estimating the enemy's ability to replace losses in Cambodia,
the report states that:
Because the enemy maintains large stockpiles in the Laotian
panhandle, many of their losses can be replenished within
a few months.
The Cambodian supply losses will impinge mainly on the
enemy's posture in III and IV Corps. The large stocks in
South Vietnam should be adequate for the time being to support
the relatively low levels of enemy activity in South Vietnam and
even permit an occasional high. point.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/SPOKE
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/SPOKE -3-
Although the rainy season will make replenishment
difficult, it will not be irupos sible.
Secretary Laird's memorandum (Tab C) makes the following points of
interest:
The amount of ammunition captured in Cambodia is equivalent
to 62-82 days of enemy requirements. [It should be noted,
however, that based on experience over the past four quarters,
we have captured:
86 days of the estimated total enemy requirements in
South Vietnam (nearly three months).
.257 days of the estimated enemy ammunition expenditure
(more than eight months). ]
On the basis of estimates of rockets fired by the enemy:
More than nine months of enemy expenditure of small
rockets, mortar, and recoilless rifle rounds have been
captured.
A 64-day supply of large rockets has been captured.
(On the basis of experience during the past six months,
this is equivalent to a 91-day supply).
Based on estimates of inputs through Laos and Sihanoukville
it is speculated that ener.y stocks of ammunition and weapons
in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia range from 12, 000 to
30, 000 tons. If these estimates are valid, we may have already
captured from 4. 4% to 11%/0 of these stocks.
During the last dry season the enemy moved supplies through the Laotiz
panhandle at the rate of 100 tons per day and probably could
transport about 25 tons a day during the rainy season. At this
rate, the enemy may be able to replace losses of weapons and
ammunition during the rainy season in about 53 days. **
This estimate includes ammunition expended, captured and interdicted
throughout South Vietnam.
This estimate is strictly a guess. It also does not appear to
contain an estimate of enemy losses in transit clue to interdiction
efforts, makes the assumption that all of the supplies transported
consist of weapons and ammunition, and does not include the weight
of packaging and crating which decreases by 1/3rd the weight of
hardware moved.
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/SPOKE -4_
In assessing the success of the Cambodian operations, it is
important that we do not succumb, to the temptation of concen-
trating on day--to--day results, thereby losing sight of our
strategic objectives.
As both the CIA and DOD assessments point out, a significant element
in any realistic analysis of the impact of these operations is some valid
estimate of the extent of the enemy's stockpiles existing prior to the
move into the sanctuaries. Unfortunately, the estimates provided
necessarily contain a high guess factor. In approaching the problem
the CIA has relied heavily on, intelligence estimates of the level of
materiel the enemy tries to maintain in the stockpiles, The Defense
figures are based on estimates of what has been supplied through the
Ho Chi Minh Trail and Sih.anoukville.
In assessing the impact of the operations, Director Helms has concluded
that supply losses in Cambodia already have inflicted a sharp blow to
the enemy's logistical system. However, he cautions against overstating
the significance because the enemy retains large stockpiles intact in
Laos and South Vietnam and has the capability to mount a major resupply
effort. Secretary Laird emphasizes that the impact-of the Cambodian
operations should be measured in terms of the effect on troop withdrawals,
Vietnamization, reduction in friendly casualties and stimulation of meaningful
negotiations.
Although analyses of the impact on the enemy are still preliminary, it
is obvious that enemy losses measured both in tangible and psychological
terms have been considerable.
Attachments
Tabs A, B, and C
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/SPOKE
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Enemy Supply Losses In Cambodia
14,
Ri h&r?d He'?i1Ci'
COPY NO. 2 c '" -1111e)_
Ener,~r ", _ SC 069,1t5/70
A~ t~chtre?, 1
May 1970
Copy No. I-)
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
May 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Enemy Su ply Losses In Cambodia
Introduction
This memorandum is a preliminary assessment of
enemy supply losses in Cambodia. Analysis is based
on reporting of the first 17 days of Allied ground
actions. Judgments are necessarily tentative; a
definitive analysis must await the completion of the
current operations when a full and final accounting
of the losses becomes available. Furthermore, the
present analysis was complicated by the substantial
degree of uncertainty about the levels of stockpiles
that the enemy possessed prior to the US/GVN moves
against their Cambodian sanctuary.
Note:-This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant
for Vietnamese Affairs.
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.1. In the short time US and ARVN forces have
been engaged in military operations in Cambodia, they
have captured substantial quantities of enemy
supplies. From 30 April through 17 May, the enemy
has lost more than 5,500 tons of food, weapons, and
ammunition as indicated in the following tabulation:
Short Tons
Class I (food) 3,305
Class II (weapons 75
Class V (ammunition) 2,152 a/
Total 5,532
a.~ Net tonnage. Gross tonnage in-
cluding crating and packaging would be
3,228 tons. The gross tonnage is a more
accurate measure of the enemy's resupply
burden.
2. Food and ammunition.comprised the most
lucrative of supply categories tapped. by the Allied
operations while only a small amount of weapons
have been captured. Geographically, the largest
total tonnages -- some 2,000 tons --w were found in
the so-called Fishhook area, which includes Base
Areas 352 and 353 (see the map). Base Area 351,
was the site of the largest caches of ammunition --
1,479 tons --- and, in total tonnage, the second
largest finds of the campaign. Important amounts
of rice, weapons, and ammunition were found in Svay
Rieng Province (Parrot's Beak), the Cambodian
territory which juts eastward to within a few miles
of Saigon, and ranks third in total tonnage geo-
graphically. The fourth most lucrative area was
Ratanakiri Province (Base Areas 702 and 701) which
borders on Laos and has long been an important
channel of supplies to South Vietnam from the Ho
Chi Minh Trail.
3. A handful of caches, such as those dis-
covered in Base Area 351, have yielded most of
the tonnages captured (see the table). Some of
the base areas have yielded smaller stocks of arms
and ammunition than expected. For example, Base
Area 702 has been the traditional area of opera-
tions of Headquarters B-3 Front and the locale for
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a major Binh Tram which coordinated the forwarding
of men and supplies to the south along the main
infiltration route. The weapons and ammunition
discovered there to date were insignificant, less
than 10 tons. Base Area 350 has been for some
time one of the most important parts of the enemy's
supply system for III Corps and is the area of
operation for Rear Service Group (RSG) 70 which
was thought to maintain a number of large storage
facilities in the area. Less than 50 tons of sup-
plies have thus far been uncovered in this area..
