WASHINGTON POST STORY ON NATO/PACT TANK BALANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 2, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

(
MEMORANDUM HAK has seen
OSD REVIEW
COMPLETED
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRET /SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: K. Wayne Smith
SUBJECT: Washington Post Story on NATO/
You asked me to check the substance of the Washington Post story
on NATO tank forces and identify the possible sources for it.
accurate (Tab A). Its principal points are drawn from the NSSM 92
"building block" papers which were later incorporated into the
NSSMs 84/92 summary papers. The main points covered in the
story and their treatment in our work are:
-- Number of NATO Tanks. The Post story identifies a
115, 000 tank replacement force" that is "only, slightly smaller than
the front-line NATO tank force" for a total of "about 11, 000 Allied
tanks (that) would be quickly available. 11 The NSSM 84 summary
reported that some 115, 250 tanks were either propositioned or held
in reserve, which along with tanks in active units (including France)
provide a NATO force of 11, 302 tanks on M-Day. Thus, the .Post
and NSSM 84 numbers are quite close.
The Substance of the Post Story
The Post story on the NATO/Pact tank balance is substantially
- U. S. Tank Force. The story does not identify the size of
the overall U. S. tank force in Europe; it does mention that the "extra"
tanks include about 1, 200 American M-60s and further implies that
"about 500 of these are prepositioned in West Germany" for the
Reforger units. The breakout of U. S. reserve tanks was not included
in either NSSMs 84 or 22.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS
APPLY
SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
SECRET /SENSITIVE
--- Soviet Tank F6ice. Both-the Posfaxad.lSTSSMs 84/92 assess
the Warsaw Pact tank threat ai about 13, 3,000 tanks on M-Day' and
19, 000 after a few weeks of mobilization. However, these estimates
are the basis of all government planning and have been widely dissemi-
nated.
NATO Improvements. . The Post reports that "one of the options
under study is assigning these forces .(the reserve tanks) to new or
current units.or possibly converting one or both U. S.. infantry divisions
in Europe to armored units. " The NSSM 84 study developed four options
for increasing the number of NATO tank/anti-tank weapons in both the
U. S..and Allied forces but none of them focused on the conversion of
U. S. units or the assigning of reserve tanks to active units. OSD had
planned to study these options but as yet has not done it.
'-tanks. Y or example:
ixiiplications of the discovery of large numbers of NATO war.. re . serve
goes well beyond it both in substantive detail about tanks .axd't1.e policy
While the Post' 'story Is drawaa'fro .-the NSSMs $4/92' materxa1, it
-- The Post story sees the discovery of the reserve tanks as a
"disclosure which could bring about a major shift in attitudes about
the ability of Western forces to withstand a Warsaw Pact tank thrust
across NATO's borders. "
-~ The NSSM 84 study found that "The Pact has been generally
viewed as possessing a major advantage over NATO in numbers of
tanks.. . this numerical disadvantage may be offset, in part, by
NATO's large tank reserves, higher quality tanks, and superior
maintenance. "
The Post story, thus, is somewhat misleading in its implication
that NATO does not by current lights have any great problem in stopping
a Pact tank attack. We have found, and I think my earlier memo to
you reflected this (Tab B), that NATO would still be outnumbered about
2:1 by the mobilized Pact tank force even if every reserve tank were
included in our active forces.
In addition, there are many statements of fact or opinion appearing
in the story that were not included in the NSSMs 84192 work:
SECRET /SENSITIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
 The statement a e reset p g
/,sealed off spurs of West'derma's`autbba ..'.there are not nearly
1enough standby crews assigned to man them." We have not yet looked
``into the location of the reserve tanks. Also, these tanks do not have
standby crews.
th t th 1VATO ve tanks are ''' `axlced alori
-- The estimate that the NATO reserve' tanks are "equal to 10
armored divisions and represent a few billion dollars in unassigned
not been informed as to what Laird would say at these meetings..
assets. 11-our study ''did.not :look at,this question.
The statement that "Laird is expected, among other t}aings,
to press NATO to improve its ability to stop a Russian armored
attack" at the November NPG meetings. We and other agencies have
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
SECRET /SENSITIVE
ese ? observations go -well?bay'orid Ehe work we have da e. .
