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CABLE TO THE WHITE HOUSE FROM TEHRAN

Document Type: 
CREST [1]
Collection: 
Library of Congress [2]
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
LOC-HAK-206-8-32-9
Release Decision: 
RIPLIM
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
January 11, 2017
Document Release Date: 
April 8, 2010
Sequence Number: 
32
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 30, 1973
Content Type: 
CABLE
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon LOC-HAK-206-8-32-9.pdf [3]204.83 KB
Body: 
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/08: LOC-HAK-206-8-32-9 25X1 State Dept. review completed DP P?MED DF- 40110 3031344 O 301243Z OCT 73 ZFF-1 FA TEHRAN To THE WHITE - USE S E C R E T/SENSTIVE 301.24^7. OCT 73 CITE TEHRAN 110 TO: IMMEDIATE GENERAL SCOWdcROFT, .!HITE HOUSE. FROM: AMB. HELMS, TEHRAN REFS: A,,yIDDA EM TEL 4745 B. IDOA` EMBTEI_ - 4708 TY RODMAN, 4OWE, ?~CFARLAo E ` f0y ,30(9c-till 1. +AHAT FOLLOWS IS AN EFFORT-TO WRAP UP FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER BEFORE HE BEGINS HIS SWING THROUGH THIS AREA MY VIEWS ON THE CURRENT STATE OF ~MI ;D HE7EABOUT.S. THERE IS NOTHING NOVEL IN WHAT I HAVE TO SAY, BUT I THOUGHT THE EFFORT MIGHT BE MARGINALLY USEFUL TO HI"M.. 2. SAQQAP'S REMARKS TO AMBASSADOR AKINS REPORTED REFTEL (A.) AND JIDDA COUNTRY TEA`11 Iv ESSAGE (REFTEL (B)) INDICATE SAUDI' GOVERNMENT IS DISPOSED TO AINTAIN SOLIDARITY WITH OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS AND KEEP PRESSURE ON THE UNITED STATES TO INFLUENCE ISRAEL TO ACCEPT THE ARAB INTERPRETATION OF SC RESOLUTION 242. 3. FROM OUR SOUNDINGS IN THE GULF, FROM AMONG LOCAL ARAB DIPLOMATS, SENIOR IRANIAN ;FFICIALS WHO ADVISE THE SHAH.1 AND FROM REMARKS MADE ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS SINCE LAST MAY BY THE SHAH HIMSELF, WE BELIEVE THAT SA~QAF'S WARNING AND THE JIDDA COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY INDEED. WE ARE IN AN UPRECEOE+NTED SITUATION IN WHICH SAUDI ARABIA TOOK THE LEAD IN UNDERWRITING ECONOMICALLY THE MILITARY INITIATIVES OF EGYPT AND SYRIA AND IN SECURING THE FINANCIAL .AND POLITICAL PARTICIPA.TIO`J OF OTHER CONSERVATIVE STATES IN THE UNITED ACTION. THE ULTIMATE FAILURE OF THE ARAB MILITARY'EFFORT HAS MADE VEN MORE DRAMATIC AND IMPORTANT THE POTENTIAL POWER OF THE ARAB ECONOMIC EFFORT AND IN THIS SAUDI ARABIA IS THE KEY TO SUCCESS OR FAILURE. SAYSALSURELY MUST ENJOY THE INVREASED POWER AND PRESTIGE OF HIS 'EW POSITION. HE IS ALSO DEEPLY ATTACHED TO THE IDEA OF A SPECIAL STATUS FOR JERUSALEM, AS JIDDA H4S POINTED OUT. 54, IT HAS BEEN TRADITI?NAL ON THE BASIS OF PAST EXPERIENCE TO SAY THAT BECAUSE 0-F- COM?ETING INT.ERE.TS, THE ARABS.: WOULD NOT STAND TOGETHER TO USE THEN-IL WEAPON EFFECTIVELY AGAINST THE USG AND ITS ALLIES. N-9W, ?OWEVER, WE HAVE COME INTO A NEW * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *WHSR COMMENT *, * * * * * .* * * * *. * HAK,SCOwCRO PSN:023551 *******S Copy 25X1 RECALLEC? PAGE o1 TOR:303/14:17Z OTG:301243Z OCT 7: ******* S E C R E.T *******S copy No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/08: LOC-HAK-206-8-32-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/08: LOC-HAK-206-8-32-9 #~is***** S E C R E T *******S copy ? SITUATION WHERE OLD PRESS!)='ES FOR OIL REVENUE NO LONGER APpLy. SAUDI ARABIA AND KU!:'ATT HQvE SUFFICIENT FINANCIAL RESERVES TO WAIT US OUT. AND EU;i;PE A ,,O_ JApAh.! HAVE SUFFICIENT SELF-INTEREST TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE ?PUDUCERS, CUTTING OUT THE AMERICAN COMPANIES AS.'mIDCLE,iEN, IF THIS SEEMS TO THEM NECESSARY To INSURE A STEADY FLOW OF !IL TO THEIR COUNTRIES. 