4. Base Areas 352/353 (Fishhook) have been
considered highly important logistically; the
incursions in these areas yielded large amounts
of foodstuffs and relatively large amounts of
ammunition (267 tons). Base Area 354, long the
base for RSG 82 and the VC 9th Division, likewise
yielded only small amounts of ammunition and only
a handful of weapons. Base Areas 706/367 (Parrot's
Beak) have long been known to contain a high con-.
centration of logistical support facilities,
including the headquarters for RSG 100; large ton-
nages of rice were discovered, about 1,300 weapons,
and 327 tons of ammunition.
Communist Losses Compared to Stockpiles
5. Throughout the war in Indochina the Com-
munist forces have adhered as closely as possible
to a stockpiling concept that calls for supply
reserves to exceed anticipated requirements by
several fold. This stockpiling concept calls for
the establishment of stores of food, weapons, and
ammunition at three distinct echelons of command.
Field stockpiles -- called combat stockpiles --
are maintained in all operational areas to meet
the specific fire power requirements of units that
are to be committed to combat, in addition to
normal day-to-day requirements. The second type
of stockpiles -- called campaign stockpiles -- are
stored in more secure areas, but at locations
still relatively close to potential combat areas
in anticipation of forthcoming or potential military
actions. Finally, contingency stockpiles -- called
strategic stockpiles -- are established in base
areas that have a high degree of security.
6. Strategic stockpiles have been. established
principally in Laos and Cambodia, although there
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are undoubtedly some in South Vietnam in base areas
deemed adequately secure. Campaign stockpiles have
been established widely throughout the:-Cambodian
base areas presently under attack as well as in
Laos and in the more secure areas within South
Vietnam. Combat stockpiles exist solely in.
South Vietnam unless they are designed to support
specific military operations outside of South
Vietnam. The various types of stockpiles are not
necessarily maintained separately. For example,
a single supply depot may contain both strategic
and campaign stockpiles. Thus the chief distinc-
tion between the two would be one of warehouse
accounting and planning.
7. Because record volumes of supplies moved
south through the Laotian Panhandle during the
dry season, there is every reason to believe that
stockpiles in Cambodia were at ,a high level in
April. This probability is underscored by the
pattern of the enemy's stockpiling practices as
observed over a period of many years. It is clear
from the evidence gleaned from captured documents
and interrogation reports that the enemy frequently
fasts to maintain stockpiling commitments. Further-
more, the enemy's military doctrine gives high
priority to the problem of assuring that VC/NVA
forces are supported by ample. supply reserves.
Throughout the past several years reports of enemy
supply shortages in South Vietnam have most fre-
quently been laid.to in-country distribution
,;problems rather than empty warehouses or bunkers
in the base areas to the rear.
8. We do not have any firm intelligence on
the size of the enemy's stockpiles in Cambodia
(or in South Vietnam or Laos) at the time the
current operations began. From what we know of
.his logistics planning doctrine, the enemy's cam-
paign stockpiles should be equal to six month's
resupply requirements. Strategic reserves stock-
piles should be equal, at a minimum, to an addi-
tional six months' resupply requirements and may
have been equal to twelve months' requirements.
9. The significance of the enemy's present
supply losses in Cambodia must be evaluated on the
basis of judgments concerning the disposition of
the enemy's strategic and campaign stockpiles. We
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have assumed that the enemy has cached in Cambodia
all of his strategic reserves. In addition, we
have assumed that the enemy's campaign reserves (an
additional six months' supply) were equally divided
between Cambodia and South Vietnam. With these
assumptions, a calculation of enemy stockpiles: based
on our limited knowledge would indicate that he had
sufficient stockpiles to take care of 9-15 months'
resupply, requirements for lower 11, 111, and
IV Corps, or between 9,000 and 15,000 tons of-sup-
plies and probably at the higher end of this range.
10. Our preliminary calculations of the enemy's
stockpiles in Cambodia are compared to his supply
losses.thus far in the following tabulation:
Short Tons
Class of
Estimated
Enemy
Stockpiles
in Cambodia
Enemy
Losses
in
Cambodia
30 Apr.
Losses as a
Percent. of
Estimated
Enemy
Supply
Apr 1970 17 May
Stockpiles
Food
6,200 -- 10,370
3,300
.,
32 - 53
Weapons
and equip-
meat .
1,600 - 2,700
75
3 -- 5
Ammunition
l,350 2,255
2,152
95 - 160
Total
9, 150 = 15,330
a. The range in the estimates reflects the un-
certainty
about the size of the enemy's strategic
stockpiles in Cambodia.
11. While the total tonnage of supplies cap-
tured is large, the apparent stockpile depletion
for the separate classes of supplies varies
greatly. The very small tonnage of weapons lost
in Cambodia (in relation to estimated stockpiles)
suggests that the Allied operations have as yet
had little impact on that category of supply.
12. Food losses are more serious, with one-
third to one-half of the enemy's estimated food
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.caches having already been captured after only.
17 days of operation. However, the replenishment
of-food stocks, almost entirely rice, can be
accomplished relatively more easily than the're?
placement of weapons and ammunitions. Rice need
knot be hauled some 500 miles overland from North
Vietnam but can be obtained from both South Viet-
nam and Cambodia. In fact, the incursions of
VC/NVA -forces deep into Cambodia may make-it
;possible for the Communists to replace their rice
'losses in short order.*
13. The losses of ammunition will undoubtedly
pose a serious logistical problem for the enemy.
The Communists have already lost?between95% and
160% of the tonnage of ammunition we calculated
was stockpiled in Cambodia at the start of the
current operations. However, a. substantial share
of the tonnage lost was 51 caliber ammunition.
We have no satisfactory explanation at this time
for the large quantities of this single caliber of
information. It may also be that our calculations
greatly understate the enemy's stockpiles of ammu-
nition. He may, for example,. be stockpiling ammu-
nition at the same high rate observed in Northern
Laos during Operation About_Face.** In any event,
the data that is in so far complicates our analysis
considerably and more detail on the composition of
these losses is necessary before their full signifi-
cance can be assessed.
