CIA WEEKLY REPORT ON NVA INFILTRATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-558-14-5-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 4, 2013
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: March 15, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
1422
SECRET
INFORMATION
March 15, 1973
MORI PER
C05106378
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
CIA Weekly. Report on NVA Infiltration
The CIA has submitted its weekly summary (dated March 13) of Communist
logistical and manpower developments in Indochina (Tab A). The
report stresses that as the end of the dry season approaches, logistical
?traffic in southern Laos and South Vietnam remains heavy. Hanoi also
continued to introduce both combat and specially skilled personnel. in the
infiltration pipeline last week, with post-cease-fire infiltration starts
now totalling at.least 8, 000. The report, highlights are summarized
'below..
Infiltration of Personnel, NVA Units
-- During the past week, two regular and 21 special purpose groups
were detected entering the infiltration pipeline for the South. The de-
tection of the 2 new combat groups represents the first time since the
cease-fire that such units have been specifically confirmed entering the
pipeline.
-- At least 8, 000 NVA personnel have started south since the
January 28 cease-fire, while a total of 84, 500 infiltrators are estimated
to have entered the pipeline since September 1, 1972. This is only
4, 000 less than in the comparable 1971/2 period. The number destined
.for northern MR-I is, however, double that for the 1971/2 period.
-- Another antiaircraft unit (the 254th AAA Regiment) has now
relocated to Quang Tri Province from North Vietnam in the first known
instance of a regimental size force moving into South Vietnam since
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January 28. In other significant developments, the 593rd AAA Regiment
is deploying from the northern part of the Laotain Panhandle to the MR II
highlands, while tenuous evidence suggests that Hanoi may have deployed
SAMs to the COSVN areas in Cambodia (e. g. Mimot) for the first time of
the war. Since January 1, 5 AAA units have deployed from the North to
Laos and northern Quang Tri, while 3 other regiments may also be. on the
move South.
Logistical Developments
--,The NVA is hard at work expanding its logistics infrastructure .
in South Vietnam. Photography from MR I indicates that the Communists
are upgrading a second runway at Khe Sanh airfield capable of handling
light transport planes; a newly-constructed segment of petroleum pipeline
was detected crossing the Laos/South Vietnam border just north of the
A-Shau valley, while a 70-mile motorable road is being build from the
Laotian border into the Quang Ngai Province lowlands.
' -- Heavy NVA vehicle activity continues, especially in northern MR I.
On March 8, ari NVA element in northern Quang Tri reported that it had -
"handled" 2, 865 vehicles, including 697 transport and 680 troop transport
vehicles. These vehicles probably were moving south. The report is
believed to cover the period of at least one month, possibly February.
The nearly 700 transport vehicles could have delivered some 2, 800 tons of
supplies -- or 100 tons a day on February. (Current resupply requirements
are estimated at only 60-75 tons per day.) Also on March 8, intercepts
indicated that 350 vehicles were active in Quang Tri, while on March 10,
47 NVA supply trucks were photographed moving east and south of Khe
Sanh. Routes leading into the A-Shau valley received heavy use during the
past week.
-- In southern South Vietnam, there were numerous sightings of trucks
moving south through Tay Ninh Province and the Communists reportedly
are constructing AAA sites at Xa Mat, the PRG's designated logistics entry
point. Photography also and 130 mm guns being towed south
in Binh Long Province. reports claim that the Communist25X1
will use the Xa Mat entry point only as the "cover" for covertly infiltrating
large amounts of arms.
-- Detected Communist logistics activity in Laos and Cambodia
was somewhat lower last week than in previous weeks, but significant
resupply continued. For example, traffic at the Ban 25X1
Karai Pass averaged 25 southbound movements a day, 'a drop of almost
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SECRET -3-
two-thirds. However, the pace of. activity doubled on Route 1033
west of the DMZ.
-- In organizational changes noted during the past week, two
Binh Trams (28 and 47) were detected converting from a logistics to
tactical activity. This development suggests that manpower require-
ments to move supplies have been greatly reduced by the U. S. bombing
halt.
-- In North Vietnam, repairs to key bridges have improved LOCs
and have restored full rail service between China, Hanoi, Haiphong,
Thanh Hoa and Vinh. Meanwhile, resupply activity continues through
the North Vietnam panhandle. One logistic associate is scheduled in
March to receive the largest single amount of supplies detected in 'the
Vinh area since the cease-fire (1, 100 tons). Detected activity south of
Vinh, ' however, has been limited in the past week, but a recent intercept
confirmed previously reported high levels in this area in late February.
