NET ASSESSMENT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-451-2-25-1
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: April 19, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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4~
OSD Review
Completed
NATIONAL SECURITY CQVNCIL
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
TOP rpEC T/SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM
FROM:
SUBJECT:
South Vietnamese Military Forces
Secretary Laird has sent you a net assessment prepared at his
request by CIA with assistance from DOD (Tab A).
This assessment was completed just as the current offensive opened.
It includes little new, but it contains some interesting insights.
External Aid for the NVA
CIA concludes that the USSR and the PRC have always been willing
to provide enough military aid to meet North Vietnamese war aims
as defined by the North Vietnamese themselves.
On the other hand, external assistance has been reduced, in total
value, over recent years and its future path is unknown. If military
aid were increased by 25% ($45 million), it could provide one of the
following:
-- Ten additional SA-2 battalions (10 were added in 1971);
-- About 40 additional MIG-21 s or more than 300 additional MIG-17 s;
-- Almost 400 T-54 medium tanks or 800-900 PT-76 light tanks.
Adding this additional equipment and supporting it would double the level
of military aid received in 1971, but would be only two-thirds the
assistance received in 1967 -- a level that continues to be well within
USSR and PRC capabilities.
Tor 636 RET SENSITIVE
CV&ide jts/5y e
DIA review
completed.
c
April 19, 1972
INFORMATION
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
CIA also examined the military implications of a 50%a cut in military,
aid. As current stocks are estimated to be at least 12 months require-
ments, CIA believes such a cut would have no early effect. On the
contrary, however, I think it quite conceivable that a cutback in deliveries,
unless the North Vietnamese were certain it was temporary, could force
Hanoi to consider reducing the level of combat to conserve its stocks.
In contrast to the overall supply situation, CIA believes a large cut in
petroleum deliveries would have an early effect because stocks are
only about 90 days' requirements. But, there are large petroleum stocks
for civilian requirements and military needs could probably be met by
reducing civilian uses.
Forward Deployment and Casualty Replacement
Since December, the NVA has increased its combat OB threatening SVN
by about 38,000 to 115,000-130,000. An additional 93, 000 men have been
infiltrated south but have not yet been included in the enemy OB by CIA.
Some are still in the trail system; some will be required for support
functions. But most provide a stock of fillers to offset combat casualties.
In short, when considering force ratios and the effect of casualties, you
should keep in mind that the enemy has already moved men into position
to replace 40,000-60, 000 casualties during the current offensive. In
addition, replacements for northern MR-1 would presumably move across
the DMZ and continued infiltration through Laos is a likely possibility.
Even if the enemy can replace his casualties, the fighting ability of his
forces will be degraded -- perhaps critically -- by loss of experienced
NCOs and officers.
Enemy Force Levels for 1973
Assuming the enemy loses about 100, 000 men this year (typical of years
with heavy fighting), the CIA argues that he will almost certainly be unable
to launch a campaign next year anywhere near as large as the current one.
We find the CIA conclusion optimistic. CIA states that Hanoi could induct
200, 000 men per year for several years before it would exhaust
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"Mr 1W
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
its 17-25 manpower pool. Thus, it would appear the enemy could
provide replacements for 100, 000 casualties or more. The enemy's
constraint, now or in 1973, is not number of men but the trained and
experienced leadership to use them as an effective fighting force.
RVNAF Strength
In assessing RVNAF strength, the CIA concludes that both in the present
period and in. early 1973 ARVN should -- from a quantitative point of view --
be able to handle the internal security demands as well as the main force
threat. CIA believes RVNAF has more strength than is needed in the south
and manpower could be shifted north to build up forces there. The
availability of additional manpower in the sparsely populated north is not
analyzed, but is probably limited.
To illustrate the current balance, the CIA developed three concepts to
guide force ratio comparisons:
-- Main force ratio; forces employed in a main force role including
the GVN's newly developed RF battalions.
-- Main and local force ratio; includes RF companies; ARVN forces
assigned to pacification and VC local force battalions.
-- Total force ratio; includes PFs and VC local force companies,
platoons and guerrillas.
Combat support and combat service support are not included in any
measure nor are NVA troops in the pool of fillers awaiting assignment
to units.
Comparison of the current situation with 1968 (Tet Offensive) indicates:
-- Main force ratio is the same nation-wide but down substantially
everywhere except in MR-4; the greatest drop is in MR-2 but the lowest
force level is in MR-1 and the ratio dropped somewhat below 1. 9 with
the April entry of enemy units not included in the table.
