MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-268-2-27-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: July 2, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

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CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Date: July 2, 1969
Place: Dinner Given by David Rockefeller
Participants:
State Dept. review
completed
ON-FILE NSC
RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
Dr. Giulio Andreotti, Former Italian Minister
and President, Christian Democratic Party
Parliamentary Group
Dr. Otto von Habsburg-Lothringen.
Hon. Pierre Edde, Former Secretary of
Treasury and Finance of Lebanon; Minister
Plenipotentiary in charge of special relations
with Lebanon, the United States, and the U. N.
Mr. Crosby Kelly, American financier
Dr. Antonio de Larragoiti, Brazilian financier
Dr. Alois Mertes, German diplomat
Hon. Antoine Pinay, former President of France
M. Jean Violet, French lawyer
Eng. Carlo Pesenti, Chairman and Managing
Director, Italcementi
Mr. David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Board,
The Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A.
Mr. Joseph V. Reed, Jr., Assistant to the
Chairman
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. William A. K. Lake
During dinner, M. Violet presented the group's view that the
Soviet threat is greatly increasing, both through buildup of strategic
forces and because of Moscow's increasingly aggressive posture. He
mentioned in particular the SS-9, the FOBS, and their posLession
of very large (e.g. , Z5 megaton) bombs. He also mentioned recent
measures taken to increase productivity behind the Iron Curtain: less
? vacations are being given and working weeks have been extended in some cas
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from 48 to 52 hours in Eastern Europe, especially in Czechoslovakia.
The Moscow Conference, Violet said, did not indicate as
much disunity within the Communist movement as some observers
thought. The Italian Communist Party, for example, may have had
Moscow's blessing in not signing the final declaration.
This increased Soviet threat should be of great concern to
Europe.
Mr. Kissinger said that he agreed with Violet's general
analysis.
Turning to the situation in Yugoslavia, Violet noted that Tito
appears to fear an attack on Yugoslavia by the Russians -- at least,
he seems to be preparing for one. Dr. Otto von Habsburg stated that
Tito would react to any Russian move against Romania. In additionL
.many Yugoslays fear that when Tito dies, there will be civil war
between the moderates and the pro-Soviets. He stated that there have
been local talks between Austrian and Yugoslavian soldiers along their
border with regard to this contingency. He did not mean to indicate,
he said, that he believed that Tito would necessarily die within the
next year.
Dr. Andreotti mentioned the desirability of attempting to obtain
the contingency plans given to Yugoslav merchant ships in the event of
war. Before August 1968, their instructions called for the ships' taking
refuge in Soviet ports.
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Violet said that new opportunities for cooperation between
Europe and the United States in opposing the Soviet threat are now
presented. The election of Presidents Nixon and Pompidou, the
probable result of the election in Germany, and the probability of
a Conservative government's taking power in England in 1970 will
allow for greater cooperation among these governments through
exchanges of information "and influence."
Mr. Kissinger asked what specific ideas the group had in mind.
The only idea put forward in response to his question was suggested
by Edde and Otto von Habsburg, with the evident agreement of the
rest. They expressed concern with Communist infiltration of the
Catholic Church, particularly in South America. Indeed, most of
the group felt that the Russians are now concentrating on the Church.
.rather than on Communist Parties in South America. Catholic
revolutionary activities are therefore very dangerous there. After
Vatican II, the Communists had established a first-class information
service targetted at the Catholic hierarchy. The service was organized
by the Fax movement in Poland. They suggested that a counter-
operation be established, with operations concentrating on Rome and
South America. Mr. Kissinger said that he would welcome their
sending him a concrete proposal in this regard. Violet said that he
would do so, and noted the large funds available to the Communist
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information service. Mr. Kissinger responded that he could not, of
course, commit U.S. funds at that time.
The group mentioned Monsignor Rich, of the New York
Archdiocese, as one of those who had spread Communism within the
Church in South America.
Returning to the possibilities for cooperation between the U.S.
and Europe, Mr. Kissinger expressed the hope that Europe could come
forward with new initiatives. The U.S. Government and U.S. elite
opinion now concentrate on Vietnam to an extent which makes it
difficult for us to take new initiatives with regard to Europe. He
warned, however, that the Europeans must remember that when they
make proposals, we may accept them.. He recalled that only one
European leader had expressed reservations about the strategic arms
limitation talks during President Nixon's visit to Europe. Now, as
we are acting in accordance with their desires expressed earlier,
they discover that they are not so sure.
