PUPPET AS PRINCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 71
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: December 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 18, 1972
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

William Safire
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-?12-4-9 "56-0-uuccree
SP
Au inquiry into the ambitions of Henry Kissinger
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
DOS Review Completed.
STRENGTH MEANS NOTHING," Rich-
ard Nixon told a group of Con-
gressmen in 1972, a few months after
? he returned from the first Moscow
summit, "unless there is a will to
use it."
With pride' the
h President ex-
? plained why e had made the deci-
shwa to mine the harbor at Haiphong
in response to a final thrust south-
ward by North Vietnamese troops:
"If, for example, when I went to
Moscow, late in May, at that time we
had had Soviet tanks rtm by the
North Vietnamese rumbling through
the streets of Hue, and Saigon being
shelled, we would not have been able
to deal with the Soviets on the basis
of equal iespect We wouldn't have
? been worth talking to ... in a sense,
and they would have known it."
? Nixon wanted to impress the world
with his will to use American strength;
he was convinced that 0 world lead-
ers believed in what Henry Kissinger
called Nixon's "reputation for fierce-
ness," he would not have to exercise
his ill and apply American strength.
He hoped to avert world war by dem-
onstrating a readiness to? react to
provocation unpredictably and some-
times savagely, thereby discouraging
more provocation. This was the basis
of his approach to what, in retrospect,
can be identified as the four decisive
moments of international crisis dur-
ing the course of his administration:
(1) the 1970 invasion of Cambodia
by the North Vietnamese after Lou
Nors overthrow of Prince Sihanouk,
which was countered by an American
"incursion" presented in an unneces-
sarily bellicose television speech; (2)
the Syrian invasion of Jordan in the
same year, in which American threats
to intervene were taken seriously, so
that no intervention was necessary;
(3) the 1972 pre-Moscow summit of-
fensive by the North Vietnamese,
which invited the mining of Hai-
12
phong harbor; and (4) the delay by
the North Vietnamese after peace
was supposed to have been at hand,
which led to the Christmas 1972
bombing of Hanoi that brought an
end to American troop involvement
in the war, if not to the war itself.
In responding to all of these crises,
Nixon achieved his purpose partly
because he had the will to use Amer.
lean strength, and partly because his
agent, Henry Kissinger, was able to
impress upon world leaders and the
Copyright @ 1975 by William Safire.
This artide has been adapted from Before the
Fall, a chronicle of the Nixon administration,
to be published this spring by Doubleday.
Mr. Safire, formerly a speechwriter for Presi-
dent Nixon, is now a columnist for the New
York Times.
world press that the American Presi-
dent deserved Ms "reputation for
fierceness." The vaill was Nixon's;
the interpreter and salesman of that
will was Kissinger.
When recordings of the Nixon-
Kissinger telephone conversations be-
come available to historians, the re-
lationship of Nixon-puppetmaster to
Kissinger-marionette will become ap-
parent Mr. Nixon manipulated the
strings of his agent's ego and ambi-
tion, sometimes thrusting Mr. Kis' -
singer into the limelight of diplomacy,
sometimes cruelly letting him go limp;
there is no doubt as to who was
the creative force and who was the
sales agent.
Now that Mr. Nixon has departed,
the puppet aspires to the role of pup-
petrnaster. It is Secretary Kissinger's
own? "reputation for fierceness" that
now constitutes the force, and he
uses President Ford to sell that fierce
reputation to the wora Hence, the
dutiful response "Be reflects the
President's views" from the Presi-
dential press secretary whenever re-
porters seek White House verifica-
tion of the latest saber-rattling from
the Secretary of State. Nobody in
Washington can tell how long Presi-
dent Ford will permit himself to be
so obviously, used; as the Kissinger
transformation has shown, there
comes a time when Pinocchio covets
Geppetto's job.
rily THE FOUR MOMENTS of crisis
?.....Pthat illuminated Nixon foreign -
policy, the most instructive?and
perhaps most revealing of President
Nixon's fashioning of Kissinger as a
diplomatic tool?was the prepara-
tion for the first Moscow summit. In
April 1972, as the North Vietnamese
advanced in their last-ditch spring
offensive, the road to Moscow was
being paved with good intentions.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
"Linkage"?the strategy- demanding dent's hand at the meeting of lead. fact that our last President was forced
that progresf No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9 because of the
relatgd to, or linked with, progress that everything had much to do with effects of the Vietnam war. President
elsewhere?was to be practiCed by everything else?that linkage lived. Nixon will not permit three Presi-
Nixon in a way that made a model The moment seemed auspicious for dents in a row to leave office under
d?nte. The relative equality of mil- abnormal circumstances."
itary strength, the Sino-Soviet split, The President's adviser character-
Nixon's recent journey to China, the ized the Soviet-supported offensive as
economic dissolution of the "post. an attempt to "win the war and drive
war world"?all these seemed to irn. the President out of office." Henry
ply the possibility of meaningful talk. went on:
Making some necessary diplomatic "It may seem at what he is do-
cuts, I will quote from the fourth and lug [mining Haiphong Harbor] to
final draft of Kissinger's opening prevent this front occurring is 'un-
statement to the Soviet leaders. Hen- predictable.' It is in fact quite con-
ry confirmed to me it is substantially sistent with his li fighting instincts
what he actually said. It is a useful when issues of Principle and vital
study of what Kissinger thought Nix- interest are at stake. His reaction
on wanted l3rezhnev to know before should have been expected..
the two leaders met. I take no delight "But I have also found," Dr. Kis-
in using classified material, but the singer continued, "that, once a mat-
Soviets heard Kissinger's appraisal ter is settled, the President is pre-
in early 1972, and it will do no harm pared to proceed with matters that
are in the common interest with those
who were on the opposite side in a
dispute. This is true in his domestic
as well as foreign policies. We would
say that he does not 'bear grudges.'
The President can look beyond the
issues of the moment to the broader
. evolution and the wider interests. He
- is conciliatory because he recognizes
that only those agreements are kept
which nations wish to keep.
"Of course, it is also characteristic
of the President to be patient and
tenacious. His political biography
testifies to that He will accept a set-
back or a detour?and wait until he
can rechart his course. When he has
done this, he has shown unusual con-
sistency, even when he makes the
most radical moves?which his posi-
tion enables him to do."
of a DNA molecule look simple.
The President and his national-
security adviser planned the approach
to the wide-ranging negotiations.
Some of the agreements?oceanogra-
phy, space cooperation?were impor-
tant in themselve, but hardly the
stuff of summits; however, they add-
ed to the "heft" of the conference.
On strategic arms limitations, last-
minute work was needed to resolve
impasses, but even this could have
been done through diplomatic chan-
nels," just as pressure to slow down
Soviet arms shipments to thefl North
Vietnamese might have been applied
by withholding desired trade agree-
ments. Nixon and Kissinger were de-
termined that this should be a summit for Americans to review it now. In
of substance, "meticulously" (a fa- retrospect it can be read as if Kissin-
vorite Kissinger word)* prepared on ger intended deliberate irony, but at
both sides by serious men aware of the time he hoped to enhance Nixon's
the potential of the moment and the reputation for fierceness, he couldn't
danger of letting it slip away. foresee the fumbling weakness later
Nixon believed that toughness of
mind was the first recylirement in any
dealings with the Soviets; he under.
revealed in the taped conversations
with Haldeman and Dean. .
"You and- we have many prob.
stood that they respected power, lerns," Kissinger began, "but we do
lived in an atmosphere of power, and have the advantage, at the present
welcomed philosophical subtleties time, of being able to deal with each
only after the power lines were laid. other from positions of essential
When speechwriter Ray Price and I equality.. . .
asked Henry Kissinger for guidance "You have known President Nix-
on the tone of the remarks for the on for more than a decade, and he
President at the- Moscow summit, is aware that you have raised ques-
Kissinger replied: "Tough. None of dons about his attitudes, orientation
your goddamn peacenik-y toasts. This and predictability. Some of your pub:
is not like in China, swearing eternal lie statements have tried to analyze
friendship. Tough." Price, a man not his behavior in terms of 'forces' in.
ordinarily given to oral argument, fluencing him. The President? com?
snapped back: "We were writing bines concern for long-term evolu-
hawkish speeches for Nixon when tion with detailed interest in concrete TflI MS WAS straight-from-the-51mM-
you were turning out dovish state. day-to-day decisions. The evolution der talk; the references to the U.S.
ments for Rockefeller, remember?" he sees--and wants to contribute to political scene were of questionable
Both Henry and I looked at Ray with ?is one of a world of several inter- propriety, since continuance in office
surprise. With a diplomatic touch, acting major powers, competitive but should hardly be the reason for a
Henry said that the tone of the toasts respectful of each other's interests. U.S. leader's reaction to a foreign
should contain numerous reminders This view of the world corresponds power's military offensive.
about comradeship and bravery in to the President's personal back- Dr. Kissinger then went into a
World War H. ground and upbringing, brief discussion of the American re-
Henry was working on a speech of "At the same time, he can be tough lationship with China. The Soviets
his own, to be given by him privately and even ruthless in dealing with spe- were most concerned, we knew, with
to the Soviet leaders at the prepare- rifle problems. You probably recog. the timing of Nixon's actions toward
tory meeting from April 18 to 22, a nize that the President is bound to China, coinciding as they did with
month before the summit. He want- see the present situation in Vietnam the deterioration of Soviet relations
ed to get across what he liked to call not only in its local context but as a with Peking. Because that happened
his "conceptual framework"; Nixon renewed effort by outside powers to to be the case, Kissinger held, that
wanted him to convey an understand- intervene in our domestic political was no cause to assume it was the
ing of Nixon's implacable resolve, processes. Moreover, as President he only basis of American-Chinese deal.
which would strengthen the Presi. is bound to be keenly sensitive to the ings, and in any event there could
14
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
not be No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9 the American Presi-
Viet Union by the Americans and their national frontiers." The North dent arrived. Nixon had been pre-
Chinese in the world of today. Vietnamese, who thought of all of pared for a backslapper on the basis
Having modestly reminded the So-
vies of the brilliant exploitation of
their weakness by American diplo-
macy, Kissinger then laid stress on
the North Vietnamese invasion in
that early spring of 1972 and began
hammering home the linkage:
"Any agreement in so central an
area as that of strategic arms depends
heavily on the general political rela-
tionship between us. The President
strongly feels that arms-control agree-
ments serve little purpose if existing
arms are used for aggression or pres-
sure.
