CABLE TO HENRY A. KISSINGER FROM BRENT SCOWCROFT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-259-5-35-1
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: May 2, 1974
• Content Type: CABLE

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/02 : LOC-HAK-259-5-35-1
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Wsshin Qton. ^.C 20520
SCOWCROFT ASKS FOR DRAFT
PRESIDENTIAL LETTER.
HAIG MAKES CLEAR TO SCHLESIN-
GER THAT HE CANNOT MAKE AN
END RUN ON SALT.
WICKHAM PROMISES TO MOVE
SLOWLY ON EQUIPMENT.
SCOW CROFT WILL TAKE CARE
OF SCHLESINGER ON LASERS.
WILL LOSE.
State Dept., OSD
Reviews Completed
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
MORI/CDF C03344701
page 2,
C03344662 pages 4-9
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rp w
0 0200477 MAY 74 ZFF-1 ZFF-4 ZYH
FM THE SITUATION ROOM
TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
ZEM
S E C R E T SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
TOHAK 43
DELIVER IN SEALED ENVELOPE TO PETER RODMAN
TO: HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM : BRENT SCOWCROFT
II 2
HAKTO 25 HAS BEEN SENT UP TO CAMP DAVID. ASSUMING AN
AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE FROM THE PRESIDENT, WE WILL HAVE LITTLE
TIME TO GET A LETTER DRAFTED AND APPROVED. I THINK IT WOULD BE
HELPFUL IF YOU COULD HAVE SAUNDERS AND SISCO DRAFT SOMETHING
WHICH WOULD MEET YOUR NEEDS AND SEND IT TO ME TO ARRIVE BY
OPENING OF BUSINESS FRIDAY.
HAIG DID TALK TO SCHLESINGER ABOUT SALT. SCHLESINGER APPARENTLY
STARTED TO MOAN GENERALLY ALONG THE LINE OF TOHAK 23 AND HAIG
BROUGHT HIM UP SHORT. SCHLESINGER NOW KNOWS HE CAN NOT MAKE
AN END RUN, BUT THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT WE HAVE A SERIOUS
PROBLEM*
REF HAKTO 23. WICKHAM SAYS DEFENSE CAN MOVE VERY VERY
SLOWLY WITHOUTANY FORMAL HOLD ON THE EQUIPMENT. NO LETTERS
WILL BE SENT TO THE CONGRESS WITHOUT YOUR APPROVAL.
I WILL TAKE CARE OF SCHLESINGER ON THE LASER BOMBS (HAKTO 26).
YOU WILL RECALLTHIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT THEY HAVE TAKEN
THIS PARTICULAR TACK.
REPORTS ARE THAT FULBRIGHT IS IN DEEP TROUBLE IN HIS PRI-
MARY FIGHT. CURRENT POLLS GIVE HIM ONLY FROM 20 TO 30 PERCENT
OF THE VOTE AND, WITHOUT SOMETHING APPROACHING A MIRACLE,
IT WOULD APPEAR THAT HE HAS HAD IT.
WARM REGARDS.
256
2084
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C R E T/SENSITIVE 022159Z MAY 74
H{A rcT 0 : 2 S
;''YONLY
1974
3 : GENERAL SCOWCROFT
Fit0 SECRETARY KISSINGER
1. -SCl-iLESINGER HAS APPARENTLY TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT HE WILL
3IVi TH:'4 THE LASER BOMBS IF I WILL RELEASE MY HOLD ON THEM. I
W?3V' T AWARE THAT THE QUESTION WAS EVEN BEING CONSIDERED.
2. TELL SCHLESINGER THAT THIS KIND OF MANEUVERING SHOULD STOP.
IF HE WILL TELL ME THE ISSUES FROM A TECHNICAL POINT OF
I WILL TELL HIM WHAT I THINK POLITICALLY.
14. BEST REGARDS.
T. C R T/S.ENSITIVE/EYES ONLY
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May 2, 1974
TO: GENERAL SCOW CROFT
FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER
Please transmit the following message to the President from
Ins.
BEGIN TEXT:
1. I am reporting to you promptly on my private meeting
with Prime Minister Moir and subsequently another meeting with
her and all her principal colleagues because the Israeli position
presented to me today foreshadows, in my judgment, a possible break
in the negotiations at an early stage.
2. Before I came I made clear to both sides my assessment
of what would be required in order to achieve a Syrian-Israeli
disengagement. I said specifically that there would have to be Israeli
withdrawal to a point roughly 2-3 kilometers west of the October 6
line including line west of the town of Kineitra. As you know,
MORI/CDF
C03344662
the past several weeks both the Israelis and the Syrians have pages 4-9
encouraged me strongly to come to the area once again to see whether
the disengagement agreement could be concluded and in theknowledge
of my judgment as to what was required in order to achieve
agreement. Despite the internal crises in Israel, both publicly
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/02 : LOC-HAK-259-5-35-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/02: LOC-HAK-259-5-35-1
OP SECRET /SENSITIVE 2
EXCLUSIVELY EVES ONLY
and officially,ithe Israelis have been insistent that I pursue the
negotiations in the area.
