TALKER FOR YOUR CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-11-4-44-6
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2011
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: January 29, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

M] No Objection to Declassification in Full 2013/08/07: LOC-HAK-11-4-44-6
11111ATIONAL SECURITY COUNCP eliC S" t
_
ACTION
CECRET /SENSITIVE January 29, 1971
? MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HAIG
FROM: K. Wayne Smith
SUBJECT: Talker for Your Conversation with Ambassador
Sullivan
Introduction ?
We have two problems outstanding with Ambassador Sullivan:
He has stopped the work of the NSSM-99 Political Analysis
panel.
?
-- He has held up for over a week a cable (Tab D) on economic
analysis on Vietnam.
Your talking points at Tab A make concessiors on the first point in
exchange for specific pledges from Sullivan. On the second point,
Sullivan cannot be allowed to halt the NSSM-99 work or else we will
be back to square one with the Enke problem.
Background
Political Analysis Problem - At the January 15, 1970 SRG /fleeting,
HAK asked State to develop political issues in the context of NSSM-99.
At Tab Bare the relevant minutes,
We issued an outline for future NSSM-99 work. Sullivan wants to
delete the portions of this outline that are marked at Tab C, contending
that they are being considered at high levels, elsewhere, etc.
Meanwhile we understand from General Kharhos (ISA) that Laird-
Rogers are engaged in talks on a possible political initiative for
Indo-China. Sansom asked Kharhos if HAK was informed of this.
Kharhos wasn't sure but thought MAX'was aware of the discussions
but not the details.
NSS, DOS Reviews Completed.
relk.-E-TiSE NS yr IVE
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
My view on Sullivan'
-- I strongly believe an issues paper on the political issues
underlying a political strategy should be prepared.
-- I don't care if the NSSM-99 group prepares it. Moreover
as the last SRO meeting showed, State's political work for NSSM-99
has been very poor. Sullivan has probably played a role in sabotaging
this effort as he has all VSSG work that hasn't been stuffed down his
throat by HAI (viz ceasefire)
-- If Sullivan does do the work, you need to get a firm commit-
ment that it will be done and reviewed here before it goes into final
form. We don't need another worthless State paper on Vietnam
negotiation issues.
? -- The NSSM-99 State panel must do the work on political issues
associated with the military strategies. Ceasefires, partition, fixed
withdrawal date, coalition government and electoral concessions all
go to Sullivan, but the questions of Thailand (SEATO, etc), China,
and the viability of Laos and Cambodia must be treated in conjunction
with the NSSM-99 military strategies.
Smyser's view (as I understand it) is that we don't need a paper. You
may want to discuss his viewpoint with him. I believe the issues must
be discussed because:
- We can't be satisfied with our position until we have 'thought
through all the alternatives. Some argue that doing such a. paper
weakens IIAK's hand because all the old and new proposals will be
surfaced again. To the contrary, the NSC system is strengthened if
it can cope with the diverse views in town and refute the usually small-
minded arguments behind many of the far-fetched proposals. HAK's
position and the President's have been strengthened in the cases where
we have demanded a full analysis of the issues (viz NSSM-99 Cambodia
strategy and Ceasefire).
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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SECRET/SENSITIVE
North Vietnam is not going to leave the political initiative
with us. We played our card after the wet season and they will
? probably play one aftr the dry season offensive and before the
? 1.971 Presidential elections in South Vietnam. We must be prepared
? to respond.
? We can respond politically without rewarding North Vietnam's
intrasigence at Paris. The October 7 initiative showed this. In my
opinion we gave more than we had to give to get the political benefits
we sought (in going for in place instead of regroupment). But we did
this for the sake of negotiability, not for political effect.
Economic Study
We have gone to great effort in recent months to devise an analytical
plan on the Vietnamese economy that if carried out would vastly
strengthen our ability to make intelligent decisions on aid levels,
exchange rate policy, etc. for Vietnam. A crucial side-benefit would
be that Enke w9uld be denied his key argument that we are using only
a gap (monetary) model to make decisions.
We had AID/PPC, the AID Vietnam Bureau, State 7th Floor, DOD
(ISA and SA) and CIA on board on a cable to Saigon kicking off the
study. Sansom had talked with Cooper and obtained his concurrence
in principle.
Sullivan, about ten days ago stopped the cable. His argument.is
totally bureaucratic as far as we can tell. He contends there is a
scarcity of resources in the Mission. Cooper has no such problem
and he should know. But Sullivan held up the cable arguing that he
wanted to discuss it with Bunker hoping, no doubt, to kill another
VSSG project.
Sullivan needs to be informed that this stiady is important before
Bunker arrives. The study, which will develop an economic model
encompassing real output variables (production, exports, etc.) not
included in the gap model. we now use, would strengthen our
analytical position on such issues as those cited above.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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? V:
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111 111,
? Sullivan is operating on his own on this, although he got his ideas
? from the AID Vietnam Bureau which initially opposed the project
until forced under by AID/PPC. The record is clear on the com-
petence of the Vietnam Bureau -- their failures prompted the VSSG's
involvement and Cooper's visit and appointment in the first place.
The 7th Floor can't handle Sullivan who uses his own lines to HAK.
That's the reason for your call. Your talking points
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TALKING POINTS
Political Analysis
I. NSSM 99 study will not look into issues of ceasefires,
electoral changes, coalition government, fixed withdrawal dates,
etc., on assurances from you that a paper on these issues is being
done separately, thoroughly and analytically and with the participation
of a representative of the NSC staff.
? . The NSSM 99 study should, however, consider political
issues associated with the military strategies including:
the viability of Laos and Cambodia and political
measures to strengthen each;
a possible strengthening of regional ties;
China; ?
Thailand;
SEATO/Rusk-Thant, Taskin, etc.
LI
Economic Analysis
. The completion of the economic analysis on Vietnam for
NSSM 99 is an urgent requirement. It. should have priority over
SECRET/SENSITIVE
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?
SECRET/SENSITIVE
other analytical activities except for the immediate needs of the Mission.
? This has already been discussed with Cooper who has agreed that it
? should and can be done.
? 4. The payoff from this study will be a much stronger analytical
base for decisions on economic policy for Vietnam enabling us to:
determine long-term levels of assistance,
define an economic growth path for Vietnam,
cope intelligently and decisively with rnke-like
arguments that play on our acknowledged use of a weak
analytical tool (i.e. the gap model) by providing us with
a more sophisticated model encompassing real output
variables.
5. If additional resources are necessary to do the study, they
should be provided. The study is a major effort, important, and
--- should be completed as soon as possible.
6. Please clear the draft cable to Saigon on the economic analysis so
the necessary work will get done.
SECRET /SENSITIVE
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