No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/08: LOC-HAK-206-8-32-9
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State Dept. review
completed
DP P?MED
DF- 40110 3031344
O 301243Z OCT 73 ZFF-1
FA TEHRAN
To THE WHITE - USE
S E C R E T/SENSTIVE 301.24^7. OCT 73
CITE TEHRAN 110
TO: IMMEDIATE GENERAL SCOWdcROFT, .!HITE HOUSE.
FROM: AMB. HELMS, TEHRAN
REFS: A,,yIDDA EM TEL 4745
B. IDOA` EMBTEI_ - 4708
TY RODMAN, 4OWE, ?~CFARLAo E
` f0y
,30(9c-till
1. +AHAT FOLLOWS IS AN EFFORT-TO WRAP UP FOR SECRETARY
KISSINGER BEFORE HE BEGINS HIS SWING THROUGH THIS AREA MY VIEWS
ON THE CURRENT STATE OF ~MI ;D HE7EABOUT.S. THERE IS NOTHING NOVEL
IN WHAT I HAVE TO SAY, BUT I THOUGHT THE EFFORT MIGHT BE
MARGINALLY USEFUL TO HI"M..
2. SAQQAP'S REMARKS TO AMBASSADOR AKINS REPORTED REFTEL
(A.) AND JIDDA COUNTRY TEA`11 Iv ESSAGE (REFTEL (B)) INDICATE SAUDI'
GOVERNMENT IS DISPOSED TO AINTAIN SOLIDARITY WITH OTHER ARAB
GOVERNMENTS AND KEEP PRESSURE ON THE UNITED STATES TO INFLUENCE
ISRAEL TO ACCEPT THE ARAB INTERPRETATION OF SC RESOLUTION 242.
3. FROM OUR SOUNDINGS IN THE GULF, FROM AMONG LOCAL ARAB
DIPLOMATS, SENIOR IRANIAN ;FFICIALS WHO ADVISE THE SHAH.1 AND
FROM REMARKS MADE ON VARIOUS OCCASIONS SINCE LAST MAY BY THE
SHAH HIMSELF, WE BELIEVE THAT SA~QAF'S WARNING AND THE JIDDA
COUNTRY TEAM ASSESSMENT SHOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY INDEED.
WE ARE IN AN UPRECEOE+NTED SITUATION IN WHICH SAUDI
ARABIA TOOK THE LEAD IN UNDERWRITING ECONOMICALLY THE MILITARY
INITIATIVES OF EGYPT AND SYRIA AND IN SECURING THE FINANCIAL
.AND POLITICAL PARTICIPA.TIO`J OF OTHER CONSERVATIVE STATES IN THE
UNITED ACTION. THE ULTIMATE FAILURE OF THE ARAB MILITARY'EFFORT
HAS MADE VEN MORE DRAMATIC AND IMPORTANT THE POTENTIAL POWER
OF THE ARAB ECONOMIC EFFORT AND IN THIS SAUDI ARABIA IS THE
KEY TO SUCCESS OR FAILURE. SAYSALSURELY MUST ENJOY THE INVREASED
POWER AND PRESTIGE OF HIS 'EW POSITION. HE IS ALSO DEEPLY ATTACHED
TO THE IDEA OF A SPECIAL STATUS FOR JERUSALEM, AS JIDDA
H4S POINTED OUT.
54, IT HAS BEEN TRADITI?NAL ON THE BASIS OF PAST EXPERIENCE
TO SAY THAT BECAUSE 0-F- COM?ETING INT.ERE.TS, THE ARABS.: WOULD NOT
STAND TOGETHER TO USE THEN-IL WEAPON EFFECTIVELY AGAINST THE
USG AND ITS ALLIES. N-9W, ?OWEVER, WE HAVE COME INTO A NEW
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *WHSR COMMENT *, * * * * * .* * * * *. *
HAK,SCOwCRO
PSN:023551
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PAGE o1 TOR:303/14:17Z OTG:301243Z OCT 7:
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/08: LOC-HAK-206-8-32-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/08: LOC-HAK-206-8-32-9
#~is***** S E C R E T *******S copy
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SITUATION WHERE OLD PRESS!)='ES FOR OIL REVENUE NO LONGER APpLy.
SAUDI ARABIA AND KU!:'ATT HQvE SUFFICIENT FINANCIAL RESERVES TO
WAIT US OUT. AND EU;i;PE A ,,O_ JApAh.! HAVE SUFFICIENT SELF-INTEREST
TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THE ?PUDUCERS, CUTTING OUT THE AMERICAN
COMPANIES AS.'mIDCLE,iEN, IF THIS SEEMS TO THEM NECESSARY To
INSURE A STEADY FLOW OF !IL TO THEIR COUNTRIES.
