SITUATION IN PERU

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-447-1-1-3
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 17, 1969
• Content Type: MEMO

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M A
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THE WHITE HOUSE
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Situation in Peru
jw.
FROM: H. A. Kissinger
February 17, 1969
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
In order to enable you to assess whether a special emissary to Peru
would help or hinder the prospect for a coup,
Opposition power is apparently
centered in the hands of Prime Minister Montagne who reportedly
has the support of Peruv din sugar interests who stand to lose heavily
if U. S. sanctions are im 'osed. Reportedly, Montagne has also been
assured by the Leftist Aprista Party that Aprista would support a
coup provided elections are forthcoming at some unspecified date
following the coup.
Another event which has helped to crystallize opposition against
Velasco is the reportedly disappointing outcome of the recent Soviet
Trade Mission to Lima which departed Peru without providing any
real assurances of Soviet trade or aid support.
Montagne has remained extremely cautious, however. Moreover,
at their last confrontation in January, Montagne lacked either the
will or the muscle to oust Velasco. At that time, the armored unit
of the Army garrison in Lima -- the pivotal force in any coup attempt
-- stuck with Velasco.
On balance, it appears that we should permit nature to take its course
while keeping our lines open in
the event the opportunity presents itself. In the interim, we should
consider overt measures designed to impress upon Velasco and the
Peruvian Government the inevitable consequences of the mandatory
application of the Hickenlooper Amendment and the Sugar Act of
1948 unless some form of meaningful dialogue can begin promptly
between our two governments.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
State Dept.
review completed
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TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
Perhaps our best hope for impressing Velasco and the Peruvian
Government rests with the dispatch of a special emissary thereby
affording Velasco a face-saving formula for the beginning of a
dialogue. This course of action also involves high risks, including
a misreading of our motives as weakness by Velasco or other Latin
American republics or a distortion of the visit by Velasco to support
complaints that he is being bullied by the U. S. Either turn could
impinge unfavorably on the prospects of a coup. Thus, the dispatch
of a special emissary should only be undertaken after Ambassador
Jones has had an opportunity to lay the necessary foundation.
I will discuss these risks and the timing of such a mission with
Secretary Rogers today with the view towards having firm recom-
mendations for your approval by Wednesday.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
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W
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
16 February 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR. Dr. Kissinger
Forwarded herewith, pursuant to your request of this morning
through Mr. Eagleburger, is a memorandum on dispatch of a
Presidential emissary to Peru. Although Mr. Helms has not seen
the memorandum, I have discussed it with him by telephone.
Thomas H. Karamessines
Deputy Director for Plans
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V
16 February 1969
SUBJECT: Dispatch of Presidential Emissary to Peru
1. The sending of a Presidential emissary to Peru would have as
its primary purpose to impress the Peruvian Government with the
inevitable consequences of the mandatory application of the Hickenlooper
amendment and the Sugar Act of 1948 unless some form of meaningful
dialogue can begin promptly between our two governments. There are
pros and cons to this course of action, but the pros would seem to out-
weigh the cons,
2. It is assumed that such an emissary would be dispatched only
after Ambassador Jones has had an opportunity to lay the necessary
foundation with the Government of Peru and with other power centers
there, and to insure that the President's special representative would
be received and heard by General Juan Velasco Alvarado and his associates.
It is also assumed, consequently, that Ambassador Jones is in the best
position to gauge the timing for such a visit, although it is understood
that the visit should take place as soon as feasible if it is not to .appear
as a panic move by the United States Government on the eve of the
April 9 deadline.
3. The risks and related considerations of such a move are the
following:
a. Unless the move is accompanied by a clear public statement
that the purpose of the mission is to insure that the Peruvian Govern-
ment is fully apprised of the mandatory aspects of the Hickenlooper
amendment and that it is not a mission to resolve the fishing rights.
controversy, it can be publicly distorted by Velasoo as a sign of
weakness. He is fully capable of making false public statements,
after the event, as to the purpose of the mission. It would be
essential to prevent this by advance publicity on our part,
b. Velasco can seize upon such a visit to support his demagogic
complaints that-he is being bullied -by-the--U.S.-and can turn this..into
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heroic claims for himself, if the visit is not carefully arranged
and carried out.
c. Over and above these considerations, however, must be
the. concern that the dispatch of a special emissary could be
interpreted elsewhere in Latin America as faltering on our part.
Any sign of weakness would prejudice the American position in a
number of other Latin American countries.
4. On balance, the dispatch of a special emissary, properly pre-
-pared-byAmba-ssador Tones and-handled in a -dignified manner which
will afford Velasco a face -saving formula for the beginning of a dialogue,
-"'tad, appear- desirable. He must be most disappointed in what the
Soviets appear to have had in mind with respect to trade and aid; the
opposition to him in critical power centers in Peru is reportedly jelling;
he probably is aware the reports that military leaders have reached
or are attempting to mach an understanding with the Aprista Party
against him; the future must look somewhat troublesome. Under these
circumstances, the sending of a special emissary to insure he under-
stands the consequences of the present course of events and to urge the
initiation of the kinds of discussions, especially of the IPC problem,
which could lead to broader understandings and avoid application of the
Sugar Act and the Hickenlooper amendment, might well offer Velasco
a face -saving out.
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