The Mix of Captured Weapons and Ammunition
14. Of the some 2,150 tons of ammunition cap-
tured in Cambodia thus far, at least 1,164 tons --
captured in Base Area 351 --- has consisted of
51-caliber ammunition, used in South Vietnam
largely as an antiaircraft weapon. This surprisingly
high and unexpected amount of 51-caliber ammunition
(over 6 million rounds) clearly must have comprised
a strategic reserve. If the 51-caliber ammunition
is omitted from the comparisons made in the pre-
ceding section, the significance of the enemy
losses of ammunition is greatly reduced. Enemy
losses of ammunition, instead of being equivalent
to 428 days of resupply requirements, would be
equivalent to only 157 days.
'.For a discussion of the impact of rice losses
on the VC/NVA forces, see paragraphs 27-32.
** See Paragraph 24.
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15. There is a strong probability that signifi-
cant caches of enemy ammunition have yet to be
uncovered in Cambodia. Small caches of ammunition
totaling about 675 tons _._ have been found so far
in the base areas other than 351. A total of 267
tons have been captured in the Fishhook and 327 tons
in the Parrot's Beak. Furthermore, the mix of
ammunition captured thus.far varies considerably
from the average mix of a typical VC or NVA Main
Force battalion -- 48% small arms and 52% heavy
ammunition. The volume of heavy weapons ammunition
captured in Cambodia has been disproportionately
high by this standard. Furthermore, as indicated
in the tabulation below, 50-caliber or larger
ammunition constituted about 97% of total heavy
ammunition losses. In the basic load of a VC/NVA
Main Force battalion, 50-caliber or larger ammunition
comprises about 75% of the total number of heavy
ammunition rounds. Thus large quantities of other
types of heavy ammunition rounds, mortar rounds,
and rockets have yet to be found if, as seems
likely, the enemy maintained balanced stockpiles
of ammunition in the base areas. Ammunition
losses by type include the following:
Type
Small arms
50-caliber or larger
Antiaircraft artillery
Mortars
Rockets (large)
Rockets (small)
Recoilless rifle
Including 50-caliber
and larger
3,690,276
7,812,464
159,047
38,879
843
14,920
14,296
11, 730, 725
8,040,449
16. The 248 tons of mortar rounds and large-
caliber rockets (107 mm and larger) captured in
Cambodia is equal to 29% of the expenditures of
these types of ammunition by the Communists in
all of South Vietnam during the 12-month period
ending in March 1970. Looked at from another point
of view, these losses are small compared with the
1,000 tons of these types of ammunition that were
captured by Allied forces in South Vietnam during
1969. .
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1 17.: To date, only 9,109 individual weapons and
1,233 crew-served weapons have been captured.
ndividual weapons represent about 88% of the
total -- only slightly higher than the average mix
of individual to crew-served weapons that is found
in a VC/NVA Main Force battalion. This indicates
that the weapon caches were stocked in a balanced
fashion, appropriate to enemy resupply requirements.
However, the total is small compared with the
430 tons of weapons captured in South Vietnam in
19 69 ..
Losses in Cambodia Compared with Those in South
Vietnam
18. The heavy losses of supplies suffered by
the Communists in Camdodia can be put in perspective
by comparing them with the total supply losses
sustained by the enemy in the entire year of 1969,
as shown in the following tabulation:
Cambodia
Class of South Vietnam 30 Apr-17 May
Supplies Jan--Dec 1969 1970
Class I
(food) 5,883
Class II
(weapons) 430
Class V
(ammun i --.
tion) 1,638
3,305
2,152
19. The tonnage of enemy ammunition captured
in Cambodia already exceeds the total tonnage of
ammunition found in enemy caches in South Vietnam
in all of 1969. However, if the large cache of 50-
caliber and larger ammunition in Base Area 351 --
1,479 tons -- had not been uncovered, the ammuni-
tion captured in Cambodia would have been equal to
41% of the 1969 total. A similar comparison shows
that enemy food losses in Cambodia have also been
of major proportions. In just over two weeks in
Cambodia the Allies have captured an amount of rice
equal to 56% of'that captured throughout South Vietnam
in 1969. Weapons losses by the enemy in Cambodia
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have been less dramatic. The 75.tons of weapons
sio far captured equals only 17% of the tonnage of
weapons captured in South Vietnam last year. How-
ever, stated differently, the Communists in South
Vietnam lost an average of 1.2 tons of weapons a
\ay in 1969 as a result of Allied ground activi--
tAi.es In the present Cambodian operations, their
os\ses have averaged 4.4 tons a day.
2,0. The above comparisons between the enemy's
losses in Cambodia compared with losses in South
Vietnam in 1969 masks the fact that for the past
12 months enemy losses have been declining. Of
the 2,927 caches that were seized in South Vietnam
during 1969, 845 (accounting for 57% of the year's
tonnages) were discovered in the first quarter of
the year. Supply losses decreased in the second
quarter and continued at relatively low levels
until February of this year. Thus the Cambodian
successes are especially significant in that they
are again imposing'a resupply burden on the enemy
that the Communists had largely been able to escape
since the end of the first quarter of 1969.
21. One difficulty in making meaningful com-
parisons between enemy losses in South Vietnam and
Cambodia is that in Cambodia Allied forces have had
access to the enemy's strategic and campaign stock-
piles while in South Vietnam enemy supply losses
are, for the most part, the sum of hundreds and
even thousands of small caches. Only occasionally
do Allied forces unearth.a cache which would rate
as a campaign stockpile, and no strategic stock-
pile has ever been discovered.* For a comparison
* For example, during the first quarter of 1969,
when enemy losses in South Vietnam were particu-
larly heavy, the following were the major caches
uncovered:
Tons of
Location SuppZies
Jan 1969
IV Corps Kien Giang 20 ("munitions")
I Corps Quang Nam 225 (rice)
III Corps Tay Ninh 50 (ammunition)
Feb 1969
III Corps Tay Ninh 323 (food)
Mar 1970
II Corps Lam Dong 346 (food)
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resupply requirements for that area, clearly indi-
cating that.General/Vang Pao's forces had captured
the Communists' strategic stockpile of ammunition
in the Plaine des Jarres area. Furthermore, these
losses highlight the importance the North Viet-
namese have placed~on maintaining extremely large
supply bases close \to the battle front.