SECRET
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7 7
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
13 March 1973
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
RECENT COMMUNIST LOGISTICAL
AND MANPOWER DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA
SUMMARY
1. As the dry season moves into its closing months, there continue
to be many signs that North Vietnamese personnel and materiel are moving
in many parts of Indochina. Our current perspective of the situation,
however, is somewhat uneven. . ? . ,
2. Logistical traffic.in southern Laos and South Vietnam, particularly
in Military Region (MR) 1, remains heavy. Military supplies continue to
be on the move in North Vietnam, but the overall levels of traffic there
appear lighter than before the cease-fire. In the ordinary course of events,
we would expect logistical activity to be tapering off very sharply there
at this stage of the dry season. Thus, whether the current slackening reflects
accommodation by North Vietnam to the cease-fire conditions is simply
too early to say.
3. Hanoi continued to introduce both combat and specially skilled
personnel into the infiltration pipeline last week. Post-cease-fire infiltration
starts now total at least 8,000 men. Another antiaircraft artillery (AAA)
regiment has deployed into Quang Tri Province, probably after the cease-fire
date. Other AAA units are currently deploying from the northern part of
the Laotian Panhandle to central South Vietnam, and major Communist
command elements were again noted relocating from Cambodia to South
Vietnam's MR 3. In Laos, some major combat units appear to be standing
down, but as yet none have been detected leaving the country. ?
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4P ~ I
Recent Communist Logistical Developments in Indochina
'Logistical Activity in South Vietnam
4. During the past week the North Vietnamese continued (and made
preparations to sustain) heavy resupply activity within South Vietnam. On
8 March an NVA element in northeastern Quang Tri Province reported on
large amounts of vehicles and equipment probably moving south within
the Province. According to an intercepted message that day, the element
has "handled" a total of 2,865 vehicles. Although the period was not /
provided, the report almo~i certainly covered a period of at least. one
month - possibly the month of February. The vehicles enumerated in the
message ? included "697 transport vehicles, 682 empty vehicles, 680 troop
transports, and 806 jeeps." Thus the unit carried. both supplies and personnel
during the period. The nearly 700- transportation vehicles could have
delivered some 2,800 tons of supplies - or 100 tons per day in February. -
to storage areas and the front lines in Quang Tri Province. By comparison,
we estimate that current Communist resupply requirements in Quang Tri
Province approximate 50 to 60 tons daily of foodstuffs and 10 to 15 tons
daily of ordnance (at current expenditure rafes) and other military supplies
which must be brought from North Vietnam. If this was a monthly
summary, it implies that a quantity of supplies in excess of requirements
was moved. The almost 700 empty vehicles may have been headed back
north to pick up more cargo. No indication of the type of supplies moved
was provided. However, on the same day, the unit revealed that 85 vehicles
with the artillery of two AAA regiments had passed through its area,
indicating that some part of the supplies being moved was ordnance.
S. More recent evidence of heavy vehicle activity in South Vietnam
came on 8 March when elements of Binh Tram 12 reported that more
than 350 vehicles were active in Quang Tri Province. The vehicles were
..simply reported as having "entered" or "departed" from various unlocated
areas under Binh Tram 12's auspices. Evidence of the large quantities of
supplies stockpiled in Quang Tri was displayed on 3 March when Binh
Tram 12 reported that more than 1,600 tons of supplies had been recently
destroyed when an ammunition dump exploded.
6. The Communist logistic activity recently noted around Khe Sanh ,t
has not subsided. On 10 March pho, )graphy, for example, 47 NVA supply
trucks were noted moving cast and south of Khe Sanh. Other recent
photography showing numerous trucks in vehicle parks and supplies stored
openly in the vicinity indicates sustained .logistical activity along Route 9.
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SECRET
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 In addition, photography shows that the Communists are at work upgrading
a second runway at Klic Sanh Airfield, and both it and the original runway /
are capable of handling light transport aircraft. As yet, there has been no
confirmation that any aircraft have used the facilities. Southwest of Khe
Sanh, several new AAA sites along Route 9 are nearing completion, and
the installation of landlines for communications in these areas suggests an
expectation of settling in on the part of the North Vietnamese.