Mr. Kissinger noted the discouraging response to President
Nixon's speech on Europe.. We had received rather discouraging
responses to our moderate proposals -- 90% of the comment
by Europeans was petty and bureaucratic. There seemed to be greater
concern with which organizations should consider what than with the
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substance of the proposals. The proposal for joint studies of the
problems of modern society was a happy exception.
Mr. Kissinger stated that we do not intend to suffer defeat in
Vietnam. The other side is attempting to erode the President's public
support. If they were successful, the capacity of the U.S. would be
damaged, which would hurt us all. It would also have a bad effect on
the authority of the President within the United States -- of both this
President and his successor. We will not let this happen.
Later in the conversation, Mertes predicted a rennaissance
of German national consciousness. This, he said, will concern the
structure of NATO, the reunification of Germany, and nuclear questions.
, The Atherican handling of Vietnam and SALT will be very important in
this regard.
After dinner, M. Pinay reviewed the situation in France. The
new government faces serious problems with regard to agriculture,
public services, the budget deficit, social security, and the franc. The
government must "make Europe" and take stern economic measures.
If it is to do something spectacular -- as it must ? it must somehow
prepare public opinion. Pinay argued that Britain's admission into the
common market would lead to greater political unity in Europe. In
theory, political unity follows on economic unity automatically.
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Pinay also described his refusal to accept a position in
Pompidou's cabinet. He said deGaulle continues to act as a consultant,
but is not too active.
Final, stated that if the Communists had supported Poher,
he still would have lost. In fact, Pinay said, many of the Communists
voted for him.
Andreotti reviewed the situation in Italy. He painted a gloomy
picture of continued difficulty with labor, of disunity within the military,
of a weak police, of an increasingly gauche "cultured circle, " and of
weakness or disunity among the non-Communist political parties.
Andreotti agreed with the earlier comment of Violet that the
Italian Communist Party was not acting entirely against Soviet wishes
at the Moscow Conference. He said that the proof of this would come
.next year -- if they were truly displeased, the Soviets would supply
less financial assistance to the Italian Communist Party.
Andreotti noted that the Christian Democratic Party could not
become a conservative force, as it is blocked to the right as well as
to the left.
Otto von Habsburg then reviewed the situation in Germany.
He said that the Socialists are no longer leading in the campaign for
September's election. The CDU could, in fact, win an absolute
majority. The refusal to devalue was very popular, and Schiller
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CONFIDENTIAL - 7 -
is, accordingly, unpopular. The Socialists had also offended the
refugees.
The NPD will gain seats, but this will not be meaningful.
Many Socialists will vote for the NPD.
Otto had seen Strauss recently; he reported that Strauss wants
to be Foreign Minister. Then, when ?Kiesinger retired after two years,
Strauss would have his big chance. Otto said that Strauss is "rather
the Ti. S. and "very positive" about
positive" in his attitude toward/President Nixon, but he fears the
possible election of Senator Kennedy. Mr. Kissinger asked how Strauss
would be able to gain a place in the new government. Otto replied that
it would be possible if the new government obtained a majority of only
? four or five, and therefore needed Strauss and his supporters.
Mr. Kissinger reiterated his desire that the members .of the
group get in touch with him -- collectively or individually -- whenever
they had new ideas or concrete proposals. Similarly, he would be in
touch with them through Mr. Rockefeller as thoughts occurred to him.
He would welcome suggestions on where the Atlantic Community should
go from here, what might be discussed at a summit of Western leaders,
put forward by
etc. He could assure them that any idea / this group would receive
consideration at the highest level of the U.S. Government. It was
agreed that he would get together with the group about twice a year
but on an ad hoc basis, when ? as during this dinner -- there were
new ideas to discuss.
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NOFORN July 2, 1969
(material attached)
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: Ton
Iv:
SUBJECT: Dinner with David Rockefeller, 7:30 p. rn. , 25X1
July 2
Attached at Tab A is a guest list,
At Tab B is the rpernorandum by David
Rockefeller of March 13 reporting on OttO4J-labsburg's views on
Spanish-U.S. negotiatiOns on military bases. There is no
indication that this will come up, but the paper was in your
'David Rockefeller file' and I thought you might wish to have it
for possible reference.
The Protocol people say that Ottdj-labsburg should be addre,ssed
as "Dr. " He renounced legally and publicly all of his former
titles.
