THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-557-5-2-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 4, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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DCI BRIEFING FOR ?
4 March NSC MEETING
THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT
I. Mr. President, since I last reported to the
National Security Council about North Korea on
August 14, the principal change in the infor-
mation available to us has been confirmation
that North Korea in the course of 1969 has re-
trenched substantially in its unconventional
warfare threat.
A. I believe it would be more useful to begin
this briefing, however, with a summary of
the conventional military threat posed by
North Korea, and then to discuss the
scope of the Communists' unconventional*
warfare, and the ability of the South
Koreans to deal with it.
North Korean Military
II. Premier Kim Il-song is proud of his armed for-
ces, and has spared no effort to achieve his
publicly announced intention "to convert the
whole country into a military fortress."
A. He does have an impressive military estab-
lishment, and appears determined to keep on
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improving it. The air force and navy re-
ceived a substantial amount of modern equip-
ment from the Soviet Union between 1966 and 1968,
but with few exceptions the ground forces are
generally using Soviet-designed weapons of the
early Fifties.
III. These ground forces total about 25 infantry divisions
or division equivalents. Fourteen of these divi-
sions--about 130,000 men--remain deployed in strong
defensive positions facing the Demilitarized Zone:
There are a few other forces along each coast.
A. Recent information indicates that North Korea
iscnow making some reductions ii the size of
its ground forces, which we estimated at 350,000
last August.
B. The ROK forces, totaling 567,000, have more
total manpower, even with 56,000 men currently
in Vietnam.
C. We believe that the North Koreans would have
trouble mounting sustained offensive opera-
tions because of a shortage of vehicles,
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ground support equipment, and fuel.
A. North Korea now has about 500 tactical air-
craft. Some 425 of these are jet fighters,
but 75 or so are used mainly for training or
reconnaissance. On the other hand, more tha7
85 are MIG-21s, most of which have been de-
livered by the Soviet Union since late 1967.
The great majority of North Korea's fighter t
craft--about 340--are stillthe older, sub-
sonic MIG 17s and 15s. These, in addition
to being the primary ground attack fighters,
would also have to be used for most of tho
fighter air defense work.
B. The remainder of the North Korean inventory
of tactical aircraft consists of some 70 to
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80 IL-28 jet light bombers, which give the
North an offensive capability, that the South
Koreans cannot match.
C. Pyongyang has continued to train the crews of
its 16 to 18 SA-2 surface-to-!air missile bat-
talions. The North Koreans now have about
as many alternate sites as occupied ones.
V. The North Korean Navy has 14 guided-missile pa-
trol boats and 4 "W" class submarines, but is
still mainly a coastal defense force,
A. There is also an assortment of patrol escorts,
torpedo boats, and motor gunboats.
VI. This military establishment represents a signif-
icant proportion of the country's economic ef-
fort, and has been a major factor in its poor
economic performance by comparison with South
Korea. The percent of GNP devoted to the mili-
tary continues to be one of the highest--if not
the highest--of any country in the world.
A. We still estimate that about 20 percent of
all able-eodied males between 15 and 42 years
of age are in uniform, adding-to the already
acute labor shortage.
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VII. In spite of this impressive military establish-
ment, we cohtlhae 1:6
believe
that under?present circumstances, North Korea
does not intend to invade South Korea, nor is
it deliberately trying to provoke South Korea
or the United States into a resumption of major
hostilities.
A. Moreover, although we estimate that North
Korean forces could defend the country against
a South Korean attack, they would need con-
siderable outside support to mount sustained
offensive operations.
does mot a
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VIII. It likely that either the USSR or Communist
China would provide encouragement and support
for a North Korean attack.
rA. If hostilities were initiate4-1--howavex-7--ann--
China felt eenvell-e-d--te---e-r-vene--ipt?ele-f-e-nee-
in Korea
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B.
4;e1a-1413-4.3-4ax'---3eployment of forces ?
tending over several months.
_
Unconventional Warfare
IX. North Korea in 1966 had embarked on a campaign
of armed harassment and terrorism against the
South described as a "revolutionary struggle,"
which was to pave the way for reunification of
Korea.
A. The Communists spoke of their campaign in
terms usually applied to classic guerrilla
warfare, although they had no potential for
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such a war in the South, and encountered
total failure in their efforts to develop
one.
