CIA PIECE ON SOVIET-CUBAN MILITARY RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-6-2-28-2
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: June 17, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/01 : LOC-HAK-6-2-28-2
INFORMATION
June 17. 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: Viron P. Vaky
SUBJECT: CIA Piece on Soviet-Cuban Military Relations
Attached is a CIA/OCI piece speculating on the meaning of recent
developments in Cuba-Soviet military relations. The piece states:
-- The Soviets may intend to establish a new Soviet facility
in Cuba, such as an installation for servicing naval ships
or reconnaissance aircraft, or botiu
Any such move is likely to be modest and accomplished
in a gradual and cautious manner to avoid flaunting mili-
tary power on our doorstep or a direct confrontation
while at the same time gaining additional mobility for
Soviet force 5.
-- Such a move would be in line with its general policy of
"showing the flagt, it may also be Moscow's answer to
the US naval activity in the Black Sea.
Attachment:
CIA memo dtd 6/3/70
#0CI-1367-70
SECRET
MORI/CDF
C05138705
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
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?
3 June 1970
tar,1:40RANOUM
SUBJECT : Some Thoughts on Recent Devalopment in CuUalz
Soviet "alitary Pelations ?:;/
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Un?recedented visits to Cuba by Sovint varshipt; and co ,
?naval. aircraft, seatent y higvx-raning officials of
both tx!'u4:.trion, and an t:!%crtango of visits by Soviat .')efew4e
gro.cnke and Cuban Arnerl Porce A,niter au1 CaItro
point to a strtInqthoning of t'4e mi)it.ary letwen
Cuba arAd tne OSS% The r,Ice4nt at r,f activitv may 1...!md to
the erma,-)11.14m,:nt of a Sovie-lt fncilitv in Cubs, sico
an intallation for sorvicing Sovivt-:ars,Jt::s.. or for r:Tfue71ing
rcounai.i5ance aircraft, or :--,erhanr,-; WAatevor movE!
carrld out, .1ce.4vter, -,,ould almost crtainly Le a modost ooe,
accom ,lishd in a gradual mannr to avoid thc appearance of
flaunt114g Soviet military OA the Us doorntep. Fuch a
low-hey a ?prosch would z,e a cautious,one deigned to avoid
tAe possi.Mlity of a rocurrenca of a direr,,t, confrontation
while at the same tinut. 111.trmitting the USSR additionza
for ita naval forcPs. -,reovor? ooscow's actions would fit
in with its general policy of !lavirig the Soviet fleet"43tIOW
the flag around the world. The4 USSAH fleet unit activity
in t-la Carioboan way aL4o b oOow nwr to the regular
entry of US war shi:?s into te Ila c% Sr,.a. (A detailnd
cusaion of rossible dovelopwents in Sovit-L:uan military
relations follows0
1. 73....1e1 Castro would -)robably Ire amnnable to an
cread Soviorit military rescnce in Cuba for sivaral reasomu.
Moat isr,ortant, he apparently belifiv(Ax that a Soviet nilitary
Proli4.Inco would act /la a deterrent to any (Arcot LS military
intervention in Cuba* An analysis of Castro's speochos and
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OCI-1367 -70
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Cuban propaganda. in general indicates that .the ?Cuban nrime
mininter is uxiow? to haVe a hedge againnt a second "Day ?
of Pics,': type operation and Castro is a9parent1y of. tha. ?
opinion that if a Sovit military unit w!re on t island
th,4, 05 would :Le muci oora reluctant to Inocnt an attack..