"Bilateral relations and trade.
Here we have broad long-term oppor-
tunities to develop cooperative rela-
tions. We are currently engaged in a
whole series of negotiations ranging
from trade issues to scientific and
outer space cooperation.
"Both of us stand to gain," Kissin-
ger told Brezhnev. "But we must be
realistic: a lasting and productive set
of relationships, with perhaps hun-
dreds or thousands of our people
working with each other and perhaps
billions of dollars of business activ-
ity, can only be achieved in a healthy
political environment. The President
wants to be candid with you: he can-
not make commitments, say, for cred-
its or tariff concessions, if these
measures do not command wide sup-
port among our public and in the
Congress. And this depends critically
on the state of our political relations.
"Moreover, we must make sure
that once commitments have been
entered into they will not soon be
, undermined by renewed crises and
deterioration of our relations. I say
this not because we want you to `pay
a price' for economic and other rela-
tions with us or because we expect
you to sacrifice important political
and security interests for the sake of
trade relations. I say it as an objec-
tive fact of political life."
Kissinger's speech to Brezhnev was
well received; on the subject of Viet-
nam, Henry had even more to offer.
I had worked on the President's
cease-fire-in-place speech the previous
October?one neither the President
nor. Kissinger had any hopes of the
North Vietnamese accepting?and
there had been a phrase of art that I
had objected to at the time as too
fuzzy, but Henry had insisted that it
be left just as it was: that the armies
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
Vietnam as one country, could in-
terpret that as a hint that we could
permit them to leave some of their
army in South Vietnam. In Moscow,
at the President's direction, Kissin-
ger made the proposal more speci-
fic, tying it in with a demand
that the North Vietnamese drop their
insistence on the overthrow of Presi-
den Thieu. The basic deal offered in
Moscow?we let the North Vietnam-
ese troops stay south, they let Thieu
stay as President?turned out to be
the deal made in the end.
? Kissinger reported back to the
President on the substance of the
Soviet response to his remarks (Ko-
sygin did not reveal how much wheat
the Soviets wanted to buy, but, as
Ambassador Dobrynin said privately
later, that would not have been smart
bargaining), and he included some
favorite Brezhnev folk stories for the
President's use in speeches. The So-
viet leader had surprised Kissinger
with his American political habit of
"pressing the flesh"?punching an
arm, squeezing, backpatting?which
Brezhnev dropped for a more digni-
of his aides' reports, but Brezhnev
crossed him up, exhibiting a wit and
dignity that was most impressive:
when Kissinger brought along the en-
tire contingent of National Security
Council staffers to the final prepara-
tory meeting so that everybody could
tell grandchildren they had met the
Soviet leader' Brezhnev took note of
the increased size of the delegation,
and deftly countered Henry's harping
on U.S. troop withdrawals as evi-
dence of our good faith in Southeast
Asia: "For people who talk so much
about your withdrawals," said Brezh-
nev, "you bring your reinforcements
up very quietly.",
Kissinger's most important contri-
bution to the summit, as to the China
trip, was in its laborious preparation
?never before had a bilateral con-
ference been so well prepared for the
turning of each page. With the major
exception of the SALT negotiations,
Kissinger's job was largely completed
before the summit took place; -as in
the China experience, when the time
drew near for departure, the Presi-
dent retired into isolation and Kis-
For s20()- v( )u can
I ot )l 11% OW11.
a Rolls- Royce,
y()u can_ build ii
sin ger felt_inrual.-.a 1-1-, 1060 an arnalg'am ref the roach nf h;a mind'
Henry -*void& I No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LO
- ,
Presidential/ prerogative without a by the President, and to lose even
pout; in /972, however, he was a the appearance of power, he felt,
superstar in his own right and resent- weakened his ability to execute his
ed the slight. grand designs.
After his "foreign policy decided
by flacks" outburst, Henry mollified
me with a thought well-directed to
himself: "You are not ambitious to
be something, you are ambitious to
do something, and that makes all the
difference in a man."
The carryings-on of Henry Kissin-
ger were tolerated by President Nix-
on because he, too, was a man who
wanted to do something, and saw in
? Kissinger a unique tool to help him
do it. James Reston once wrote in the
New York Times, "Henry Kissinger
has got beyond the news?he is go-
? ing to be left to the psychological
novelists."
Kis' singer's maneuvering in this pe-
riod between the Peking and Moscow
? summits was played on the world
? stage in full view of his appreciative
audienee. Richard Nixon's manipula-
? tion of Kissinger, on the other hand,
his periodic inflation and deflation
? of Kissinger's ego, were totally hidden
from the public. Nixon,. who con-
' stantly thought of himself 'not. as he
was but as he wished to be, could use
Kissinger as a marionette, and then
place himself in his own marionette's
hands; the President understood in
his assistant the needs he refused to
examine in himself. (Reston is right;
perhaps all this is better left to the
psychological novelists.)
On May 17, 1972, the President
must have done something soothing
because Henry was in a much better
mood as he went over some prepara-
tory material with writers Ray Price,
John Andrews, and me. "We want to
get away from hyperbole," he said.
"The Chinese are beside themselves
with the possibility of great power
collusion. So say we have a common
interest in making peace, and don't
use the `new era' stuff. Friendly, not
sentimental." Price asked him what
had become of the "tough" tone, and
Kissinger said: "Look, for three
years we tied to interest the Rus-
sians in Vietnam. The first time they
showed any signs of interest was
when their ships were threatened in
Haiphong."
Henry was a happy man. "Taking
Hanoi off the front page is like a mil-
itary defeat for them. China did that
last year. Russia this year. Now
N TUE WHITE ROUSE after Kissin-
E. ger's return from preparatory dis-
? cussions, I was writing the Presi-
dent's opening toast for the first
night of the Moscow summit at the
end of the state dinner in 'Granovit
Hall. Henry glanced at my four-page
draft and said, "You need two more
pages." I said no, Haldeman told me
1,000. words tops, and Kissinger ex-
ploded: "Foreign policy decided by
flacks!" I glared at him, since I was
not ashamed of my own public-rela-
tions background, and Henry hastily.
added, "I don't mean you, Bill. I
mean them." He pointed down the
West Wing hall toward Haldeman,
Chapin, and Ziegler. "The President
was telling me just the other day," he
?
:add pickishly, "how much he liked
?
your work." This was .a att4i joke
about one-upmanship, a standard
routine of Presidential- aides, not
meant to he taken seriously. He called
Haldeman to ask him to ask the Pres-
ident to change to 1,500 words, be-
cause that was how long Dobrynin
told him that Poclgorwj would go;
that Henry had to deal with Halde-
man and could not go directly to
Nixon irritated hire immensely. The
President was putting him down
again. "A week ago," Kissinger said
with passion, "he would have done
anything I asked, he was on his
? knees--God! And now I have to talk
to Haldeman."
I couldn't help wondering if jeal-
ousies like these surrounded the
General Secretary in the Politburo.
Well, we would be in the Kremlin
soon enough; once abroad, the Pres-
ident's men dropped their rivalries
and served him better than any out-
side observer could imagine.
The pettiness of White House in-
trigue might not be expected to oc-
cupy a mind filled with grand de-
signs, Nobel-worthy strokes to end
an arms race and get the world into
the habit of peace. But Kissinger
jockeyed for power around the Pres-
ident, using everyone he could to
serve his ends, for two reasons; first,
intrigue was instinctive to hint, an
exercise he often went through with-
out thinking; second, his power was
Manta 1i,i hPAn niztae to look like a
C-HAK-536-12-4-9 Smiling, he
shook his head in mock self-pity:
"And all the President says is that
he wishes Gromyko was working for
him."
He discussed the contrast between
the ways in which the Russians and
the Chinese prepared for the "Nixon
arrival": Brezhnev had proudly
shown Kissinger the Presidential
quarters, something the Chinese
would never do,. ince the Chinese
have always felt 4ln:rally superior,
the Russians culturally inferior. The
Russians of a'centnry ago hired Ger-
mans or Frenchmen to handle their
foreign relations, Henry reminded
us, and not until 1880 was there a
Czarist foreign minister born in Rus-
sia; before 1820 Russian foreign
ministry, archives were written in
French.
Brezhnev had shown Kissinger the
antique MIS on pedestals set up
along the corridors of Nixon's Krem-
lin apartment. Only one was uncov-
ered, beautifully polished?all the
rest - were covered with shrouds. to
keep off the dust. "We will take off
the shrouds two hours before he gets
here," Brezhnev told- Kissinger. "It
reminded me of my grandmother,"
Kissinger told us later. "The house
had to be cleaned spick-and-span on
Thursday, and everything covered up
so it would be right for Friday
night." He laughed again and then
became serious. "But never forget,"
he said in a statement I never forgot,
"that feelings of inferiority can lead
to bluster and to arrogance."
EGOTIATIONS AT THE 1972 Mos-
I 11 cow semmit involved consider-
able bluster?in the privacy of his
dacha, Leonid Brezhnev shouted
about the "barbaric" action of the
Americans in mining Haiphong--but
Henry merely told us how Nixon and
Brezhnev worked well together in
shaping a historic breakthrough. At
press backgrounders as well as at
more private talks with reporters and
columnists, the national-security ad-
viser would, in Nixon's words, 'get
out the line" about the pact being a
great step forward toward interna-
tional stability.
