LETTER TO STUART SYMINGTON FROM RICHARD NIXON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-298-1-3-7
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 3, 1973
• Content Type: LETTER

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"I' I l l: \V i i i 'i' i? HOUSE,
August 3, 1973
May Contain Congressional
Material
This is in response to your request of July 5, 1973 that
copies of the National Security Council Intelligence Directives
which implement the National Security Act of 1947 with
respect to the Central Intelligence Agency be made available
to your Committee.
As CIA Director-designate William E. Colby has informed
you, he has been authorized to acquaint you with the contents
of these docurnent s and discuss with you any questions
concernixhg therm at your, convenience. I. am. confident you
will find that these directives do not in any way circumvent
n IT ..r ;ay Oct 01 1 or viU1LL'L- : Lll
' JJOl'Ua.fi3`l 71. ta1.C C;z1 CLlr y i
As I am sure you. will appreciate, these directives deal with
sensitive naa.tte:rs relati.r g to intelli.gc:nce affecting the
national secu:rit:y and i'nu.st be carefully protected.
Sincerely,
~'.1cii l:l'iablt: ?}:LiJ.ct: Sy'a1:17.t1}ton
(Jo.iY117~7.ia:(:c: on
D. G. 205)10
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MEMORANDUM ? 38319
THE WIIITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
July 30, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Senator Symington's Request for National
Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID's)
On July 5 Senator Symington wrote to you (Tab B) requesting that those
NSCID's relating to CIA operations be made available to the Senate
Committee on Armed Forces. He is interested in seeing if the NSCID's
circumvent or violate any portion of the National Security Act of 1947,
and if they provide authority for the CIA involvement in Laos. These
issues arose in William Colby's hearings.
I have authorized Colby to hand carry and show Symington the relevant
ymington probably will conclude that the NSCID's are con-
sistent with the 1947 Act, but do not clarify the source of the authority
for the CIA Laos operation;
Attached at Tab A is a letter for your signature responding to Symington's
request which confirms that Colby has been authorized to provide access
to the relevant NSCID's.
RECOMMENDATION
That you sign the letter at Tab A.
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'TIL; \VIT.IT i IIOUSI~?
3832
aEC,RrT July 21., 1973
MEMO FOR: ANDY MARSHALL
FROM I: BRENT S COW CROFT,%27
I understand Timmons' preference is that
the letter to Syixiin tan come from the
President so that he gets credit for this
action. HHIowever, I believe it is in the
Preside:nt's interest to keep the. response
below his level.. Therefore, I would appre-
ciate your revising the package to include a
draft so we, can give IIAK
the option of using the Presidential or
r,`
Atta chment
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
July is, 1973
MEMO FOR JON HOWE
JEANNE DAV1,
FROM. A. W. Marshall
SUTr-e.YFFCT Attached
Fred Fielding suggests that the Presi--
dential inemO be expanded so that the
President is aware that his letter will
not be totally responsive to Symington`s
inquiry.
We feel, however, that the Presidential
memo is adequate as it is.
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MEMORANDUM 11 3832evised
NATIONAL SECURITY COU
SECRET i I A- '_R9 ENT ACTION.
MEMORANDUM. FOR HENRY. A. KISSINGER
FROM: A. W. MARSHALL
SUBJECT: Symington Letter to the President Requesting .
Access to NSCID's
At Tab B is Symington's letter to the President requesting that he make
available to the Senate Armed Services Committee all National Security
Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID's) relevant to CIA operations.
At Tab C is Timmons' letter to Symington acknowledging receipt of the
letter and consigning action to you.
Per your conversation with Colby he will hand carry and show to
Symington the appropriate 1vSGID s. He has afire d.y ci i eci Sy117.111 LU11
and will go to see him as soon as Symington calls back and asks him to
come. I have asked that the DCl's office inform us as to which NSCID's
are shown to Symington.
Symington will find that the NSCID's:
Are fully consistent with the 1947 National Security Act.
-- Do not clearly provide specific authority for CIA
operations of the Laos type.
Therefore we should expect that Symington will continue to dig for the
basis of that involvement, which will be found in:
-- The basic legislation which authorizes CIA "to
perform such other functions and duties related to intelli-
gence affecting the national security as the National Security
Council may from time to time direct. "
-- The interpretation of this to include covert actions.
-- Specific Presidential and 40 Committee decisions.
SECRET - GDS
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There are two options:
-- A letter- from the President to Symington authorizing Colby to
sho-%, him the NSCID's.
A similar letter from Timmons to Symington.
I have talked to Bill Timmons. He preferred that the letter be signed by the
President, since the basic response to the request is positive and the Presi-
dent should get the credit. He is aware that Symington will not be entirely
satisfied by the release of the NSCID's about the basic issue, the authority
for the CIA Laos operation.