.The Cuhanz are.conficnt--and ititiflably so?that tey
can
:.rap up with 'ease the infiltration teams that exile
groupa periodically stmd out but they 04Imonatrated
a peculiarHscnnitivity to press reportn. that an 'exii(i -
arply.'1 is. beim recruited openly in varioun?cities i!A. the
U. To th,4t Qui4aAs, announcommt% in the ,Irons Of the ? ,
on recruit:nont of th,iKt current exile army by individuals.
closly linket'.' to the hated 13atis8 regine-bear strildnq ?
resemblance...to prof?I?reports ?:)receding 1961 affair and
thoir view in evince of US acquieseaccat least, or ?
of OS. sponsorship, at most, of another tp-mt.4, to unsat
tb riwolutionary govrnnent if .the op.rortunity. should ?
evctr ariae. ? Castro known that U'3 officials are aware. of
the riaiAg 'discontent" I.A.uba and he. ilkay Velieve... that
'013 Las incorrectly interpretd the diaturd Cuban .
internal situation an dawloping in?such a fashion aa to
eventually presant a iropitiolas opr?ortunity for a?c'econd?
invalon. .ltough btu analyain of the situation may be
prong, he does. intorret events. from a rather narrow .
viewpoint with Ilavaoa?aq the. center of tr:.:e universe and he. ?
bases his docisions on that analysis, right or wrong. .
2. In addition, Castro probably blolieves that, in
the eVent of an attach that prmts a serious challenge ?
to ht 8ecurity'foreos, h.c will e hotter able to count ?
on military assistance from the USSR if a soviet military
unit ia in Luba. Ever since his ignominious' treatmcnt by....
tlic USSR during the 1962 missile. crisis Castro has Lad
grave. .doul)tti about thn willi145nens of ttIt'2 USS1 to como to
his. aid in the event of attack. Both be and 7au1 have: ?
voicd thesct doubts ,A114ic1y. Sovict p.arformance in
the Middle Last war in 19,7 and in vietnam roi:Iforced
belief tnnt unless :lirectly involved, tnc.; assa will oro- ?
bably ba'ek tIOWA in a 'crunch.' with the. US. ? In thin. respect,
the. presence of a_Sovict military uait would -serve. to ???
alleviate Itin 4oubt3, ?
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3.. ? ra what han comi't 4aey4oribad az .1.5 ?
Slovak spoece Cafstro poScd?tno question of what- ally-aculd
cw11 to?Als aid if thr arose in cab.a. a situation rtiigilar ?
to that of.Czechoslovaia ia 17)6.;. t'robably belieVs? ?
that 3wle?ty7,112 of Sovit military 2rvvft,fnce (i.e., a?.;:,re5ence
7oeyov.0 -1.e estimated two to.thro tousand 5r7viet military
aaVizler and tocdlkician oow sCatterod tliroa4jhout Cu)
would act aa a damer on any donaetic olamnts which night.
contlate? active orposition anfa youn 10 increase:the
possiility of?and facilitate--Sovie,t action to 7rop up
r. ii in, the *vont that di9intof..:xert pressure .on
him to 'liberalize hlsoicie.may 'lave tAe. .? ?
unlikalY parallal ten te.devlomo:nts in Czechozlovakia.
in 1967-63 ?and the concurrent activities?in Cuba of tha ? ?
'microt:action,"--a very-r5mall. group .0f.in.Iidents that.
chalinged the efficacy of his =terity measareu: in parti-
cular, and his foreiqn and domeFitic policies in goneral. ?
Althougn his vigorous retaliation off;IctivA,y, ,A.iminat(A
this ranor irritant, ma7 7,:eth dy w,hn popular d13-?
satil-faction with oneroaa domandg and continued
ortage,s of 'food and consumer qoods oventaaIly creates
iresGares which. force ? him to ate!ek external sudport. ?
? ? 4. ittthe.s.T.m.tii, Castro.11..ed no denire to submit
totally to complet ;ovit -41ominat1on vlor?to?giv* the:
appearance of bin g a .2,oviQt 7t117:., ?W,?) can. expectod
to ak very atteA?t to maintain indpondence? ?Iti.le ?
negottryting to incroaGe the physicF1. security c>f?both i1,11 ???
001Intry and his reglwe. Whatever Soviet military' rrence ?
is agr6ed upon, it will not be sufficient to u.t the power
structure. aa it now exiata in Caba.