7. Slightly farther south, in Thua Thien Province, aerial observers
report that routes leading into the A Shau Valley received heavy use during
the first week of ?March. Troops of the 324B NVA Divisioi are scattered
throughout the mountainous areas of western Thua Thien Province, where
they protect transportation units bringing in war materiel from North
Vietnam. One NVA engineer company reportedly is equipped to dig trenches
and build caches in the mountainous border area where materiel is to be
concealed for future military activity.
8. The North Vietnamese are also improving their logistic capabilities
elsewhere in MR I and the adjacent Laotian border area. Recently,
photography revealed a newly constructed segment. of petroleum pipeline
crossing the Laos/South, Vietnam border in the Route. 922 area just north
of the A Shau Valley. The. pipeline had been emplaced since last December.
Although there is no evidence that it hooks up with the north/south pipeline
in southern Laos, such a connection would seem likely and would
significantly facilitate Communist resupply operations around A Shau, a
major Communist base area. In the same general area, a major supply artery
leading eastward from the A Shau Valley also has been recently upgraded.
9. Still farther south, Communist capabilities have been improved
by the construction of a new 70-mile road extending from the Laotian
border into Quang Ngai Province in southern MR 1. When completed, it
will provide a mc`orable road from Route 966 in southern Laos to the /
coastal lowlands of Quang Ngai. The western half of the road, first detected
in January, is now complete and showing signs of vehicle use. Photography
during thu,: last half of February showed construction still under way on
the eastern half of the road, and recent agent reporting indicates that much
of it, too, is now sustaining truck and tank traffic. The Viet Cong reportedly
are also constructing a large secret tunnel complex in northern Quang Ngai
to use as a supply base and troop-quartering facility.
10. In southern South Vietnam, there were numerous sightings of
trucks moving south through Tay Ninh Province during the last half of
February. The reported construction in northern Tay Ninh Province of three
new 37-mm AAA sites near Xa Mat, the point designated by the South
Vietnamese government as a logistic entry point for the Communists, '
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qu I V
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provides evidence of an intent to resupply that area from Cambodian bases-v'
Route 244 in eastern Tay Ninh reportedly is being used extensively by
trucks hauling ammunition, food, medicine, and construction materials for
the. 7th NVA Division's storage bases in adjacent Binh Long Province. Also,
in Binh Long Province, along Route 13 north of An Loc, aerial
reconnaissance on 9 March revealed eight ZSU-57 self-propelled antiaircraft
guns. Recent photography has also revealed 37-mm and 57-mm AAA guns
and two 130-mm field guns being towed south in Binh Long. In addition, v
GVN air spotter reports from mid-February to 7 March have identified some
90 NVA tanks in MR 3.
11. The North Vietnamese may try to keep supplies moving into Tay
Ninh in spite of the presence of an inspection team of the International
Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) near the border. COSVN
has reportedly directed that damaged weapons be' collected near Xa Mat,
to be checked by the ICCS and subsequently replaced by new items. This
was done only as a "symbolic gesture" and as a "cover" for the infiltration J
of new war materiel from North to South Vietnam. The source added that
only by "overtly" replacing worn-out weapons and at the same time
"covertly" infiltrating new ones can the Communists -have a large supply
of arms, and concluded that North Vietnamese engineers are refurbishing
roads and cutting new routes across the Cambodia/Tay Ninh border so
trucks and tanks can rriove rapidly.
Logistic Activity in Southern Laos and Cambodia
12. Detected Communist logistical activity in Laos and Cambodia was
somewhat slower last week than during previous weeks. However, significant
resupply continued, and it is too soon to judge whether the lower level
of detected activity accurately portrays the current functioning of the entire
system. Occasional poor weather over Laos could have had some impact
on logistic flows. Moreover, the decreased activity through the input
corridors after a heavy February push parallels the pattern in past dry
seasons. Most of the sensor-detected traffic continues to be through the
Ban Karai Pass, where a daily average of 25 southbound movements -- well
below the average of 70 for the preceding week. -- were detected on
Route 912 between 6 and I I March. The pace of activity roughly doubled
on Route 1033 west of the DMZ, with 17 southbound detections per day
during the same period. At Mu Gia Pass, light vehicle activity continued
according to sensors.
