MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-462-3-8-7
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 15, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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DOS, OSD
Reviews
Complete
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AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
ON
THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR
[General comments about U.S. objectives: In dealing with the Soviet
proposal for an agreement on this subject, the U.S. has had the follow-
ing principal objectives:
- - To see to it that any document that emerged would
be so phrased that violation of it could be used by the
U.S. as a breach of a -U.S. -Soviet understanding and
therefore justify U.S. action directed against Soviet
attempts to establish hegemony.
-- To avoid any impression of a U.S. -Soviet condominium
by keeping out of the document any implied right of
interference in conflicts involving only third countries.
For the same reason, to make every obligation between
the two parties also applicable to third countries.
To make as a future goal the objective of renouncing
nuclear weapons and to make it dependent on acceptable
goals of international behavior.
These objectives have all been achieved.
Following is the text of the draft agreement with commentary pointing up
the significant changes that were obtained in the previous text.]
The United States and the Soviet Union
Guided by the objectives of strengthening world peace and inter-
national security;
Conscious that nuclear war could have devastating consequences
for mankind;
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Proceeding from the desire to bring about conditions in which the
danger of an outbreak of nuclear war anywhere in the world would be
reduced and ultimately eliminated;
Proceeding from their obligations under the Charter of the United
Nations regarding the maintenance of peace, refraining from the threat
or use of force, and the avoidance of war, and in conformity with
agreements to which either has subscribed;
Proceeding from the basic principles of relations with the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed in
Moscow on 29 May, 1972;
Reaffirming that the development of U.S.-Soviet relations is not
directed against third countries and their interests.
[Comment: The following additions have been made in the preamble.
There is a new paragraph "Proceeding from the desire to bring about
conditions in which the danger of an outbreak of miclear war anywhere
in the world would be reduced and ultimately eliminated"; the purpose
of this is to make clear that an objective, not an obligation, is involved.
In the next paragraph there is a new clause referring to "agreements to
which either has subscribed, " in which the U.S. would include the
Shanghai Communique as governing its actions. There is a new para-
graph which reaffirms that "the development of U.S.-Soviet relations is
not directed against third countries and their interests. "I
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
The United States and the Soviet Union solemnly agree that an
objective of their policy is to remove the danger of nuclear war and of
the use of nuclear weapons.
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Accordingly, they agree that they will act in such a manner as
to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous
exacerbation of their relations, as to avoid military confrontations and
as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between themselves and between
either party and third countries.
[Comment: First, what was stated in the Soviet draft as an obligation is
now stated as an objective. Secondly, whereas in the Soviet draft there
was a distinction between the solemn obligation concerning nuclear war
and weapons on the one hand, and attaching great importance to preventing
situations which could aggravate bilateral relations on the other hand, the
draft agreement now puts these two goals on the same level. Thirdly,
where the article used to say that the two countries will do all that is
necessary to exclude nuclear war, it now says that "they will act in such
a manner as to" exclude this possibility. Finally, whereas the Soviet
draft pointed only to the exclusion of nuclear war between the two countries,
the draft agreement now also refers to nuclear war "between either party
and third countries." In addition, this article is organically linked to the
following article in that the relationship between nuclear use and any use
of force is not separated, as it was in the Soviet resolution in the United
Nations.]
ARTICLE II
The two parties agree, in accordance with Article I and to
realize its objective, to proceed from the premise that they will refrain
from the threat or use of force by one party against the other, by one party
against the Allies of the other and by either party Against third countries,
in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security.
The two parties solemnly agree that they will be guided by these considera-
tions in the formulation of their foreign policy and in their actions in the
field of international relations.
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[Comment: As already indicated, the language now links organically
the renunciation of force in this article to Article I concerning nuclear
use and makes the two matters dependent on one another. Furthermore,
whereas the Soviet draft stated that the two parties will be guided by-
this consideration" the draft agreement now states that "they solemnly
agree that they will be guided by these considerations," namely the
renunciation of force.]
ARTICLE III
The two parties undertake to develop their relations with each other
and with third countries in a way consistent with the above purposes.
[Comment: This article is also linked to the interpretation of the first
two articles, in that the objective of avoiding military confrontations and
reducing the danger of nuclear war and of nuclear u8e applies equally to
relations with third countries as well as between the U.S. and the USSR.
