"RE-ALIGNED CONFIGURATION" OF TWO U.S. DIVISIONS IN KOREA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-448-3-7-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 9, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/10/29: LOC-HAK-448-3-7-4
111P
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: John H. Hold idge
ACTION
July 9, 1970
NSS, State Dept.,
OSD reviews
completed
SUBJECT: "Re-aligned Configuration" f Two U.S. Divisions in
Korea
Ambassador Porter and General Michaelis have suggested that one way
for us to sass President Park's political problems over U.S. troop
reductions would be to retain both 13.5. divisions in a re-aligned
configuration involving the replacement of U.S. brigades being with-
drawn by ROK brigades. Divisional command would be retained by
the U.S. (See Ambassador Porter's back-channel message at Tab Z.)
You have asked if we could do this.
Theoretically speaking, there would appear to be no reason why the
re-alignment suggested by Ambassador Porter and General Michaelis
cannot be carried out. There is a long history of Koreans serving with
American units under U.S. command, dating all the way back to the
Korean war. KATUSAs (Korean Army troops assigned to U.S. Army
units) still are a feature of our forces in Korea, and the addition of two
ROK brigades to a U.S. division to replace two U.S. brigades would not
be a %oast change from this pattern. If it would meet President Ps.rk's poli-
tical desiderata of retaining what could be described two U.S. divisions.
we would want to consider carrying this recommendation out.
However, information which has Just been provided by Defense on our
proposed troop reductions indicates that one entire division is to be
withdrawn along with Army and Corps supporting units, leaving one
division consisting of eight maneuver battalions. The question here is
whether there would be enough of a U.S. framework remaining upon which
a mixed U.S. -ROK division under U.S. command could be assembled. it
might be possible to apportion the U.S. battalions in such a way as to
provide a nucleus for two divisions, with the rest madeof ROK., but I
suspect that Defense would balk at having U.S. forces in such a minority
position. This would also require around four ROK brigades, not the two
TrIp gir;cit.FT
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/10/29: LOC-HAK-448-3-7-4
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/10/29: LOC-HAK-448-3-7-4
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TOP SECRET 2
which Ambassador Porter and General Michaelis call for in their proposal.
Alternatively one mixed division could be assembled, leaving the U.S.
division considerably under strength. Porter and Michaelis are evidently
operating on the assumption that two brigades from the U.S. 2nd Division
are to be removed, but that one will remain to which two ROK brigades
could be added. I recall from earlier discussions with Defense on U.S.
force reductions in Korea that Defense was thinking in such terms, but
the signals appear to have been switched. Ambassador Porter might be
asked if his proposal is fully compatible with the latest Defense planning.
Assuming that this proposal is compatible with Defense planning, another
problem is involved: that of retaining U.S. forces along the DM7. One
feature of the present reduction plan is that with the exception of one company
rotated to Panmunjom for security duty from the rerna?ining U.S. divisions,
the ROKs would man the satire DMZ. Under Ambassador Porter's concept,
the two ROK brigades in the 2nd Division would assume places on the line,
thereby leaving what in name would be a full U.S. division along the DM7..
The advantages of a U.S. pull-back would then no longer obtain, i.e.
lowering the chances of a direct U. S. -North Korean confrontation from the
very outset of & significant North Korean military move across the DM7.
I believe that Ambassador Porter might be asked for his thoughts on this
issue.
Another immediate problem I can foresee is the purely technical one of
getting Ambassador Porter's message into regular instead of back channels.
It will be difficult for you to discuss this question with Secretary Laird or
anyone else in Defense until it has come to us through either State or
Defense channels. I suggest that a message go back to Ambassador Porter
telling him that we think this proposal has merit but recommend that he
forward it through regular State or Defense communications. We could
also ask him to address the two problems bestentioned above. I have drafted
a massage from you to Ambassador Porter to this effect (Tab A).
Larry Lynn concurs.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you clear the message to Ambassador Porter at Tab A.
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/10/29: LOC-HAK-448-3-7-4
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/10/29: LOC-HAK-448-3-7-4
- ?
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DRAFT MESSAGE FROM DR. KISSINGER TO AMBASSADOR PORTER
Yours and General Michaelis' suggestion' for the "re-aligned configuration"
of the U.S. divisions in Korea appears very interesting, and I believe
that it should be given full State and Defense consideration. To this end,
suggest that you put this matter into regular channels, using either State
or Defense communications as you consider appropriate. There is a
question in my mind about your suggestion's compatability with Defense
planning, however, since the latest word we have is that one entire
division is to be removed and that the remaining division will contain eight
maneuver battalions. -Is this a sufficient framework upon which to implement
your proposal? If so, I would also appreciate your thoughts as to whether
as signed
the presence on the DMZ of the ROK brigades/to a division under U.S.
command would in effect be stationing a full U.S. division on the line, and
1?41-11.."?;
whether this would be-desirable..-
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/10/29: LOC-HAK-448-3-7-4
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/10/29 : LO-HAK-448-3-7-4
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/10/29: LOC-HAK-448-3-7-4
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/10/29: LOC-HAK-448-3-7-4
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/10/29: LOC-HAK-448-3-7-4