Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
Body:
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IP t
771
SECaET INFOaMATION
AMC 18, 1971
MEMORANDUM FORE DR. KISSINGER
FROM: JOHN HOLDRIDGE
SUBJECT: COSVN Resolution 10 and Communist
Strategy in Vietnam
So far, we have only the general outline of COSVN Resolution 10 provided
us by briefing notes in captured documents and in agent reports. (The
most complete of these reports is attached at Tab A.) Probably as a
result of the capture of Resolution 9, Resolution 10 is apparently not
being distributed below the regional level; therefore, we may never see
the actual document.
The resolution probably was issued in January 1971, having been agreed
at the Hanoi 19th Central Committee Plenum last December. It does not
appear to differ greatly in form or content from Resolution 9 (of July 1969)
and subsequent COSVN directives. Like all such documents it is largely
hortatory in content. The following summary covers only the specific
objective* and problems reportedly described in the resolution.
Military Objectives
Pacification continues to be the primary target. According to one account,
the resolution declared that the defeat of pacification is 'a life and death
matter which determines the outcome of this war. " This objective is to
be reached by attacking or proselyting :IF. PF, and PSDF units and by
assassinating or otherwise neutralising OVN pacification personnel.
Mountain and border areas are to be developed as strong main force and
infrastructural bases. Sapper and shelling attacks axe to grind down
ARVN forces, stop them from entering Laos and Cambodia, and to smash
pacification; however, pitched battles are generally to be avoided in
South Vietnam. Guerrilla units are to he used to expand control in
contested areas.
S T
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The conducb of the war in Laos depends on the needs of South Vietnam
and Cambbdia, according to COSVN 10.
To update Resolution 10, reportedly a Directive ;01 was issued in April
which stressed that Allied 'tosses in Leos should be exploited by main
force attacks in Cambodia, the tri-border area, and in Quang Tri and
Quang Nam Provinces. Local and guerrilla forces were to concentrate
On pacification targets. it should be noted that Directive 33, probably
Issued before Resolution 10, reportedly called for the defeat of the AaVN
in Laos and Cambodia, and for the expansion of the liberated areas
in Quays Tri Province, the Central Highlands, and the Delta.
Future Tactics
The resolution itself is characteristically vague concerning future
tactical moves; however, the more specific Uirectivis 01 reportedly
describes tactic* which the enemy has already employed since LAM
SON 719 and will probably continue to pursue during the coming months
high polar' attacks in MR I and the Central Highlands, lower level
assaults on pacification targets, and main force attacks on vulnerable
A1/44, VN units in Cambodia (as at Snout).
Neither the resolution nor the directive envisages another Tet offensive.
Nov do they appear inconsistent with greater emphasis on political
struggle, especially in the urban areas.
Political. Objectives
Control is to be expanded over the rural population by motivating those
In refugee camps or resettlement areas to return to VC-controlled areas
either by force or persuasion. Considerable emphasis was placed on
exploiting the 'urban struggle by taking advents,* of existing grievances
(e.g., inflation, unemployment, repression, etc.) and of anti-regime
movements and organisatioas, Peace and coalition themes are to be used
among the intelligentsia and bourgeoisie.
There is to be an increased effort to place legal cadres (i. e., those with
a legitimate front) in the GVN administrative apparatus, the AR VN, and
in various urban organisations both for political and intelligence purposes.
According to one source, these -legal cadres were to capitalise on a
inuidan sad significant development of plans in 1971. The nature of these
plans was not revealed.
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ECRT
ommunist Problem
3-
Like itesolution 9, this resolution lists a number of serious problems
and shortcomings.
-- Pacification has eroded the Infrastructures and diminished the
initc wary logistic and manpower base.
-- Cadres, inadequate in quantity and quality, are demoralised,
poorly motiveted, and passive. They meet "many obstacles in trying
to operate In GYN-controlled areas.
The GVIsits PSDP has caused the in-place armed and political
infrastructure considerable problem.
The'lliberated areas have not been expanded and the *Mack on
pacification is not strong.
R. ET
31-1H:WRS:Vi : eth: 6/18 / 71
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