The second sentence of the previous draft of this article has been deleted
because it was too bilateral in nature, and its basic ideas have been put
into the preamble.]
ARTICLE IV
If at any time relations between the parties or between either party
and third countries appear to involve the risk of a nuclear conflict, or if
relations between states not parties to the Agreement appear to involve
the risk of nuclear war between the U. S. and USSR or between either of
them and third countries, the United States and the Soviet Union, acting
in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, will immediately
enter into urgent consultations with each other and make every effort to
avert this risk.
[Comment: First, the draft agreement now takes into account the
observation concerning the clause "relations between states not parties
to the Agreement" by limiting this reference to "the risk of nuclear war
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between the U.S. and USSR or between either of them and third countries";
thus there is no implication of a generalized right of interference. Second-
ly, in any situation where there was a danger of nuclear war, consultations
between the U.S. and USSR would no doubt occur in any event. Thirdly,
in case of the threat of nuclear war between the Soviet Union and a third
country, this article provides the obligation for prior consultation with the
U.S.; if this obligation were not met, this would justify the drawing of
conclusions by the U.S.}
ARTICLE V
Each party shall be free to inform the Security Council, the
Secretary General of the United Nations and the Governments of allied
or third parties of the progress and outcome of consultations initiated in
accordance with Article IV of this Agreement.
[Comment: This article has been broadened to include the Security
Council, the UN Secretary General and third parties as well as allies.]
ARTICLE VI
Nothing in this Agreement shall affect or impair
(a) the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense,
provided for by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to
the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security;
(c) the obligations undertaken by the United States and the Soviet
Union toward their allies or other countries in treaties, agreements and
other appropriate instruments.
[Comment: In paragraph (c) there is the addition of "other appropriate
instruments" in which the U.S. would propose to include exchanges and
letters with third countries or unilateral American obligations expressed
in appropriate documents such as Presidential letters.]
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AGREEMENT
betWeen the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the United States of America
on
the prevention of nuclear war
The United States and the Soviet Union
Guided by the objectives of strengthening world peace and
international security;
Conscious that nuclear war could have devastating consequences
for mankind;
Proceeding from obligations under the Charter of the United
-Nations regarding the maintenance of peace, refraining from the
threat or use of force, and the avoidance of war;
Proceeding from the basic principles of relations between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
signed in Moscow on 29 May, 1972,
'Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
The United States and the Soviet Union solemnly agree to remove
the danger of nuclear war and of the use of nuclear weapons. Accord-
ingly the USSR and the US attach great importance to the prevention of
occurence of the situations which can cause dangerous aggravation of
relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Proceeding
from this they will do all that is necessary not to allow military
confrontations and to exclude an outbreak of nuclear war between them.
ARTICLE II?
The two parties, acting in the spirit to achieve the Objectives of
Article I, ,will refrain from the threat or use of force by one party
against the other, by One party against the allies of the other, and by
either party against third countries in circumstances which may enclaver
internttional reeace and security. They ,will be guided by this consideration
in the forn-le,lation of their foreign policies and in their actions in the fic:1d
o inte-z-n7.t'onal affairs.
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ARTICLE III
The two parties undertake to develop their relations with each
other and vr'.17.1-1 third states in a way consistent with the above purposes.
flisAqr3ement in no way affects the interests of third countries and
has as its sole aim the prevention of nuclear war, of the threat of its
outbreak, and the preservation of peace.
ARTICLE IV
If at any time the relation's of one or both of the parties. to this
Agreement with each other Or with.. a state or states not parties to this
Agreement appear to involve the risk of a nuclear conflict, or if rela-
tions between states not parties to the Agreement appear to. involve
such a risk; .the United States and the Soviet Union, acting in accordance
with the provisions of this Agreement, will immediately enter into ? .?
urgent consultations with.each.other and make every effort to.avert.this
?risk. .
ARTICLE V ?
Each party shall be free to inform the Governments of allied
parties of the progress and outcome of consultations initiated in
accordance with Article IV of this Agreement.
ARTICLE VI
Nothing in this Agreement shall affect or impair:
a) the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence,
provided for by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations;
b) the provisions of the Charter of the -United Nations relating
to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security;
c) the obligations undertaken by the -United States and the Soviet:
Union towards third 'countries in appropriate treatieS and agreements.