6. SAUDI ARABIA SO FAR HAS APPLIED ONLY THE MILDEST OF MEASURES TO PUT. PRESSURE +, ;, THE UNITED STATES: THE 10 PER CENT CUT-BACK IN PRODUCTION AND AN E MB.ARGO ON EXPORTS TO THE USA, SHE HAS ALSO, WE SUPPOSE, APPLIED A SECQND INFORMAL PRESSURE BY NOT MOVING FORWARD-.'DN NEW CONTRACTS WITH. AMERICAN FIRMS. WE 00 NOT'?.tz?NOw_TO ' WHATEXTENT THE SAG 'MAY HAVE BEGUN TRANSFERS OF DOLLAR RESERVES AND INVEST;,ENTS. BUT 100 -BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE CONSTANT P AWARE OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT OTHER SAUDI PRESSURE OPTIONS W I L L BE TAKEN I F DO NOT APPEAR To BE USING OUR INFLU- ENCE TO SECURE ADHERENCE T`": SC 242. THESE OPTIONS WOULD BE FURTHER CUT -BACK I N OIL PR,,JDUCT I OWN; DENIAL OF OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS; CLOSING OF THE U.S. MILITARY TRAINING MISSION; NATIONALIZATION OF ARAMCO; WITHDRAWALDF SAUDI FUNDS FROM U.S. ACCOUNTS AND O.S. INVESTMENTS; A BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS; AND EXPULSION OF AMERICANS FROM THE COUNTRY. I F THESE MEASURES WERE TAKEN IN CONSORT WITH KUWAIT, QATAR AND ABU DHABIs THE IMPACT UPON OUR INTERESTS WOULD BE SERIOUS INDEED. 7. FAYSAL USED TO BE INHIBITED FROM CONSIDERING SUCH RADICAL MEASURES BECAUSE T:-~E LOSS OF HIS AMERICAN ALLIANCE WOULD HAVE MADE HIM VULNERABLE T;j EXT'ERNAL AGGRESSION FROM EGYPT OR IRAQ AND VULNERABLE TO INTERNAL SUBVERSION BY NATIONALIST AND "PROGRESSIVE" FORCES. TODAY HIS PRESTIGE IS SO IMPROVED, HE PRO- BABLY WOULD FEEL SAFE IN AOPTING SUCH MEASURES AGAINST US, EACH MEASURE WOULD ACTUALLY TEND TO INCREASE HIS POPULARITY AND STRENGTHEN HIS IUGIME. 8. LONG BEFORE THE PRESENT CRISIS, AS THE SECRETARY WILE REMEMBER, THE SHAH IN CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON AND WITH ME HERE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE THOUGHT THE USG SHOULD ADOPT POLICIES WHICH WOULD RESTORE ITS APPEARANCE OF BALANCE BETWEEN THE ARABS An!D ISRAEL. HIS OWN GOVERMMENT HAS REPEATEDLY STATED ITS. SUP-. PORT OF SC 242: WITH THE IW~TERPREATAIQN THAT EVACUATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES MEANS JUST ABOUT ALL TERRITORIES. 9. SINCE THE OPENING Or- HOSTILITIES, IRAN yA..,..-REAFFIRMED THAT POSITION. IN RESPONS.E? TO POPULAR SENTIMENT, IRAN HAS FLOWN MEDICAL. SUPPLIES TO THE ?A.RAB.S, HAS -MADE PREPARATIONS TO ACCEPT ARAB WOUNDED FOR TREAT.t-^ENT, HAS LOANEP _C-13o'S . TO SAUDI ARABIA AND HAS AUTHORIZED A H 0ERaTE TILT BY IRANIAN. MEDIA IN FAVOR OP THE ARABS. THIS HAS OCCURRED DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE cHAH ANn THE IRANIAN ESTABLISHMENT ''AVE HAD, VERY CLOSE COOPERATIVE RELATIONS ','ITH ISRAEL. THE REASON IS THAT THE SHAH AND HIS ADVISORS HAVE COME TO BELIEVE THAT THE 84LANICE OF FORCES HAS CHANGED SUFFICIENTLY THA T IDENTIFICATION WITH ISRAEL WOULD JOT BE POLITICALLY VIAB Eo REC ALLELE 25X1 PSN! n7l;57 PAi,h rn r ZnI r, r.. rt'f7 TG:30 2432 OCT No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/08: LOC-HAK-206-8-32-9 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/08: LOC-HAK-206-8-32-9 0 TP,UGHT'-4 Y AR:~ PLL ~ S :L TH.~:T THw ARABS ;rs RE NOT MILITARILY VICTF';il0,iS. 10. FROM THE OF T;H .AN IT LfOKS Tip US AS Ip T!?F USG a~C? ISRAEL UST T-4IS TI T HAMMER. OUT A SOLUTION WHICH A CCli;Sp` v41 Ivy A` LADE ' LIKE FAYSAL AND A MODERATE. N~TIE!NALIST LI

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[2] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/collection/library-congress
[3] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/LOC-HAK-206-8-32-9.pdf