Possibl.e.Sources' of 'the"Story
Washington Post's story is based on the NSSMs 84/92 studies, but
this in itself is of little help in determining' the source of the Post story..
- The basic NSSM 84 report and the working papers associated
with it were distributed to some 200 individuals in about seven agencies
and perhaps as many agency components. A distribution list is at Tab D.
-- The personnel associated with the NSSMs 84/92 studies who had
both access to these reports and enough policy background to write
the story number about 30. I have listed the members of this group
at Tab C, but because of the wide distribution of this report, the main
source for this story was not necessarily a member of this group.
It could just as easily have been a consumer of the report.
-- The finding on reserve tanks was common knowledge in DOD-
oriented staffs around Washington more. than a month ago. The formal
distribution of the initial report was made in late September.
Thus, the tank information was very widely disseminated throughout
Washington and could have been obtained by the Post from an almost
endless number of individual sources.
SECRET /SENSTIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25 LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
SECRET /SENSITIVE
-- Content. Because the story must have proved embarrassing
to the military, the SCS and conservative elements of OSD(ISA) could
have no interest in leaking it. Given the somewhat technical nature
of the story's military discussion, it is unlikely that State is respon-
sible. This leaves OSD, CIA, OMB, and the NSC as the possible
sources.
The Post sto.ry itself, however.,, offers a, few additional clues:
''military planners, " "intelligence sources, " and "officials, " On the
whole, this language suggests that OSD was the main source of the
story though it also implies that the intelligence community confirmed
it. Given the diversity of material, the story may have had several
- Attribution. The story attributes its ni.aterial'prixnaiily td
sources, .. ' .
staff, there is no evidence and little reason to 'support this contention.
One can't be much, more specific.than this without, attributing motives
to individuals in what would be an unfair manner.
commun itty. -.Though DOD would .like, I'm sure, to pin the story do your
sources probably within DOD and wag. confirmed within the intelligence
u.ess (and it is only a. guess)'is that the story came fr6m several
As sliown in Tab C, there were at least nine individuals, including
myself, on the NSC staff-who had sufficient access to leak the story,
but I sincerely do not believe that any of them did largely because
they knew the impact it would have on our efforts to get the Allies to
contribute more to remedy known deficiencies in the NATO posture.
Nay
.SECRET /SENS PTIVE
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
In NATO Stockpile
00
By Michael Getler
Washingtoi Post Staff Writer
...The Defense ? Department
has discovered that 'this coun-
try and its NATO allies have
about 5,000 more tanks in Eu-
rope than top-level Pentagon
officials knew about.
Existence of the tanks was
uncovered within the last four
weeks, according to military
planners; urine a`lugh-prior-
i yy aMinistration review of
.over=all NATO strategy known
as National Security Memo-
randum 84.
The disclosure could bring
about a major shift in atti-
tudes about the ability of
Western forces to withstand a
Warsaw Pact tank thrust
across NATO's borders:
For years, the Pentagon, by
'many -for- two brigades. of .the
U.S based First Infantry:Divl
lion, the.size of 'NATO's
backup tank' force has. been
unknown to ? top Defense. De-
partment and administration
officials dating "back to at
least the Johnson administra-
tion, it is claimed.
- Disclosure of the actual di-
mensions of the reserve tank
force during the National Se-
curity Council study is said to
have stunned civilian and mils:
tary defense official at the
highest -levels. It also has
caused a hasty official upgrad-
ing of estimates on the total
NATO armored force that
could be available within a
matter of days to meet a So-
viet ground attack in Europe.
- See TANKS, A16, Col. 1
RA I
lis -0 (Gull
Its-, own , 'estimate, has rzonsid-.
ered NATQ. to be badly?out-
gunted by massive tank forces
of the' Soviet Union and its
Eastern European allies.
The extra tanks, almost all
of them among the most mod-
ern in ?, service, have been
stockpiled in West Germany
for years as potential replace-
ments for operational NATO
tanks knocked out in battle,
But the reserve tanks, which
could 'almost double NATO's
tank strength, have not been
included in the Pentagon's
top-level planning estimate of
NATO armored units facing
the Warsaw Pact forces, ac-
cording to these sources.
