MEETING ON THAILAND -- JULY 1, 1969

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-105-2-1-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/10: LOC-HAK-105-2-1-1
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
Subject: Meeting on Thailand -w July 1, 1969
Participants: Kenneth T. Young, The Asia Society,
New York
-. Lauriston Sharp, Cornell University,
New York
CIA,. OCI Thai Analyst
Henry A. ssinger
John H. Holdridge
William A. Lake Dos Review Completed.
I. RgSionsand Minorities
Sharp noted that one of the government's main problems
is to unite ;the country's four regions without suppressing
ahem. He described the Northeast as containing the "country
Thais." The language there is much like that of across the
river in Laos, but the populace identifies politically with
Bangkok..
Young noted the dangers of over-reaction by the Thai
Government to the insurgency in the Northeast. He feared
that 'a heavy-handed military reaction would alienate the
people from the government(as'happened in the north last
year). The participants agreed that while the insurgency
fed on internal:: roblems it would collapse without external
support. when the Thai military moved
into northeastern villages in 1967, the local apparats
collapsed.
There was general agreement that the insurgency in
the Northeast is under fairly good control; the insurgency
in the north, however, is having more success.
The various minorities in Thailand were listed as:
-- 540OOO.Cambodians along the border;
M several million Malays on the,southern border;
~- a quarter of a million hill tribesmen;
3 million Chinese, who are concentrated primarily
in the southern cities.
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2-
The Chinese are well assimilated, at least by South-
east Asian standards. There is not too much tension,
although some government officials were reportedly con-
cerned about a spill-over to Thailand of the communal
fighting in Malaysia.
.'here are many Chinese in the'Communist Party hierarchy.
Sharp emphasized the need for the Thai Government to
.adopt an effective minorities policy, particularly with
regard.to the hill tribes. The government should train
people to deal with the minorities. As an example of the
unenlightened actions of the government towards the minori-
ties, Sharp said that Cambodian children are required to
speak Thai, in 'the early grades of school instead of being
.allowed to lean the language there.. As a result, many
drop out.
2. Central Society
.Thai society centers on Bangkok. The farther you are
from that city, the farther you are from authority. There
has traditionally been no concept of the territorial state.
Thailand had zonal borders--it extended as far as the
authority and ability to raise taxes of Bangkok extended.
3. Prey
The two prestige jobs are government service and the
monkhood. Government service--which includes most.teachers--
has high status because of. the power it provides and, more
importantly, because a government servant is in the King's
hierarchy. In fact, it is seen as service to the King
rather than to the State.
4. Personalities
T'hi:e:, Young said that the King is hard to judge
at first meeting. He tends to 10-20 minute monologues.
He speaks perfect English. He sometimes sounds surprisingly
cynical, an attitude caused by doubts about his own political
role. Until the late 1950's when he had worked out a
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mutually advantageous collaboration with Sarit, the King
had lacked confidence and had often feared for his life.
The King is very important to the people of Thailand
,--young as well as old. He is held in an almost magical
awe.
Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn: Thanom is rQ imus
inter Pares, a figure of conciliation.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Thanat Khoman: 'Thanat is'
very powerrful. in foreign policy, but doesn't cut much ice
outside it. He may be. on the way out, as he has applied
fora seat on the ICJ. Thanat has discussed the possibility
of an opening to China during the past year on various
occasions--both in cabinet meetings and publicly. He is
not, however, anti-American.
5. Effect of Vietnam Outcomes on Thailand
There 'vas some inconclusive argument over whether the
Thais would seek an accommodation with China should Vietnam
be united under the Communists. There was agreement,
however, that key factors would be North Vietnamese actions
in Laos and Northeast Thailand, Chinese actions, and--a
matter of great concern to the Thais--the kind and level
of US.,support. Holdridge observed that this is perhaps
the key factor to the Thais in the Vietnam situation--they
are more concerned with how we perform than what the actual
result is.
of the budget is spent on all security activities. Great
amounts are spent on education.
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Only 22 to 25 percent
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6. President's Visit
The group agreed that what the Thais want most from
the visit is another reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment
.toThailand. They need constant reassurance. The impor-
tance the,Thai placed on Secretary Rogers' reaffirmation
of theRusk-Thanat communique was noted.
Young suggested that the Thais will also be interested
,in the question of "retooling" the U.S. presence. Thanat
is particularly interested in this. They want a U.S.
commitment and U.S. help without a large,.visible U.S.
presence. Itwas agreed, however, that it would alarm
the Thais if we raised the subject of reducing the U.S.
presence there. Young suggested that we approach the sub-
ject through questions, asking the Prime Minister about
the impact of U.S. troops in Thailand and what we should
do about it. doubted that we should raise it
even in queston form; we should let them bring it up.
the Thais will also wish to dis-
cuss the situation in Laos. They want the U.S. to commit
itself to-fight in Laos to hold the Mekong Valley. They
will also, he said, press for more military and economic
assistance,
There was agreement that the Thais would wish to
discuss Vietnam and will hope that we say that we will
stick it out. The Thais support Vietnamization and
react badly to the word "coalition," partially because of
their dislike of the Laos experience.
The group. agreed with Kissinger's suggestion that
the Thais would be interested in discussing the future
of the region. Young reported that the Thais he had met
recently had often raised the President's Foreign Affairs
-article on.the subject.
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