THE FORCES OF AGOSTINHO NETO APPEAR STRONG ENOUGH TO SEIZE THE ANGOLAN CAPITAL AND SURROUNDING AREA

Document Type:

CREST [1]

Collection:

Library of Congress [2]

Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):

LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9

Release Decision:

RIPLIM

Original Classification:

Document Page Count:

Document Creation Date:

January 11, 2017

Document Release Date:

April 27, 2010

Sequence Number:

Case Number:

Publication Date:

July 12, 1975

Content Type:

REPORT

File:

Attachment	Size
LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9.pdf [3]	425.36 KB

Body:

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27 : LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINOTON July 12, 1975 For Jerry Bremer From Bud McFarlane Per our conversation. ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27 : LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 STAT rig MI Mk MEI WO No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 TioA-v4iii. If%FA...we I UI . SUMMARY The forces of Agostinho Neto appear strong enough to seize the Angolan capital and surrounding area. Mobutu is exhausted economically and can no longer sup- port Holden Roberto who lacks a countrywide political following. Savimbi is weak militarily but has political strength. 1 WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED 25X1 SECRET/SENSITIVE No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 '411116... No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 II. BACKGROUND A. The military balance among ,the three contending nationalist groups in Angola has recently shifted in favor of Agostinho Netois Popular Movement for the Libera- tion of Angola (MPLA), thanks to an influx of arms from the USSR via Congo. B. Neto is strong among urban dwellers and among the Kimbundu tribes which surround Luanda. He has exploited his newly found weapons superiority to press his military advantage around the capital. He is pushing Roberto 's forces back into their tribal lands and is strong enough militarily to defeat, if he chose the Savimbi forces around Luanda who are relatively unarmed. C. The lightly armed forces of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) led by Holden Roberto do not seem able to cope with the better armed MPLA. The FNLA has serious leadership weaknesses at the middle level and, depending as it does largely on the Bakongo tribes of northern Angola, faces difficulty in building a following throughout Angola. D. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi is based on the SECRET/SENSITIVE No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 114111111111. hilltallwaNillilliPOIS erg No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 .10 IS II WO .1/ MOW WM, ? ? IP ?? numerically-large Ovimbundu tribes. UNITA enjoys a large following in eastern and southern Angola. Its leadership appears dynamic. Savimbi is recruiting new forces but does not now have sufficient arms for the men he has in training. SECRET/SENSITIVE No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 1111111116&- g Oa PM silk inkiest IriPs No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 IV. OBJECTIVES AND PROSPECTS A. Our primary objective is to prevent a Neto talc over and the establishment of an MPLA-controlled state with close Communist ties. 25X1 25X1 B. We also share the interest of Savimbi and Roberto in avoiding a protracted civil war in Angola even if it means that the MPLA remains the third party of a three- party government. Up to now, together Savimbi and Roberto enjoy support not only from Mobutu and Kaunda but other of the non-radical leaders of Africa as well. Savimbi also appeals to some elements in the new Portuguese regime. Neither Savimbi nor Roberto can afford to alienate these other leaders. They need not only their political and financial support, but also in the case of Mobutu and '7 SECRET/SENSITIVE No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 '94111111Milk_ No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 - ? 50 Pk sift Irmo rot:1002 ter risql clo Kaunda the right to transship supplies through Zaire and Zambia. A protracted civil war in Angola would reduce chances for the peaceful solution of the Rhodesian and South-West Africa issues. 25X1 SECRET/SENSITIVE No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/27: LOC-HAK-257-6-1-9 25X1