25. A more detailed comparison of losses in
the two areas is presented in the following tabu-
lation:
Northern Laos
Cambodia / (About Face)
Weapons
Units
Individual -
Crew-served
Ratio of individual
to crew-served
9,109
11233
7.4:1
4,485
616
Small arms
3,6.90,276
1,847,000
50-caliber and. larger
7,812,464
220,200
Grenades
6,922
14,000
Antiaircraft rounds
159,047
86,000
Mortar. rounds
38,879
143,000
Rockets
-?
Small
14,920
18,000
Large
843
8,000
Recoilless rifle
14,296
N.A.
Mines
1,865
N.A.
Through 17 May.
There are several striking differences in the
composition of the enemy's ammunition caches in
northern Laos and Cambodia. The tabulation above
shows that. enemy losses of small arms ammunition
has been greater in Cambodia than in northern
Laos (3.7 million rounds compared with 1.8 million
rounds). However, because of larger enemy forces
in II, III, and IV Corps, the Cambodian losses of
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this type of ammunition appear to be somewhat
below the stockpile levels which are suggested by
the northern Laos experience.
26. There is a strong implicate on from the,
,comparative data that very substantial quantities
of mortars and rockets are yet unfound in Cambodia.
In Laos, 143,000 mortar rounds and 26,000 rocket
rounds,were captured, compared with only 39,000
(mortar and 16,000 rocket rounds captured thus far
in Cambodia; about 8,000 large rockets .were cap-
tured in northern Laos compared with only 843
rockets in Cambodia. The comparisons of rockets
are puzzling because of the important role they
have played in'the enemy's strategy and tactics
against Allied bases and population centers in
South Vietnam.
The Rice Situation
27. The large caches of rice which have been
captured in Allied operations reflect the impor-
tant role that Cambodia has traditionally played
in feeding Communist troops. An estimated
10,000-20,000 tons of rice has moved annually
from Cambodian markets to VC/NVA forces in the
rice-deficit areas of II, III, and IV Corps and
in adjacent Cambodian sanctuaries. In former
years this trade has been sanctioned (and at times
managed) by the Cambodian government, and it has
been carried out for the most part in normal com-
mercial channels.
28. The 3,305 tons of rice lost by the Com-
munists represents only about a 5-months supply
in terms of the requirements of communist forces
in southern South Vietnam for Cambodian rice. This
amount can be readily replaced from existing Cam-
bodian stocks in the nine border provinces where
the Communists are now actively. exerting some
degree of military control.*
29. The bumper 1969/70 Cambodian rice harvest
was completed by January, and a minor crop is
nearing harvest. Production in the provinces to
which the Communists now have access is estimated
to total a little more than one million tons of
. * Ratanakiri, Mondolkiri, Kratie, Kompong Cham,
Prey Veng, Svay Rieng, KandaZ, Takeo, and Kampot.
The majority of the rice is produced in the Zatter
six provinces.
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milled rice. After deducting for consumption and
making allowances for re-seeding needs and losses,
there remains a surplus of about'200,000 tons.
While a portion of this surplus probably reached
terminal export markets in Phnom Penh and Kompong
Sam (formerly Sihanoukville)' during the peak mar-
keting months of March and April, a large amount
still remains within the nine provinces, in the
hands of millers and merchants. Conservatively,
the Communists have access to at least 50,000 tons
of rice, excluding'very large stocks being held by
the Cambodians for local consumption. The Com-
munists can freely draw upon this marketable surplus
and, if the need were to arise, upon consumption
stocks as well. It seems highly unlikely that there
could be serious resistance to Communist demands in
those areas where the enemy maintains an active
military presence -- regardless of any official
government strictures against the sale of rice to
the Communists.
30. South Vietnam has also just harvested a
very large crop of rice -- estimated to be about
17% higher than last year and the largest in five
years. The enemy has the ability to buy Vietnamese
rice almost at will on the open market, although
in those immediate areas where the need for rice
is greatest (as an offset to the loss of caches in
Cambodia), production does not meet local require-
ments.
31. Despite this generally favorable supply
picture, the enemy is likely to continue to be
troubled with intermittent and localized rice
shortages. For example, during the past year or
so, there have been fairly frequent reports of
shortages among Communist forces in II and III
Corps, particularly in the western regions. These
apparently have stemmed from procurement and dis-
tribution problems; captured documents cite as
causes insufficient porters, Allied surveillance
of roads and trails, transport blockades, and the
steady expansion of government control which has
increased the reluctance of the population. to
support the Viet Cong.
32. In summary, the enemy in Cambodia has
access to large amounts of rice -- more than
enough to meet requirements and far more than the..
amount lost to Allied operations. The enemy's
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more active military posture throughout eastern
Cambodia will facilitate the purchase (or confisca-
tion) of required rice stocks. Indeed, it is
likely that tie enemy has already taken steps to
replace losses. However, despite ample rear area
supplies, the\Communists will'continue to face
forward distribution problems within South Vietnam.
These will undoubtedly be aggravated in the border
regions by the,,greater freedom of movement now
exercised by Allied troops.
Ability of the Communists to Replace Supplies
33. Allied actions in Cambodia have undoubtedly
created uncertainty for the North Vietnamese
logistical planners. The Communists logistical
stockpiles in Cambodia have been seriously depleted,
and even though all types of weapons and ammunition
have. not been captured in critical amounts, the
Communist forces are off balance and must adjust
to the new Allied initiatives and a heavy logistics
burden. The North Vietnamese do not know the quan
Cities of supplies which will be ultimately captured
nor can they be certain of the security of the
north-south logistical system in Cambodia. Further-
more, although large caches of supplies still exist
in Cambodia, the Communist forces may not have as
ready access to these supplies as in the past. The
following discussion analyzes the enemy's capa-
bility to make up his losses in Cambodia and to
maintain his logistical pipeline from North Vietnam
and Laos to II, III, and IV.Corps in view of the
rapidly oncoming rainy season.