However it may be more prudent to keep the response below the President's
level. There is not much credit to be had by simply providing access to the
NSCLD's, and the basic issues now raised as to CIA covert operations
probably will be the subject of hearings this fall.
Appropriate memoranda and letters for each option are attached. At Tab I
is a memorandum from you the President that-
- Tells him that Colby will show the NSCID's to Symington.
Recommends that he sign the letter to Symington.
Lee Huebner and Fred Fielding have reviewed the President's letter at
Tab A and concur.
At T b II i me ndum from you to more
to n on. ttache it is t of an. appropriate letter.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
That you initial the memo/tie President at Tab I.
at Tab II.
SECRET
e spored
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S DART SYMINGTON, MO. STROM T URMON~
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH. JOHN TOWER, TEX.
JAM J. ERVIN, JR.. N.C. PETER H. DOMINICK, COLO.
HOWARD W. CANNON. NEV. HARRY GOLDWATER. ARIZ.
HHORAS J. MC INTYRE. N.H. . JR,, V WILLIAM U. SA%BE, OHIO Wnitab
HARRY F. BYY P.RO D, JR., VA. WILLIAM L. SCOTT, VA. ~w(~[-Jy}L {L tY
HAROLD E. HUGHES, IOWA
SAM NUNN. GA. COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
V. EDWARD BRASWELL, JR.. CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
July 5, 1973
Honorable Richard M. Nixon
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. President:
During his confirmation hearing earlier this
week before our Committee, Mr. William E. Colby, your
nominee for the position of Director of Central
Intelligence, stated in response to a question that
he did not have the authority to declassify, or to
provide to the Congress in a classified form, the
National Securty Council Intelligence Directives
(NSCIDs) which interpret and give effect to the
meaning of the 1947 National Securty Act as far as
CIA operations are concerned.
We would respectfully request that you make
available to this Committee, which has t ... e resspp ....,.._.:...
hon-
sibi-lity for legis'lati`Vr oversight of both the CIA
and the eoDefense,
Security Act all of 1947Ds
which implement the National with respect to the CIA.
If all or any part of these documents must
remain classified, kindly include a statement which
gives the reason for such classification.
We are interested in whether or not any pro-
visions of these NSCIDs circumvent or violate, in
letter or in spirit, any portion of the 1947 Act.
As an example, we are anxious to know by what
authority the CIAs rather extensive involvement in
the war in Laos was undertaken.
Sincerely yours,
Stu f' Symi gton
Act g Chairman
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V
July 9, 1973
Dear Mr. Chairman:
I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter
to the President requesting that National Security
Council Intelligence Directives relating to CIA
operations under provisions of the 1947 National
Security Act be made available to the Committee
an Armed Service a.
ThIs request will be accorded early consideration
and you will bear further as soon as possible.
With, beat regards,
Sineerel
William E. Timmons
Assistant to the Presides
Honorable Stuart Symington
Acting Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
WashLngton. D. C. 20510
w/incoxni.ng to Dr. Kissinger for ACTION. .Please advise
this office of action takn.~ ^ .._...
bcc: w/incoming to Fred Fielding
WET: EF: VO:vo
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NOT TU DISTRIBUTED TOP SECRET NSCID No. 5
OUTSIDL IHE U.S. LIMITED DISTRIBUTIC
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTIVE NO. 51
U.S. ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES ABROAD
(Effective 17 February 1972)
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(d) of the National Security Act
of 1947, as amended, the National Security Council hereby authorizes and
directs that:
1. For the purpose of this directive:
a. Espionage is defined as that intelligence activity directed toward the
acquisition of information through clandestine means.
b. Counterintelligence is defined as that intelligence activity; with its re-
sultant product, devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign
intelligence activities and undertaken to protect the security of the nation and
its personnel, information and installations against espionage, sabotage and
subversion. Counterintelligence includes the process of procuring, developing,
recording and disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine activity
and of penetrating, manipulating or repressing individuals, groups or organiza-
t ons conducting such act vity.
2. To ensure centralized direction through prior, comprehensive and con-
tinuing coordination of all clandestine activities authorized herein, the Director
of Central Intelligence shall, after appropriate consultation:
a. Establish the procedures necessary to achieve such direction and co-
ordination, including the assessment of risk incident upon such operations as
compared to the value of the activity, and to ensure that sensitive operations
are reviewed pursuant to applicable directives,
b. Coordinate all clandestine activities authorized herein and conducted
outside the United States and its possessions, including liaison that concerns
clandestine activities or that involves foreign clandestine services, except
when the provisions of paragraph 8 apply; also coordinate clandestine activities
with overt collection abroad.
c. Invite departments and agencies not permanent members of the United
States, Intelligence. Board that have clandestine counterintelligence re-
sponsibilities abroad to participate in deliberations of the Board when clan-
destine counterintelligence matters affecting such responsibilities are under
consideration.
d. Make mutually agreeable arrangements with other departments and
agencies for such cover support as may be needed by the Central Intelligence
'This Directive supersedes NSCID No. 5 dated 18 January 1901.