On the way back from Moscow, we
stopped in Warsaw and Henry was
euphoric. After the Polish state din-
ner, he and I walked out of the Mal-
inovsky Palace about 11:00 P.M.,
16 No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
followectl No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9 at he helped create in
&dozen paces back, to stroll through bombing of Hanoi. But, in that epi- the past: the importance of the Nix-
reconstructed downtown Warsaw. As
we walked through the dark new-old
Streets saying little, Henry reflected
on the events of the past couple of
weeks; where the world was, where
he and I were walking; and he said
in what struck me as honest affec-
tion, "Not bad for a couple of Jewish
boys, huh?"
We talked about the book he would
do someday, and the one I would do
fairly soon?"Yours will be better,"
he assured me, "because you only
have to he 90 percent right." I re-
? called another walk we had taken,
around the pitch-and-put golf course
in Key Biscayne in January 1970,
working on the first? State of the
? World message, when he had? said
about his relationship with Secretary
of State Bill Rogers: "It's like the
? Arabs and the Israelis. I'll win all the
battles, and hell win the war. He
only has to beat me once." He remem-
bered, and said it had not changed
much?one wrong step, and he was
? finished, all the vultures would eat
him up, But, Kissinger added, it was
? all worth it, even the backbiting, be-
cause what he and Nixon were doing
really counted for something, and if
they had not happened to be there at
? this time, who knows who would have
missed the chances the President and
? he were not missing?
We could not know that a combi-
. nation of. Ruisian shrewdness erratic
crop conditions, and bureaucratic in-
eptitude would make the forthcom-
? ing grain deal appear scandalous; or
that during that time we were in Mos-
cow a small group of workers for the
?. Committee to Reelect the President
was planting listening devices on the
? telephones of Democrats in their Wa-
? tergate headquarters; or that, in the
? coming year, the Soviet press would _
be in the odd position of denouncing
American impeach-Nixon dernandias
aimed against the policy of detente
that Nixon and Brezhnev had brought
about. hA
"Been one hell of alweek, Henry,"
I said, as we came to the replica of
an old square in Warsaw where a few
members of the American party were
? whooping it up in a nightclub. "What
does the President do for an encore?"
? Henry didn't hesitate a second.
"Make peace in Vietnam," he said.
And so he did. After the North
Vietnamese declined negotiations, the
will to use Ameriran strenoth was
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9 ,
sode, Henry's too-anguished public
appearance weighed against his am-
bition to be Nixon's second-term
Secretary of State. I mentioned to
?
Henry in January 197a that other
White House aides did not like
the way he was letting word go out
to influential columnists that Dr.
Kissinger was not wholeheartedly
with Mr. Nixon on the bombing,
when in fact the national-security ad-
viser had urged that decision. Henry
confirmed that he had indeed "can-
vassed for the bombing" and insisted
he had nothing to do with reports to
the contrary. He reassured Halde-
man and the President on that, but
they did not wholly believe him; if
the Watergate scandal hadn't en-
gulfed the administration, Nixon
probably would have forced Kissin-
ger to resign. The puppet had begun
to tug at his own strings.
Until February 1973, Mr. Nixon
had been using Dr. Kissinger as his
agent; afterward, with the ascendant
Secretary of State Kissinger running
American foreign policy, the Ameri-
can "will to use strength" was in
doubt. Arms accord foundered at a
pitiable second Moscow summit, and
the Middle East situation deteriorated
steadily.
1974 with a
President, Henry Kissinger be a new reputation for "the will to
use strength," which he had learned
at Mr. Nixon's knee. The idea was to
present the world with a new Presi-
I new
N VLADIVOSTOK, ,
on-Brezhnev relationship. In Vladi-
vostok, Kissinger passed the word to
the press corps that Nixon never
"looked Brezhnev in the eye"; that
the Soviets had always mistrusted
Nixon; that the former President's
inflexibility hindered negotiation.
This was the making of an unperson
on a grand scale. Henry enlisted
Ford's press secretary, Ron Nessen,
in the media-washing, causing that
unsuspectingyoune man to say,
straight-faced, of the Ford-Brezhnev
agreement to agree: "It was some-
thing that Nixon couldn't do in three
years, but Ford did it in three months.
I don't know what it was?they hit
it off."
The first press reaction was dis-
belief, even outrage, at such a trans-
parent distortion of history; but Sec-
retary Kissinger is the man with the
information the source upon which
backgroundhungry newsmen depend.
It was the expendable press secreta-
ry, not the Secretary of State, who
was embarrassed at the response to
this heavy-handed dropping of the
wreckers' ball on last year's statue.
Dr. Kissinger continues to privately
maintain to his trusted writing
friends that the latest SALT initia-
tive was not begun until President
Ford took office, and that the "break-
through" heretofore placed in Mos-
cols., in 1972, in fact took place in
Vladivostock -in 1974. Smoothly,
subtly, the trap is baited; irate news-
men will jump on press secretaries
and other Presidential assistants who
denigrate the years of effort by Kis-
dent who could carry on that will? singer and the other fellow Henry
proven by his treatment of Henry brought along, President What's-his- -
Kissinger as the indispensable man, name. Thus Henry gets the credit
who, in himself, constituted much of for unwavering loyalty to Ford, while
the American strength. I do not have he takes the credit for all that Nikon
the Kissinger notes for his converse- accomplished.
tions with Mr. Brezhnev about Mr.. . Henry Kissinger's ability to shape
Ford, but on the basis of his 1972 the attitude of much of the Alfieri-
-speech in Moscow one .can assume a .can press and of the Senate Foreign
presentation along the lines of "Rich- Relations Committee is part of his
"ard Nixon did not choose Gerald strength; his skill in making Presi-
Ford because he was made of sugar dent Ford his Pinocchio (after years
candy.
The greatest danger to the alliance
of Kissinger and Ford is, of course,
public acknowledgment of the new
President's undue dependence on his
adviser; if what had been the prede-
cessor's tool were to be seen as the
successor's brain, instability would
soon set in.
e.rotritar AA. 4_ :?
of watching Geppetto at work, using
Kissinger as a Pinocchio) is the great-
est part of his strength. In months to
come, we can expect to feel the appli-
cation of Kissinger strength, despite
urgings by his friends not to go too
far, because Henry Kissinger learned
a lesson from a master: "Strength
means nothing, unless there is a will
0
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9 2
Top SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY COS--tt- Cocc-j
Opening Statement
1. Our relations in context of present international situation.
a. Since the war three summits (X 59, X 61, LBJ-Kos 67). They
occurred when major issue was war or peace between US and
$U. Specific crises in which we both involved (Berlin, Middle
East). Whether ,rightly or not each of us was seen as a leader
of hostile coalition and relationship between these two camps
was seen as major determinant of international politics.
b. We now have a different situation. It was wise of both leaderships
to let contours of new situation emerge more clearly before agree-
ing to new summit. We think Soviets now do not see Western camp as
monolithic and ITS guiding hand. We for our part do not see Com-
munist world as monolithic ? not because we have deliberately
set ourselves task of disrupting Soviet-led coalition, but because
we recognize differentiation and play of autonomous forces.
c. Present and foreseeable situation characterized by play of several
major actors, on one hand, and continued disparity in power as
between US and SU and rest of countries. Each of us is still the
a
dominant power in its coalition. Problem now not so much
prevention of direct conflict (though still not wholly solved)
but cooperation between us so that our power and influence can be
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
P re_Ecingleti:Atri A4) ,e21 At
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
"??-1
. . . No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9 -
v T(J1.? bk-A-AK b.R.NW. 1 V it../ V I .O JWaL
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
6.?
used to stabilize international situation as a whole.
d. This Is neither "condominium" nor ignoring of continuing major
differences -- in systems, in outlook, in history. It means
recognizing that we have role to plarin containing the dangers
of diversity while capitalizing on its assets.
2. How we view each other.
Evolution of new relationship between us faces many obstacles,
some real but some more "subjective" than "objective". In past
25 years we have probably never really tried to sort these- out
but now have opportunity to start this process.
We 'understand Soviet sense of "encirclernent", though we believe
some of this is due to the way the Soviet Union entered the world
.scene after its revolution which challenged not only domestic
values but also international ones. We perceived Stalinist
?
? Russia, after WW II as outward-thrusting and aggressive and
responded accordingly. We recognize that in responding we may
have conveyed a purpose that to Soviets looked like a design to
maintain USSR in a permanently disadvantageous position. We
were perhaps less conscious of Soviet concerns stemming from
experience of WW II than we should have been. We were perhaps
insufficiently conscious that security requirements of continental
power differed from one, like ourselves, surrounded by oceans.
? TOP SECTIET/SF.NSITIVE/F.XCLUSIVELY nyEs ONLY
- . ? .
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06 : L0e-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
0 flurStk t ti31" vrft", -Wolfe owl..1-
? ?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
1.0
' No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
MOPoxJ 1N )Li A v J?? ??.?.a. ? 4.....????
Our history of no foreign invasion since 1812 made us less
seniitive to problems of nation invaded many times in same
time span. At the same time, a more sympathetic compre-
hension of Soviet outlook was complicated by nature of Stalinist
regime and by *universalist claims which Soviets advanced in
regard to thei.' doctrines and domestic values.
-
We recognize that Soviets may have viewed us as having similar
universalist pretensions.
?
We think both of us are approaching point where we understand
each has legitimate security interests, especially in adjacent
. ?
areas; and each has broader world-wide interests. In any case,
? we think both of us now know that this is the only basis for a
sound relationship between us. We know that great powers cannot
?? be induced, or persuaded, or pressured or flattered into sacri-
ficing important interests. We know that any agreement reached
on such a basis cannot last because no great power -- nor indeed
?
any power in a relationship of essentialli equality with another --
will long abide by a disadvantageous agreement. In fact we know
from' history that agreerbents or arrangements that may have
made .
been/at a Moment of disadvantage will become the source of new
instability and conflict as soon as the affected pirty gains or regains
?
TOP SF.CIIET/sENsITIvr./ExcLusrvv.i,v F.YES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06 : LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
orprsii-t ik-5 a-4 ura41
shitp4a4-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06 : LOC-FIAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06 : LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
its strength. You and we have many problems but we do have
the advantage, at the present time, of being able to deal with
each other from positions of essential equality. And that pro-
vides us with a unique moment in our histories to reach ever-
lasting agreelmTts. In fact, the opportunities for broad coopera-
tion open to the leaders of Our two countries at present have never
been greater and may decline again if they are not grasped.
