YOUR MEETING WITH DAVID BRUCE: CHINA MATTERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-462-8-24-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: August 31, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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i'viEMOItANDUM IP
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
DOS Review Completed.
INFORMATION
August 31, 1973
HENRY A. KISSINGER
L. S. EAGLEB
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
Your Meeting with David Bruce:
China Matters
1. Your Trip: As Ambassador Bruce knows, we proposed some time
between October 21-29, or October 3-6. (The notes we gave the Chinese
are at Tab A.) On Wednesday, Ch'iao told Bruce that they "welcome
your visit to China in October. "
2. Chinese Political Developments: Ambassador Bruce's report of his
conversation with Ch'iao is at Tab B. It was far from profound. Ch'iao gave
assurances, however, that the development of our relations should
be considered normal." You will be interested in Bruce's judgment of
the significance of the 10th Party Congress. (Solomon's analysis is at
Tab C.)
3. North Korean Dernarche: The Jenkins /Holdridge report on their
meeting with the North Koreans at the USLO is at Tab D. The Koreans
asked about privileges and immunities at the UN. We have asked for
Rush's recommendations on responding to the North Korean inquiries.
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5. USLO Housing in Peking: USLO had been told we would lose two out
of four senior-level apartments. At Bruce's request, we raised the
matter here with Chi Ch'iao Chu and Tsien Ta-yung. Chi said they
"understood our request." We have received no other feedback here.
(There are hints in Peking, however, that the Chinese are corning around.)
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HAKTO
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August 23, 1973
TO: AMBASSADOR BRUCE
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER I IT
Many thanks for the thoughtful note from you and Evangeline. 1
greatly appreciate your good wishes.
We have just passed to Han Hsu the following note and accompanying
oral comment: [Quote textsattached].
State will be requesting your early return for consultations.,
greatly need your sage counsel regarding organizational and personnel
moves which need to be made in the Department.
As noted in the oral comment, you should seek meeting with Chou
and Ch'iao Kuati-hua before you leave. Should they have any urgent business
which cannot await my visit to Peking, would appreciate you initiating the
dialogueion which we can then confer while you are here.
We are seeking views of Habib and President Park on North Korean
request to meet with one of your people. We are inclined to accept but
will advise you shortly. In the meantime, please inform the North Koreans
that you are waiting for instructions.
Warm regards.
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The dates suggested by the Chinese side in the note passed on
August 17 are not now convenient for the U.S. side because of
impending change in U.S. Government organization with which the
Chinese side is now undoubtedly familiar.
However, Dr. Kissinger would consider, especially in light of
these changes, an exchange of views with the Chinese side highly
desirable. The best time for Dr. Kissinger to visit China would be
for any three-day period between October 21 and October 29. If this
is inconvenient or if the Chinese side considers an earlier meeting
desirable, Dr. Kissinger could visit the People's Republic of China
from October 3 through October 6? .
Dr. Kissinger would appreciate the views of the Chinese side
on the specific dates suggested.
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Oral Comment
Dr. Kissinger has, in addition, a personal comment which he
wishes to make to the Prime Minister.
As far as Dr. Kissinger is concerned, U.S. -Chinese relations
constitute a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. He further considers
that, in light of the great danger which he foresees, it is increasingly
important that synchronization between the policies of the United States
and the People's Republic of China take place. As stated in the note,
Dr. Kissinger is certainly prepared to visit China, but it will not be
possible for him to do so while his confirmation hearings before the
Senate are taking place and during the period of the opening of the fall
session of the United Nations General Assembly. If it is considered by
the Chinese side to be essential, Dr. Kissinger could visit China between
October 3 and October 6, but by far the most convenient time would be
between October 21 and October 29.
Dr. Kissinger is recalling Ambassador Bruce for a week or so
in order that Ambassador Bruce may assist him in the reorganization
or the Department of State. Ambassador Bruce will request an appoint-
ment with the Prime Minister and the Vice Foreign Minister before his
departure. If they will give Ambassador Bruce any messages they may
have, Bruce will be authorized to discuss any interim measures which
may be appropriate prior to Dr. Kissinger's visit.
