GREATER SHARING OF US INTELLIGENCE WITH NATO ALLIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-453-5-5-8
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 13, 1974
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
URGENT ACTION
TOP SECRETMENSITIVE- March 13, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR; SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: JAN M. LODALV"
SUBJECT;
Background
NSS, NGA, OSD, State Dept.
reviews completed
Greater Sharing of US Intelligence With
NATO Allies
As you know, the US has had a special intelligence relationship with
All of the other NATO, Allies
have on occasion indicated an interest in learning more of what the US
knows, but in particular I has rankled at being "excluded" from
25X1 the intelligence privileges that the They have probed
every appropriate opportunity. for a relaxation of the US policy.
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Nonetheless, former Secretary Laird
and Secretary Schlesinger have given personal briefings at selected
times to some NATO Defense Ministers which involved satellite ,photo-
graphy and the outputs of other highly classified means of collections.
Current DCI Colby appears more flexible; at least he is inclined to give
active study to sharing more of our intelligence with the NATO Allies.
He was instrumental in getting a downgrading of the product of our
satellite photo reconnaissance program. He did, however, insist on
keeping such product classified as NOFORN, which' effectively prevents
it from being available to the Allies. Purportedly, this was to allow the
transition to occur first in an. orderly fashion within the USG. In fact,
it was probably the result of foot-dragging within the CIA.
We believe that Director Colby does envisage some sort of eventual
further relaxation of at least our photographic product, but we do not
know the scope or timing that he might have in mind.
?1117P-SS"CiteefVS NSITIVE
XGDS
Classified by Henry A. Kissinger
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TOP SECRET/SENIPVE
Secretary Schlesinger also has demonstrated an increasing interest in
this overall area, and from what we can discern, he may want to pursue
some unilateral Defense initiatives both with the German Ministry of
Defense and in the course of updating MC-161 (the NATO estimate of
overall Warsaw Pict force capabilities).
Finally, as you are aware from my memoS of February 19, the NSC has
become involved in this issue in the context of MBFR verification.
Specifically, although we will ask for negotiated inspection, our primary
reliance in MBFR, verification will be on national means. The FRG
accepts this approach (with increasing fervor as the potential political
impact of "permanent", visible Pact teams of inspectors in the FRG has
been absorbed). Nonetheless, they have stated that they "must" receive
greater access to the product of US national technical means (NTM)
in order to be able to accept the US proposal to rely primarily on national
means in MBFR. Their arguments have a tinny ring, but viewed in the
larger context of the intelligence sharing issue, we may be able to get
some additional mileage out of what we already intend to do.
Current Developments and Proposals for How to Proceed
We have established a apecial committee under the Verification Panel
Working Group on MBFR in order to explicitly surface both issues (MBFR
verification and more sharing of NTM with the Allies) and come up with
a full range of options for the Verification. Panel. The latter would be
using the MBFR lever to work a larger issue, but, in any event we feel
strongly that greater sharing of intelligence with NATO Allies is an inter-
agency issue which will ultimately require Presidential review.
The overall issue is complex. For example, there are the following
subsidiary issues:
-- Should any greater sharing eventually decided upon be with the
FRG, NATO, both, or some subset of the Allies?
-- How should new sharing arrangements be established and con-
trolled (e. g., or DOD/MOD)?
Who should pay the costs, which could be substantial? 25X1
-- Should the scope of the sharing include satellite photography,
SIGINT, ELINT,, . . ?
-- How should the various steps be coordinated within the USG?
TOP SECRET/ SENSITIVE
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?P'TOP SECRET/SENS/I'VE?
Several specific proposals have been inside safe drawers for years, and
now with some signs of high level interest (which have been interpreted
from establishment of the NSC Verification/NTM Committee), they are
being dusted off. The movement in this area may be more rapid than you
desire especially if Secretary Schlesinger has a predilection to pursue
further relaxation (which he appears to have).