5. What can Caqtro offer the USSR? In the political
area, Castro has inaicatod that ht, is finally villing ho
ta:;e ni.,.103i tho Siho-Sovtet conflict. or marr, yr4ars he
had av.sumod a fixnd Tosition on the fenoo,r rav:ating that
lie belonged aZilong t.%oso who wiWw2ri for c-, conflict. In
June 1%9,'nowevet, h13 enisarv to the Communl_st Party
conforenca in r4cE1COW acu,owledg?,d that in the evAnt of 'a
L)rovocatica or aggression w7ainst th,* Soviet In!onl,A--coma
from where it may--0.4ha will anyie.ldingiv bo at the ;;;We
of thv: USS,!.." A1thou0 it was couctd in cautious trims,
there io no doubt tat tho stattment was oirectd against
Communilt China. In "%ay 070, daring hi xtended visit
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to tho. USSR, Raul Castro made almost a verbatim repeat of
thia 1e4g. y forma1i2iug thi:77 new policy in soma way
the Cut,ans would be giving nvidence of thoir political
support at the very tiu that Moscow ts accelerating its
effort.; to aci6lve a mea ure of bloc soltlarity against
the Cinese.
.6. in the milit,ary area, Cuba can .rovic1 thn?USSR.. ?
wit f4cilitian to sup7ort air and naval o rtion. in the
wesern hemihoro at a. time wh.,nn tho. ?::;1732 is dkwoloping
its onapoWer?to oporato on a worldwitin !7.,)asis. Peraps
most Idvantagef)us. to the 1.1SS.. would be a srxvice facility
.for. naval reconnai5v7ance aircraft (such as the TU-i BEAR
.Ds whith have already visit,A Cla,a on thr4,'e occasions this?
rig) ad port 7;xiviloga for a zi.imdrin..9, tandr (a tendor ?
and?sub.marinQe have?ben?incluid in. oach of tTa* two groups
of Soviet -warships that Eave.visite CuLa in the?.2ant year).
A tcrmicx in aj2auld srvicIA lumarins
wissilearring.alles far at ?s?oa, thIls avoi4ing thrembar- ?
ras9nt?tat a shor* installation, fiuch.. as our naval base
at Gt4intanarAo th Cubans. Cu6a could pro-
vide?.th. Soviet.Navy nansofyAatntaining 3i.44maries
on station for a greater 1,cngt. (and possily for
extanding submarine. oprations) pr'- vcn th optioi.
of provi4ing Tort facilitis for tq.ox.sumarins thclogelves
at a more propitioul tine. Similarly, a woall.
tary aircraft maintanance or support unit stationed at .
Jose flarti Airport or at a Cuban iAlitary airfield could..
foxtend convideraUly the range of Sovi.t re,conna1s5ance air-
crafts TiazA activit could be ox.onded later to include
the actual stationing of Soviet reconnainsancf,i1.aircraft
in Cuba. ?
7. In any event, Castro would r.robably inaist that
the presence cit of an aircraft or naval sarvicing and
maintenance unit ratlw:r than a ground forc,as unit. The
Soviets would, a1s6 ,r.:,2,Cor a se.!rvice unit which would attract
little attention and could he ex2anded later if necer,sary.
The presence of sueti a unit miOt evontually beemployod to
embarrass the US in tho eyFig of :,atin TII*Irica; to rate the
intornational political t.:.,futerature and exert pressure on
the UL.,; to provix,le the U, with a domestic The't. notato:" or
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to et'u1i& trath bait for quid-pro,quo negotiating with
the US
8. To guard against a soviet withdrawal 3uch as
occurred in 1962, Castro might hone to formalize Cuba's
closer military relationship with the USSR on naper. To
acrve this 'AIrr,lose, he .may try to involve tho Uttl-t in so;Lke
tY.Pc of mutual defnse agent hy offorinq to formalize
in writing Cuba's colioarity with the WISP in the Stno-
Soviet cisT)Lite. He woula froh,ably also attompt to include
a plodgia of Cuan support Lu future 'Tzechoslovak-type ,
crise..3 in return for a recirrocal statement guarantoeing
CovieL l'acking in t.,In event of a 'counterrevolution? in
Cuba. Thore_aeems to be PO c'zance, !.:,w,-,?v1r, that the uSSR
would r,.t.5c1;J
a9rc,t,:w.an. uVLoificiall aro 14(,;11 avara of Caqtro s
ani,rdici-able nature and ?iouL,t be entromaly cautiou% about
entoriLg into vv.:At a teliuous zlgreament which could 1,e
Jr Castro as a form of diplrimatic blae;mail. in the ovent
of either a 'Czechollova::-ty7.9 nituation or A Sino-Soviet
olwIn? Cuban sup7ort would of course symolic
than substantive wlcreag a cuba-LT5crj1 could idring
immediate and, insitont demands for Soviot military ana
diplomatic involvnt from flavana. Simnly stated, the
Cubans ',1avt, too little to of for the USSR in return for
tha risks inht-Ixant in even tha most 'vague/y worded mutual
defense agreement.
