CIA WORKING LEVEL VIEWS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-558-13-13-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: October 17, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/01/04 : LOC-HAK-558-13-13-4
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET/CODEWORD
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
MEMORANDUM FOR. GENERAI.~ HAIG
THROUGH: ~ ?~ Phil Odee
FROM: ~ Jbhn Eushnellf;'i "'
SUBJECT: CIA Working Level Views
On October 12 I spent the afternoon with about a dozen CIA Vietnam
division chiefs and analysts exploring their views of the situation and
problems of intelligence acquisition.
General Conclusions on Situation
The following points on which there seemed to be a working level
consensus are of interest.
-- There are na serious widespread logistics shortages for
the NVA now in the North ar South.
-- Imports into NVN are running at least at three-quarters
of the normal (last yeax) level.
-- Shortages of imports are not a problem; the bombing
problems are distribution, transportation within NVN, disruption,
storage dispersal, supply managexira.ent.
-- The analysts expect NVN to step up sea infiltration of
supplies as soon as VNAF takes aver the Market Time operations, not
because they cannot bring the supplies down the trail but because it is
cheaper and easier to bring them. in by sea, especially to Binh Dix~.h
and MR - 4 .
-- NVN and its Allies appear to be making pxeparations for
a long period of overland supply to NVN; the construction of the fourth
pipeline which the analysts expect will be matched by over 2Q0 miles
SECRET/CODEWORD
" INFORMATION
October 17, 1972
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/01/04 : LOC-HAK-558-13-13-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/01/04 : LOC-HAK-558-13-13-4
of xa.ew pipeline construction iii China would allow direct tanker to .
pipeline shipment (we do not yet have indications of pipeline construc-
tion in China however).
-- Recruitment/draft levels in NVN appear to have been at
record levels during September, assurix~.g availability of substantial
numbers far infiltration about December.
`~ ' -~- Training cycles in NVN have oat been reduced as they have
in the South.
-- There have oat been any replacement personnel infiltrated
-` to COSVN since May; all the substantial inflow has been to MR=1.
-- 'T'here has been very little repair of bomb damaged
industrial and electric facilities; there is no indication of import of
replacement. equipment and parts.
-- In short the general feeling is that NVN is on track for
continuing intensive efforts in the South during 1973; there are no
indications that any units will be pulled back into NVN or Cambodia.
Intelligence Assets Dawn
CIA will no longer be able to make judgexn.ents on logistic constraints
for the various southern fronts as they have in the past because of:
(2) the development of
many additional routes through the DMZ and route redundancy in
South Laos; (3) the great fall off in aerial photography a? the Laas Trail.
We continue to get pretty good inform.atian on volume of supplies
enter9ng the trail, partly because our bombing has forced the enemy
to go more extensively to radio instead of land-lines. However, even
this souxce is spotty and enemy radio blackouts could remove this
last resource an supply flows.
dur infarxnation on personnel infiltration continues to be good and is
even improving as additional transportation units use radio communica-
tion.
25X1
25X1
SECRET/CODDWORD
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/01/04 : LOC-HAK-558-13-13-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/01/04 : LOC-HAK-558-13-13-4 3
SECRET/CODS J.?
The amount of POW information getting back to Washington is limited
and decreasing as our presence goes down. It appears that much
material is available in SVN in Vietnamese. There is also an increas-
ing time lag in getting the material back. Same xeports being received
now are from interrogations six months ago. ?
Gomment:
However, contingency plans 25X1
might be madc~for intensive seeding should this become important far 25X1
maintaining acease-fire. We should be able to get an adequate amount
of aerial photography of South Laos. We should also improve our access
- to POW information on a current basis. Given the presence prablexn in
? SVN we should make provision to handle material in Vietnamese in the U. S.
Timing of Comprehensive Assessment
I explored when additional indicators which would be useful for assessing
capability and 'intentions for 1973 will be available.
Logistic movement south will speed up seasonally in November. But
the analysts would like L?o watch it fox a couple of months before they
can give a fix oxa. annual level and an direction.
The next major recruitment push will not be until about December. Those
recruited in December will be trained far infiltration. in March-May.
Tn short, capability can. be assessed anyti.xne. The CTA answer is
essentially that NVN has the capability to infiltrate at the 1972 level
of 250, 000 in 1973 and to provide the logistics suppoxt (tanks and
artillery may be another story dependent on the coxxirzYUnist Allies).
However, enemy intentions, what he actually will da in 1973, cannot
be assessed until about January when additional infiltration, logistics,
and recxuitment information becomes available.
RECOMMENDATION
That in addition to Phil Odeen discussin the Laos trail photography and /
POW exploitation with DIA and Paul Walsh in CIA,
you arrange the contingency planning for sensors if cease-fire prospects 025X1
make this desirable.
That we do not begin a comprehensive VSSG assessment until December
for co xnpl e'.t.ion in January-February.
SECRET/CODEWORD
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/01/04 : LOC-HAK-558-13-13-4