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Afighority O;,,Q 0,44.%),
THt WHITE
IVE
ONLY
A HIN GTO N
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cc
V
AT ON
PARTICIP TS: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Winston,Lord, N8C Staff
Han Hsu, Deputy Chief of the PRC Liaison Office
Chien Ta-rung, Official of the PRC Liaison Office
Chi Chiao Chu, Official of the PRC Liaison Office
Mr. Kuo, Official ofihe PRC Mission to the
United Nations
C1C:
Tuesday, May 15, 1973
10a0 a. in. 11:00 a. rn.
The Map Rown, The White House
_ore D. tasinger. arrived, Mr Lord and the Chinese 'held... informal
ersation, Mr. Lord asked them if everything was .,going well and said
.thet.ihe..hs&.hear ,they haitnarrowed!.down their choices for ?a residence for
'Xitaison...:Office to .a ...couple of places. The ChineSe?responded that
were going :smoothly and confirmed that they had narrowed down
their choices. ..,.Lord...hoped.they.had..some chance for sightseeing.. and
..telasation, :.SO4.401.b.a.ssador Hari repI404...th4lhey,,,,4ad not bad to. work too
hard.. They bad been sightseeing on two 6e0aSons. Mr. Lord welcomed.
firstMr. Jnj Lroii New York and asked. him 11 was his,. time to. Washington.
?Mr. K 4 that it.40ke and...that:he bad cone On short notice :..jnet for a
1.co.uple Of.
Kuo sadthat he had heard about Mr. Lord's departure from the staff
fl"*" the news papers. mi.- Lord confirmed this, and he noted that he had
lked to Mrs. Wall about this and earlier to members of the Liaison Office.
Lord reviewed the reasons for his leaving, namely, rest, reflection,
recharge his batteries, and see more of his family. He reiterated that ,he
wouL4 stay in the Washington area and hoped to see the Chinese on a
personal basis. He said that he might be back in government some day,
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perhaps working for Dr. Kissinger, but that he needed to take a break
at this point! If he did come back, he would then be all the more efficient.
The Chinese repeated their regrets that Mr. Lord was leaving and their
hope to see him on a private basis and inquired about his replacement,
Mr ? Lord responded that the staff was being somewhat reorganized and
Dr. Kissinger was bringing in some good new people, but that in any event
there would be continuity. He cited Messrs. Howe (temporarily), Rodman,
and Solomon.
After ten minutesDr. Kissinger arrived and the meeting began.)
Dr. Kissinger. sorry I'm late. I was with the President, an I could
not get away. How is your search for housing progressing?
Az*bassaor There's been some slight progress. The Skyline place
has been ruled out.
Dr. Kissinger] You mean the one inSouthwest?
Ambassador Han: Yes. The Ramada Inn is not bad.
Dr. Kissinge : Where is that?
Chi and Mr, Lord: Thomas Circle, on 14th
Dr. Kissinger;it have some grounds?
Ambas sado,r There's a larger area thanin the mbassy Row Apartments.
There's a big swimming pool.
Dr singer: I will come for a swim. Has there been any progress in
ding a residence?
Ambassador Han: No.
Dr. Kissinger: First, you are concentrating on finding an office and then
the residence. I'm eager for your cook to arrive. (Laughter)
tre
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EXP..,MPTION cxrupogy
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We are also hoping for an early arrivall.
I am sure of that.
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eciate your agreeing to see rn here, Mr. Ambassador. It is very
cult for me to go to New York since Pm leaving tomorrow for Paris.
I wanted the Prime Minister to have an a ount of our meeting. (Mr. Lord
indicated to V. Kissinger while this was being translated that the Chinese
wished to keep the meeting secret. They had told Mr. Lord this as they
were walking from their car to the Map Room.) We can keep this meeting
secret very easily. The entrance at this point of the White House is not
known to the press. If you are seen, we will say that it concerned
preparations for housing and technical things. But there is no possibility
that it will be seen.
Ambassador Ram, Our hope is that this meeting Will be, as previous meetings,
kept secret.
Dr. Kissinger: You can be sure that from our side there will be no discus sth
of it. just on the one chance.in a thousand that someone sees you drive out
this has never happened before -- we will just say this is a routine visit
connected with technical arrangements for hoUsing. There' s.no
I'm just protecting against the possible chance. I use this room for meetings
when I do not want them to become known.