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PEKING 37
August 29 3.973 .
TO:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
?HENRY A.
KISSINGER
DAVID BRUCE
My Meeting with Chliao Kuan-hua
1. I called on Ch'iao
at 11:00 on August 29,
In addition to Ch'iao,
i-Hua, and Chen Jo-Yun
Kuan-hua at Ministry of Foreign Affairs
accompanied by Jenkins and Holdridge.
on Chinese side were Lilping, Chao Ch'
all from Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. After usual preliminaries I asked if Chinese had received
report of your conversation with Han Hsu. Ch'iao responded
affirmatively. -I then noted that your conversation had
consisted of two sessions, one written and the other oral.'
In the oral presentation, you had spoken of the great importance
you attached to the relationship between the PRC and US, and
that you regarded it as essential to synchronize policies
between our two countries. I noted that several days later you
had sent a message to me saying you hoped before I left that I
would see Ch'iao and Prime Minister Chou and to ask if they
would not be helpful in connection with your new appointment
by outlining Chinese views of the current relationship between
China and the US. I added that I had been informed only this
morning that on Saturday you had expected to see our Ambassadors
to South Korea, India, and the Phillipines, plus others,
presumably including those from the Asian region. This indicated
the importance which you attach to complications on Asian
affairs.
3...Turning .to.the.timing of your assuming your new position,
I said that present Secretary of State would relinquish office
formally on September 3, after which your' nomination required .
confirmation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee headed
by Senator rulbright and, if after SYRC approved your appointment,
nomination would be submitted to full Senate. Ordinarily, the
consent of the Lull Senate to SFRC report was forthcoming
quickly, but I surmised during your appearance before the
committee would be questioned on a great number of problems and
process might be lengthy. I did not know when the hearings
would commence, but they were likely to do so by next week.
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y
I told Ch'iao that this Was background until you were confirmed
- and that in meantime you were known as "Secretary of State-
Designate."
4. I observed also that one of the questions which would be
asked of you was your views on the status of relationship between
our two countries, and assumed for that reason a frank expression
by Ch'iao as .to this relationship would be useful to you,
including reference to those areas of differences which could
create problems for us. In other words, I said, I was almost
asking Ch'iao to deliver a monologue.
S. With reference to relations between our two countries,
Ch'iao stated that during your visit to China, especially
February visit, both sides had exchanged views fully. As for
actual situation in relations between our two countries, something
objective existed: I was in Peking and the Chinese had their
Liaison Office in Washington. This signified that our relations
were "developing". As to Ch'iao' s views on these relations,
he felt that you had your own views and the Chinese had theirs.
To sum Up, Ch'iao said, he felt we both understood each other
regarding our differences and area of agreement. The Shanghai
Joint Communique was an example, because it both stated .
differences and points of accord. This was our new style - not
? to attempt to hide our differences, but to admit them frankly.
Ch,lao credited you with having contributed much to the joint
communique in the course of drafting
6. Ch'iao next declared that he thought "the development in
our relations should be considered normal." He noted that last
time he and I exchanged views we had discussed state of mutual
relations as well as general situation. All he wanted to know
was to ask me to convey congratulations .of Prime Minister,
Foreign Minister Chi, as well as his own on your appointment
as Secretary of State. Ch'iao said that Chinese "welcome your-
visit to China in October." They would be in touch with us
sometime later on as to specific date'. Aside from this mater,
there was nothing else new which they would like to discuss Witn
me. If anything came up-while I was in the U.S., he would get
in touch with Jenkins and Holdridge. He wished me Bon Voyage and
hoped my journey would not be too tiring.
7. I prodded Chliao as to whether he foresaw any specific
problems which might cause either side.difficulties, other than
those which might flow from the differences of opinion already
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expressed in the joint communique. Ch/iao remarked that with the
differences already stated in the joint communique, new
differences might appear with new situations, but that would not bE
strange. But there was a good point here - both sides admitted
their differences and did not cover them up. We could have a
further exchange of views in the future.