You have knovrn President Nixon for more than a decade and he
is aware that you have raised questions about his attitudes,
orientation and predictability. Some of your public statements
have tried to analyze his behavior in terms of "forces" influencing
him. The Presid,ent combines concern for long-term evolution
with detailed interest in concrete day-to-day decisions. The evolution
he sees -- and wants to contribute to -- is one of a world of several
interacting major powers, competitive but respectful of each
other's interests. Within this basic framework, he sees an
opportunity for all countries to develop their own identity. This
view of the world corresponds to the President's personal back-
ground and up-bringing.
At the same time, he can be tough and even ruthless in dealing
with specific problems. You probably recognize that the
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
President is bound to see the present situation in Vietnam not
only in its local context but as a renewed effort by outside powers
to intervene in our domestic political processes. Moreover, as
President he is bound to be keenly sensitive to the fact that our
last President as forced to vacate his office because of the
effects of the Vietnam war. President Nixon will not permit
three Presidents in a row to leave office under abnormal circum-
stances. It may seem that what he is doing to prevent this from
occurring is "unpredictable;" It is in fact quite consistent with
his fighting instincts when issues of principle and vital interest
are at stake. His reaction should have been expected.
But I have also found that once a matter is settled, the President
is prepared to proceed with matters that are in the common interest
with those who were on the opposite side in a dispute. This is true
in his domestic as well as foreign policies. We would say that he
"does not bear grudges." The President can look beyond the issues
of the moment to the broader evolution and the wider interests. He
is conciliatory because he recognizes that only those agreements
are kept which nations with to keep.
Let me make this more specific and relate it directly to you.
The President has a reputation from his past as an anti-Communist.
You may think that this is a basic prejudice which sooner or
later will assert itself. (Actually, I would not find such a view
T0tVrr VNTRTPTV frit ri .11q T .V mh"'VraC r114a T
? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
. - .
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
on your side surprising. I would have thought that you would
only regard it as normal that a "capitalist" should be anti-
communist and that you would not respect bin-1 if he were not.)
But as a practical matter the President understands that
whether he likes your system or not will not affect its existence;
just as your liIes and dislikes do not affect our existence. He
will enter a contest with you when you challenge him and he will
do and say things that you may regard as challenging you. But
he will not lose sight of the special role that our two countries
must play if there is to be peace in the world. That, rather than
anti-Communism, is the point that will again and again reassert
itself -- whatever the turbulences of the moment.
Of course, it is also characteristic of the President to be
patient and tenacious. His political biography testifies to that.
He will accept a setback or a detour -- and wait until he can
rechart his course. When he has done this, he has shown unusual
consistency, even when he makes the most radical moves -- which
his position enables him to do.
f. Let me in this context mrention China. We understand that nothing
we can say to you will persuade you to judge our relations with
the PRC other than by actual events. But since this is so, we
also know that no purpose will be served -- except to create new
misunderstandings -- if we tried to mislead you. We have understood
? T , I itrr oar" TtegY1frn T 7 *L-.N.TL"C FT T
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
you to say that you favor a normalization of US-PRC relations;
but you have expressed reservations about the timing of our
actions over the past three years, arguing that they coincided
with a deterioration of your relations with Peking. But this is
an objectiva fct, not a matter of arbitrary choice by ui.
However, the fact that the state of Sino-Soviet relations in
a sense contributed to the development of contacts between our-
selves and Peking does not mean that that is the basis of the
American relationship with China. The fact is that you are too
powerful and influential for our relations with China or any
. country to be based on hostility toward you. Objectively, there
cannot be American-Chinese collusion against the USSR in the
world of today.
In addition, while we attach great importance to the opening
of a dialogue with the PRC, we recognize that with the Chinese
we are at the beginning of a process. Major concrete agreements
are not likely in the near future.
With you - given the objective facts of the world situation
we have. several important matters on our agenda that can be
resolved if there is a mutual respect for each other's interests.
TOP SECRET SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
g. As regards our internal systems, we should not gloss over
the differences; but difference is not synonymous with in-
compatibility. We are content to let history judge which system
ultimately produces the most productive and contented society.
.1%
We welcome,a certain spirit of competitiveness -- this is part
of our make-up and we think it is part of theirs too.
Cooperate to eliminate or at least contain crises over which we
both have influence;
Cooperate where we can to help bring about solutions. to problems
that have a potential for becoming dangerous crises;
c. Develop bilateral cooperation (including in arms control) so that
U.S. -Soviet relationship becomes a force for international stability.
In this respect, our relationship is unique because the U.S. -Soviet
relationship affects the nature of international relationships
generally.
d. In particular, this means developing, either explicitly or by
practice, some "rules of conduct ":
recognize that each of us has certain areas of special
sensitivity which should be respected;
MO MO subordinate short-term tactical advantages to longer-
term stability; neither side will permit the other an
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
g. As regards our internal systems, we should not gloss over.
the differences; but difference is not synonymous with in-
compatibility. We are content to let history judge which system
ultimately produces the most productive and contented society.
We welcomeka certain spirit of competitiveness -- this is part
of our make-up and we think it is part of theirs too.
3, Our Tasks
a. Cooperate to eliminate or at least contain crises over which we
?
both have influence;
Cooperate where we can to help bring about solutions. to problems
that have a potential for becoming dangerous crises;
c. Develop bilateral cooperation (including in arms control) so that
U.S. -Soviet relationship becomes a force for international stability.
In this respect, our relationship is unique because the U.S. -Soviet
relationship affects the nature of international relationships
generally.
d. In particular, this means developing, either explicitly or by
practice, some "rules of conduct":
F
recognize thit each of us has certain areas of special
4? ?
sensitivity which should be respected;
???? IMI subordinate short-term tactical advantages to longer-
term stability; neither side will permit the other an
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9 S
,
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
? 611,014 p ? 2 40r
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
- No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9 ?
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
mlo
?
accumulation of short-term gains and the effort to
snake such gains will merely produce counter-
actions;
exercise restraint in crises in which, given our con-
gutted competitive relationship, we find ourselves
II
on 'opposing sides; indeed avoid letting situations
. get to crisis stage;
use our influence, if necessary by regulating aid
.
and arms supplies, to induce parties to a crisis
or conflict to moderate their behavior.
?;
1, ?
Although it comes after some three years of preparation and in that
? t , .
sense is a sort of culmination of our efforts, it is also a beginning. It
will engage the leaders of both countries; it will establish a pattern of
contact; it will provide dramatic impetus to our future endeavors for a
peaceful international order (though of course only if there are concrete
accomplishments).
a. HAI{ has been sent to Moscow because the President wanted
to. assure the most comprehensive and meticulous preparations
of the Summit. He understood you to have the same motivation.
b. We had not of course anticipated that our Summit would coincide
with the renewed intense fighting in Vietnam. It is a tough
TOP SECRF.T/SENSITIVE/F,XCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY - 10 -
problem and we must take account of your assistance to the
DRV's effort to win the war and drive the President out of office.
While leaving a more detailed discussion ,until later, I can say
now that this affects not only the climate of the Summit but the
specific accomplishments that will flow from the Summit. For
this reason, bath of us have an interest in getting the escalation
of the fighting 'stopped and to have negotiations resumed. In our
own country, the Congress and the public will measure the
achievements of the Summit to an important extent by whether
the trend of the last three years toward a winding down of the war
?
will be resumed. In the Soviet Union a similar test may be
applied. We do not want the Summit to be merely an episode --
another meeting of no particular historical significance -- we
want it to be a new beginning that sets us on a new path. Our
energies should be concentrated on the task of constructing peace,
not diverted to those of fighting war. We think you see it the
same way. Inevitably, at this moment, this problem has to be
uppermost in our mind and on our agenda.
c. If it w.,.re not for the acute problem of Vietnam, strategic arms
limitation would engage most of our attention. We recognize
that the agreement we are now talking about may disappoint
some and it will indeed only be a starting point. Yet for that
very reason -- a starting point opening the way for more to
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES _
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
01,kI-
osnle 41,10 Orv'tj
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
,
' No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
C.
come -- this first agreement must be such that both of us can
be satisfied that our interests are protected. And it must be
such that we have a real platform from which to proceed to
the next step. The subject is intricate and technical but both
of us understand that we are dealing now with political
.1k
decisions serving political ends as well.
The viability of any agreement in so central an area as that
of strategic arms depends heavily on the general political
relationship between us. The. President strongly feels that
arms control agreements serve little purpose if existing
? -; ?
arms are used for aggression or pressure.
y? ? 4.?? , ?
As regards Europe, so long the center of our concerns and
. :
the source of tension and danger, we want now to find ways
of building on what has been achieved. We in the U.S. are
prepared to play our role, recognizing that some aspects
involve Europeans more directly than ourselves.
f. Middle East.
g. Bilateral relations and trade. Here we have broad long-term
opportunities to develop cooperative relations. We are
currently engaged in a whole series of negotiations ranging
from trade issues, to scientific and outer space cooperation.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY - 12 -
Both of us stand to gain. But we must be realistic: a lasting
and productive set of relationships, with perhaps hundreds
or thousands of our people working with each other and
perhaps billions of dollars of business activity, can only be
achieved lin a healthy political environment. The past history
of our relations has clearly shown the connection between the
political aspects and others, like the economic. The President
wants to be candid with you: he cannot make commitments,
say for credits or tariff concessions, if these measures do not
: . ? ,
command wide support among our public and in the Congress.
And this depends critically on the state of our political
relations. Moreover, we must make sure that once commitments
have been entered into they will not soon be undermined by
renewed crises and deterioration of our relations. I say this
not because we want you to "pay a price" for economic and
other relations with us or because we expect you to sacrifice
important political and security interests for the sake of trade
relations. I say it as an objective fact of political life.
h. The final communique-- public framework for our relations.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
Ark! to-4-
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06 :
LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
11414 Or".1"1
E4criews4-
tz--/f)
Ple w-Pststattokcit.