Attachments
SECRET /NOFORN
(material attached)
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CONFIDENTIAL
is, accordingly, unpopular. The Socialists had also offended the
refugees.
The NPD will gain seats, but this will not be meaningful.
Many Socialists will vote for the NPD.
Otto had seen Strauss recently; he reported that Strauss wants
to be Foreign Minister. Then, when Kiesinger retired after two years,
Strauss would have his big chance. Otto said that Strauss is "rather
the U.S. and "very positive" about
positive" in his attitude toward/President Nixon, but he fears the
possible election of Senator Kennedy. Mr. Kissinger asked how Strauss
would be able to gain a place in the new government. Otto replied that
it would be possible if the new government obtained a majority of only
four or five, and therefore needed Strauss and his supporters.
Mr. Kissinger reiterated his desire that /e me bers of the,
group get in touch with him -- collectively or i dixidually -- whenever
they had new ideas or concrete proposals. Sitn"larly, he would be in
touch with them through Mr. Rockefeller as tho ghts occurred-to him.
He would welcome suggestions on where the Atlantic Community should
go from here, what might be di/cussed at a summit of Western leaders,
put forward by
etc. He could assure them that any idea / this group would receive
consideration at the highest level of the U.S. Government. It was
agreed that he would get together with the group about twice a year
but on an ad hoc basis, when ? as during this dinner ? there were
new ideas to discuss.
CONFIDENTIAL
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?)61Y
RUSSELL H. DORR
sboo-r7n4 STREET; N. W.
WASHINGTON. 0. C. 20006
June 30, 1969
VOISNING1IM CCCCC SENTATIVE
THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK,N.A.
NEW VONE
Miss Sally Dollar
Office of Dr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C.
Dear Miss Dollar:
Per our conversation, below are listed the names of the persons who
will be attending the dinner which Mr. David Rockefeller is hosting
on Wednesday, July 2nd at Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller's residence
at 2500 Foxhall Road, N. W. The dinner is scheduled for 7:30 p.m.
and dress will be informal.
Dr. Giulio Andreotti,
Former Italian Minister and President, Christian
Democrat Party Parliamentary Group.
His Highness Archduke Otto of Hapsburg.
Hon. Pierre Edde,
Former Secretary of Treasury and Finance of Lebanon;
Minister Plenipotentiary in charge of special relations
with Lebanon, the United States, and the U.N.
Mr. Crosby Kelly, American financier.
Dr. Antonio de Larragoiti, Brazilian financier.
Dr. Alois Mertes, German diplomat.
Hon. Antoine Pinay, former President of France.
Mr. Jean Violet, French lawyer.
Eng. Carlo Pesenti, Chairman and Managing Director,
Its]. Cementi.
Mr. David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Board,
The Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A.
Mr. Joseph V. Reed, Jr., Assistant to the Chairman.
If you have any questions regarding the above, please do not hesitate
to call me at 212-552-3255.
Sincerely,
Joseph V. Reed, Jr.
JVH:dina
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TELEPHONE
585-5750
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Dinner with David Rockefeller, et al
7:30 p.m., July 2, 1969
2400 Foxhall Road, N. W.
Giulio Andreotti
Otto von Habsburg-Lothringen
Pierre Iddi
Crosby Moyer Kelly
Antonio Sanches de Larragoiti, Jr.
Alois L. Mertes
Antoine Pinay
Jean Eugene Violet
Carlo Pesenti
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Archduke Otto's views an American-Spanish military conversations
I had a talk with Archduke Otto in Munich at the time of our
meeting with Franz Joseph Strauss. He left with me the attached
memorandum, setting forth some views on recent negotiations between
the Spanish and American Governments on the question of military
bases. It is his view that the conversations have not proceeded too
satisfactorily, largely because of the hard line taken by the Spanish
Foreign Minister. He believes that Carrera Hlanco, the Prime Minister,
is moremeanable. but there is 4 split between the two. Another member
of the government who is growing in importance is Silva Munoz, who is
presently Minister of Works. Otto says he Is quite young and might
one day become Prime Minister. He is well disposed toward the United
States and will be visiting the United States between April 28 and
May 8 when he is to be a guest of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
Otto hopes he will be able to see Henry Kissinger while he is here
and that possibly even he might shake hands with the President. Otto
believes he could be a useful ally for the United States for the
future.
David Rockefeller
March 13, 1969
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v
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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL!