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/f . I W Table IV-1 !
Ratio of Allied and VC/MVA Combat Forces
. in South Vietnam
First
a/
tF 1
MR 4 c/
South d/
Vietnam
Main Force Ratio
1968
2.4
3.3
3.9
2.4
2.9
'
1970
2.5
7.0
4.5
8.3
4.2
1972
1.
9
2.1
7.8
7.4
3.3
.
(3..3)
(2.8)
Mainland Local-Force Ratio
1968 .
3.5
5.3
6.0
6.1
4.9
1970
3.3
8.3
7.5-
10.2
6.5
1972
2.8
4.5
6.7
10.3
5:1
(4.7)
(7.8)
(4.7)
Total Force Ratio
1968
1.8
2.6
-4..1
2.5
2.6
1970
2.5
4.6
5.8
4.4
4.1
1972
2.8
3.8
7.4
6.8
4.8
(5.6)
(6.1)
(4.5)
a. Including i/VA combat forces between the D14Z
and Dong.Hoi, North Vietnam, which represent a
threat to the military region.
b Data in parentheses include adjacent VC/NVA
combat forces `in Cambodia, the Sth, 7th, and 9th
Divisions; the 24th NVA Regiment; and the 271st
Independent NVA Regiment. They do not include
the possible now division which fragmentary
,evidence suggests may be in Cambodia.
c. Data in parentheses include adjacent VC/NVA
combat forces in.Cambodia (roughly a divisional
equivalent of the Phuoc Long Front).
d. Saigon General Reserve forces have been
assigned as follows; the 369th VP11C Brigade to
MR I and the First and Third Airborne Brigades to
MR 2. Data in parentheses 'include?ad'jacent VC/NVA'
combat forces in Cambodia which may be deployed
to MRs 3 and 4.
xvw- 7
Sensitive
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TOP SECRET/S NSITIVE
-- The main and local force ratios dropped in a pattern similar
to the main force ratio, but the ratio is substantially more favorable
ever here because the RVNAF has far more strength at the local
level than the VC despite considerable NVA infiltration to fill local units.
-- The total force ratio has improved substantially nation-wide
since 1968 from 2. 6 to 4. 5; improvement is substantial in all MRs.
In short, while the main force ratio is the same now as in 1968 and
substantially less favorable in the northern MRs, the total force ratio
is close to twice as favorable nation-wide and substantially more
favorable in the northern MRs. The factors contributing to this are:
-- Destruction of enemy local forces;
-- Build-up of GVN local forces;
-- Continued replacements for enemy main force units which dropped
only about 40% in strength since the Tet Offensive;
-- Redeployment of Allied forces and only moderate increase in
GVN main force strength (partly because combat units are well under
authorized strength), Allied main forces dropped by 50% since 1968 if
the new RF battalions are excluded.
What these ratios say is that against all-out enemy attacks, the GVN has
substantial force superiority given the total force ratio of 4. 8 nation-
wide -- a measure of relative strength most relevant when the RF and PF
participate in engaging an attacking enemy. However, the GVN is much
less well equipped for counter-attack when its main forces would carry
most of the fighting burden. Moreover, the enemy often uses its combat
support units for offensive purposes.
Net Assessment
Despite its title, the CIA paper is hardly a comprehensive net assessment.
It concludes that RVNAF is more numerous and better equipped but the
communists are better disciplined, less prone to desert and more determined
to fight hard and win.
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Future Work
This net assessment will have to be revised in light of RVNAF and
enemy actions in the current offensive. First hand information which
General Haig and others are gathering this week will be useful.
Some of the key indicators will be:
-- How extensive have RVNAF desertions been;
-- How many enemy units have not responded to orders;
-- What have the casualty ratios been (an initial ARVN report for
April l -l2 of 6, 300 enemy killed and less than 1, 000 friendly is
encouraging but very preliminary);
-- What effects would the offensive have on the control situation.
Most important will be GVN efforts not just to hold off the enemy but to
destroy him while he is exposed and U. S. air is available. If the enemy
retires to his cross-border base areas after a couple of months with his
cadre largely intact, he will be able to rebuild for similar offense next
year.
Studies underway on the VNAF, U. S. force levels, and longer term
RVNAF improvements will also throw more light on some of the
assessment points as well as on concrete things we should be doing.
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