TRANSCRIPTS OF THE OCTOBER PEKING TRIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-460-9-14-6
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: November 24, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2010/12/02: LOC-HAK-460-9-14-6
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY Nov. 24, 1971
SUBJECT: Transcripts of the October
Peking Trip
MEMO FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: WINSTON LORD
Chou's tough speech and your
rebuttal.
Tab A - October 22, on Korea, Japan, South
Asia, the Soviet Union, and
Arms Control. (You have already
glanced at this one.)
Tab B - October 23, the evening sitting room
session on the President's visit.
Tab C - October 24, morning, which includes
meetings bets=.weer_ you and Chou in October:
Attached are transcripts of three more
cc: General Haig
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
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 No Objection
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(..~ i /U J
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P~1- 1, (1-2,-3 (-~J
South Asia
- The current military situation is still somewhat unclear.
-- What is clear is that the Indians, by using the Mukti Bahini
and some of their own forces, are trying to provoke Pakistan into a
counter-attack that would give New Delhi an excuse for all-out war.
- We are thus tetering on the edge of full-scale hostilities.
(You may wish to give a brief rundown of our latest intelligence reports
from the WSAG meeting, as updated.)
-- As I explained to the Prime Minister, we have clearly seen
the Indian game from the beginning. Atthe outset~they? had a legitimate
problem caused by the mass influx of refugees. And the Pakistanis
did not display much imagination.
However, the Indians have used the problem of li ast Pakistan
as a wedge to try and drumble West Pakistan as well. Every time
President Yahya has made a gesture, the Indians have increased their
demands. For example, first Yahya was told to spare Mujib's life,
then he was told to let Mujib designate a spokesman to talk to the
Pakistani government. Now the demand is that he release Mujib and
deal only with him.
Clearly;, New Delhi is forcing political demands,oa,?Yahya which
can only serve to topple him. If the Indians were willing to wait a few
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
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months, events would move in a direction favorable to them ' East
Pakistan.
Our problem
n this country has been compounded by substan-
tial pro-Indian sentiment in the bureaucracy, Congress, and media.
Nevertheless, in addition to providing massive humanitarian
help in both East Pakistan and India, our efforts overthe past months
have been concentrated on warning the Indians and Soviets of the dire
consequences of hostilities.
-~ We have also encouraged President Yahya to take certain steps
remove Indian pretexts for attack
One of the most helpful proposals by Yahya is that the two
countries pull back their forces from the border.' The Indians have
refused to do this.
Let me run down the steps my g ;,yernm.ent is taking and has
taken to prevent hostilities.
Present Steps
We.have sent , a message to New Delhi which said we would not
understand an Indian decision to
resort to war. C c4k
- We have serf a message to Islamabad which
thanks Yahya for his restraint, ' appreciates his difficulties and repeats
that political solution, not hostilities is the only answer. (c:0 le at Tab B)
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- We have sent a message to Moscow which notes special USSR
responsibility, given the Soviet-Indian treaty and Soviet arms shipments,
and again urges Soviet restraint on India and cessation of deliveries of
arms (cable at Tab C).
..~ W .'e G~Oun~ l?_ .~. d
-- We are also considering going to the United Nations with this
matter.
Frankly, we have not been anxious to see this problem rai pd'
there. We had hoped other efforts would cool the situation and allow
time for political evolution in East Pakistan.
However, events in recent days will probably bring inevitable
UN involvei;.AG,,.;,. Aiiu` wu uii ierst'and that Pakistan might take this issue
to the Security Council in the next couple of days.
-- We believe that the UN might serve as a restraint on In' is and
that the line-up on the Security Council should make for a ralancted resolution.
We would welcome your views on what the UN%role should be and
why type of Security Council resolution should emerge.
We think a resolution along the following lines might be helpful:
) Calls upon all states to refrain from any actions that would
endanger the peace in the area;
2) Ur es all parties concerned to refrain from actions which
would violate the territorial integrity of India and Palcista. ,
TOP SECRET /SEN,SITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
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3) Requests the Government of Pakistan to continue urgently its
efforts towards creating a favorable climate conducive to the voluntary
return of refugees to East Pakistan;
4) Requests the Governments of India and Pakistan to take all
possible measures to facilitate the safe and speedy return of the refugees
o their homes;
[ 5) Invites the Governments of Pakistan and India to respond.
affirmatively to the proposal of the Secretary General offe.xing Good Offices
looking towards a peaceful resolution of the. situation in the,area. ]
[Alternative Para 5) Invites the Governments of Pakistan and India
o consider availing themselves of such Good Offices as they rn.ay deem
app-,- ;riate.
