MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 3, 1973
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
SANITIZED
COPY
FOLLOWS
DOS Review Completed.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 4
I don't want you to get involved in the drafting details of this nature.
(Ambassador Huang smiles.) I use it only as an example. The reason
I am talking to you is that I read some speeches made last week in
Peking, and I understand your necessities.
Mrs. Shih: Understand...?
Dr. Kissinel: That you have certain necessities as well. Because I
pay special attention to my old host Marshal Yeh Chen-ying. (Ambas-
sador Huang smiles.) But that is not the issue.
We have offered the North Vietnamese to sign the agreement as it stood
on November 23 with one additional modification. These are all things
that had already been accepted. We are not asking for anything new,
and if this is done then we have the moral basis to take very strong
measures against Saigon, including cutting off aid if they don't agree.
(Ambassador Huang nods slightly,)
But if the negotiations fail next week, I cannot possibly commit myself
to be kept in Paris another two weeks and dealt with as frivolously as
last time. We sent to you the transcripts of some of these meetings so
you must have your own judgment, which I may say is more than we have
done for our colleagues in the Foreign Ministry. So I hope you won't
publish these some day.
If the negotiations now fail, we will abandon the October Agreement
completely. We will not then continue to negotiate on the basis of the
October Agreement. We may seek another basis of a more bilateral
nature, but it will certainly not be the one we now have.
Now the consequences of this... we cannot believe, if we look ahead to
the next four years...it is our conviction, as I told you before, that by
1975 when the new rocket program of your northern ally is completed,
we assume certain consequences could follow, we don't know in which
direction. Certainly we don't believe these weapons are being built in
order to make your friends easier to deal with. What we would like to do --
if it were not for the war in Vietnam -- what we would like to do is to
accelerate the normalization of our relationship with you and accelerate
our relationships with Western Europe, and I believe for the same reasons
you are accelerating your relationships with Western Europe. You have
been long enough in the U.S. , and you will have some judgment as to
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
25X1
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
?
PARTICIPAIsITS1
DATE& TIME:
Ambas
MEMO
VYHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
DUM OF CONVERSATION
r. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to
President for National Security Affai
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the
United Nations
Mr, (uo, Notetaker
Mrs. Shih Yen-huat Interpreter
Wednesday, January 3, 1973
10:15 p.m. 11:00 p.m.
New York City
ng: Happy New Year.
Dr. Kissinger: I have been calling on your Ambassador in Paris. I
don't know whether he sends you reports.
Ambassador Iltiang: Ye
Oki
, I understood that.
Dr. Kkee41lke I never now how much he understands because we have
to communinate with a combination of trench and English. (Ambassador
Huang laugh French interpreter is very good, but mine isn't.
Ambassador. . I dont 'believe it.
Dr. Kissiniter: its true.
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
You probably realize this, but you have completely seduced Joseph Alsop.
He has written articles like Harrison Salisbury did from the Soviet Union.
I dont know whether you have read his articles. They have been very fair.
CT,WIPIPI) ItY
Top CRET /SENSITIVE - ;ler mom C1NERAL DECLA
EXCi..ustvELY EYES ONLY Of EXECUTIVE ORD%
rrioN cATEGoRY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
Ambassador uang: Yes. I have read part of them, particularly his
articles on MS vs&t to Yunuan Province. That was a renewed visit
of his; he had been there once before to the Province.
1D...._1:4Lciteij.V He el when he came back that thi
experience ha his 41 years of professional journalism.
wa
greatest
I wanted to ;See you principally to hand you personally a letter from the
President to-Premier Chou En-Lei which he wanted to give you since it
as not eo le for me to be in China at this time. There is very
little about Vietnam in it so that is not its principal... (Dr. Kissinger
ands over the letter at Tab A and Ambassador Huang scans It.)
It's quite a long . It is three pages single-
spaced.
Hu
pte to summarize our viewon our relations
e will promptly convey this.
Pa.
pr,....Ailittdeiran I wanted actually only to discuss two other matters with
you. One, there is a great deal of speculation because of the appointment
of Mr. Moynihan as Ambassador to India and also because of some of the
overtures India hes made to the United States. We want you to know,
.
first of all, that until January 20th it Is difficult for us to control every-
thing that is being said by the State Department. But there will be no
significant change in our policy toward the Subcontinent without prior
discussion with you, and the essential elements of policy which we dis-
cussed with the Prime Minister still remain. In the next weeks we will
make some shipments of arms to Pakistan, and after our new Ambassador
comes to Iran we will do it on a more systematic scale. We simply
wanted you to know this.
The only other subject... two other subjects. First the President
says in his letter to the Prime Minister, if the Prime Minister is still
interested, the President is still prepared to send me to China after the
Vietnam negotiations are concluded, for a general review of the inter-
national situation before we are too far along in the second term. If the
TOP SECRET iS 11SITIV1E
EXCLU 1VELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
3
make a specific proposal, we would make every
ort t make ft possible, maybe toward end of February or early
ch
Now the last subject I wanted to mention to you is the Vietnam negotia-
tion which I will start again next week. Now we have an understanding
for your difficulties in this matter, but it is also a matter of extreme
difficulty for us. It is simply not true that we are looking for a pretext
not to sign the agreement. We feel quite frankly that your allies have
courage, but they lack wisdom.
Our basic problem is that as a great power we cannot simply betray
an ally, but we are Prepared to make an agreement, even if our ally
disagrees, which
You remember w
that we tboi
Ambassador
So it reall
ramose side has
meets c
we ha
ould sign or
e told him
absolutely minimal conditions for us.
r with the Vice Minister I told him
ember 8 or 9. When we met your
wanted to sign by December 22.
ue that we are holding up the agreement. The Viet-
ented obstacles faster than we can remove them.