6. SAUDI ARABIA SO FAR HAS APPLIED ONLY THE MILDEST OF
MEASURES TO PUT. PRESSURE +, ;, THE UNITED STATES: THE 10 PER CENT
CUT-BACK IN PRODUCTION AND AN E MB.ARGO ON EXPORTS TO THE USA,
SHE HAS ALSO, WE SUPPOSE, APPLIED A SECQND INFORMAL PRESSURE BY
NOT MOVING FORWARD-.'DN NEW CONTRACTS WITH. AMERICAN FIRMS. WE
00 NOT'?.tz?NOw_TO ' WHATEXTENT THE SAG 'MAY HAVE BEGUN TRANSFERS OF
DOLLAR RESERVES AND INVEST;,ENTS. BUT 100 -BELIEVE WE SHOULD BE
CONSTANT P AWARE OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT OTHER SAUDI PRESSURE
OPTIONS W I L L BE TAKEN I F DO NOT APPEAR To BE USING OUR INFLU-
ENCE TO SECURE ADHERENCE T`": SC 242. THESE OPTIONS WOULD BE
FURTHER CUT -BACK I N OIL PR,,JDUCT I OWN; DENIAL OF OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS;
CLOSING OF THE U.S. MILITARY TRAINING MISSION; NATIONALIZATION
OF ARAMCO; WITHDRAWALDF SAUDI FUNDS FROM U.S. ACCOUNTS AND O.S.
INVESTMENTS; A BREAK IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS; AND EXPULSION
OF AMERICANS FROM THE COUNTRY. I F THESE MEASURES WERE TAKEN IN
CONSORT WITH KUWAIT, QATAR AND ABU DHABIs THE IMPACT UPON OUR
INTERESTS WOULD BE SERIOUS INDEED.
7. FAYSAL USED TO BE INHIBITED FROM CONSIDERING SUCH
RADICAL MEASURES BECAUSE T:-~E LOSS OF HIS AMERICAN ALLIANCE WOULD
HAVE MADE HIM VULNERABLE T;j EXT'ERNAL AGGRESSION FROM EGYPT OR
IRAQ AND VULNERABLE TO INTERNAL SUBVERSION BY NATIONALIST AND
"PROGRESSIVE" FORCES. TODAY HIS PRESTIGE IS SO IMPROVED, HE PRO-
BABLY WOULD FEEL SAFE IN AOPTING SUCH MEASURES AGAINST US,
EACH MEASURE WOULD ACTUALLY TEND TO INCREASE HIS POPULARITY AND
STRENGTHEN HIS IUGIME.
8. LONG BEFORE THE PRESENT CRISIS, AS THE SECRETARY WILE
REMEMBER, THE SHAH IN CONVERSATIONS IN WASHINGTON AND WITH ME
HERE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE THOUGHT THE USG SHOULD ADOPT POLICIES
WHICH WOULD RESTORE ITS APPEARANCE OF BALANCE BETWEEN THE ARABS
An!D ISRAEL. HIS OWN GOVERMMENT HAS REPEATEDLY STATED ITS. SUP-.
PORT OF SC 242: WITH THE IW~TERPREATAIQN THAT EVACUATION OF
OCCUPIED TERRITORIES MEANS JUST ABOUT ALL TERRITORIES.
9. SINCE THE OPENING Or- HOSTILITIES, IRAN yA..,..-REAFFIRMED THAT
POSITION. IN RESPONS.E? TO POPULAR SENTIMENT, IRAN HAS FLOWN
MEDICAL. SUPPLIES TO THE ?A.RAB.S, HAS -MADE PREPARATIONS TO ACCEPT
ARAB WOUNDED FOR TREAT.t-^ENT, HAS LOANEP _C-13o'S . TO SAUDI ARABIA
AND HAS AUTHORIZED A H 0ERaTE TILT BY IRANIAN. MEDIA IN FAVOR
OP THE ARABS. THIS HAS OCCURRED DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE cHAH ANn
THE IRANIAN ESTABLISHMENT ''AVE HAD,
VERY CLOSE COOPERATIVE RELATIONS ','ITH ISRAEL. THE REASON
IS THAT THE SHAH AND HIS ADVISORS HAVE COME TO BELIEVE
THAT THE 84LANICE OF FORCES HAS CHANGED SUFFICIENTLY THA
T
IDENTIFICATION WITH ISRAEL WOULD JOT BE POLITICALLY VIAB Eo
REC ALLELE
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PSN! n7l;57 PAi,h rn r ZnI r, r.. rt'f7 TG:30 2432 OCT
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/08: LOC-HAK-206-8-32-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/04/08: LOC-HAK-206-8-32-9
0
TP,UGHT'-4 Y AR:~ PLL ~ S :L TH.~:T THw ARABS ;rs RE NOT
MILITARILY VICTF';il0,iS.
10. FROM THE OF T;H .AN IT LfOKS Tip US AS Ip
T!?F USG a~C? ISRAEL UST T-4IS TI T HAMMER. OUT A SOLUTION
WHICH A CCli;Sp` v41 Ivy A` LADE ' LIKE FAYSAL AND A MODERATE.
N~TIE!NALIST LI