US RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER MEDITERRANEAN--HENRY TASCA'S CONCERNS RE GREEK INVOLVEMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-452-7-6-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 12, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/08/01 : LOC-HAK-452-7-6-6
IIP
MEMORANDUM
NSS, State, OSD, JCS
reviews completed
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION
EGRET/SENSITIVE LXGDS)
(with Te-P-S-ECIIE-T attachment)
MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
SUBJECT:
A-D
April 12, 1973
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS r-Y.
US Reconnaissance Flights Over
Mediterranean--Henry Tasca's Concerns
re Greek Involvement
Bill Porter's memo on further postponing our reconnaissance flight
along the Libyan coast mentioned briefly a problem in Greece. This is
to give you more background on that aspect of the problem.
Following the Libyan attack on the last flight, Ambassador Tasca des-
cribed two issues; (1) persuading the Greeks that the flights serve NATO
and therefore Greek interests; and (2) whether to give 48 hours' notice
of the next flight since our agreement with Greece requires such notice
for any flight that might draw public attention. Tasca sent you a back-
channel message calling attention to his difference of views with the
State/Defense positions. Tasca's cable and the cables he refers to are
at Tab 33, but you do not need to read all these.
Background
4: 4". 7/
Use of Greek facilities for launching and recovery of our aircraft
involved in reconnaissance is governed by a 1966 agreement concluded
with the previous Greek-Government but still recognized today. The
agreement provides blanket clearance for these flights, and they are
launched routinely,. Among the exceptions requiring advance notice to
the Greek Government are flights liable to attract special attention. Our
flight which was the subject of the recent incident was routine and, since
we had no expectation of the Libyan attack, we were within the terms of
our agreement.' Now that the attack has occurred, however, Tasca feels
that the next flight may attract attention and the Greeks should be notified.
The State/Defense position is that the recent incident raises no unusual
questions regarding our performance under the 1966 agreement. They
prepared a statement of the rationale for these flights for Tasca's use
with the Greeks. They argue that the fact that the particular flight
SECRET/SENSITIVE JXGDS) XGDS
(with TOP SECRET attachment) DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
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SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
(with TOP SECRET attachment)
involving the Libyans attracted special attention was the result of
outside intervention due to a breach of international law and thus an
aberration, not a characteristic of these flights. Their position has
been that there was no violation of the 1966 agreement, and Tapes.
should B2Lts.lk with the Greeks either specifically about their applying
any advance notice requirement on future such flights or generally
about reviewing the 1966 agreement. State also feels that the Greeks have
generally accepted our explanations of the flights and are quiet for the
moment.
Tallowa on the other hand has a d stron 1 that the recent incident
could spark Greek reassessment of the desirability of being involved in
our recon.naiss WIC e program and thus ultimately jeopardise our long-range
Interests in continuing this program. He is extremely reluctant to see
th ticular fli hts near Li a reinstituted. He feels the Greeks
would have cause to reconsider because: (1) Greece was dragged into
our Arab/Israeli problem, which they have assiduously avoided; (2)
Greece's national sovereignty stood to be embarrassed, as the Greeks
were not fully informed about the flight; (3) Greece's overall national
interests might suffer because the US is not concerned when it has
broader interests in mind. He feels that his instructions not to let the
Greeks think about requiring advance notice or generally seek review
of the agreement are not responsive to his interest in a serious review
of the consequences for continuing these flights without sensitivity to
Greek needs. He doss not care about legal arguments.
The Options
As matters now stanch there are three choices:
I. We could refrain from_notifyin&the Greeks on the ground that
this flight is not expected to attract attention. &ate and the Pentagon
have favored this approach so far to avoid getting entangled in a
procedure of providing advanced notice for each such flight in the
future. The disadvantage would be that the Greeks could claim we
violated our treaty obligations if there is another incident.
2. We could givlp formal advanced notice through military channels.
This would have the advantage of meeting our obligations squarely
but it could restrict our flexibility on future flights. Tasca has
favored this approach.
SECRET /SENSITIVE (XGDS)
(with TOP SECRET attachment)
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SECRET/SENSITIVE ()CODS)
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3. We could inatruct Theca to Approach General Angelis or Prime
.Minister Papadopoulos directly to explain our feeling on the necessity
to establish the international right to fly through international airspace.
He could explain in general terms what we planned to do and the Greek
Interest. saying he wanted to be sure they had an explanation directly
from him. This would be an unusual enough procedure to avoid getting
trapped in the mechanics of regular notification while still keeping
faith with the Greeks. We favor this, but State is afraid Papadopoulos
might say no, and that would create a new problem for us.
Thus the issue is bether to be completely open with the Greeks and risk
a negative reply in advance or to go ahead and fly, taking our chances
that these will not be another incident which would involve the Greeks.
If there is, it might be touch-and-go whether our right to fly would be
revoked. If we were to notify the Greeks, we would have to override
State and Defense. The alternative would be a back-channel along the
lines of the draft at Tab A.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
I. That we encourage a highelevel approach to the Greeks in lieu
of a formal notification.
Approve
Favor no notice
Z. That you send the short back-channel message at Tab A to Tasca.
Approve
Disapprove
Concurrence: Rob Roy Ratliil
R-ichard T. Kennedy
S CRFT/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
(witTi -rup SECRET attachment)
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TOP SECRU(XGDS)
TO: Arn embassy ATHENS
AMBASSADOR TASCA /Exclusively Eyes elDnly
FROM: WHITE HOUSE
HENRY A. KISSINGER
I. I have reviewed the problem raised by the reconnaissance flights
from Athens and appreciate your concerns.
Z. In addition to those concerns, the other important point that must
be met is the need to maintain right of transit through international
airspace. Greece as important Mediterranean nation has as great an
Interest in this principle in this area as any of our NATO allies, and I
hope you can explain this to the few key people there at an appropriate
Urns who need to understand this.
XGDS Z
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
ICOP SECRET (XGDS)
IMSaunders:trnt 4 /12 /73
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