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Transportation Options
.36. In past years, enemy logistic activity in
the Panhandle has been largely curtailed during
the rainy season, and much of the road system ---
particularly south of Route 922 -- left abandoned
and unused, indi- 25X1
cates that most of the southern route structure
(Route 92/96) and the east/west route (Route 110)
could be maintained and kept motorable, but at a
'considerable cost in manpower, only one segment
of Route 92/96 -- the rugged 40-mile long segment
between Ban Bac and Chavane -- would present for-
midable problems to the North Vietnamese engineers.
If this crucial stretch of road could be kept open
and the balance of the system provided with ade-
quate drainage control, overland travel can be
assured into the tri--border area and west -- via
Route 110 --- to the edge of the Se Kong River.
From there supplies could move into Cambodia.
As an alternative to transiting the critical Ban
Bac - Chavane road segment, the enemy could truck
supplies to the Se Kong near Ban Bac to be free-
floated down to transshipment points near or below
Chavane.(see the following discussion).
Waterways
37. Recent enemy incursions on the Bolovens
Plateau and raids against several Cambodian river
towns on the Me Kong and the Se Kong suggest that
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the Communists are attempting.to secure an alternate
north-south supply channel to their beleaguered
Cambodian base areas using these water routes.
38. About 601miles south of Tchepone near Ban
Bac the Se Kong meets the Ho Chi Minh Trail and
begins its 200-mile course toward the Me Kong well
within the Cambodian border. The river is navigable
only by pirogues and similar small waterborne
logistical craft for the first 50 miles south of
Ban Bac. It winds through a mountainous area con-
taining three short segments where portage is
.necessary. The enemy for years has used this seg-
ment of the Se Kong to free-float supplies down-
stream to transshipment points where the goods are
reloaded on trucks for further southward movement.
The remaining course of the Se Kong to the Cambodian
border is a clear channel through the year and is
navigable by craft drawing two and one-half feet.*
39. if the Communists are able to extend their
control to the Me Kong River, they would have access
'to a relatively safe, year-round water route ex-
tending from north of the Bolovens Plateau in Laos
to within 50 miles of Phnom Penh. Lateral roads
and several navigable waterways extending eastward
from the river could be used for relatively rapid
motorized shuttling of supplies into existing base
areas near the South Vietnamese border or new base
areas further inside Cambodia.
Trail System South of Tri-Border
40. In addition to the water routes the enemy
could continue to use the extensive trail network
south of the tri--border area. Portering of supplies
on these trails would pose no serious problems
during the wet season as was demonstrated by the
high rate of personnel infiltration through the
trail system during the summer of 1968. If, how-
ever, Allied sweeping actions become intensive,
the enemy would seek alternative routes. A shift
of portering operations westward beyond the range
of Allied activities would be unlikely, particu-
larly between Base Areas 701 and 740, because of
* At high water this stretch of the river is
navigable to craft drawing up to four feet of water.
.During the wet season months, boat traffic is little
affected by the increased flow of water and flood
conditions.
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the low marshy terrain and the lack of connecting
high ground. Therefore, the enemy might choose
under this situation to increase reliance on the
Se,Kong - Me Kong water route.
Availability of Supplies in the-Laotian Panhandle
41. We believe that the enemy maintains in the
aotian Panhandle large strategic and campaign
stockpiles of food, POL, and arms and ammunition
which could be immediately drawn upon to replenish
Cambodian losses. in this connection, the largest
category of ammunition losses in Cambodia --
50-caliber and above -- is stocked in the Panhandle
in substantial quantities.* While it is impossible
to say.with certainty how long such a resupply
operation would take under present conditions,
transfers within the Laotian Panhandle might be
accomplished in a week or two and the portering
operations (or waterway transport) within Cambodia
might add an additional two to four weeks, depending
on ultimate destinations and uncertainties asso-
ciated with Allied military action.
42. In summary, the North Vietnamese probably
could replenish much of their arms and ammunition
losses to date from existing stockpiles in the
central and southern Panhandle within a few months.
However, in the weeks ahead, should Allied forces
capture rockets, mortar rounds, and small arms
ammunition on the order of magnitude of current
losses of antiaircraft ammunition or substantially
increase the number of weapons captured, the
logistics task would be considerably increased.
The importance to the enemy of losses in Cambodia
should be reflected in the nature, intensity, and
duration of logistic operations noted in the
Panhandle over the next several weeks.
Effect on Enemy Operations in South Vietnam
43. Recent Communist supply losses and the
presence of Allied forces in Cambodia will force
the Communists to reconsider their strategy in
South Vietnam. The enemy forces, especially in
III Corps, are undoubtedly off balance and some
tactical adjustments will be necessary as local
shortages appear. Furthermore, the conflict in
This category accounts for 50% of antiaircraft
firings in the Panhandle.
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Cambodia may inhibit enemy actions in South Viet-
nam as the enemy attempts to redistribute sup-
plies and hoard manpower in the face of the new
Allied initiatives. However, we believe that the
enemy's stockpiles of arms and ammunition already
positioned in South ~ 'Vietnam are largely intact
and that the Communists retain the logistical
capability to undertake stepped-up combat inter-
mittently if they are willing to accept the high
casualties that attend increased aggressiveness
on their part. At the\same time, the enemy has a
capability to set up a renewed logistics flow
through Laos, or could draw down stockpiles in that
country, so that within a few months he will have
made measurable progress in rebuilding his stocks
in Cambodia. The degree of success in carrying
out this resupply operation would in large measure
depend on the extent to which Allied forces con-
tinue to maintain a ground presence in Cambodia.
We believe that the.threat of,casualties rather
than supply shortages will continue to be the
main deterrent of enemy operations in South Vietnam.
44. This estimate assumes that the enemy will
choose militarily to continue to maintain roughly
the strategic posture of the past year -- sustained
lulls punctuated by high points involving numerous
shellings, sapper attacks, and limited ground
probes by small enemy units. The logistic require-
ments for such actions are relatively small -- well
below the level of support the enemy would need for
large-scale sustained offensive operations such as
were mounted during TET 1968. In any case what
limited and temporary effects on enemy plans the
Cambodian supply losses may occasion, they will
impinge mainly on the enemy's posture in III and
IV Corps. It seems unlikely that I Corps, which
has seen some of the heaviest fighting, and II Corps
would be affected; the rear-base supply sources for
these areas are in Laos or in the mountainous and
isolated northeastern part of Cambodia where supply
activities have presumably been relatively undis-
rupted by the present Allied operations.