9. At the time of thn 1962 missile crisis? several
Sovix$t diesel submarines were headed for Cuba. They
raturml,d to Soviet wators before reaelinc the island,
however, no we do not I.now whethr4r the Swiots intended
to establinh a submIrine baae in Cuba at that time. The
only submarine base actually ostablilthea by the Soviets on
foreign soil was in Albania in the it 1959's, prior to
Tirana's split with roscow.
10. P:oscow may Ic interested in the kind of facilitius
it now enjoys in the UAR. Foviet diesel rinbmarines are now
using port facilitien in A1exan4ria to replenih and make
minor roymirs. A submarine tondQr assi7ned to the Soviet
Mediterranean oquadron friquently ca114 there and, by making
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11,
1.13 of these ft%cilities, Soviet diesel submarines have
been able to extend t74r Mediterranean, deployments to. 3
long as. six months. .p.rsumabl'ii, 4imi1ar facilities in Cuba
would be.just as advantageous to the. Soviet navy in tho?
Atlantic.
11. ? The operation of a force of surface combatants
in tae Caribbeaa at much more freTunt intervals than the
preksent once-a-year 2attern.seems unlikely in light of
Soviet naval comnitmonts in t.1- :4ditrranean and. the.
Indian.. Ocean. small suadron of attack submarinc:s.
oprating from a base la .Cuba or from a ?tender bald in ?
CulJa, howevr, would give the Soviets. excollont.acces$,T
forint,:',Ulig*nce collctction and training operations againfA
Polaris submarines.working out of Charlston, out Carolina,
as veil ?as -against naval forcas tatione4 at the major bases.
of Maypert and Eey Wst., Florida.
12. For political and security rea3ons, it neems un-
Iixely that Sovict missile suroaarinfls--such as the Y-clasE
uniti now making regular patrols in tne
Atlaatic--:0ould operate from Cuban bas?s. Other nuclear
suLlmarinris suco th N-class ettIck unite and
E-XI Jla ss CrUirit-A mis,3iin units probably would not use
cuban facilities on a regular basis. Submarine tendars
ahd other logistics snie3 o:lerating,from Cuban facilities,
however, could provide sunport at stt. to ''ovict nuclear
and lidanile sul)warimas in the relatively secure .4aters
of the Cape Verde Basitl witi,out creatix4 undue political
problems for either t1-4o Soviets or the Cul.ano.
13. A facility for servicing naval reconnaissance
aircraft would also be of use to tho USS:f,% If aircraft
such a% the TU-95 BEAR 1) were to operate out of Cuba, they
could provide operaticqlal intelligence on Ur naval forces
in th ulf of iexico and along the east coast an far north
as Boston. (Ten Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft are
currently las*I.d in tho VAR to collect intelligence on the
US Sixth Pleet.) In addition, the BEAR 0 is equipped to
provide radar target d,-xta to cruise missile-e7uipped sub-
marines and surface Ships such as the Class nuclmar
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pow red aubmarine aad the Rresta- lase cruiser which arrived
in Cienueg., Cuba on 14 May.