Furthermore, with the ex-
ception of about 500 tanks
pre-positioned In West Ger-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
Intelllgene.s urces confirm
#h t -big, increase in. Asti.
mated Allied tank strength
.h-sitbe n made.
The -assessment of. NATO
strength vis-a-vis the Warsaw
Pact Is the key item in figur
ing out each year's total U.S.
military b u dg e. t, since the
needs for a defense of Europe
la
el
rg
y determine the.ll
overa size ' of American armed
The , extra 'tanks, which are
, ,._rkec .alQnrasealey firs
of West German's auto~l bn,
i+n c u~de about 1,200 American
1VI60s, tile' rnafn battle tank
vow n lry"th A}mom:
mosfof the o t h e r s are
equally modern German-built
Leopards and British Centu-
rions. Only about 500 are old
U.S. M-24s and A 1-48s still used
by the Germans. '
The same study that
brought the size of the re-
placement force to top-level
attention is also said to have
raised the idea that tinder cur.
rent. strategy these tanks
would be virtually useless In a
fight.
According to m_ ilitar plan.
ners, the stud? pointe out
Mal laarkin;_ tite tanks along
highway leaves tiiem_.._.ef
c.
-
tremely 'Vulnerable to any
gLFCT-`So a afr'strif brin
lug into question their availa-
b 1 yeas "x7 laccmen -e ssi -'i`e l u ans, os one official
uts 't, must be more aware of
tWelse tanks than is the Penta-
gon.
Furthermore, it is said that
there are not nearly enough
standby crews assigned to
man these tanks in the case of
an urgent crisis, and that it
from regular units will sur-
vive if their -tanks are knocked
out in battle,
....The. lack of standby crews is
reportedly" t,he-?: nsa$n reason
why the tanks are not-
consid-ered to be combat ready now.,-
However, military experts
say this could be easily reme-
died and the' .Pentagon is now
reconsidering how-.best to use.
tdtem.tanks. .
'':Though' ?no -decisions- h.ave.
been made. on . what, if any,
thing, will be done, one ofthd
options-?under study is assign-
ing some of these ? forces to
new or current units
or possi-
.
bly converting one or both U.S
infantry divisions in Europe to
armored units.
The administration of late
has also been pressing NATO
allies to beef up their own mil-
itary readiness rather than
simply offering to pay more of
The cost of keeping large
The 5,000 tank . replacement
By revealing the huge nutp-
ber of t'a iks actually 'in ]au
Trope already and the: options
for. making therm combat
ready, officials say, the NSC
Istudy makesft-clear for the
first time that NATO. has at
least a better potential for
holding off Russian. armor
,without quickly resorting to
nuclear - weapons- .Ilian many
strategists believed.
Until' now, , the. Pentagon] of-
fieiallr estimated 'that NATO
had about- 6.000 'tanks really.'
for immediate use.. . .
Arrayed against these are
about 13,000 Warsaw Pact
tanks, mostly Russian, spread
through Eastern Europe.
U.S. intelligence also esti-
mates the Russians could
move another 6000 tanks into
the front lines' from Soviet
bases, within'-three or four
weeks of a decision to mobi-
lize.
Contrary to the Allied idea
force is only slightly smaller Of keeping tanks as replace
than the front-line NATO tank ments, Soviet doctrine calls
f ual toaborit 0 for a fast war-fighting strategy'
force. It f is ec
force. i divisions and u rep r 0 that brings all forces to bear
... as quickly as possible. Soviet
gents a fe y l 1; it tank forces reportedly are all
ltnasss ned assets. The extra
assigned to specific units and
U.S. xf6os alone costa Independently manned.
$50~ million. The overwhelming numeri-
ie orthcoming NATO cat superiority of the Warsaw
defense ministers meeting in Pact forces has depressed
Brussels in December, sources NATO-planners and fortified
say.U.S. Secretary of Defense the impression, especially in
Melvin Laird is expected, Europe, that NATO could not
NATO-a_ is_- _.to ress~ hold off the Russians using
NATO te.iunprove-its-ability-to just conventional weapons for
so-pa Russian armored attart-
W
hen the Heretofore un.
tanks o be ear
t ' -aritl? counted replacement forces
nns,j rboth. are added, however, and pro.