?40-4 phottowitt-
fork/LvLitre)
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06 :
LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
MEMORANDUM 11. ETS
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
'PARTICIPANTS:
DATE & TIME:
PLACE:
SUBJECTS:
Leonid L Brezhnev, General Secretary of
Central Committee of the CPSU
Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister
Anatoliy Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador to the
United States
A. Alexandrov-Agentov, Assistant to Mr. Brezhnev
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter
Notetaker
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, National Security Council
Staff
Winston Lord, National Security Council Staff
Friday, April 21, 1972, 12:00 noon to 4:45 p.m.
Guest House, Moscow
Summit; Vietnam; Principles of U.S. -Soviet
Relations
There were some opening pleasantries during which Dr. Kissinger said
what a tough negotiator Mr. Dobrynin was. Mr. Brezhnev asked Dr.
Kissinger if he were comfortable. Mr. Brezhnev said that they could
have given the U.S. party more pleasant accommodations but they wanted
to be close to their plane. Dr. Kissinger replied the Americans appreci-
ated not only the technical arrangements but also the human warmth.
Mr. Brezhnev said that he was glad and as for the warmth, perhaps they
could add to it in the talks. Dr. Kissinger wondered whether that was a
threat or a pleasant prospect and Mrs. Brezhnev replied pleasant prospect.
They were against threats.)
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Mr. Brezhnev: How is President Nixon?
Dr. Kissinger: He is fine. He sends his warm personal regards.
Mr. Brezhnev: Thank you.
Dr. Kissinger: He lays great stress on personal contact and looks forward
to his meetings with you.
Mr. Brezhnev: In fact I have met President Nixon personally, but it was
some time ago. I was in a different position and he was too at that time.
He probably did not pay attention to me at the time. I even have a photo
of myself with him which I have now found. He may have one too.
Dr. Kissinger: I understand the General-Secretary was present during
the so-called Kitchen Debate. We don't expect to have the same at this
meeting during this visit.
Mr. Gromyko: The famous Kitchen Debate.
Mr. Brezhnev: God forbid. I would never be capable of such debate. It
was one of President Nixon's most famous debates. The great debate as
the Foreign Minister said. But that indeed is talking of the past and has
no bearing whatever on the present.
Dr. Kissinger: That is exactly our feeling.
Mr. Brezhnev: Is this the first visit to Moscow, Mr. Kissinger?
Dr. Kissinger: I was in Moscow once as a member of a scientific delega-
tion. I met with some members of the Soviet Academy of Science to dis-
cuss disarmament.
Mr. Brezhnev: Let us endeavor to lead matters into a direction to enable
us to visit one another's countries more often, Moscow and Washington.
After all it does depend on us.
Dr. Kissinger: Exactly. We have an historical opportunity.
Mr. Brezhnev: That is true. I will, of course, convey friendly regards
for President Nixon at the close of our discussions. But since you are
probably in touch with him even today, even now I convey my warm good
wishes to him.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SERITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES MPLY - 3
Since you did mention earlier on the significance of our meeting, I
would like to start out by elaborating on that subject for a little time.
And we certainly understand and believe that President Nixon and your
leaders generally attach great importance to this meeting. As for my-
self and my colleagues we too attach great significance to these meetings and
express the hope that they will be successful and culminate in useful and
constructive decisions. All hesitations or vacillations in regard to these
meetings have now become a thing of the past. The decision that we took
was a considered decision and we are therefore entitled to believe that
these meetings will be not only important but perhaps even historic and
epoch-making. This will all depend on the decisions arrived at.
We have already traversed a long road toward one another in preparation
for these meetings. There are quite naturally on these roads various bumps
and cracks, but that is not the crux of the matter. The most important
thing is that both sides were guided by a desire to achieve positive results for
this meeting and to ensure that it ends well.
Now I gather that you are aware of our desire as regards the way in which
the meeting should be completed. We have no wish to bring about a quar-
rel in the meeting. That is something we could easily do by staying in
Washington and Moscow.
Dr. Kissinger: We have proved that.
Mr. Brezhnev: And to quarrel so badly as not to be able to patch up the
quarrel, that is something that requires no great wisdom. That is some-
thing any leader of much less rank can easily do.
But to find a good solution for our two big powers -- such two big powers
as the Soviet Union and the United States -- is something that requires great
statesmanship and foresight, and we will need to look forward into the
future.
Of course, we can both note that the general atmosphere and general
political situation is well. It is a fact that it plays not a second rate
importance in our meetings, but that is only too natural. I would not be
saying anything new, and you are as aware of this as we. We like your-
selves want there to be a good atmosphere at the time of our meeting.
At present world pul.lic opinion is riveted to the forthcoming meeting
and a great deal is being said on the subject. We believe we should
utilize all useful things and cast aside all harmful things. In the remaining
TOP SECRET /SEE ITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
t. .
? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SAITIVE/ EXCLUSIVELY EYES MILY - 4 -
' month we should do what we can to produce what we can for successful
negotiations. That is very important I feel.
You know we live at a time when due to well-known circumstances
things can change very rapidly in world politics. There are forces
in the world which seek . . .
At this point Mr. Brezhnev offered Dr. Kissinger some tea and told him
not to drink water. Mr. Gromyko said that he had already earned some
tea. Amtassador Dobrynin commented that the General-Secretary had
earned some tea since he had done all the talking. Dr. Kissinger re-
marked that he hadn't said anything and that was right. Mr. Brezhnev
promised to give him an opportunity. Dr. Kissinger remarked that may-
be then he would want to take the tea away. Mr. Brezhnev replied that
after that he would give him brandy, although perhaps he favored whisky.
Dr. Kissinger replied that he preferred brandy. Mr. Brezhnev and
Ambassador Dobrynin noted that it would be a 5-star brandy.
Mr. Brezhnev: There are forces in the world which seek to bring about
a heightening of tension, but of course the majority of the countries of the
world endeavor to bring about an atmosphere conducive to the lessening
of tensions and improvement in the atmosphere.
So both you and we can see both sides of this matter and others. Unfor-
tunately it so happens that events in the recent period -- shortly before
this private meeting between us -- dampened the atmosphere somewhat.
I am not saying that this will reduce the prospects for our meeting. I
am merely saying it as a statement of facts. Of course, the general
question of atmosphere is one we will be able to elaborate on as the
talks proceed. Now I wish merely to mention it as such. All the more
so since I do not believe that either of us is limited in the time set aside
for these negotiations. I am assuming -- in fact I am counting on it --
for myself and all my colleagues that the discussions with you and the
discussions with President Nixon will be as frank as possible, direct and
honest. This should be an obligatory condition if we want to assure a
complete mutual understanding and leave behind no doubts or anything
unsaid. The spirit of frankness I feel is the spirit of confidence. Be-
cause we intend to be very frank in our discussions with President Nixon.
I believe this spirit of frankness should be the dominant spirit in these
conversations we are going to have with you.
I was satisfied indeed to hear the news that you have broad authority
to conduct discussions on a broad range of important issues and this I
feel is a very important factor. I would say that the basic issues which
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SETITIVE/ EXCLUSIVELY EYES RLY - 5
will be subjects for discussion at the summit meeting have in principle
been identified in the process of preparatory work in which you are
playing a most active and perhaps a decisive role. There are included the
basic issues of the day which neither of us can bypass in our discussions.
I do not on the other hand rule out, in fact I assume, that we can discuss
any question which you may wish to raise or I wish to raise. I would be
happy if you acquiesce in that feeling.
Dr. Kissinger: Absolutely.
Mr. Brezhnev: If any of our aides would like to say anything, let's give
them the opportunity. I don't mean that they should say nothing. That
is the worst way to do that.
Dr. Kissinger: I don't run my staff as democratically as you, Mr.
General-Secretary.
Mr. Brezhnev: I'm a great democrat, a great democrat, a great
democrat. (He laughs) Dr. Kissinger, you are in agreement to that
approach to our discussions.
Dr. Kissinger: Completely.
Mr. Brezhnev: Thank you. When I saw the range of questions we
might discuss was very broad I decided to have no preparations in writing.
It gives me a complete freedom of maneuver.
That was what I really wished to say by way of introduction. I would
like to invite you to feel completely free in these discussions.
Here try this candy. It is very good; it is plums in chocolate.
Dr. Kissinger: I just started a diet before I came here, which has
already been destroyed in 12 hours in Moscow. It is very good.
Mr. Brezhnev: Let me just record in that connection that I was a guest
of President Kekkonen of Finland, and I gained 2 1/2 kilograms in several
days. I complained to him that this was all wrong. He asked me how
much I had gained so I told him 2 1/2 kilograms. He said that's nothing.
When two of our engineers were in Moscow ten days with a delegation,
each one added 8 kilograms in ten days. (Dr. Kissinger laughs.) About
that I was very happy since I had only gained 2 1/2 kilograms and not
more. In good neighborly fashion.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
IIP
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
May I make a few comments on procedures on our work with you?
- 6 -
Dr. Kissinger: Please.
Mr. Brezhnev: I would like to devote the maximum possible time to our
meetings and discussions. Because they are indeed serious negotiations
we ought to do our best to introduce the greatest possible clarity in our
discussions and that will take time. I was in fact the sponsor of your
coming earlier.
Dr. Kissinger: I know.
Mr. Brezhnev: You've got me revealing my secrets already. You haven't
told me anything and I am giving away all my secrets. I'm losing all of
my advantages now all because I am so kind. Now today unfortunately I
can only stay with you until 4:00 p.m. Because after that we have a sol-
emn meeting dedicated to Lenin's birthday and I have to attend it. Later
in the evening I have family circumstances to prevent me from resuming
discussions. But tomorrow and the day after I can devote all day to dis-
cussions. Perhaps that is all for the good because this evening you will
have a chance to have some rest. If there is no objection to that proced-
ure we could then be ready to start.