B. In the absence of a sympathetic environment--
in the words of Mao Tse-tung's aphorism "the
"water" in which their guerrilla "fish" could
swim--the North Koreans had to rely instead
on DMZ incidents and ambushes, sabotage, in-
filtration, and an occasional large-scale
raid with troops specially trained for uncon-
ventional warfare.
C. Their objectives were threefold:
1.. In South Korea, they wanted to disrupt
. public order, destroy confidence in the
gOVerliment, force the diversion of men
and resources from the growing civilian
economy, and generate friction between
Seoul and Washington.
2. The purpose in North Korea itself was
to stir the people to greater contribu-
tions to the economy, and to solidify
Kim Il-song's political position.
3. As regards. the United States, the pres-
sure of unconventional warfare was
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supposed to add to the dissatisfaction
over military commitments in Asia, and
ultimately to bring about a reduction
of American commitment and support.
X. These North Korean objectives undoubtedly are
still valid, and the policy of "revolutionary
struggle" persists, but in the course of 1969
the Communists--still unable to find a "revolution"
in the South-'-virtually suspended their previous
efforts to implant one from the North by violence.
A.
The North Korean regime drastically changed
the tactics of its subversion program, if
not the strategy. The calculated use of
steady paramilitary pressure, a key element
in the ?subversion program from 1966 through
1968, has been absent since the beginning of
1969.
1. North Korean military harassment along
the Demilitarized Zone last year was at
the lowest level since 1966. Only 98
incidents were recorded, compared with
542 in 1968 and 445 in 1967.
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2. In the interior of South Korea, only 36
incidents were recorded, compared with
219 in 1968.
3. The type of activity also changed radi-
cally, with North Korean agents direct-
ing their activity primarily at recruit-
ment, propaganda, and intelligence col-
lection.
? -Januar-y-19-6-8-i and the inf iltrat ?
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took
South
C.
no missions
in the interior of
Korea in 1969,
It sees most likely that Premier K'm Il-song
judged t at the unsuccessful viola t opera-
tions of tie preceding year were not helping
to achieve h a goal of unific ion of the
Korean penins a.
1. Kim apparen y had b 1 eyed that North
Korean infilt tors ould brew rebellion
in the villages of the Southe and create
a revolutionary -1 osphere which the
South Korean
2. Instead, the
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addition, North Korean brinks
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XI.
forocz and withdraw from Korc!1]
D. Although it is clear that Kim Il-song has
not renounced the use of force in his grand
strategy for unifications the changes of the
subversion program in 1969 suggest that,
under present conditions, violence will be
a minor element.
1. Pyongyang's diplomats axe working hard,
particularly in Africa and Asia, to
erode the two-to-one edge in internal-
tional acceptance presently held by
South Korea.
2. These efforts emphasize the "Korean-ness"
of the northern regime and its "legiti-
mate" national desire for a united coun-
try, a desire frustrated only by the
a
presence of the U.S. occupation force
in the South.
The attainment of Kim Il-song's goals in the
foreseeable fature will continue to depend much
more on international developments than on his
own plans and efforts.
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A. Kim seems to understand this, and is stick-
ing to capitalizing on any favorable turn
of events. He is not now trying to follow
a deliberate timetable.
B. We cannot tell how long the present low-
keyed program will continue, but the tacti-
cal change in 1969 is a good reminder that
Kim is a calculating gambler, well aware of
the necessity for changing tactics when the
returns are low or the risks too high.
South Korean Counterinsurgency
XII. The South Korean Government now is better pre-
pared to respond to North Korean subversion than
at any other time in its history. A comprehen-
sive counter-infiltration system has been.devel-
aped, implemented, and successfully tested.
A. At the national level, there is a cabinet-
level coordinating committee chaired by the
Prime Minister.
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D. A major factor in the success of the counter-
insurgency structure is the widespread dis-
like of the Kim Il-song regime among South
Korean adults, who have bitter memories of
the Korean War.
1. In addition there are broad anti-Commu-
nist laws rigidly enforced. Liberal
cash rewards are given to those who as-
sist the authorities.
2. Whatever the motive, over the past three
years, South Koreans seem generally to
have informed the authorities following
contacts with infiltrators.
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