End Section 1 of 2
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Final Section of Peking 37
8. I tried again to draw Chliao out on any problems, asking
if their were any immediate issues which had not been discussed
in the past or which you or your representatives in Washington
.
had not raised with their representatives. Were their such which
might cause concern in our relationship? Chliao replied that
"an our side sees it, there is not any immediate problem."
9. Nothing else of substance emerged from the conversation.
Chtiao proceeded to ask me about how much time it might take for,
your appointment to clear the Senate, probably in connection
with scheduling your visit to China, and I told him that the
SFRC hearings might extend over several days and, possibly a week_
Chliao said that as the Chinese saw it, your appointment was
welcomed by both U.S. political parties and people of different
circles in American society. I agreed, noting that reaction in
Europe had also been very favorable.- Chliao said he believed
that you would handle the hearings very well because your ability
was high -- he admired you for this. You also knew how to handle
correspondents. He wondered what the Japanese:reaction had been
to your appointment, to which Implied that their reaction was
not yet evident but they had respect for your knowledge and would
find from their standpoint your appointment would be a fortunate
one. In Europe our relations would certainly be strengthened,
including the negotiations going on between the U.S. and
European governments. I recalled your long background in
European affairs, going back to before time you had joined the
government.
10. Chtiao ended by promising a further conversation after r
returned.
11. Comment: Chliao appeared blandly non committal on the
State of US-PRC relations, but at least described them as being
good and as making progress via our respective liaison offices.
In view of the internal political events going on here at this
time, which we have reported both in this and in other channels,
it seems that Chinese at this time wish to keep their
relationship with us In the background so it does not intrude
unduly into whatever domestic political maneuverings may be going
on.
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12. In just the last few days Chinese have sharpened their
criticisms of the Soviet Union. While we are not attempting
to incourage such criticisms, the pointed singling out of the
USSR as an element hostile to China inevitably put Chinese
relationship with us in a better light internally. We ourselves
are not receiving a hostile press in Peking, although their is
occasional low-level iping in connection with Indo-China and
Korea. Incidentally, I deliberately did not raise Cambodian
situation with Ch'iao, believing if so, he would deal with this
in same way he dealt with state of US-PRC relations, i.e., "we
know where our differences lie."
13. Although Ch!lao was as usual polite and amiable it was clear
that he had no desire to prolong a conversation that was degenerat-
ing into pleasantries. At no point was any reference made to%the
?
Prime Minister except my mentioning instructions from you to call
On him and on Ch'iao, and the message of congratulations from
Prime Minister to you.
14. Warm Regards.
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
URGENT INFORMATION
CONFIDENTIAL August 29, 1973
. ? ? ?
? MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER
FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMONW
SUBJECT': Chinese Communist Party Concludes
10th Congress: Chou En-lai Holds the Line
IgCNA announced today that the Chinese Communist Party held its 10th
National Congress between August 24 and Z8. The official press corn-
xnunique'of the Congress -- which was said to have been held
"solemnly" in Peking with Chairman Mao presiding -- conveys the
impression of a very brief series of meetings focussed on leadership
problems that have not been fully resolved. There is no indication
that the contentious social and economic problems which have been
visibly debated in the press in the past two months were dealt with by
the Congress; indeed, Chou En-lai and his supporters probably sought to
avoid such debate and limit the Congress agenda to issues on which they
could preva9,. the leadership lineup partially revealed by the Congress
communique indicates that Chou strengthened the organizational position
of his supporters, while Mao's wife slipped somewhat in her position-
The followin_g are the most interesting points revealed in. the Congress
commu.niqu?:
The pin Piao "anti-Party clique" was "indignantly denounced" by
the Congress. This is the first time that Lin,.. and his co-conspirator
Chien Po-ta, have been explicitly named in the press,. They were said to