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SummarZ
45. During the `first 17 days of operations in
Cambodia, US and GVI,forces have captured more than
5,500 tons of supplies,. This tonnage represents
substantial losses to the enemy and includes some
strategic reserves with which the enemy backstops
its major war strategy it South. Vietnam. The enemy's
stockpiles, just prior to the Allied moves, are
calculated to be at least 9,000 to 15,000 tons and
may well be greater.
46. Food (principally rice) represents the
largest single category of supply losses w- nearly
two-thirds-of the total. The 3,300 tons captured
to date represents from 30% to 50% of the enemy's
estimated food caches and represents about a 5-
months' requirement of Cambodian rice for the enemy
forces in.southern South Vietnam. The second
largest tonnage captured is ammunition. The
2,150 tons are equivalent to more than a year's
resupply requirements and exceed the total animuni--
tion lost to Allied ground action-in South Vietnam
in all of 1969.
47. A disproportionately large amount of the
ammunition captured in Cambodia -- over 60% --
consists of 50-caliber or larger ammunition, used
in South Vietnam largely for antiaircraft purposes.
This suggests both the magnitude of the enemy's
reserves in Cambodia and also the strong possibility
that significant caches of other types of ammuni-
tion have. yet to be uncovered. The very small
tonnage of captured weapons and equipment --
75 tons -- does not represent a significant loss
to the enemy. More than five times that amount
was captured in South Vietnam in 1969.
48. It must be emphasized that the supply.loss
figures are changing rapidly from day to day.
Their full impact cannot be gauged until the Allied
operations are completed. Initially, it appears
that the Allied actions have inflicted a sharp
blow to the enemy's logistical system in Cambodia
and undoubtedly have placed a ceiling on the types
of offensive activities he will be able to under-
take in the near future. However, there are several
factors which will operate in the enemy's favor.
The Communists maintain large amounts of stocks
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w
within Southh\Vietnam which should be adequate for
the time being to support military activities at.
current relatively low levels and even permit an
occasional high,point. There are large stock-
piles -- particularly of large-caliber ammunition in the Laotian Panhandle which can be transferred
southward in a matter of weeks. The Communists
.losses of foodstuffs, although substantial, are not
critical. Bumper harvests in both Cambodia and
South Vietnam should provide ready sources for
replacing losses. In fact, the enemy probably now
has access to larger quantities. of Cambodian rice
as a result of his expanded offensive actions than
before the Allied border incursions commenced.
49. The Communists have already begun to make
adjustments in their logistics effort in response
to the Cambodian developments. They now intend
to keep the logistics system in the Laotian Panhandle
operative during the current rainy season. Further-
more, there are signs that the enemy intends to
make more extensive use of the river system in
southern Laos and northeastern. Cambodia. The
augmentation of supply flows southward will be
difficult but by no means impossible. The magni-
tude of the task for the enemy will be determined
by the final tally of supply losses and the extent
to which the Allied forces continue to maintain a
ground presence in Cambodia sufficient to prevent
the stockpiles from being reconstituted.
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Cumulative Results of US and ARVN Operations
in Cambodia
(as of 17 May, 2000 Hours EDT)
Parrot's
Cuu
Long I
Cuu
Long II
Terminated
Opera-
Supply Item
Beak a/ Fishhook
702
701
351
350
704/709
704
tions h/
Total
Individual weapons
1,037
3,958
803
109
898
216
712
86.
1,290
9,109 c/
Crew-served weapons
255
519
23
18
86
29
112
7
184
1,233 c/
Rice (tons)
635
1,704
599
37
95
29
15
0
191
3,305
Vehicles
8
170
3
0
19
.1
7
0
3
211
Ammunition (tons)
327
267
7
6
1,479
12
23
d/
31
2,152
a. Totals for Rock Crusher IV previously reported in this column now appear in the Terminated
Operations column.
b. Operation Rock Crusher IV and Operation TIA CHOP (BA 354).
C. Represents the Loss of about 75 tons of arms.
d. None reported.
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VCINVA Base Areas Along Cambodian Bortiier .
`Snoul._
Mimot i'cNihh
..'352
3!i3?
Fish _loak Area
,TaiNinh
~_-AMY Yung Tau
Svay iq:j
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707
706,
367 "*snson
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Enemy Supply Losses In Cambodia
(Revis ed)
Secret
ER IM 70-70
May
Copy No.
T ! uilul u
34
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
May 1970
SUBJECT: Note To Holders Of CIA Intelligence
Memorandum, ER IM 70-70, En, emu
Supply Losses in Cambodia,
May 1970
1. In our recent preliminary analysis of
VC/NVA supply losses in Cambodia we noted that a
seemingly excessive share of the enemy ammunition
losses consisted of rounds of 50-caliber and
larger. The latest available data from MACV
revises downward greatly the take of this category
.of ammunition -- from 7.8 million rounds to
.2.6 million rounds.* This revision and other
minor adjustments in field reporting reduce the
total weight of ammunition (Class V) captured in
Cambodia from the 2,152 short tons given in our
report to 1,182 tons.
2. The data used in our initial report had
suggested that between 95% and 160% of the Com-
munist's estimated stockpiles of ammunition had
been destroyed. Such high. shares of losses to
stockpiles raised the possibility that our stock-
pile estimates were understated because a large
share of total enemy ammunition losses consisted
of 51-caliber ammunition alone. The revised data
indicate that enemy ammunition losses amount to
between 52% and 88% of our estimate of enemy
stockpiles of ammunition in Cambodia at the start
of Allied operations. The mix of the ammunition
captured to date is now much more consistent with
our understanding of the weapons assigned to a
typical VC or NVA Main Force battalion.
'~ YT he reason for the major reporting error from
the field is not fully understood. One report has
it that "cans" of 51-caliber ammunition were mis-
trans Zated as "cases."
No Foreign Dissem
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3. The new data revise several other comparisons
made in the report. Instead of exceeding the total
ammunition losses in South Vietnam during 1969, the
Cambodian losses are now equivalent to about 72% of
enemy ammunition losses in South Vietnam last year.