THE AMERICAN-SPANISH MILITARY CONVERSATIONS
In the month of June of 1968 Spanish and American Delegations
met. On this occasion the former presented a demand for military aid,
which the latter promised to study and consider.
In September of the same year - in the course of the general
negociations concerning the renewal of the defensive agreement linking
both countries, a mixed civilian and military group met to study the afore-
mentioned request. On the part of the United States a counter-proposal
was made, which scarcely reached the 10% of what Spain had requested in
june. Despite the fact that the Spanish Military Commission presented up
to two successive proposals, which finally cut the original demands nearly
in half, it was impossible to have a fruitful dialogue with the American
counterparts. The latter somewhat improved their original offer (by
about 25%) but this new offer was given on a take it or leave it base.
This and other reasons led Spain to denounce the Defensive
Agreement. Shortly thereafter the Americans showed a sudden interest
to renew the negociations during the six months foreseen in the Treaty
before the cancellation of the latter should become final. They .proposed
purely technical preliminary conversations with the aim to determine exactly
the scope of the military aid. Its result would be considered in conversa-
tions between governments which would follow, before the final date,
March 26, 1969.
These technical conversations, which began in November, went on
satisfactorily till the middle of December. At that moment difficulties
arose, which, in the opinion of the Spaniards were due to political dis-
agreements in the American camp. As a consequence the military conversations
go through a period of crisis at present.
Concerning the military conversations, Spain would need in order
that its agreement with America function well, without increasing excessively
the risks it contains, the following:
That it be understood that the integrity of the Spanish territory,
its air-Apace and its communications are of common 'interest, without meaning
that this should involve whatever action by American forces in case of a
localized aggression against the former. Quite to the contrary, such an
intervention could meana grave peril of escalation, and for this reason
resistance against such perils would be an exclusively spanish task. What
would be desired is an understanding by the other Partner and that no diffia7
culties should arise on his part against the full Use of the Spanish forces in
such purely defensive operations.
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?2?
Since the attitude of certain nations forming part of NATO
towards Spain has not yet changed, Spain has no desire to be tied to
this organization in a manner that gives it only the charges and risks,
but not the advantages. The mission of Spain in the defense of Western
Europe in the case of a generalized war would be to repell whatever
arrression against its own territory, thus covering the rearguard of the
total European front. For the above mentioned reason it is not desirable
to take over new engagements leading to the use of Spanish forces outside
their own territory, nor to utilize the common basis established on
.4unish territory outside of what has been agreed upon in the past for
nissons of support of the above mentioned organization. Whatever changes
in this field, which might be rendered desirable by the circumstances,
s:.ould be studied jointly at the governmental level.
Spain is not able to produce certain types of military
-aterial which are indispensable in order to meet the dangers which
be originated by its close association with the USA. It is hence
nor.essary that America should give, under the title of military aid,a
s%eficient quantity of these equipments, completing them with the instruction
and the maintenance means which are indispensable.
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EINDENBUROSTEASSE 1$
8134 POCKING b. STARNBERO
(OBERDATERN)
March 6th, 1969
TELEFON: FELDAFINO 170
Dear David.,
You will remember the conversation we had concerning
MinisterSilva Munoz and his plans foratrip to the United
States at the invitation of the Tennessee Valley Authority. You
had the kindness to tell me that yoOrould receive him in New
York, if you are there and also that you would see to it that he
could call on Prof. Henry Kissinger, while in Washington. You
further had the kindness to agree to ask Prof. Kissinger even-
tually to introduce Silva to the President, which Ni-, Silva very
much desires. My suggestion to do all this is especially'besed
on the idea, that Silva is probably the most promising young man
of Spain, who might be in a position of power before long.
have just received word from Silva that he will be in the
United States between ARril 28 and May 8th. 1, hence, hurri?Y6---
-___
write to you to tell this, so that you might be informed well in
advance. If eventually you could tell me when you could see him
in New York, I would be most grateful so as to be able to notify
him so that he could prepare accordingly his further trips to
Washington and to Tennessee. If I may make a suggestion, I would
think it highly useful, if he could start out by seeing you in
New York,because you could give him good advice as to what to do
and as to the general lay of the land. Furthermore I hope much
from your influence on him in the sense of greeter co-operativenesz
on the part of Spain, of course he is quite prepared for this.
Hoping to see you soon again and with warmest regards
Yours very sincerely,
OTTO vor HABSBURG
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