have been expelled from the Party for their crimes. Curiously, the
milita.ry leaders Involved in the Lin plot were not named, and only indirect
reference was :made to Congress approval of "measures taken with regard
to them," This suggests that the leadership continues to tread cs.uti.?ously
in its relations with the military. Most surprising, the communique
indicates that the effects of the Lin Piao affair have not been settled
when it states that the Congress decided, "At present we should continue
to put the task of criticizing Lin Piao.... above all else. "
CONFIDENTIAL or*
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CONIrTDENTIAL
-- Leadership relations, as' revealed in the communiqud, indicate
Chou En-lai further consolidating his organizational position. Two
long-tin-Le leaders associated with the Premier, one an agricultural
specialist, who had been purged during the Cultural Revolution were
rehabilitated and named. to the new Central Committee. The Shanghai
leader Chang Ch.'un-chliao ? once associated with the "left", but in
the past three years increasingly a Chou man ? was Secretary-
General of the Congress. His protege' Wang Hung-wen (age 31),_ was
the most notable young individual advanced, by the meetings. In a
meteoric rise to prominence, Wang delivered a report to the Congress
on the revision of the Party constitution._ He also appears to have been
elevated, to the Politburo Standing Committee. At the same time, Chiang
Ch'ing (Mao's wife) and her protege' Yao Wen-y-uan, appear to have
slipped several notches in the leadership ranking. (Confirmation of
this, however, awaits a formal announcement of the new Politburo,
which may not come for a week or so.)
? The Congress apparently was very C01113 CiOU of the process of
generational transition; and of the succession problem. Reference was
made to the fact that the new Central Committee "embodies a combina-
tion of the old, the middle aged., and the young," and that the Party "has
no lack of successors." It remains unclear whether the new Party
Constitution embodies an institutional mechani13111 for handling the suc-
cession problem, however, Hopefully, this document, and Chou En-lai's
political report to the Congress, will be published in Coming days, thus
helping us to clarify the results of the meetings.
-- International affairs were characterized by "great disorder on the
earth." The chaos, however, was said. to be a good thing, and not a bad
thing." The Party stressed the need to uphold "proletarian internation-
alism" and oppose "the hegemonism of the two superpowers ? the U. S.
and the USSR." There was no explicit reaffirmation in the Congress
document of the current PRC foreign policy orientation, but the election
of Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fel, Vice Minister Chita? Kuan-hua, and.
Ambassadors Huang Chen and Huang Hua to the Central Committee implies
strong continuity for Chou's positions.
The communique' ends on an ominous note by calling on the Chinese people
to "strengthen without fail their preparations against wars of aggression...
particularly against surprise attacks by social-imperialism and be ready
to wipe out resolutely, thoroughly, wholly and. completely, any enemy that
dare invade us!"
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CONFIDENTIAL
In sum, Chou En-lai (and Mao) appear to have held the line on their
current policies, but apparently continue to it on an unstable set of
leadership relations (particularly in dealings with the military). The
Congress does not appear to have built a consensus on a range of
social and economic issues facing China. In an ironic way, the
failure of the Congress to wrap up the Lin Pia? affair -- the call for
continuing criticism of the man and. his plotting; and renewal of Mao's
admonition, "Be open and aboveboard; don(t intrigue and conspire" --
conveys the image of a political system hung up on its own problems,
in a manner reminiscent of things closer to home. At the same time,
Premier Chou has strengthened his organizational position. with the
election to the Central Committee of men close to him. Thus, he
has added resources to build for the future.
These initial impressions of the results of the 10th Congress hopefully
will be strengthened and elaborated in more detail by documentation
(Chou's political report, the new Party Constitution) which may be
made public in coming days.
CONFIDENTIAL
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PEKING 034
August 28, 1973
TO: KENRY A.: KISSINGER
FROM: DAVID BRUCE
SUBJECT: Call, on jUSLO by North Korean Charge in Peking
1. North Korean Charge Li Jaepil, accompanied by First Secretary
Sin Jido, called on USLO per his request at 5:30 P.M., 27 August.