The prospect for quickly in. viding some attempt is made
creasing actual NATO ar- to improve their readiness,
mored strength has major im- planners stress that the ratios
plications for U.S. and NATO
change dramatill
cay.
long-range strategy. About 11,000 Allied tanks
would. be quickly available.
versus 13,000' for the. Pact. ;
Further balance is provided,
weapons experts say, because
roughly half the total NATO
tanks are modern, with long-
range and highly accurate.
105mm guns. Only about one-
fourth of the Warsaw Pact
tanks, mostly. Russian. T.62s,
are,ratecl,as good.:The bulk of
the Pact forces:are older So-.
viet T-5~4s and" T-55s: ' `
The imbalance in opposing ?
armored .forces,..at least as it
has been ? understood in' the
past, ? has 'also been' labeled
NATO's : most, serious weak-
ness.
NATO countries have about
t eFi same rumberf ;ducal
Aghte taomogrs as the
Warsaw Pact and about the
same nmber of men under
arms.
Thus, -it is now being . rea-
soned in some quarters, that a
new tank balance sheet might
change some minds Overseas
about Europe. being defenda-
ble and might also help in fu-
ture NATO-Warsaw Pact mu-
tual force reductions.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
SECRET
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 2050G
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: K. Wayne Smith
INFORMATION
October 5, 1970
SUBJECT: The NATO-Warsaw PACT Tank Balance in Central Europe
The PACT has generally been viewed as possessing a major advantage
over NATO in numbers of tanks. Analysis done recently in connection
with NSSMs 84 and.92 indicates, however, that NATO's tank. problem is
not ope:of items of equipment'but of mobilization of manpower reserves
to operate available tanks. ..When : a' simple, count of tanks :in active units'
'.is ma.de, the PA CT has' a 1.8.3:1 advantage on M-day and a 2. 70:l
advantage at M+15 (the -most. favorable 'situation for the PACT). When
all relevant quantitative and 'cjualitativ.e factors are considered, however,
it appears that the PACT advantage in terms of the number of tanks as
such is probably never significantly greater 'than the 2:1 ratio its
doctrine regards as necessary for a successful response to a NATO
..attack (presumably the Soviets would want even higher ratios on the
attack but we have no evidence as to what they are). Factors which
? modify crude calculations of the tank balance include the following:.
= Previous DoD calculations of the tank balance failed to take
.'account of NATO tanks in reserve stocks in the Central Region (roughly
one third of total tank holdings). The PACT maintains .ll its tanks in
`active units. If organizational changes could be made which allowed
NATO tanks in inventory to be thrown into the balance more rapidly,
.relevant force ratios would change radically. While NATO stockpiles
have a smaller percentage of modern tanks than our active units, they
still.contain relatively- more than do Soviet active units.
1 NATO tanks are more reliable and NATO tank maintenance is
better. According to best estimates we have, PACT tanks would be
out. of action for maintenance 28 percent of the time on the average,
NATO tanks only 11 percent.
NATO tank forces are supplemented. by anti-tank systems superior
to thePACT's.
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
.+FZ lllllllllllllll'' .. t,;, r.:.:-.: ..
:SI?a,C1tT '
SECRET 2
--C A'I' ?tanks should' have advantages- oft'
terrain, ? can oa ricaent'
nc emp acemearit,.,aidthus of firix g~fz 'tin them ajority.'of engagements..
`According. to analyses of World War IItank engagements,, kill ratios
favoring the .defense on the order of three to one can be expected.
NATO's tactical advantage would be further enhanced by the se. of
barriers and' anti-tank, mines.
Several important conclusions- emerge from all of.?this:
-~ It way. not be as important as we. thought toy ddesign correctiv:e.
.approaches ,,to MBFE which are tank heavy on the PACT side.
MPr agree zaent is extreru iy. s?ensit%.ye.to ?the.'data,base, e pioyed. ,,
Ppd., experience im analyzing the tank pro le ra is at ue. V a xe
.. enco zntering similar d fficulties, in .every otb~r a4rea,
Enclosed (Tab A j is a paper sumirxnaizlng tank issues which will provide
you with more detail oin''fhe points made above. ' f.> .