3. Both in my private meeting with the Prime Minister and
subsequently with the Cabinet, at which the Chief of Staff made
a detailed presentation, the line to which Israel indicated it would
be willing to withdraw am* one several kilometers east of the
October 6 line with the Israelis occupying the high ground
throughout. The new Chief of Staff Our, used the specious argument
that there was no other line further west to which Israel could
withdraw which it would consider defensible. The line was
essentially the same line which Dayan gave me four weeks ago
with some slight change favorable to the Syrians in the south but
with a more important change in the north on Mount Hermon
in favor of the Israelis. In short, the line I received today can be
considered, if anything, a retrogression from the line given to me
by Dayan four weeks ago which I told him then would prove
unacceptable. If I were to present this line to the Syrians there
would be a blowup in the neogitations and the likelihood of a
renewal of war greatly increased. Once again, the Israelis
have continued to view the disengagement line in narrow military
terms -- and even in these terms, it ismt wholly defensible since
there is a high ground on which a line could be drawn roughly
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10
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
a4veaw.3 kilometers west of the October 6 line which in our
judgment would be defensible. I a?mr?lra~ am therefore
playing for time and will discuss secondary issues when I go
to Damascus to give Israel an opportunity to reconsider.
4. 1 pointed out to the Israelis that disengagement could not
be viewed only on basis of these narrow military considerations.
I stressed that Israel faces two choices: to stick with the present
very unsatisfactory position wbich in my judgment would have the f
following consequences; it would break the negotiations with the
onus on Israeli shoulders; it w uld reverse the trend in the Arab
world towards moderation; it would weaken the Sadat leadership in
the Arab world; it would offer both the Soviets as well as the West
Europeans an opportunity to inject themselves into the picutre in
a most unfavorable way; it would throw the whole matter into
international forums, is. "o United Nations Security
Council and the Geneva Conference; it would result in a loss of
control by the United States in both the negotiations and the trend
of developments in the area; it would probably result in the
reinstituting of the embargo since the oil Ministers are again
scheduled to meet to reveiw the situation again on June 1; it is likely
to result in Syria starting another war against Israel, a war of
attrition in which even the moderate Arabs would be under
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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 4
pressure to come to Syria's support, where the Soviets would
see an opportunity to regain influence by all-out military support
of Syria and in circumstances where the United States would be
isolated and in the likelihood that the kind of support necessary
would be dependent on a most uncertain public and Congressional
opinion.
5. At the same time I openly acknowledged that there was
a risk for Israel in going forward on the kind of line which has
been previously discussed as one that is within reason. I agreed
with Mrs. Meir that there could be no absolute guarantee that
if they withdrew to this point that a war would not result
eventually, but I felt that time is on the side of Israel. If an
agreement is achieved, this would permit Sadat to continue to take
the lead toward a peaceful settlement, and there was less risk,
in my judgment, in this course than the one which the Israelis
seem stuck on.
6. I am, therefore, meeting with Mrs. Meir this evening
to consider together the consequences of the failure of my mission
and how one could proceed in these circumstances.
7. It is, of course, possible that what we have heard today
to tactical, for the Israelis have asked us to go to Damascus tomorrow
and to take up a number of specific elements in the disengagement
agreement other than the question of the line. I will do this and I
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 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/02: LOC-HAK-259-5-35-1
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EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 5
will be able to get by for this one round with Azad, but in the
absence of anything more from the Israelis, it cannot be
strung out much beyond early next week.
S. I, therefore, would like you to consider on an urgent
basis the consequences which will face us should this mission
be terminated in the circumstances that I have described. I
believe a letter from you which lays out frankly the consequences
which would ensue particularly with respect to U. S. policy would
be most helpful at this juncture. If you agree, I would Ike it sent
soonest and I could have the opportunity to review it before it
is transmitted. You will wish to weigh, Mr. President, what
specifically you would want to tell Mrs. Moir regarding
American policy in these circumstances. What would the reaction
of the America a people be to a course which is likely to result
in not only the maintenance of the high prices of oil but the
rye " of the embargo? Could Israel expect American support
for an airlift of the kind which would he required in order to prevent
an Israeli defeat' What could Israel expect by way of changes in
our ongoing arms policy? These are very dundamental gtiesthmnow
and I would hope that your letter would deal with these matters.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/02 : LOC-HAK-259-5-35-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/02: LOC-HAK-259-5-35-1
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Finally, could Israel expect the consistent and steadfast
political and diplomatic support we have given in circumstances
where the United States veld be isolate? I do not wish to
ANaw' my own idea` is that we may
prejudge your
have to take some very painful decisions.
9. I would appreciate your voonsideration of the above on a
most urgent basis.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/02: LOC-HAK-259-5-35-1
 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/02: LOC-HAK-259-5-35-1
4W 4W
SECRET/SENSITIVE HAK TO 23
May 2, 1974 FLASH
Further to my HAK TO 21, 1 want it to be clear that the
hold should be removed on the equipment but that Defense should
move it at an imperceptible pace.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/08/02 : LOC-HAK-259-5-35-1