13. The largest transportation effort in southern Laos detected
recently in COMINT involved vehicle movements from the central to the
southern Panhandle. On 1 March, COMINT revealed that 150 vehicles of
two transportation battalions had been dispatched from Group 472 and
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W, I W
would arrive at Group 470 by 4 March. The cargo being transported
included communications gear and "military equipment." And, according
to Laotian intelligence sources, a 50 to 60 truck NVA convoy moved south
along Route 16 through Attopcu to Cambodia carrying both foodstuffs
and munitions.
14. Numerous references to transportation activity dealt with the
movement of rice and other foodstuffs to communications-tiaision entities
along the Laotian corridor, some of which reported inadequate food supplies
to accommodate the large numbers of personnel which they are handling.
Between 6 and 9 March, for example, the 574th Communications-Liaision
Regiment, which probably operates in the Saravane/Attopeu area, reported
receiving at least 30 tons of rice - enough to provide 10 days' rice rations
for 4,000 personnel. Other units have been reported moving petroleum and
cornmunic::.',)ns gear south through the Panhandle. Some tanks --probably.
stragglers from groups previously detected moving south - are also
continuing to move through southern Laos; on 7 March, reference was made
to the consignment of more than 100 tons of diesel fuel to Binh Tram 34,
possibly for continuing resupply of tanks currently moving through the
system.
15. ' Several new organizational developments have been observed
during the past .week. Last week it was reported that Binh Tram 33 may
have been disbanded and its role assumed by other units in the central
Panhandle. Now it appears that Binh Trams 28 and 47 near the DMZ and
the Bolovens Plateau area, respectively, have relinquished their Binh Tram
status. The evolution of Binh Train 47 from a logistical function to a
tactical unit -- the NVA 59th Regiment, operating in the Bolovens area --
has been under way since late 1972. The Binh Tram had apparently
relinquished all logistic responsibilities by several weeks ago, when it was
excluded from a list of Group 471 subordinates. Part of the void left by
Binh Tram 47's demise may be filled by the newly reemerged Dinh
Train 46, which had not been heard from following a temporary merger
with Binh Tram 36 late last year. The current locations and roles of Binh
Trams 36 and 46 are unclear, but it appears likely that one is responsible
for moving supplies south from Laos toward Cambodia or the tri-border,
while the other -- probably Binh Tram 46 -- is responsible for logistic
.support to Communist tactical forces in southern Laos. Binh Tram 28,
which was believed to have been responsible for logistic activity around
Khe Sanh, has also been redesignated: on 3 March, Group 473 was 4
informed that "the former Binh Tram 28 is now the, 28th Artillery
Regiment." Given the probable composition of the 28th Regiment,
however, it is more likely that the unit will function as an antiaircraft unit
than as a field artillery unit. The impact of these organizational changes
cannot yet be discerned; however, it is clear that with US bombing halted
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lp
Logistical Developments in Southern North Vietnam
19. In the rear base the North Vietnamese have recently improved
their lines of communication by completing repairs on key bridges in the
Hanoi and Haiphong areas. The Doumer Bridge at Hanoi was reportedly
repaired in less than six weeks after the bombing halted over North Vietnam
despite its having eight piers damaged and three spans destroyed. Its return
to service restores direct rail and highway traffic between Hanoi and the
major supply corridors from China and the Haiphong port. On the western
edge of Haiphong, the recently restored Tam Bac Rail Bridge replaces a
lower capacity combination fixed span/barge bridge and provides full rail
capacity between the port and Hanoi and south to Thanh Hoa. A rail ferry
is still used to cross the river at Thanh Hoa, but from there south the
line is operational to Vinh.
20. The North Vietnamese are continuing to use the rail line into
the Vinh area 'to move cargo. On 9 March an associate of Binh Tram 18
over southern Laos, North Vietnam's manpower requirements to carry out I
logistic operations are greatly reduced.
16. Heavy logistic activity and continuing troop transport in the Binh
Tram 37 area - near the tri-border area of Laos, Cambodia, and South
Vietnam - and in northeastern Cambodia was detected during the week.
On 3 March, Group 470 revealed that Binli Tram 37 was preparing for
"a new offensive," Binh Tram 50 was supporting troop movements, and
"activities are normal" at Binh Tram 53. Vehicles transporting cargo within
the area were also referenced. Several days later, 25 vehicles were reported
as being sent to Group 471, probably after having left their southbound
cargo with elements -of Group 470. On 7 March, it was revealed that cargo
had been received at a storage area associated with activity in the B-3 Front.