..:Analysis :of NAT.O,strategies and of possible approaches'to.an
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25 LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
Tank Issues
1. The Present Situation
'The' Numerical Balance,-; ?'' '.?
The Pact has been gencrally viewed as possessing a majcdr advantage
over NATO in numbers of tanks. For instance, on At-day the number of
tanks in active units in the Central Region is 13102 Pact tanks to
7148 NATO tanks ..(including. France), a ratio of 1.83:1.
,combat replacements, while NATO replaces 'indiv dual personnel and
This difference. follows from :,the Pact ' method of ,us ng.4vhole::un is .,as
However,, this neglects two factors which modify the conclusion.
First, the Pact keeps all its'inventory of tanks in active units,.
while NATO keeps over 1/3 of its Central Region tanks in reserve stocks.
equipment items. Including the 4152 NATO tanks that are propositioned.
or iii' reserve brings the balance to 131.02 Pact 'tanks to 11302 NATO tanks
a,ratio of 1.15 : 1.
While this total number of tanks in the region is significant', not
all tankson either side are immediately available for combat on M-day.
One way of indicating this is to balance the tanks of Pact Category I
divisions in GDR., and Czechoslovakia against NATO divisions in FRG,
Belgium and the Netherlands (stationed and indigenous forces in both
cases). This balance is 9727 Pact tanks to 6052 NATO tanks, a ratio of
1.60:1.
By 1i+15, the number of Pact tanks in the Central Region is at its
peak, with 6262 tanks arriving from the Western military districts of
the Soviet Union. At this point all ac a.'c-units are assumed to be combat
ready and available. The balance at this point is 19364 Pact active. unit
tanks to 7148 NATO, a'ratio of 2.70:1,. The balance of Ithe total inventory
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25 : LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
 ?v tanks is 19364Pact tanks to"11302 NATO (s`orri e'of *NA'tO's, res'e'rve talcs
may be mobilizing but are not so counted here). A ratio of 1. 71:1.
The M+15 balances are the most favorable the Pact will receive; nomore
SECRET
Pact tanks are added after M+15, while NATO tanks are mobilized from the
in'-region reserve stocks and, latet, tanks arrive froni. 'the US' and Ul
These balances.and their relationships are shown in Table X.
? The Qualitative Balance
There, axle ; sa.gnificani< qualitative, differences, nio.ng: arks. T Paetx .
'Shows that ?the' m st modern Soviet tanks, all of the T--62'm.odel, make up' 23%
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
and: NATO tanks are. divided i ito'.c1ass-es according to effectiveness:;,; Table U'
of the M-day total, and 3176 of the tanks in the GDR; and Czechoslovakia on M-day,
while the most modern category of NATO tanks mak up 58% of the active unit
tanks in the FRG, Belgium and the Netherlands and 46%a of the total Central
Region inventory of NATO tank:. (including about 1/3 of the reserve tanks).
In addition, it is argued by many that NATO's support and maintenance
of tanks are superior to the Pact's. One analysis concluded that while only
11% of NATO tanks would be unavailable at any one time because of major
failures, 28%6 of Pact tanks would be. While the conclusion and the
quantitative estimates are disputed, applying these factors to the M+15
balance, the most favorable for the Soviets, shows that the balance of
working active unit tanks is 2, 19:1 and the balance of working tanks is 1. 38:1.
Being on the defensive could also help NATO. NATO tanks should have
advantages of terrain, of concealment and emplacement, and thus of firing
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
' ? ~~'~~ Y 1. tiro ~.
;tank enga8.cmertt.s has. conq.luded, ..gc' .e ..'rally., . a11ow -k-i.1.1 .:ratios. - a~roxang tie.
defense on the order of three to l 1Thekill ratio might not be asp
favorable in a mobile defense situation. On. the other hand, the use of
barriers and anti-tank mines could improve the effectiveness of NATO's'
defensive 'us,e .of tanks.'. NATO-engineer units pare .oxiented around..iho
construction of barrier defense (seven days work.is estimated to construct
a moderate barrier protecting Centag). In. addition, large stocks of anti-
;tank mines. (I.7 'million). are kept by.the FRG.