Dr. Kissinger: It seems like a very good procedure to me.
Mr. Brezhnev: I think it is business like.
Dr. Kissinger: Good. Yes.
Mr. Brezhnev: Very well. Dr. Kissinger, I know you have many instructions
and duties to perform, and I would like to hear what you say.
Dr. Kissinger: Mr. General-Secretary, I appreciate your observations
which are exactly in the spirit of my instructions and in fact also of the
purposes which brought me here. The General-Secretary was very kind
in calling me a diplomat, but I think they my major contribution to these
meetings can be to cut through diplomatic discussions and to speak with
you in complete frankness and answer any questions you might have with
great openness.
Mr. Brezhnev: That is very very good. If you get rid of the State Depart-
ment then we will get rid of the Foreign Office.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
3, ?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES PLY -7- .
Mr. Gromyko: Shall we burn the buildings down?
Mr. Brezhnev: We'll burn them down. Otherwise you'll get back into
them again.
Mr. Gromyko: That's okay; you can build new ones.
Dr. Kissinger: With all respect, Mr. General-Secretary, we have made
more progress in abolishing the State Department than you have in abolish-
ing the Foreign Office. (Russian laughter.)
Mr. Brezhnev: I have to get to the bottom of that. I'm not all that
familiar with American realities.
Dr. Kissinger: You can be sure that this part of our notes will be
suppressed.
Mr. Brezhnev: You may rest assured that the same fate will befall our
notes on this question. We are always true to our word. We have agreed
that the talks will be strictly confidential, and that's the way it will be.
If I may say in a very friendly way, sometimes your safes leak. There
are holes in them, and things get into the papers. Perhaps it is neces-
sary to send someone to put plaster or weld them tight. Perhaps there
should be one big patch for the State Department.
Dr. Kissinger: You can be absolutely certain, Mr. Secretary, that these
discussions will never leave the White House and will be seen only by the
President and no one else.
MT. :131-ezhnev: That's the way it should be. There is nothing to fear,
however, since we are talking honestly.
Dr. Kissinger: So we can speak with complete openness and without fear
of any embarrassment.
Mr. Brezhnev: This is the only way we can proceed, I'm sure.
Dr. Kissinger: Mr. General-Secretary, let me make a few general observa-
tions and then we can decide what topics to go into in greater detail.
Mr. Brezhnev: Well Pm prepared for anything you have to say in any
order. You go ahead in any way that you see fit.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SMITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES IRLY -8-
Dr. Kissinger: First, the spirit of the General-Secretary's remarks
reflects the attitude of President Nixon. (Mr. Brezhnev nods.) He,
too, believes we have an historic opportunity. The leaders of the Soviet
Union and the United States have met on several occasions since the end
of World War II when we were allies. But they have never managed to
recapture the spirit of cooperation which characterized our relationship
in that period, that is before the end of World War II. Their meetings
were episodes. We feel, as the General Secretary does, that we should
begin an epoch.
Mr. Brezhnev: That is very true indeed if I may just butt in. Please
excuse me if I occasionally interject.
Dr. Kissinger: That's much better. Otherwise we are just exchanging
diplomatic notes.
Mr. Brezhnev: That's exactly right. If I wait until the end for my
observations I have to write things down or forget them, and later I
trust you will act in the same fashion.
Dr. Kissinger: Thank you.
Mr. Brezhnev: The name of President Roosevelt is very popular in the
Soviet Union and whose names remains very popular in the minds of the
Soviet people. I can say very sincerely, truly the Soviet people have
maintained very good feelings toward President Roosevelt. There is no
other President in my lifetime, and I am 65, in the history of Russian-
American relations who enjoyed such a respect among the Russian people.
I know about our people. I have been active in party life for 40 years.
I am a war veteran. I know the attitude of our party generally and of
our people. I agree with you when you talk about the attitude in that period.
The attitude in that period was very important. I think all of us are so
conditioned, so built in fact, that we always maintain in our memory
either things that are very good or are very bad. The mediocre or
second rate goes away from the memory. I think that concerns all na-
tions, the Russian or American nation or anyone else. Those who really
leave their mark in history are either bad ones or very positive figures
relative to the times past, present and future. Napoleon, Wilhelm or
Hitler are known in history, and in a positive sense President Roosevelt.
This also goes for the various Czars. Peter The Great was one kind of
Czar, Nicholas the Second another, and Catherine another.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
IP
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
-9-
Dr. Kissinger: Lack of personality was not one of the problems of
Russian history.
Mr. Brezhnev: There were certainly different kinds of personalities.
Dr. Kissinger: You have had dramatic figures in your history.
Mr. Brezhnev: There were different kinds.
Anyway that's just by the way. I just touched on an area which belongs
more to scholars, historians or other scholars. But even so it illustrates
the illustration might teach us where to go and the correct path.
Dr. Kissinger: Very much. Our intention is to recapture the spirit of the
Roosevelt period. The reason why summit meetings since the war have
never had a lasting effect was either because they only dealt with surface
events and with personal relationships of leaders, or because they con-
cerned only very narrow individual problems. On our side there may
have been the difficulty that we felt that we had to deal with you from a
position of superior strength. That was in the past. I was speaking of
the past. On your side there may have been the difficulty of looking at
us in a certain way. . .
Mr. Brezhnev: That is completely fruitless. One does not deal from the
position of strength.
Dr. Kissinger: I agree.
Mr. Brezhnev: That is a complete waste of time.
Dr. Kissinger: On your side there may have been, in the earlier time,
too much of the ideological aspect. In any event there were specific incidents,
which may not have been intended by either side, that thwarted the progress
of previous meetings.
On this occasion our opportunity is so unique because for the first time
since the cooperation in the second World War we are proceeding on a
very broad front. We are dealing with you from an attitude of complete
equal and no pretense of a position of strength.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLT.iSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
? TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY - 10 -
Mr. Brezhnev: That is very true indeed. I recall that when President
Nixon first came into office, indeed he indicated when he was seeking
office, that he advocated the formula that we should proceed from
an era of confrontation to an r a of negotiation. Perhaps it is taking
too long a time in coming; the good thing is that the process has not
stopped completely.
Dr. Kissinger: We are dealing with you on the basis of complete
reciprocity. Any agreement we make with you must be in your interest
as well as ours. You must want to keep it. It must be a mutually
beneficial arrangement.
Mr. Brezhnev: Certainly, just by a word of addition, I certainly
am in full agreement with that. I merely wish to add it is my
view that we should conduct negotiations in a big way, not a small-
minded way. And the arrangement which we achieve should be sig-
nificant and should be well understood by the peoples of our countries.
The arrangement should encourage tranquility in the world and respect
in all states. I believe both states, the United States and the
Soviet Union are worthy of such agreements. We are against talking
about petty things, although that is necessary sometimes, but only
as a corollary of big things.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 11
Dr. Kissinger: That reflects exactly the attitude of President Nixon.
Indeed, we believe the meeting between the General Secretary and
President Nixon is so important because our two countries are the
two strongest powers in the world today. The future peace of the
world and the wellbeing of the world depend on big decisions made
by the two leaders and not simply on tactical moves to deal with
immediate crises.
Mr. Brezhnev: There is no machine in the U.S. which could translate
your language into Russian and mine into English?
Dr. Kissinger: It would make things much easier.
Mr. Brezhnev: Perhaps we might make a resolution that you learn
Russian and I English.
Dr. Kissinger: I started to learn Russian one summer but I am very
bad at languages.
Mr. Brezhnev: I don't think I am too good. Besides I have no time.
Dr. Kissinger: The President once tried a system with a man speaking
softly into a microphone simultaneously while he had on earphones.
We threw the machine out after five minutes because it made him
nervous. (Mr. Brezhnev laughs)
Mr. Brezhnev: You just suggested one comment to me. Frankly, I
did not intend to mention this at all, at least at the first meeting. In
this connection, I do recall and I had occasion to mention it in one of
my speeches when I referred to a remark attributed to President Nixon
during his China visit. He said, these two countries, the U.S. and
China, were holding the future of the world in their hands. I don't
know whether he was misrepresented. I'm not asking a reply to this
point. Maybe at some time in our discussions we can return to it.
You pushed me into saying it. When I speak to President Nixon I
will say that Dr. Kissinger pushed me into saying it. On second
thought, I will just mention it to President Nixon, [without saying
you pushed me into it]. I don't think the crux is holding the future
of the world in our hands; that is not the important thing. The
important thing is to secure peace and tranquility in the world and
respect others. That is what we should endeavor to do, our two
countries.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
1111 4P
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY ' 12
Dr. Kissinger: If the General Secretary will permit me, perhaps I
can give an answer if we can keep it informal.
Mr. Brezhnev: I give you my word that this is between us. I will
be content to wait for that reply, but not at this juncture. I would
rather hear you go on with the general discussion.
Dr. Kissinger: I may forget; therefore, I will give it to you now
anyway. There are two things I would like to say very briefly about
this comment. First, it was correctly reported. Secondly, it was
made in a toast at the end of a very long banquet in which very much
ma.o tai was consumed.
Mr. Brezhnev: I certainly don't want you to forget, so I want to listen
to you now.
Dr. Kissinger: It was not a fully worked-out statement of national
policy.
Mr. Brezhnev: Does President Nixon feel a bit bad about it now?
Dr. Kissinger: It was to express a general mood of friendliness rather
than a detailed statement of our policy. In fact, since the General
Secretary mentioned this occasion and since I intended to speak about
it anyway, why don't I just make a few observations on the subject of
China? I had intended to do it anyway.
Mr. Brezhnev: No, no. We can get to that sometime in the future;
I prefer you do what you planned. Had you intended to talk about it
anyway? If you prefer, you can go on.
Dr. Kissinger: I was going to say three or four sentences in my opening
remarks as I told the Ambassador on the plane yesterday.
Mr. Brezhnev: I too on my side have many questions I would like to
raise and discuss. One thing I omitted to mention in my opening remarks.