TSC 030574 TOP SECRET
t..Wd.a /,... w...w.4
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TOP SECPLET
Agency and coordinate the arrangements for cover 'support required by any
other department or agency to carry out the clandestine activities authorized
in paragraph 4 below, except when such cover is to be provided unilaterally
and witjioui utilizing the facilities of, or becoming identified with other de-
partments or agencies of the government or nongovernmental organizations.
e. Resolve disputes arising in the coordination of U.S. espionage and clan-
destine counterintelligence activities abroad.
3. The Central Intelligence Agency has primary responsibility for U.S. clan-
destine activities abroad. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 8, it is responsible
for the following services of common concern:
a. The conduct of espionage outside the United States and its possessions
in order to meet the intelligence needs of all departments and agencies con-
cerned, in connection with the 'national security.
b. The conduct of clandestine counterintelligence outside the United States
and its possessions.
c. The conduct of liaison with foreign clandestine services or, concerning
the above clandestine activities, with foreign intelligence or security services. .
d. The maintenance for the benefit of the intelligence community of central
indexes and records of foreign counterintelligence information. All departments
and agencies shall contribute to this index, on a continuing basis, such material
collected by them as is appropriate for a central file; this material shall be
collated and analyzed for appropriate dissemination.
e, jpouu iequrs and to the c tent practicable, assisfinn nther departments
and agencies in connection with their cover and. support needs.
4. Subject to the,provisions of paragraph 2 above, other departments and
agencies with commands or installations located outside the U.S.- and its pos-
sessions may:
a. conduct supplementary espionage in order to satisfy departmental in-
telligence needs;
b. conduct clandestine counterintelligence activities necessary for the se-
curity of their personnel, commands, activities and installations;
c. conduct liaison with foreign clandestine services or, concerning the above
clandestine activities, with foreign intelligence or security services.
5. The departments and agencies concerned shall assist the Central Intelli-
gence Agency in its conduct of espionage by providing guidance in the form
of continuous, timely and specific collection requirements and, as required,
assessments of the value of the information collected. Such departments and
agencies shall provide similar support to each other as required. Conversely, the
Central Intelligence Agency shall assist other departments and agencies by
providing, as practicable, assessments of the value to national intelligence of the
information derived from the activities of other agencies as authorized herein.
6. In a foreign area, except where paragraph S applies, the Director of Central
Intelligence shall, after consultation with the Secretary of State, ensure that
2
TOP SECRET
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the senior U.S. representative, or his designated representative, is appropriately
advised on a timely basis of U.S. espionage and clandestine counterintelligence
activities conducted in or affecting the area.
7. In a foreign area where major U.S. military commands are stationed, the
designated representative of the Director of Central Intelligence shall keep the
senior U.S. military commanders, or their designated representatives, appropri-
ately informed of the espionage and clandestine counterintelligence activities
and operations conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in or from such
areas, including liaison between the Central Intelligence Agency and foreign
military establishments:
8. In active theaters of war where U.S. forces are engaged, or when the
President so directs:
a. Except as provided in subparagraph b below, the entire Central Intelli-
gence Agency organization conducting espionage and clandestine counter-
intelligence operations in or from a theater shall, as a component force, be
under the direct command of the U.S. Theater Commander, in accordance
with agreements separately reached between the Director of Central Intelli-
gence and the Secretary of Defense, and shall provide espionage.and counter-
intelligence support to military operations.
b. Espionage and counterintelligence operations that because of some
exceptional political, diplomatic or other implications, are conducted inde-
pendently by the Central Intelligence Agency, shall be coordinated by the
Director of Central Intelligence with the Secretary of Defense and with the
Secretary of State.
r c;. ; l1C 7Cu1eLaiy V1 DV'1*CiiNC aiiu tl e 1 /iLCCLV1 01 l-eiiu al I111CAll 4t.'1ll:C' ?Milli
establish general procedures for the coordination of liaison on clandestine
activities between U.S.' military commanders and foreign services- that engage
in such activities.
9. In addition to the above, the Director of Central Intelligence shall:
a. Develop appropriate policy recommendations for National Security Coun-
cil consideration with respect to the overall U.S. counterintelligence effort
conducted outside the U.S. and its possessions.
b. To the extent necessary to ensure conformity with. policies approved by
the National Security Council, provide for the coordination of all types of
U.S. counterintelligence activities conducted abroad and for the coordination
of such activities with those conducted by the departments and agencies
responsible for domestic counterintelligence.
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