THAI FOREIGN MINISTER THANAT CRITICIZES U.S.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-12-3-8-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 26, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-12-3-8-6
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Henry;
State had not invited the King of Thailand
to the U. S. as the President had suggested
but had instead sent a memo to us outlining
their plans to do so.
In the interim the President saw Ambassador
Kennedy prior to his trip to the Far East.
He suggested that the Ambassador enlarge
his itinerary to include Bangkok. In dcTing so,
he asked the Ambassador to be sure that the
Thais knew that the King was being invited
to visit the United States.
As a result of this action, I notified State
as did Kennedy and he departed with the
intent of inviting. the King. In the interim
State is flashing Unger so that he is aware
that an invitation is to be extended.
Jeanne Davis is preparing a memo for the
President informing him that the King is
L.-CG~'ry! _-
being invited c n it lz %' P. /E P T7
lX
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-12-3-8-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-12-3-8-6
MEMORANDUM W W
THE WHITE HOUSE 25639
SECRET
WAS 1-1 INGTON
INFORMATION
February 26, 1971
THE FiiTSID JN HAS SEEN...
MEMORANDUM FOR: HE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: Thai Foreign. Minister Thanat Criticizes
U.S.
You may be interested in Ambassador Unger' E; report of three conversations
between Foreign Minister Thanat and the British Ambassador. The main
points follow:
Thanat criticized the Americans for continuing to engage in the sterile
Paris discussions, sticking on the two points of mutual withdrawal of
forces and continuity of the Thieu-Ky Government. Thanat characterized
these as not really important points, mentioning that if Big Minh, for
whom he has no great respect, could nonetheless negotiate successfully
with the Communists, then this would be better than Thieu-Ky.
Thanat observed that the American military was sound and would like
to do the right thing but Congress would not permit this and in any case
America as a whole had lost its stomach for playing any kind of role in
Southeast Asia and only wanted to get out. Thanat paid homage to the
great efforts the U. S. had made previously, and granted that the U. S.
should be helped to find a way to withdraw without humiliation. Thanat
appeared to regard U. S. withdrawal as virtually total and inevitable.
In a discussion of what might be the basis for a settlement in Southeast
Asia, Thanat made clear that he realized this might not be achievable
without South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia coming under Communist
domination but that was something he was prepared to accept. Thailand
will not go Communist and will be able to hold its own. There was some
suggestion of a continuing role in the region by the U. S. to help Thailand.
Some kind of accommodation with Communist China would also be apart
of the pattern.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-12-3-8-6
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-12-3-8-6
SECRET
Unger notes indications earlier in January of Thanat's sour state of
mind and concludes that Thanat's remarks indicate he has moved
about 180 degrees on such matters as his lack of concern about what
.the Communists might be able to accomplish in Indochina and his in-
difference to the fate of the present Saigon Government.
Ambassador Unger concludes that Thanat was probably speaking for
himself, not the Thai Government, that Unger should take opportunities
to refute Thanat's views in the same indirect way he received them
(through other Ambassadors) and that we should not over-react to these
and other signs of Thai nervousness as they go about modifying and de-
intensifying their relations with us in the days ahead. 25X1
Comment
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/16: LOC-HAK-12-3-8-6