They represent the equivalent of 154 days of re-
supply requirements for the enemy forces in lower
.II, III, and IV Corps. The revised data also show
that the enemy's ammunition losses in Cambodia
are less than half -- 46% -- the losses the Com-
munists suffered in northern Laos last year.
4. Our conclusion that supply losses in Cam-
bodia have inflicted a sharp blow to the enemy's
logistical system in Cambodia still stands. The
impact should not be overstated, however, because
the enemy retains intact stockpiles in Laos and
South Vietnam and has the capability to mount a
major resupply effort to rebuild the captured
stockpiles.
5. The tabulations on pages 3 and 4 are revi-
sions and updates through 21 May (2000 hours) of
the tabulations appearing in paragraphs 10 and
25 of our initial memorandum.
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Class of
Supply
Food
Weapons
and equip-
ment
Ammunition
Total .
w
Estimated
Enemy
Enemy
Losses
in
Losses as a
Percent of
-Stockpiles
Cambodia Estimated
in Cambodia
30 Apr --
Enemy
Apr 1970
21 May St
ockpiles
6,200
- 10,370
' 3,890
38.
- 63
1,600
- 2,700
90
3
- 6
1,350
- 2,255
1,182
52
88
9,150
- 15,330
a. The range in the estimates reflects the
uncertainty about the size of the enemy's
strategic stockpiles in Cambodia,
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Cambodia `-"
Northern Laos
(About Face)
Weapons
individual
Crew-served
Ratio of individual
10,253
1,566
4,485
616
to crew-served
Ammunition
R
ound
s
Small arms
4,717,436
1,847,000
50-caliber and larger
2,587,074
220,200
Grenades
8,942
14,000
Antiaircraft rounds
126,972
86,000
Mortar rounds
Rockets
21,304
143,000
Small 11,964
18,000
Large 1,.056
8,000
Re
coilless rifle 16,827
N.A.
Mi
nes 2,061
N.A.
a.
Through 21 May.
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 "!?A C Tr [T nr-nino-mor
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
SUBJECT: Impact on the Enemy of Ammunition Losses in Cambodia (U)
This memorandum is in response to General Haig's request for an estimate
of the impact on the enemy of the capture of ammunition in'Cambodia and any
other related information.
It is still too early to measure with confidence the impact of the
Cambodian operations on the enemy. The real value of the operation will
only be apparent months from now when we see how it has spurred Vietnamiza-
tion; enabled us to accelerate troop redeployments; reduced U.S. combat
casualties; and provided incentives for productive negotiations. Also the
data are uncertain and any conclusions are subject to a variety of factors
which cannot be quantified.
To determine the real impact of the capture of equipment and supplies
we would need to know the size of the stocks of the VC/NVA forces in Cambodia,
Southern Laos, and South Vietnam. Also we need good estimates of the time it
will take the North Vietnamese to move'replacement supplies down through Laos
into Cambodia and South Vietnam. Our data on the size of VC/NVA stocks is
'speculative at best and our knowledge of the NVN logistics system in Laos
is incomplete. Nevertheless, we are able to make some tentative assessments.
v. Food Supplies Rice is by far the largest component of the captured
material, but the impact on the VC/NVA is likely to be transitory. Some
3,305 tons of rice had been found as of May 18. MACV estimates that amount
of rice would feed 12,070 soldiers for a year or 101 VC/NVA battalions (the
enemy strength in III and IV Corps) for 249 days. Unfortunately, this rice
may not be difficult to replace. Cambodia is a heavy producer of rice and
the crop this past year was unusually large, totaling about one million tons.
CIA estimates that approximately 80,000 tons of rice were produced in the four
eastern Cambodian provinces now largely controlled by NVA. Because of the
disruption of roads and waterways and dislocation of normal market patterns,
much of this rice will be available for the VC/NVA to confiscate or purchase
(the captured rice would be worth about $1 million at official exchange rates).
Thus, they will probably be able to replace the rice stocks captured fairly
quickly.
Ammunition Our forces have captured very substantial amounts of ammuni-
tion and this could have a significant impact on VC/NVA military capabilities.
To estimate the impact of capture of enemy ammunition stocks, we compared
DOWNGRA,DS) A.T 3 Y:1 :dTZ p ~........ Pages
DFCI~.ASSIA TED _.:_, 12 Y :a:Rs. SENSITIVE .__
}O.D 51.E
~ F SECRETARY OF' ENSE
SHINGTO[~,% o
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reported captured munitions with estimates of VC/NVA requirements in South
Vietnam in order to determine how many "days of supply" our forces have
captured. It is important that we avoid misinterpreting this data. The
real impact of the capture of this ammunition depends on the size of VC/NVA
stocks in Southern Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. The smaller their
"safety level" the more they will be hurt by our operations. The larger
their "safety level," the less they will be hurt.
The first approach compares gross tonnages of ammunition captured with
estimates of enemy daily requirements.l/ The VC/NVA forces in SVN consume,
or lose to allied actions in SVN, about 15-20 tons of ammunition per day.
Thus, the 1,866 tons captured equates to about 90-125 days of consumption.
If you exclude the forces in I Corps who are supplied directly from Laos,
the impact rises to 135-185 days.
The second approach uses DIA/MACV detailed estimates of the average
expenditures (in number of rounds) of basic types of ammunition. These
estimates, based on 1969 experience, are very rough and must be used accord-
ingly. The table below lists the major ammunition types, amounts captured
and the computed impact in terms of days of consumption.
IMPLICATIONS OF VC/NVA AMMUNITION LOSSES IN CAMBODIA
Rate of Expenditure 1/
Ammunition Captured
(Daily Average Rounds)
Total No.
Rounds b/
No. Supply
Trays
Small Arms
68,500
3,690,276
54
Machine Gun
n.a.
7,812,464
-
Anti-Aircra
ft
n.a.
159,047
-
Mortar Roun
ds
295
38,879
132
.Recoilless
Rifle Rounds
14
14,296
1,021
Mines
n.a.
1,865
-
Grenades
n.a.
6,922
--
a/ Based on 1969 expenditure rates.
b/ As of May 18 .
Note: n.a. = not available.
1/ VC/NVA requirements are subject to wide variations depending on levels
of enemy activity and success of allied ope-:-ations in destroying stocks.