They were received by Jenkins and Holdridge. Li drove into US
compound in large Hungchcm'i Limousine, but I do not believe
he was observed except by members of our immediate staff and
the Chinese P.L.A. guards at the gate.
2. Li did not waste time on pleasantries and promptly got
down to business. Referring to fact that members of DPRK
Permanent Observer Mission to UN had already obtained U.S.
visas from U.S. Embassy in Moscow, he handed over list of this
mission (they will be forwarded by SEPTEL).
3. Li-then stated he wanted to discuss some problems directly
concerned with entry into U.S. of members of DPRIC staff Permanent
Observer Mission. He understood that U.N. Secretary General
Waldheim had reached agreement with U.S. government on question
of treatment of DPRK Mission after which Waldheim had informed
North Koreans (by letter on June 29) that their personnel would
receive every convenience. However, Li wanted a direct reply
from U.S. government confirming that DPRX Permanent Observer
to the UN and all other members of his mission would be
provided with:
'. a. Diplomatic privileges and perogatives in accordance
with international law and practices;
b. Guarantee of safety of Permanent Observer and mission
members;
c. Inviolability of DPRKs missions office building houses,
Property, conveyances, etc.
d. Insurance of: inviolability of cryptographic communicatior
and diplomatic courier services;
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e. Guarantee of exemption from trial, exemption from
inspection of luggage at point of entry;
f. Right to fly national flag.
Li laid particular stress on U.S. government providing
official guarantee to DPRk government on personal safety of
its Permanent Observer to the UN and other members of his
mission, and anticipated that this would be forthcoming
"considering that your government respects international
law and practices."
4. Jenkins told Li that we would be glad to transmit this
request and'would ask for a detailed reply as soon as
possible. He expressed confidence that normal diplomatic
privileges and protection would be extended to the Nort1.1
Koreans in New York and they would be afforded those things
necessary for the successful and safe operation of their
mission. Holdridge added that U.S. took its position as
host government for the UN very seriously. In response to
remark from Li that North Korean Embassy in Peking would be
waiting for U.S.. reply, Jenkins stated that we would be in
touch with them as soon as answer received.
S. Li then raised question of meaning of C-3-visa which had
been issued to Koreans in Moscow. After checking Jenkins
Provided him with explanation on this point.
S. Jenkins suggested to Li that it would be in interest of
both parties not to arrouse speculation as to why this meeting
had takenplace, and accordingly proposed that it be kept
secret. Li said that he fully understood and also hoped that
meeting and subject discussed would not be publicized. He
pointed out that meeting was significant in that it was perhaps
the first time such a contact between diplomats of DPRK and
U.S. had occurred. Li at this point declined offer of
refreshment from Jenkins and departed pleading pressure of
business, but hoped that more time would be available later on.
7.. We here now are obliged to follow up with information and
assurances requested by North Koreans. I trust that this will
not present any particular difficulties for you, and that we
?
will be in a position to reply to them soon. You will note
that they spoke of ttguaranteet regarding security and other
matters affecting their UN mission. I assume that we will not
go beyond the confines of arrangements normally offered other
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UN missions, including those of countries we do not recognize.
8. I have the impression that despite the relatively non-
substantive nature of this initial contact, the North Koreans
had somewhat something larger in mind; namely, to test the
atmospherics in USLO and on the part of the U.S. government
toward further contacts of a possibly more substantive nature.
This might be deduced from the fact that North Koreans could
have approached the U.S. government in a number of different
locations, e.g., Moscow, regarding the questions which they
raised (or indeed coUld have gone through third parties such
as the Chinese). The appearance of the North Korean charge
in person rather than a lesser member of his staff lends further
height to my supposition. Pyong Yang could look upon Peking
as a convenient - and safe - place to deal directly with the
U.S. when or if such a course is determined. Peking is
probably aware of these considerations and may well have
encouraged the North Koreans in approaching us directly here.
In my opinion, the Chinese in all liklihood knew in advance of
the August 27 meeting.
'S. Warm Regards.
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