Let me talk about my visit to Moscow and my general impressions. I spent
four days in Zavidovo, which is the hunting lodge of the Politburo. Most
of my time was in conversations with General Secretary Brezhnev. First
talk to you about matters that concern the United States and the Soviet
Union. Then let me talk about what we said concerning China. And then
let me tell you what our policy is, because it is important that Peking and
Washington understand each other completely.
First let me talk to you about the various drafts of the nuclear proposals
given you every previous draft, and I have attached the last draft that the
Soviet Union gave us, and where it stands now after discussion there.
(Dr. Kissinger writes an addition on one of the attachments that he is
about to hand over.)
that the Soviet Union has made to us. (He pulls out his
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Let explain what we are trying to do. If we want to establish a
condominium with the Soviet Union, we don't need a treaty. We've had
many offers to that effect. If we want to gang up with China against
the Soviet Union we don't need to make any arrangements, as I will
explain to you later. What we are trying to do first of all is to gain
some time. Secondly, to establish a legal obligation as between us and
the Soviet Union that requires the Soviet Union to consult with us before
taking any military acts, so if they do take any military actions without
consultng us, they will have taken unilateral acts which gives us the
basis for common action, which we do not now os sass with regard to
third countries. So what we have done in our discussions, which are
not yet finally completed, is first of all to insist that any obligation
that applies between us and the Soviet Union applies also between the
Soviet Union and third countries. Secondly, that the objective of not
using nuclear weapons can be realized only if the a renunciation of
the use of any force. Thirdly, any consultations that occur between us
and the Soviet Union are confined to those cases where the two countries
might go to war against each other or they might threaten a war against
a third country. Thirdly (sic) where it says in the draft that nothing
should impair existing agreements, etc., the Soviet Union wanted only
to say when there are treaties and formal agreements, and we insisted
that it should include "other appropriate instruments" such as letters
and communiques.
Ambassador Ban: That's the fourth point.
Dr, Kis stake Yes.
should impair . ?
Dr. Kissinger: (reading from the draft treaty) "Nothing in this agreement
shall affect or impair the obligations undertaken by the United States and
the Soviet Union toward their allies or other countries in treaties, agreements,
and other appropriate instruments."
We have prepared a document on where this now stands with our explanation
of what it means, for whatever views you want to express. There are three
basic objectives. First, to gain time. Secondly, to force the Soviet Union
if it engages in military actions to do so out of a posture of peace rather
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phere of tension. Thirdly, it gives us legal obligations for
our positiOn in case of countries where we don't have formal arrangements.
(Be hands over the annotated current draft and the previous version that
the Chinese had seen, attached at Tab A).
Mr. The second principle concerned . could you kindly repeat his?
Dr. Icis)dnger: We want to make sure that when the Soviet Union attacks it
will be from a posture of relaxation of tension immediately to war, rather
than from a prolonged period of tension which confuses the issue.
Of course, no one knows we are giving you this. The single-spaced part
is our comment.
While talking on this Subject, let me mention a discussion with Mr. Brezhnev
t concerned China. Brezhnev took me hunting one day, which is a sport
ve never engaged in (the Chinese smile). In fact he went hunting, and
at walked along. In the Soviet Union one hunts from the stand in the
eS with the animals below, so it is not excessively dangerous. After
the shooting was over Brezhnev had a picnic lunch brought in, and it was
Just he and I and one interpreter. In this conversation he expressed his
extremely limited admiration of China. (Laughter from the Chinese.) And
he is a somewhat less disciplined and controlled leader than your Prime
Minister. That is not new. That has been done before.
But then he said the Soviet Union and the United States had a joint obligation
to prevent China from becoming a big nuclear power. And he said, "do you
consider China an ally?" I said, "no, we don't consider it an ally ? we
consider it a friend." He said, "well you can have any friends you want,
but you and we should be partners" -- he meant Moscow and Washington.
He repeated again that we have a joint responsibility to prevent China from
becoming a nuclear power. And I said we recognize no such joint
responsibility. That was it, in effect. The rest was simply tirades about
China which there is no sense in repeating -- things like big power chauvinism,
and as soon as you are strong enough you will also turn on us. That sort
of thing, immaterial.
Then on the last day, I flew from that lodge to Moscow just to Stop at our
Embassy for 15 rni.nutes, and I was accompanied by Dobrynin, their
Ambassador here. I4e said that Brezhnev had asked him to make sure
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that I understood that the conversationt the huiting stand was meant to
be serious and not a social conversation. He said be wanted to know
whether there existed a formal agreement between the People's Republic
and the United States. I said there didn't exist any agreement, but there
existed appropriate instruments which we took from this draft, and that
in any event we will be guided by our national interest -- which we had
expressed in the President's Annual Report.