In particular, ,Lt. General Daniel Graham (who Schlesinger brought to CIA.
when he was DCI) has proposed an approach where the Defense Department
would establish a tie with the BND (FRG Central Intelligence). He en-
visages a facility on a US installation in the FRG which would be accessible
to about twenty very carefully screened German (primarily military
intelligence) personnel. We have several reservations about this idea,
but, in any event, the. cardinal point is that the overall issue of greater,
intelligence sharing with the NATO Allies should be carefully studied, on
an interagency basis, before action is taken. In the context of such a
systematic examination of the entire question, the specific choices can be
much more clearly illuminated for decision, if necessary, by the President.
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
,We,,belfieve that-iewertbusti irharing .of -our intelligence is probably e s sential
if we ever get an M.13FR agreement, and is perhaps desirable 'in any event.
However, in your contact with Schlesinger and Colby, you should stress
the importance of conducting a thorough interagency study before any
significant unilateral agency programs' are approved. This should not
require an inordinate period of time. In particular, you might ask
Secretary Schlesinger and Colby whetherylans for upgra.dins MC-161
this spring currently include any significant steps to share sensitive
information with our Allies. Based upon the responses, you may wish to
ask that they hold off on major changes until the entire issue can be re-
viewed. You should also make clear that you want to control the timing
of any relaxation in order to coordinate it with other diplomatic initiatives
you are undertaking in Europe.
However, in lieu of stonewalling entirely with our Allies on these issues
it might be preferable to at least inform them at a responsible level that
the US has undertaken serious study of the matter. This might ease con-
siderably the kinds of problems we traditionally encounter with the FRG in
the course of the MC-161 exercise and would be likely to provide a generally
reduced level of Allied pressure for six months to a year. At that point, we
can anticipate renewed and heightened interest. " Any special arrangements
with the Germans would of course require delicate handling with the other
Allies.
Talking points for your luncheon meeting with Schlesinger, Moorer, and
Colby tomorrow drafted along the lines we recommend are at Tab A.
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, IP
SECRET /SENSTZWE
Talking Points for Secretary Xissingeris
Luncheon Meeting with Secretary Schlesinger,
Admiral Moorer and DCI Colby
Thursday, March 14, 1974
Greater Sharing of Intelligence with NATO Allies
[We understand from General Dan Graham that Director Colby
will wish to raise this issue in the meeting; if he does not broach th
subject, then it would be helpful. for you to bring it up
Bill [Colby
around CIA.
[If Director Colby has not already initiated this discussion, be
will respond with some specific proposals.]
Jim [Schlesinger] you are faced with at least some preliminary
understand that you have a
number of ideas floating
decis
ons in this realm in the MC-161 exercise.
should proceed?:
SECRET /SENSITWE
How do you think we
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SECR T/SENSIT E
? [Secretary Schlesinger may not give a forthcoming response but
perhaps you caniiraw him out. We believe he has given some thought
to the overall issue, and that he favors some unilateral Defense
initiatives (e. g. General Graham's idea
It is clear to me that this entire issue merits serious study. We
should not get ahead ofourselves; we should hold off on independent
agency initiatives. It is too complicated an issue for us to proceed in
an uncoordinated fashion; there are political factors, intelligence facets,
and military aspects . all of which need to be taken into account. We
need to look systematically at the altermtive sets of coordinated actions
that we could take. Otherwise, we may miss some real opportunities,
or even end up working at cross purposes.
I have already asked the Verification Panel Working Group to
undertake study of the questions relating to greater sharing of intelligence
with our Allies in the context of our MBFR preparations. I think we
should use this mechanism, with GIA as the lead agency, to coordinate
the study. Are there any objections?
[Secretary Schlesinger may state that he will still continue some
independent efforts at Defense but Director Colby will fully support you.
SECRET /SENSITIVE
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SECRET'S 1481\TW'
In the meantirne, it may be best not to stonewall completely with 1
the Allies. We could gain some cooperation by telling appropriate
individuals in NATO capitals that we are studying this matter. This
would tend to commit us to do more than work a deal with the Germans,
? but a German opening alone is probably not a reasonable approach in any
event. (Ask for the views of the others.)
SECRET/SENSITW
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