For example in 1969, the DIA estimates that VC/NVA ammunition requirements
(expended plus captured and interdicted) range from 22 tons per day in
the first quarter to 8 tons in the fourth quarter. Moreover DIA and CIA
estimates vary. We used 15-20 tons per day which is the DIA 1969 average
range and is more conservative than the CIA estimates.
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Rockets General Haig's memorandum asked specifically about the rockets
captured in Cambodia and the possible impact on enemy attacks by fire. Dur-
ing the first three months of 1970, the VC/NVA forces are estimated to have
expended an average of 190 rounds of Rocket/Mortar/Recoilless Rifle rounds
per day., The number of rounds of this type ammunition captured (68,938)
represents about one year of supply. They also expended an estimated 17
rounds of large rocket (107mm, 122mm, 150mm) a day. About 870 rounds of
this type of ammunition have been captured representing about 50 days supply.
Again, the impact on their operations depends on their stockpiles.
Weapons The 9,109 individual weapons would equip about 45 current
strength VC/NVA infantry battalions or about 45% of the current number of
enemy units in II and III Corps. In addition over 1,200 crew served weapons
have been captured.
Estimated Supply Stockpiles To judge the real impact of our Cambodian
operations we need an approximate estimate of the VC/NVA stocks in South
Vietnam and adjacent areas. The table below summarizes my staff's efforts
to develop an estimate of stock levels of ammunition and equipment. First,
they estimated the amounts that have come in by ship through Sihanoukville
adding to it the amounts estimated to have been moved into Laos from NVN
during the past two dry seasons. They subtracted amounts claimed to have
been destroyed by air strikes or consumed in-Laos. Finally, they subtracted
estimated consumption in.SVN (including the caches our forces discovered).
This gave them an estimate of possible VC/NVA stocks of ammunition and equip-
ment in South Vietnam which ranged from 12,000 to 30,000 tons. If these
estimates are roughly right, the supplies captured in Cambodia would amount
to 5-15% of total.stocks. However, the remaining supplies would be enough
to meet VC/NVA needs for 1-1/2 to 4 years. While these stockpiles seem
extremely large, recent studies of VC/NVA logistics practices indicate they
attempt to maintain large reserves -- often in excess of one year. Therefore
it is not inconceivable that they have stockpiles of this magnitude.
ENEMY AMMUNITION AND EQUIPMENT STOCKPILES
CAMBODIA, SOUTHERN LAOS, AND SOUTH VIETNAM
(October 1968 - March 1970)
Supply Inputs Ammunitions and Arms (Tons)
To Southern Laos from NVN a/ 57,300
To VC/NVA via Sihanoukville 3,200
60,500
Less
Losses to Air Strikes in Southern Laos b/ .14,300 to 32,300
Consumed in Southern Laos 5,400
Consumed or Captured in SVN 10,800
30,500 to 48,500
Net Available for Stockpiling
(Cambodia, Southern Laos, SVN)
12,000 to 30,000
a/ 52% of total shipments are estimated to be arms and ammunition. (Compo-
sition based on all-source intelligence.)
Source: CIA estimates show 25% of inputs from NVN destroyed; USAF
estimates show 56%.
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1VN's ability to Rebuild their Stockpile The other key consideration
is the time it will take the North Vietnamese to rebuild their stocks in
South
rn Laos and Cambodia.
e
Sensors placed along the roads into SVN indicate during the dry season
just ending (November-April) the North Vietnamese shipped over 100 tons per
day (primarily ammunition and other military supplies) into SVN from NVN via
Laos In addition, the enemy supply system has substantial additional
capability -- for instance, during peak weeks in February 1970 over 280 tons
per day moved into SVN via Laos. Although the NVN logistics system in Laos
essentially ceased operating last wet season, recent-intelligence indicates
Laotian supply flows will-continue during the upcoming wet season -- using
all weather routes and rivers. While the rains will degrade the logistic
system, it is likely,NVN will be able to continue to move substantial supply
tonnage through Laos. At a shipment rate of 25 tons per day North Vietnam
could replace the Cambodian ammunition and equipment losses in about 75 days.
Getting the supplies repositioned in the base areas after transiting
the Laotian corridor will take additional time. There is some evidence that
the enemy may be attempting to secure a river route from the lower Laotian
Panhandle to Kratie (Cambodia) on the Mekong River, which is reasonably close
to the Cambodian base camps along the SVN border. If this route can be used,
travel time from Southern Laos will be shortened. Also, there are some.
unconfirmed reports that the enemy has captured large stocks of Cambodian
Army supplies.
This does not mean that the losses of supplies will not affect the VC/NVA.
Even after U.S. troops withdraw from Cambodia, the RVNAF threat to Cambodian
base areas will remain, and the North Vietnamese may have to change their
system of infiltrating into III and IV Corps or at least relocate deeper
into, Cambodian territory. Even then supplies will have to be dispersed.
Perhaps most importantly, the VC/NVA can no longer mass with impunity for'
attacks on SVN outposts and cities.
Summ
It is important that we view the impact of the Cambodian operations
within the perspective of longer term results. Since the enemy has manpower
reserves and can replenish stocks, the numbers of enemy killed or weapons
and ammunition captured are only important in terms of our objectives of
entering Cambodia in the first place, which were: (1) to permit the U.S. to
continue or accelerate U.S. troop withdrawals, (2) to continue the Vietnami-
zation program successfully, (3) to reduce friendly casualties, and (4) to
stimulate meaningful negotiations.
Preliminary reports indicate that the morale of the RVNAF units has
greatly improved. There are potential major benefits to be derived from
this development in terms of long term U.S. and RVN goals. But there are
potential negative aspects as well. The RVNAF successes in Cambodia may
reinforce their penchant for large operations, for example, and have a
deleterious effect on pacification and security. In any event, it is
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important that in assessing the success of 'the Cambodian operations, we do
not succumb to the temptation of concentrating on day-to-day results and
thereby lose sight of our strategic objectives.
I again emphasize this assessment must be considered preliminary. We
are continuing our appraisal of the Cambodian campaign and will provide you
with additional analyses as the situation clarifies.
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/09/08: LOC-HAK-553-6-6-5