These were all the conversations which concerned China . . except every
time we mentioned third countries here, Gromyko wortid say that we were
acting as the lawyer for China. Our views remain exactly as expressed
by me to the Chairman and the Prime Minister, and by the President in
his lettere to the Chairman and the Prime Minister. We continue to
believe that it should be the objectives of both our governments to continue
to accelerate normalization to the point where it becomes clear that we
have a stake in the strength and independence of the People's Republic.
I would be prepared., if the Prime Minister wanted, to come to Peking
in August after the summit here in order to make a visit. It wouldn't have
to be as long as previous visits because we've had basic talks. Maybe two
days, or two or three days. If the Prime Minister -- we mentioned this
in New York once -- were considering a visit to the United Nations, we
would, of course, give him a very warm reception here in Washington,
or if he would come only to Washington. Then we could announce that in
the summer. But we could think of other res to symbolize this.
I have a self-interest in this anyway because if those two things happen,
Winston Lord would certainly come back from vacation. So you should
also consider it from this wide perspective.
This is the general perspective. I also want to tell you that even though
there are many changes in the staff, such as the departure of Winston Lord,
there are also some compensations like the return of General Haig to the
White House. And you can count on the continuity f our policy that we
have been pursuing.
Those are the most important things from Moscow. Now I want to tell you
a few minor things,
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With tee
except goner
-7-
SALT, we do not foresee an agreement' year on anything
rinciples. (To Lord) Did we give them our latest proposal?
Mr. (to (to Kissinger): We gave them th Soviet p
posal.
Dr. Kissing.er: By the end of this week we will give you our proposal, so
you know s being discussed in Geneva. We are working on this proposal
this week. roi. my conversations in Moscow it's quite Clear that there
will, be no concrete agreement except on general principles, and those
principles are not yet worked out. When they are, we will show them to you.
They will not be distinguished by excessive precision.
On MBFR there was practically no discussion except for the timing of
negotiations later this year. We will also give you a summary of the position
we are discussing with our allies. We have not yet discussed it with the
Soviet Union. We will do that next week.
We are also preparing for the Summit a number of bilateral agreements of
the same sort as last year -- agricultural research, oceanography, cultural
exchange, civil aviation.
onornic side, it was simply another reiteration by the Sovietaders
d for long term credits,
Again, we want to repeat that anything we are prepared to do with the Soviet
UrtiOU we are prepared to do with the People's Republic. And conversely, we
may be prepared to do things with the People's Republic that we are not
prepared to do with the Soviet Union.
Those are the major things I discussed in the Soviet Union.
As to the visit of Brezhnev, he will be here eight days. He will spend five
probably in Washington and two in Los Angeles or San Clemente. We haven't
decided yet on some place in. between, it may be Key Biscayne, it may be
Detroit -- he is crazy about automobiles.
You know I'm going to Paris on Thursday to meet with I can't call him
Special Advisor anymore, he's the Deputy Prime Minister now (Laughter).
Again I want to 'repeat what I've said to Ambassador Huang Hua and the
Prime Minister, that it is really in the interest of all countries to bring
about an observance of the ceasefire.
1.0P SECRET /SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/13: LOC-HAK-462-3-8-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/13: LOC-HAK-462-3-8-7
AyAbort
TOP SECRETi Ti
X
e say one thing about all the domestic excitement you find in the
United States at this point. Once you are here for some time you will
see that there are always fits of hysteria descending on Washington in
which people talk about nothing else. And six months later Ws difficult
to remember exactly allithe details of the controversy. The conduct of
foreign policy is unaffected, and may in fact be even slightly strengthened
in some fields, because many of our opponents may even want to show
how responsible they are. It will become clear within the next two months
that control of foreign policy in the government is being strengthened.
Se the lines is down in the conversations in February in Peking were
fixed and will be pursued with vigor, and I would not let the noise here
in Washington be too distracting.
On Korea uld like to give You an anser I two weeks. Frankly I
have not had time to prepare an adequate an
Cotton textiles. You sent us a note. W&ve asked the agencies not to
pursue this subject until your Ambassador comes here We have certain
legal obligations imposed on us by the Congress. I can tell you now that if
our relations are ever impaired it will not be because of cotton textiles.