14. Certain tentative feelers along the lines described
above may have been discussed during Soviet I;ofensc, Minister
Greeliko's visit to Cuba last Uovsmbnr. 'ho signifioance
of hi % trip, howtver, i tiL1unl,nown and he Fs.nd hi q star-
studded delegation may have been conceriwd ossertially with
asassing %.;u5a's military ,:stablimnt, its UsP of Sovit
Ilvtlons and eflti,ment, and its future needs for resti,7:oly
and modernization. 'Irc.0.1ko has conducted many ratailar visits
to otaor countrios cutsidtr. the socialist camp in th Past,
few 7e4ire and no outstanding politico-military significance
secsAq to hava been attached to the 5e tris. (See attached
annex).
IS. Little mote ca 1 atro' visit to
-cow in tsri1and
.2.au1 may ;lave 'nad SOMe
succ,xAs, howuvor, in arranging for a new series: of military
duliveries to rofurbieh anti uodate the Cuban armed forces.
only a few shi2ments Ivtve e.en received since the lant
series elided in February 1g6i5 and a?major resupply *f fort
may gat unaer way shortly. Unlie Crcht:oso trip to Cuba,
aaul's visit to Aoscow 'as not un9rocedented. He has traveled
to the USSi: often in the past and spent almost two months
there in late 1165.
16. Whatever the nature of any arrangements the Cithans
and Soviets may be working out, Fidel aeeMS to be preparing
public op.inionrand creating the proper netting for possibly
jUztifying closr military tic's by resurrecting tiw old but
reliable Ogre of the 81porialint threat." Us reaction to
the amed infiltration hy exiles in mid,-April, for eXaMplo,
exceeacd ilavana's,reaction to similar attemnts inccaither
16a and in nay, September, and Decamher 19.1--;9. The exiles
on 11 Aay 1970 gave him a 4ia1e-to-order issue by oinking
two small Cuban Us:ling boats and kidnaping cloven crow
members. On this Occasion, too, Castro's reaction exceeded
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that which occurred in late 1963 urhen units .cf the 17ne-
zuelan. 'fiavy .a0.zed letrgc.: Cu%.0an fish,L.Ag trawler with more.:
thaA 30. crewmen. aboard.
13. attxibutina both incidontc zdrectly to tItc US
govornment, Castro chos to ignore fAct,a readily availanla
to him.
In addition, hri haA access to the?intrrogaticn reporta
on oapturd?iyifiltratore, and pxcerience indicates that 'the
Cubanv anla to rccontruet tae ?facts with onsidrablc.
accuracy .1.-y an Of priwnr?.r interrogations. PIthough
Castro may bit. sinCerely w:,rried .About ZiS 1-articipation in.
long-range plan. to orqnizo on a /arge nctlfz an. exile.
army for .anothr Bay of. Pig.5-style invasion, hc. leaves. ?
()pun to qw,stion ti * sincority of claimz.; that irres-
ponsible exiie. antics tob blamd on.. the US.
? 19. csteo prnt aggresiv.stance Can .be attri-
. ? buted paray to hip.dasire to cr(latea diwYtsion from his
f&iLucoto acievo the highly touted qoal of ten millirm tons.
. .in ttIe current sugar harv2zt. The laryesto 4,wever, which
broc All rviou roduatjor rtcord..?.!, can !-Iardly.e ?thc.
? ? rason foruuc"1 actions az Castro 's rough.trestnent.of Swizs
eli440matic officialri during tho incident of th hidnaped
..fisermcn; his verbal ahui o riti$701 govrnor of tho
"aahaas Islands; his cryptic hint that "w&41 alwayq
. ready to increase our military ties f3ov1et Union";
waicAh mado'in hi o Qf 22 -April; his virtual st,ge.
Of tha old US eobas!5y luilding in iiavana in !..ayt 1A.n.rmars
. on 19' may aut net having 'long rage Aircraft' And about.
"going over. from dofensive. to offQnsive" aqainat
countries frm whic4 the exiles 1.eunch 1:lair attacks;
.a. t1-rat in -ths samo speech about ?aliminating all US
repreSentation?in Lavana'a diploMatic community. Viz ::Tovo-
, -cativc attitude may nisp be due partly to hin. frustration
? over failure.. to .gain W4at he considors to be significant
military liacking..froni tile'USSR.? ?
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