Anti -tank'weapons.' are -also effective'. i.n'*a""'aefens'a.ve ? role:: these
,weapons'includevariety of 'guns and missiles, mounted an vehicles or ,not.
.capability. Numberical estimates vary, according to what' i's included.
One M-day count compares 24SO Pact weapons to 2533 NATO weapons 'i.n active
units.) However, this does riot include weapons in reserve and inventory.
In addition, the artillery of each'.side is estimated to have an anti-tank
In particular, it does not include the weapons of the German Territorial
Army. This force is planned to have units of up to brigade-/strength,
with 4000 anti-tank weapons, available by N4-l2 hours. Also, NATO has
in its total, several types of tracked tank destroyers, like the US
Sheridan and the German Jagdpanzer, while the Pact has none of this high
mobility type. However, aircraft and helicopters on both sides at present.
have a low anti-tank capability primarily due to ordnance limitations. In
addition the more sophisticated anti-tank missiles systems have had their
combat effectiveness questioned {in connection with reliability, capability
at short ranges, and prohibition costs of effective training).
1/ The JCS do not concur with this evaluation and state there is no fully
accepted basis for these judgments.
2/ 6 1--1- 'ua ono now formed.
x 1 A , No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4 ' __ - .
 7 77
-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
Table.I
U-Day Tank 'Balance
Pact
NATO
'Tangs available 'at. front
.9727
6052
Other tan1 s in 6ombat - ready units
1774.
1096.
Other tanks a r.'; actx ve 'un is ?~
I6O?1;
Total. in : aottve units
13102
7148:.
Tanks; preposit-loned or in reserve 41
0
41:54
Total
1310:2... .
11302
Ij Pax Pact;:?Cat. div ,signs. in
GD~2 and'' Cxchoslovaka; .far NATO, a11
divisions in FRG; Belgium and Netherlands
2l Por Pact, ?Cat. ,Z divisions in Poland (available'h9+5), for NATO, active
divisions-in France -(available
At+15).
3l For Pact, Cat. II and III units; no NATO units.
4l ;Np Pact-.-tanks in this status.
anks in active units
14+15 Tank Balance
Pact- NATO
19G`..1148
anks propositioned or in reserve.
otal
0 4154 '(mobi j :z.ation.
;.-going's ,n)
19364.. , 11302,
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
 3131
0
6366
2413
8779
Al Pact - T--54-55, T-10/T-1OA1; NAT4-AMX-13, M-48, 1OSr.~m. Centurion
f 1-04; #UUu, PR-6u, Leopard, Chieftain, ?AMX-30
4/ Pact'-none; NATO- 84.mm Centurion, M'47
f 5/ Pact'-T-34; NATO414, M26
a xca y t~
4154 reserve or' prepositioncd tanks.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
/ Categories B F C combined since no breakout can be made between .1 4mr~and
1O5mr Centurion versions.
7/ Combines 1096 Tench comb d
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
 Table III
Operationally Available Tanks Takin Account of
Main?enance Factors 1
Pact
13942
NATO
7Z for Pact; . 89 for NA TO; an estirAate of the* perceri#a.ge
of tanks not unavailable because of maintenance.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25 : LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
M+15
Tanks in active units
Tanks prep6si:tioned or i,n.-'reserve
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
. Pos,sibl,e $$ouroes. of .the: Tan.k.Story.
Hank Gaffney
Garen Staglin
Dan Gulling
Jim Kolb
..Robert Chapman
Jim Alf
Hans Einstein
Paul. Bowron
Robert Stone
Greg Woods
James. Goodbv
Marvin Humphries
Wayne. Smith
John Court
Bill Hyland
Robert Ryan
Andrew ilamilton::
Wilfred Kohl
Gol. Richard . Kennedy,
,Hal Soxxielieldt
.. Keith Guthrie..' . `
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
"William Morrill
. Lucas r'ischer
Col.'.,-Rayrri:o, id .Thayer ..
suavid . )4tiebaugh
Reginald Bartholomew
James. Morrison
Phil Odeen
' . Barry. Carter.
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/02/25: LOC-HAK-9-4-3-4
3