17. Apparently both waterways and roads are being used in the
current effort in the border area. According to a 10 March intercept, troops
being transported to COSVN are moving by boat, probably down the
Se Kong River into northern Cambodia, while those going to the Central
Highlands are traveling by truck, probably via eastern Route 110.
18. Inside Cambodia, aerial surveillance over several key, enemy-used
roads on 7 March (the first in several weeks) revealed considerable truck
traffic on Route 19 east of Stung Treng, but few signs of activity of
Route 13 to the south. The absence of movement of Route 13 is unusual, i
considering its past importance as a major supply route. A plausible
explanation is that vehicles may now be using a recently built, heavily
camouflaged road 15-20 miles to the east which leads toward the important
Communist base areas adjacent to South Vietnam's MR 3.
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reported that ammunition and other cargo were being moved to the rail
station at Cho Si, the jumping. off point for supplies headed to northern
Laos. The station was ordered to ensure that this shipment was offloaded
and not sent farther south to Will, an indication that other cargo is, in
fact, moving by rail into Vinh. At least 55, and possibly .as many as 85,
vehicles are to be engaged in supply movements between Cho Si and points
farther cast on Route 7.
21. Resupply activity through the North Vietnam Panhandle is to
continue in the. near future. A Binh Tram 18 associate revealed on
10. March that 1,100 tons of cargo were to be received by one element
in the Binh Tram 25 area during March. The entity which was to handle
the receipt of this cargo was specified, but, again, the types of cargo
expected were not enumerated. An associate which is apparently not to
be involved in this transaction is reportedly now engaged primarily in the
receipt of "various types of weapons." This intercept is the largest single
reference to supply movements through the general Vinh area since' the V
cease-fire. NNi hile activity there has apparently been, at..a lower pace since
late-January, such a drop is not unexpected at this stage of the dry season.
Still, sporadic references such. as this do imply that weapons and ammunition v
continue to move south.
22. Although evidence of resupply activity south of Vinh was limited
during the reporting period, a 5 March intercept confirmed the previously
reported high level of activity there in late February. More than 2,800 tons
of unidentified y cargo.. were reported on the move. to numerous locations
in the Group 571 area during the period 26-28 February. Recipients of
the cargo included Binh Trams 14, 16, 19, 25, and 26, all major
subordinates of Group 571, while some quantities of cargo were simply
consigned to various other areas designated by placename. Both vehicles
and barges were used to move these supplies.
Recent Communist Manpower Developments in Indochina
Personnel Infiltration
23. The detection of infiltration groups continued during the past
week, as two new regular and 21 special-purpose groups appeared in
COMINT. As a result of these detections, it is now apparent that at least
8,000 personnel in both regular and special-purpose groups started south
after 28 January.
. 24. The most significant development during the past week was the
initial detection of two regular infiltration groups in the Vinh area destined
for northern South Vietnam. This marks the first time since the cease-fire v
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that re ular combat groups have been specifically confirmed entering the
pipeline in this awa. While evidence of the insertion of regular infiltration
groups since mid-February is sparse, it is too early to reach any positive
conclusion based on this.
25. Thus far this dry season a total of 84,500 infiltrators are estimated /
to have entered the pipeline, only slightly fewer than the total for the
comparable period during the 1971/7.) dry season -- 88,500. With the V
detection of the two regular groups in North Vietnam plus resulting gapfills,
the total number of personnel destined for AIR Tri-Thien-Hue is double V
that for last year, as shown in the following tabulation:
Destination
1 Sep 72 -
12 Mar 73
1 Sep 71 -
12 Mar 72
Total
84,500
88,500
MR Tri-Then-Hue
26,000
13,000
MR 5
9,000
16,500
B-3 Front
12,500
21,000
COSVNN
26,000
30,000
Southern Laos/MR 559
11,000
8,000
VC/NVA Redeploylncnts in South Vietnam
26. Recent evidence reveals that the 254th NVA AAA Regiment is
now located in Quang Tri Province. In early January 1973 the unit was
located northeast of Hanoi, and it probably arrived in-country after the
cease-fire. If so, this would be the first known instance of a regimental-size
force moving into South Vietnam after 28 January and would bring to
five the number of air defense regiments known to have deployed from
North Vietnam and northern Laos to Quang Tri Province since 1 January.