For , let me cite one minor problem, and I don't ask you to
judge its merits. (To Lord) Did you mention the question of the word
"destroyed" in your presentation?
Mr. Lord: No, I did not, although I
new issues on the last day,
ne
hat they raised several
Dr. Kissinger: For example, with regard to military equipment, there
is a provision that says that destroyed, damaged, worn-out or used-up
equipment can be replaced. It has always been in there. On the last
day of the last negotiations, when things were already not going well,
the Vietnamese said that the word "destroyed" had to be taken out. When
I asked why, they said you canIt destroy something without damaging it.
We had already given this language to Saigon as well as to our colleagues
in Washington. I wouldn't care about the sentence if it hadn't already
been in there. But for me to say that we spent the last day discussing
whether one can destroy something without its being damaged won't
make a good impression. It does not give an impression of seriousness.
TOP SECR T/SENSITIVE
Y !EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
1 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
We have intere
we? The decisive ev
emonias aspire
Id these con Ic 0, and they are not very
e obv4otts onsequenes of discredit ng the
House will go far beyond Vietnam, and conversely
Id accelerate and enable us to concentrate on
be of real priority.
permanent presence in Indochina., Why should
s in Asia will occur far north of there, and
one will not come from Washington in that area.
portant that the American people not be so disillusioned by
any events Asia that we will be paralyzed with respect to what are
the crucial e t
Ind?
inte
the me
with Peking
in Indochina, whin
our tt oritinue to focus on
accept these pressures either domestically or
will be over issues' re not essential for
of the future. Conversely, if we can coexist
certainly coexist with Hanoi. Our major concern
not a central feature of our policy anyway, would
cooperate, with those who want to prevent other hegemonies from
tablished there.
This is simply our philosophy. I wanted the Prime Minister to know.
The next two weeks will be very important. I took the liberty of asking
to see you today because I am leaving Sunday and I will not be available
the t few days. I also thought it might be important for the Prime
stsr to have our thinking.
These are the major things I wanted to zneition to you. I don't think you
have instructions to give a long reply. (Ambassador Huang laughs.)
Ambassador Huang: We will report what you said to Prime Minister
Chou
Eat....15...t1 I also have, a very selfish reason you can convince
your allies to settle by the 10th, then we can still see one of the per-
formances of the acrobats on the 11th. (Ambassador Huang laughs.)
A_n ibassad: They wont leave until the 13th.
TOP SE T /SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
N7 v
Dr.
U.S.
If they are sti
Washington? I thought they would be there three
some diecuseion on when the acrobats would be
has become clear subsequently that Ambassador Huang
e physically in Washington through the 13th; as the
, they would perform only on the 9th through the 11th.)
here on the 13th I will certainly see them. But in any
event I want you to know that they will be given a very warm welcome,
and my office will contact them when they get there to see if there is
anything to be done which will make them more comfortable.
'rst, about the visit of our acrobatic troupe to the
U. S. We appreciate the meticulous arrangements made by the National
Committee for U Relations and the New York City Center as its
host organization. New York is the third city the acrobats have been
*siting, and we have been very satisfied with the results of the visit.
Kissinger: They a
pectacular success everywhere.
Ambassador Huang: They have been given a very warm welcome for the
performances, and the acrobats have been encouraged because they feel
that they have done their share and made their contribution to promoting
understanding and friendship between the American and Chinese peoples.
We believe that they will leave the United States with satisfaction for
Latin America, And in this respect we also appreciate Dr. Kieeinge 's
consideration, attention.
1?r. Kissinger.: There are two other matters I might mention to you.
We have a memorial service for President Trumanashington. There
is a certain category of visitors that the President see ? everyone who
is President or Vice President of a country primarily. We have just
been informed that Taiwan is sending its Vice President, so the President
may see him for 15 minutes. So this has no significance. This is a
protocol matter. Everyone of a certain rank is received as a courtesy
by the President, only 15 rntt" itues each.
Secondly, I wanted you to know for own information that the Soviet
Union has proposed June for the return visit of Breshreav to the United
States. We have not yet given a definite reply. We said that we will
discuss it in February, but we will let you know when anything definite
is arranged.
TOP ECR N ITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5
7
Aboutthe Paris talks I would e to convey a very
Ti the U.S1. side truly wishes a settlement in
S sessions, this opportunity should not be missed.
0us reciprocal negotiations will be conducted and then
can be expected.
make every e
reasons whic
to do so.
If there is a serious attitude on the other side, we will
ffort to settle it, We would like to end the war for the
have explained to you, and we will make a major effort
Is this news based 012 the visi
Amhassador }luau
wishes Or. Kiesizge
of
Duc Tho to Peking?
can't explain it. The last sentence of the message
a happy r4ew Year.
,L,..r,I.J_Sts2f.tatl:: Thank you very much. I appreciate it. e come to
Poking, or through some othe *n? la, we will be prepared o discuss
Cambodia with you as I pointed out to the Prime Minister.
It.is always a pleasure to see you, Mr. Ambassador, though it is not
frequent enough. (Ambassador Huang smiles.)
Ambassador rintagL This evening our acrobatic troupe performed in
New York City.
didn't think carefully enough -- maybe I should have
arranged to see them here.
Amb_4..tesador 1_1u...tan We are very sorry we
representatives to the United Nations were
American friends.
Dr. Ki
Anyway,
ere because many
and also SOme
I understood that you were the host and couldn't leave.
uch an 10311 Buil event for me to be here first.
(The chinese then got up to leave and there was brief small talk about
Mr. Alsop's enthusiasm concerning China before the Chinese left to
take their own car back to their Mission.)
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/11/17: LOC-HAK-462-1-2-5