[laughter] This is an issue that will be easily settled.
I don't know whetbev the Ambassadorhas anything. [The Chinese discuss
among themselves.]
Amt...,2alatm_f3ttn: I have two things I would like to take up with Dr. Kissinger.
The first thing is that the day before yesterday, on the 13th, there was a
demonstration here against us in which, according to reports, they burned
the national flag.
Pr. Icissinger We regret this deeply. It is inexcusable. We will do the
maximum permitted under law to prevent this. We cannot prevent demon-
strations in authorized places. We will do our best to minimize these
incidents. And when we can physically stop them, we will, of course, stop
them. I know I express the view of the President and the whole U.S. Govern-
ment when I speak of our regret over this incident.
TOP SECRET./SESITIVE
EXCLUSIVE Y EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/13: LOC-HAK-462-3-8-7
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/13: LOC-HAK-462-3-8-7
1,0 j.
'NARA Dee g
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
-9-
ba 0510r Han,. Another thing -- this is a minor matter. The American
columnist, Mr. Marquis W. Childs, he is in Peking now, and he told our
people that Dr. Kissinger suggested that he call on the Premier.
Dr. Kissinger; I'm a great admirer of the Premier and therefore I atwa
think it is of *benefit for someone to see him. I think Marquis Childs is
basically so well disposed toward China and so eager to be helpful that ft
might be in your interest if the Prime Minister saw him. He will certainly
write very favorably, and is socially well-connected so that what he brings
back will be very positive. But except for this I have no personal interest.
If the Prime Minister is too busy it would not be considered a personal
affront to me. (There is discussion among the Chinese.)
ys
Ambassador Han: About keeping this meeting secret from the press. If in
the one of a dozen possibilities we were seen as you mentioned. . .
Dr. .Ks singer: I won't say anything. I will deny that I saw you.
Ambassador Han: . . We will say that it was
addition to an ordinary call we will say that we
the incident on the 13th.
P.P... Kissinger: That is fine. That is all right.
opportunity to say anything. (laughter) There
being seen. (To Mr. Lord) Correct?
an ordinary call and in
expressed our regret over
We should not look for an
s practically no chance of your
Mr. Lor: That's right.
Dr. Kissinger: I'm glad to see my old friend (Mr. ao). I hope the
Ambassador will come here.
Mr. Kvot I came on very short notice.
. Kiseinge I know about the system -- we will work it out.
Mr. M Solomon and Mr. Romberg are working this out.
rme?re WAS some more light talk during which Dr. Kissinger said that US
policy wouldn't change with Mr. Lord's absence although it would be less
efficient. He was counting on Mr. Lord's getting bored on the outside and
also on the good sense of his Chinese wife.]
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/13: LOC-HAK-462-3-8-7
Mt/MEM
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/13: LOC-HAK-462-3-8-7
,7v
TISENS TIVE
Y EWES ONLY 40-
D. I saw that Ambassador Bruce arrived yesterday. We
need to expand our office
[laughter]
ince 10,000 Americans want to work there.
You still d nit know when your Ambassador arrhe
A,nabaseask?r Han: There is still no news. As soon s we do know, we will
let you know. Solomon asked Mr. Chi whether the Ambassa:lor might
come while you are in Paris. [Dr. Kissinger indicates puzzlement.)
A
Ambass
We have no news. He was just wondering if the
come while you were away.
Pr ?Kissinger: Whenever he does come he will be
course, President will see him very soon after
Han: We are looking foward to that.
elcorned. Of
val.
i,..11E&O.S:4 It is always a pleasure to see our friends. I win leave
first and separately so that you can leave more discreetly.
[There were then cordial farewells. Mr. Lord checked to make sure that
there were no people around to notice the Chinese departure. There was
a brief discussion in which Mr. Lord told the Chinese that they should
contact Mr. Lord the next day or two, and after that, Mr. Howe. Mr. Lord
again indicated he was looking forward to seeing the Chinese on a personal
basis. He asked Mr. Kuo to give his warm regards to Ambassador Huang
FIlla and Mrs. Shill. in New York. There were then very warm farewells as
Mr. Lord escorted the Chinese to their limousine waiting at the diplomatic
entrance. j
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/13: LOC-HAK-462-3-8-7