Other AAA elements may also be on the move south: the 246th Regiment,
which moved from the Hanoi area into Quang Binh Province during
February is still in a deploying status and could move farther south, as
may the 225th and 256th AAA Regiments, currently located near Hanoi.
27. Although the reason for North Vietnam's decision to deploy south
an increasing number of its air defense units from around Hanoi is unclear,
it is significant that these units are trained not only in air defense, artillery,
and infantry tactics but also in military police activity, which they have,/
used previously to control the population during periods of heavy flooding
and bombing in the north. On the other hand, Hanoi may simply be
attempting to augment air defense protection for its ground combat forces
in the south in the event large-scale warfare is resumed.
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Comm TlLillist and i.Ei Re-,ifuia CoillEJat ForL"f" ill Sull`h1 ViU112111
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1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in combat and combat
~' P1't,rt units .+ud l i .i fir i. companies and platoons.
I .lt..ii . l; h'`,\I t'rtumnrl it iotiit it, Cotnhat Support,
Military region boundary
-- -- Province boundary
ICCS region boundary
0 25 50 75IAdcs
0 25 EO 75 Kdornetera
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/01/04: LOC-HAK-558-14-5-2
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/01/04: LOC-HAK-558-14-5-2
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/01/04: LOC-HAK-558-14-5-2
2S. In another significant air defense development, recent COMINT
indicates that major elements of the 593rd AAA Regiment are deploying
from the northern part of the Laotian Panhandle to South Vietnam's Central
Iiiahl,inds. Apparently included in the deployment are two battalions and
the regimental headquarters. Advance elements of these units arrived in the
tri-bonier area as early as mitt-February, while the rest of the column is
still moving through the Laotian Panhandle and should arrive by the end
of the month. The d;:ploynent will not seriously degrade NVA air defense
capabilities in the Panhandle, because the North Vietnamese deployed three
additional AAA regiments from North Vietnam to southern Laos in January.
:9. Tenuous evidence suggests that Hanoi may have deployed SA-2
missiles (SAMs) to the Communist-designated COSVN area this dry season
for the first time of the war. Recently, a low-level agent reported that
he saw two heavily guarded trucks with covered cargoes on 27 February
just southeast of Mimot, which the accompanying soldiers stated were SAMs
brought down through Laos for emplacement near Mimot, Cambodia, or
Lac Ninh, South Vietnam. In addition, a US pilot received tenuous SAM
radar indications on I I March approximately 30 miles west of Miinot. If
confirmed. the presence of SAMs would significantly increase the air defense
protection afforded the Mimot/Snoul area -- designated a post-cease-fire
Communist base and staging area for its forces in GVN MR 3.
30. In MR 3. additional elements of the South Vietnam Liberation
Army were detected in Tay Ninh Province. By 5 March the Military
Intelligence Bureau moved into South Vietnam from Kratie Province,
Cambodia. This redeployment, made since 5 January, is one more of a
series of relocations of major command elements from Cambodia to South
Vietnam over the last three months. In this connection a major COSVN
command element moved almost 45 miles from central Kratie Province to
a position close to the Cambodia-South Vietnam border between
30 January and 7 ;March. A further move into Tay Ninh Province of South
Vietnam may be expected.
Derelopments in La(,.s
31. In northern Laos during the past week there were indications that
the 174th Regiment of the 316th NVA Division - located on the
southwestern rim of the Plaine des Jarres -- is preparing for a standdown
in military operations. On 8 March, subordinate units of the 174th
Regiment were directed to improve and cover their bunkers as "the rainy
season has conic." Moreover, the intercept indicated that the deployment
of the 1`4t11 will remain "unchanged" for the near future. In conjunction
with the standdown, one battalion was ordered to send some men to the
regiment for training to be conducted soon. Farther cast, elements of the
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/01/04: LOC-HAK-558-14-5-2
335th NVA Independent Regiment apparently are making preparations to
end Operations southeast of the Plainc des Jarres. COMINT on 4 and
9 March revealed that the regimens has instructed its battalions to settle
their economic, political, and personal affairs as well as to take a weapons
inventory. Moreover, one support unit was instructed to check equipment
and weapons so that "all units" could be at the regimental headquarters
on 5 March to receive a new, unspecified mission.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2013/01/04: LOC-HAK-558-14-5-2