NOr,
-.1 "; ,1 would regard operative para 5 as optional and could accept
i_ m without it.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE /.c,XCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY,
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V
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Past Steps
We have made unmistakably clear to the Indians that a resort
to hostilities is unacceptable and would have serious consequences. I
have personally warned the Indian Ambassador on several occasions
that in the event of Indian aggression we would cut off our economic
aid. (HAK-Jha in San Clemente and Washington. President and
Mrs. Gandhi, November 4.)
We have also urged the Russians to exercise restraint on India
and have said that their arms shipments exacerbate the problem. Their
response is that they are restraining New Delhi and that their arms
shipments are insignificant. (HAK-Dobrynin, November 18, 15 and 4, and
Prey-10 us
--- Our specific efforts to effect a ?rnutual pullback and encourage
a political dialogue have been as follows:
October 11: Our Ambassador in Pakistan suggested to
President Yahya a mutual withdrawal of
Indian and Pakistani troops and armour Yahya
agreed "in Coto" if the details could be worked ou
October 16: Our Ambassador in India apprrached the Indians
with the mutual withdrawal idea . The Indians
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throw up a smokescreen, responding that India
could agree if the Pak threat were removed but
meanwhile India must continue protective measures.
October 18: Our Ambassador in Moscow informed the Soviets
of the result of our approaches on withdrawal to
the Indians and Paks and suggested that the Soviets
also encourage the Indians to accept.
Nov. 2: Our Ambassador in Pakistan saw Yahya and
(1) suggested initial unilateral Pak withdrawal and
(2) discussed next political steps, perhaps with
Mujib. Yahya accepted the idea of unilaterally,
withdrawing his forces, although not all the way
back to the barracks. He also indicated that he was
prepared to meet with a cleared Awami Leaguer
from Dacca, or a Bangla Desh representative from
India not chargecl with a major crime and would
"consider" meeting with a Bangla Desh loader
designated by Mujib.
Nov. 3: The Pakistani Ambassador unformed me: that Yahya
would bc: willing to go through with uu.iia.t:eral
'roP SSE CET/SENSITIVE;/I_:XC,L-u' 1:VELY .EYES ONLY
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withdrawal "provided" Mrs. Gandhi gave an
undertaking to President Nixon that Indian forces
would withdraw shortly afterwards.
Nov. 4: The President warned Mrs. Gandhi of the grave
consequences of military conflict and the impact
on world peace and on our bilateral relations. He
said we could not accept policies which would in
effect overthrow Yahya. He outlined all the
reasonable steps Yahya had taken and urged India
to respond to his offer of mutual pullback of forces.
Mrs. Gandhi blamed everything on Pakistan and
did. not respond to the pullback idea. (Full Y erneon
at TabE. )
Nov. 4-5: The Indians during Mrs. Gandhi's visit indicted
that they were unable to agree to any troop w?th-
drawal as long as the Pakistani. "threat" rea~nained.
Meetings between Yahya and cleared Awami League
or Bangla Desh leaders were characterized, as a
non-starter. They only showed slight inteze.st in
talks between Yahya and a Mujib designee.
TOP SECR.IE,`.T/SENSI.TIVE/ExCI..,LUSIVl . ,Y 1,YE;S ONI.,Y
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Nov. 11: The State Department called in Indian and Pak
ambassadors to express US concern over con-
tinuing clashes along the east Pak/India border
and warned the Indians that we had information
that their regular troops were involved.
Nov. 15.17: Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan in Washington was
briefed. on the outcome of the Gandhi visit. I
outlined the steps we had taken, including our
warnings to the Soviets that their arms shipments
were inflaming the situation, that war would not
be understood in the U. S. , and any Soviet role in
the war would worsen U.S.-Soviet relations. We
also explored possible political steps to put Paki-
stan in a better public position and ease the situation
in East Pakistan. (Full me no at Tab . )
Nov. 20: Yahya informed our ambassador in Pakistan that
he would not talk with any Mujib designee. He
also said he would not begin war with India, although
Pakistan would have to protect itself.
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