The way I see it, before we get to questions such as the relations with
China and other countries, and we should discuss many such countries;
perhaps we would make better progress by starting out on relations
between our two countries, the Soviet Union and the United States. Of
course, other issues hinge on this question -- all are interwoven. I
think the basic issue is U.S. -Soviet Union relations. You set out your
views in any order that you prefer.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
?????????????? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
IIP
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 13
Dr. Kissinger: Our conviction is that peace in the world and progress
in the world depends on the relations between our two countries. We
are the two principal countries on whom this depends.
Mr. Brezhnev: Do you smoke?
Dr. Kissinger: I never learned to inhale.
Mr. Brezhnev: That's good then. Inhale or exhale?
Dr. Kissinger: Many of my colleagues in the bureaucracy hope that I
also forget how to exhale (Mr. Brezhnev laughs). There are no other
countries in the world that can take a global view of events or take the
generous farsighted attitude which the General Secretary described.
Mr. Brezhnev: I fully agree. I certainly agree with the additional thought
that it is very true we can play such a role in the world provided we pursue
a policy of peace. Then we can play a decisive role in the world. Of
course, we can take different stands on different issues. The role we
can play is different, too. This is certainly something that is important
to bear in mind considering the fact that the last century has been marked
by wars. (Mr. Brezhnev stands and says, "Excuse me, I get tired of
sitting. ") There are still a live men and people everywhere who
recollect the last war. During the war we had occupation and really
great sacrifices, and wars are still going on in the world and one can
not abstract one's self from this on this occasion.
Dr. Kissinger: In our view we can cooperate on many occasions and
in others we can differ on occasion and in those cases we can cooperate
to exercise restraint and keep our differences within limits.
With these attitudes, we believe we can settle a number of
issues at the summit. We believe we can complete an agreement on
limits on strategic arms. We should make important progress on the
question of European security and other European issues. We are
prepared to review the Middle East question. We are prepared to
discuss any other part of the world in which we have a mutual interest.
With respect to economic questions, we are prepared to consider such
issues as most favored nation and long-term credits, a whole range
of bilateral relationships, such as science and the environment in
which negotiations are now progressing.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
T
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
14
More important than these specific issues is that we have an
opportunity to engage our peoples and governments on such a broad
range of issues, that every time there are conflicts in parts of the
world we will remember what unites us rather than what divides us.
That could be the greatest achievement of the summit.
(Mr. Brezhnev then offered the Americans some pie that
had been brought in. Dr. Kissinger said we would break Kekkonen's
record and complained about gaining weight and Mr. Brezhnev said
that he could start losing weight after the negotiations. Dr. Kissinger
then said the summit would come and we would all put our weight back
on. Mr. Brezhnev said that was right. By photos he saw that
President Nixon had been losing weight. Dr. Kissinger replied that
he kept quite stable. Mr. Brezhnev commented that was good. There
were further exchanges between Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Gromyko
and Ambassador Dobrynin in which Brezhnev said they were all
youngsters. Mr. Gromyko said he appreciated that very much.
Mr. Brezhnev said that he and Dr. Kissinger were much more serious
minded than all those youngsters there.)
Dr. Kissinger: I am authorized to discuss all these subjects with the
General Secretary and bring them either to conclusion or closer to
conclusion. Also, as I told the Foreign Minister yesterday, we should
begin working on final statements of the meeting.
Mr. Brezhnev: I agree.
Dr. Kissinger: But there is one problem which I must discuss with
the General Secretary. The General Secretary speaks about obstacles
that may be in the way of the summit that we should try to remove.
That is a subject I would now like to address.
Mr. Brezhnev: Certainly.
Dr. Kissinger: That is the problem of Southeast Asia, particularly
Vietnam. I will put our point of view before the General Secretary with
complete frankness.
Mr. Brezhnev: Please.
Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union did not start the war in 1963 and 1964,
and there have been many mistakes made since then. But the past is
not of interest in the immediate crisis. I am talking about the situation
of 1972, specifically April 1972. We are confronted now with a massive
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECREPSENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EN'S ONLY ,.15
offensive by the North Vietnamese four weeks before a summit meeting,
at a time when we are withdrawing our forces and in the process of
slowly liquidating American involvement in the war. We had no
intention of having a crisis at this time. As your Ambassador knows,
I intended to take a vacation at this time. The only reason I didn't
take one was he thought that the more intensive period for summit
preparations would be now, so I moved it up three weeks.
Let me give you my judgment of North Vietnam with total
frankness.
Mr. Brezhnev: That is the only way to talk.
Dr. Kissinger: You, of course, know them better than I.
Mr. Brezhnev: But I have never been there myself.
Dr. Kissinger: I haven't yet either. They are a heroic people but not
a wise people. They are sometimes more afraid of being deceived
than of being defeated. They are not prepared to leave anything to
history. I know they believe that in 1954 they were deceived by the
settlement at Geneva. But the objective conditions between 1954 and
1972 are entirely different. In 1954 John Foster Dulles conducted
our foreign policy and he was constructing positions against what he
considered Communist aggression all over the world. We were going
into countries.
But in 1972, when President Nixon is conducting American
foreign policy, we are seeking a policy not of confrontation with the
Soviet Union or for that matter other major Communist countries,
but negotiations. We are doing this in the spirit of cooperation which
I described. We are not going into countries to build barriers; we
are trying to work out cooperative arrangements. We don't want any
permanent bases in Vietnam.
We have two principal objectives. One is to bring about an
honorable withdrawal of all our forces; secondly, to put a time interval
between our withdrawal and the political process which would then
start. We are prepared to let the real balance of forces in Vietnam
determine the future of Vietnam. We are not committed to a permanent
political involvement there, and we always keep our word.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 16
Mr. Brezhnev: Do you have a sort of judgment of your own, an
assessment of your own, as regards the withdrawal of your
forces, or is this just a general principle?
Mr. Kissinger: Yes. We have some ideas. We are talking of
months, not years. The number of months is a details.
Mr. Brezhnev: These plans or projections you have, have they
already in any way been communicated to North Vietnam?
Mr. Kissinger: Yes. But we don't believe . . . the-difference is
that the Vietnamese . . . we cannot withdraw our forces without
getting our prisoners back and without some perspective of what
follows afterward. This North Vietnam refused to do. But if we
can get this, we are prepared to withdraw all our forces without
any residual forces, and to close all bases within a period of
months, which remains to be negotiated, but is not an obstacle to
a solution.
Arnb. Dobrynin: Within this year?
Mr. Kissinger: Yes, by the end of this year. By the end of the
-year. The number of months will not be a question of principle.
We have said six months in our last proposal.
Mr. Brezhnev: That would be starting from what date?
Mr. Kissinger: The date of agreement.
Mr. Brezhnev: Do you have really accurate data as to the number of
American prisoners in Vietnam?
Mr. Kissinger: Not as accurate as the Vietnamese. They have
never given any names officially. They have the irritating habit of
dealing only with our domestic opposition. They have given others
the names of about 500 prisoners but have published pictures of
prisoners whose names they didn't give anybody.
Mr. Brezhnev: What would be the approximate figure? More than
500 or less; about what figure?
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
IP IP
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELYE EYES ONLY 17
Mr. Kissinger: The confirmed number is about 500. Then there
are about one thousand missing, not all of whom are confirmed as
prisoners. Therefore, there is a maximum of 1500, certainly less
than that, and a minimum of about 500.
These are our two objectives. What we will not do under any
circumstances, no matter what military pressures and no matter
what the results, is to meet their demand which is to install their
government in Saigon. They claim that isn't what they want, but
I can explain to the General Secretary that the objective consequence
is that. I do not wish to waste time on that now because I wish to
make a more fundamental point. But we are prepared to have a
political process which gives political forces in Vietnam a chance
to express themselves over a period of time, although we recognize
this is difficult to design.
These are the general considerations which the President would
have [sic] discussed with you in May. I only mention them to
explain the immediate crisis. And that is the crisis started by
the North Vietnamese offensive on March 30 which has the
additional complication that it is conducted almost completely
with Soviet equipment.
This affects us in four ways. First, as great powers; second in
terms of what I already mentioned, whatever the Soviet role in
this offensive has been. Third, the impact of this offensive on
our immediate situation which also affects you, which I will explain
in a minute. And fourth, the measures which must be taken to end
the crisis.
Let me talk about the last two points first. If this offensive succeeds--
and if I read Pravda I would be very concerned--the impact on our
relationship, quite unintentionally, would be very serious. I hope
my reports are better than your newspaper.
Amb. Dobrynin: Unintentionally?
Mr.. Kissinger: Unintentionally. I hope the General Secretary
forgives me for being so frank, but Ambassador Beam can put
it in diplomatic language later on.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 18
Mr. Brezhnev: That is exactly what I expect. Complete frankness is
the only way to gain a true perspective of the state of affairs.
Mr. Kissinger: If the North Vietnamese offensive succeeds, there will
be another 69,000 Americans who will become prisoners.
Ambassador Dobrynin: Do you believe in this?
Mr. Kissinger: That's at least what we must protect against. They are
trying hard. If the South Vietnamese army collapses, which is what the
North Vietnamese army is attempting to do, this will be the consequence.
We cannot tolerate it, and we will not tolerate it at any cost.
Secondly, if we look at the perspective which we described before, it
would deprive an American President of any authority to have the sort of
discussions with the General Secretary that it has been the principal
objective of his Administration to bring about. We have had the . . . we
are discussing now, for example, in Helsinki the limitations on strategic
arms, and the Soviet proposal is that submarines should not be included,
the one that came through the confidential channel.
Now, as I told the Ambassador, our military people have an almost
religious conviction. The President, assuming he could come to Moscow,
which would be very doubtful, [the translator omitted the last phrase]
even if he came to Moscow he would have to be a very rigid participant.
He could not say, after having suffered an enormous defeat in Vietnam,
I have made the following concession to the leader of the country whose
arms made our defeat possible. I want to tell you the truth. I am telling
you facts, not subjective speculation. I am just telling you what the facts
are.
But let us take a more realistic case, which is that North Vietnam will not
win but will continue its offensive in order to gradually undermine our
domestic support. Then we will be in Moscow under conditions where the
issue is still in doubt, when major military operations are going on and
our retaliatory measures are also going on. We understand that this
creates great difficulty for you, and it also creates enormous difficulty
for us. In that case, the major campaign will concern our domestic public
opinion. Now, as your Ambassador knows, we have had riots every May
since we came into office. And we have defeated them each time -- by
October people are always wearing American flags in their lapels each
time. Upper middle class students are not good revolutionaries. In America
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 19
at least, the upper middle class does not make good revolutionaries,
but they make a lot of noise. [Mr. Brezhnev laughs}
In order to defeat this domestic upheaval, especially in an election year,
we will have to go right and have to appeal to those people who normally
vote for Wallace.
In short, a little country whose heroism derives from a monomaniacal
obsession with local problems is bringing about a situation where the
whole situation is clearly developing in a direction which neither of us
wants, and which is not our preference, and which is imposed on us by
developments which we would not have chosen. This is why we are
determined to bring this issue to some sort of conclusion, either a final
one or an interim one which removes it for this year, while you and we
settle fundamental issues and while other developments take place.
We are doing this in no spirit of hostility. We are not asking for anything
other than the two objectives I mentioned to the General Secretary. And
even if we defeat the offensive we will not change our objectives.
But what I must in all honesty tell the General Secretary is that if develop-
ments continue unchecked, either we will take actions which will threaten
the summit or, if the summit should take place, we will lose the freedom
of action to achieve the objectives which we described and which are the
principal goal of our Administration.
We have read your last communication with great care, Mr. General
Secretary. We chose not to reply to the specifics because we knew we
would have an opportunity to talk. We recognize that the Soviet Union is
pursuing a principled foreign policy, and we would never ask you to betray
an ally. I also, as a professor, have studied Russian history and know that
it has not happened infrequently that certain sentiments of loyalty are put
before tactical considerations. That's not the worst trait a country can
have. All I can say is that we are prepared to deal with the issue with a
spirit of generosity, fairness and broad-mindedness, and we hope this
lays the basis for the development of U.S. -Soviet relations which will be
a historic departure.
Mr. General Secretary, I am sorry to have spoken at such length, but as
a former professor it seems that my internal clock is geared to 50-minute
presentations.
Ambassador Dobrynin: Fifteen minutes or fifty minutes?
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 20
Mr. Kissinger: Fifty minutes.
Mr. Brezhnev: No, I think that is all to the good because I do want to
gain a better understanding of the way in which President Nixon and his
Administration in general views the prospects for all these problems.
After all, it is the United States and not the Soviet Union which is conducting
this war in Vietnam.
(Mr. Brezhnev takes a document from Mr. Aleksandrov and reads it in
Russian. Dr. Kissinger interrupts by saying that the only thing he under-
stood was his name which happened very often.)
Mr. Brezhnev: I would like to broaden the Vietnam question in this
discussion by introducing the following matter. Can you tell us why the
U.S. suspended talks and what your view is regarding the resumption of
talks in Paris? Because after all the questions have to be resolved by
you and the Vietnamese, no one else, President Nixon and yourself. We
have been in communication with Vietnam and have received this communi-
cation today. They have advanced their views regarding the resumption
of meetings with the Americans. I have had no time to distribute this to
my colleagues and will do so whenever there is an opportunity. They have
informed our Ambassador about their position in response to the proposal
put forward by Dr. Kissinger. That is where I started reading from the
cable:
"The Vietnamese are of the view that the Vietnamese problem
must be resolved through negotiations in Paris and in no other
place and only between the Vietnamese and the Americans. In
this connection Dr. Kissinger's proposal for a confidential
meeting in Moscow is not accepted by the Democratic Republic
of Vietnam.
"The Vietnamese side continues to insist on the parallel conduct
of talks, both official and restricted, but in this case the resumption
of official talks must precede the resumption of the meetings
between Special Advisor Le Duc Tho and Dr. Kissinger.
"The U. S. side has proposed first to have a restricted meeting,
and if they should yield progress to resume official negotiations.
The Vietnamese side has made its proposal regarding the date
of the resumption of the official negotiations, that is April 27.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE /EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 21
The restricted meeting could then take place on May 6,
but the U.S. side is free to make its own proposal as regards
that date.
"If the U.S. side should state its readiness to hold the 148th
meeting of the Paris talks on the 27th, Special Advisor Le Duc Tho
could without delay fly to Paris. On April 20, instructions have
been sent to Minister Xuan Thuy to get in touch with the U.S.
side and communicate the above to the Americans, but it is
also said that at their own discretion the Soviet comrades can
communicate this reply to Dr. Kissinger in person."
This, as I have said, I received this morning. Only I have seen it; I have
not had time to acquaint my colleagues with it. I will do it. (Mr. Brezhnev
shows the document, pointing out that only his name had been checked off
on the distribution list.)
Ambassador Dobrynin: They should have contacted you yesterday.
Mr. Kissinger: They did. I was going to tell you.
Mr. Brezhnev: I see in that cable they have instructed Xuan Thuy to deliver
this message to the U.S. side.
Mr. Kissinger: If I may point out to the General Secretary, this note, even
to the Soviet Union, and even more marked in dealings with us, contains
an attitude which we cannot accept any more. They make proposals not as
proposals but they say "must", "the U.S. must". If it is about a meeting,
it is not so bad perhaps but it is impossible for proposals of substance; then
it takes on an ultimate non-like character. And in negotiations they always
take the attitude, even in private talks, as if I were a student taking an
exam on the adequacy of my understanding of their proposals. They never
answer my proposals.
But I will then give an answer to the question you gave me, Mr. General
Secretary, and will then give you our answer to this part of it.
Mr. Brezhnev: I wanted to add something.
Mr. Kissinger: The General Secretary asked me why we suspended talks
on March 23. I would be glad to answer his question if he wants. First of
all, Mr. General Secretary, there have been 147 plenary sessions which
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
IP MIP
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 22
have settled absolutely nothing, not one thing of even the most minor
kind. Indeed, it seems to be the North Vietnamese strategy to demonstrate
no progress in negotiations in order to maximize our domestic difficulty.
Let me talk about specifics here. Since this is not a public forum, I can
tell you absolutely honestly how the sequence of events came about.
Mr. Brezhnev: Perhaps we can take a ten-minute break and give the
interpreters a break, a breather.
(There followed a 20-minute break during which the two parties walked
around outside. 2:25 p.m. - 2:45 p.m.)
Mr. Brezhnev: So how will you deal with this proposal of whether to resume
the Vietnam talks or not to resume them? What is to be done, in short?
Mr. Kissinger: I don't insist ? does the General Secretary want an answer
as to why we suspended talks? It is up to him.
Mr. Brezhnev: Of course, I want to hear everything you want to tell me.
Mr. Kissinger: Then I will give an answer to his question. First, as I
already pointed out with regard to the plenary sessions, there have been
147 without any results. Now let me give the General Secretary the sequence
of events of recent months. I am doing it from memory, so my dates may
be off by a day or two, but they are generally correct.
On February 15 (sic) North Vietnam proposed to us a private meeting for
anytime after March IS. On February 18 (sic) we accepted this and
proposed a date of March 20. The reason we proposed March 20 was
because for reasons of secrecy, we always do it on a weekend, so we did
it for the first weekend after March 15. On February 29, the North
Vietnamese accepted the date of March 20.
Mr. Brezhnev: Some tea?
Mr. Kissinger: That would be good.
On March 7, they cancelled the meeting of March 20 and proposed instead
April 15. They said we had bombed between March 2 and March 6, and
also February 19 and 20. The first dates we had bombed, but this preceded
the acceptance of our dates so they were irrelevant; they were 10 days
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
IP 1111
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 23
before the acceptance of the date. The second date, it was a lie. We
had not bombed; it was just an excuse.
On March 13, we accepted to meet in April, but we proposed April 24.
The reason we proposed April 24 was that I had already agreed, as you
know, to go to Japan the weekend of April 15, so we suggested the first
weekend after my return from Japan.
To this they didn't reply. When they had not replied for ten days, we
suspended the plenary sessions. We saw no sense in plenary sessions
when they were playing games with the private sessions, and we were
making no progress on plenary sessions. We suspended on March 23,
ten days after we accepted their date and had received no reply.
On March 27 . . .
Mr. Brezhnev: Please eat up. You will certainly have to report back to
the President.
Mr. Kissinger: On March 27, the North Vietnamese accepted the date of
April 24. As soon as they accepted the date, we notified them that we would
return to the plenary sessions on April 13. We told them, in other words,
that we would return to the plenary sessions, not because of their offensive
but because they accepted the private meeting. The offensive had not
started, or we didn't understand that it had started. So then the offensive
had started, and so we cancelled the plenary meeting, but we maintained
our willingness to go to the private meeting. They cancelled the private
meeting again, and now we are playing children's games.
But the basic issue isn't this. We are prepared to find a solution as to how
to have plenary and private sessions concurrently. We can probably tomorrow
make a concrete proposal to you as to how we can do this because that is
a subsidiary issue.
Mr. Brezhnev: You have not yet arrived at a final decision on that?
Mr. Kissing_er: I will let you know tomorrow. I have an idea. I will let
you know exactly what we propose to do. Because we just got their message
and I want to think about it a little more.
Mr. Brezhnev: I was too late in communicating it to you.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Mr. Kissinger: No, it was really simultaneous.
24
The real issue is this. First, it is now obvious that they used this private
meeting really in order to deceive us about their offensive. It is clear to
us that they scheduled the private meeting to happen some period after
their offensive started, and when their offensive was delayed they always
delayed the private meeting.
But we will leave that aside. There is a more fundamental point. (The
Soviet side holds brief discussions among themselves.)
But a more fundamental point is this. The North Vietnamese for four
years now have pursued the tactics of selling us talks for concessions.
They have done it with great skill. But they have to understand now, as
far as we are concerned,the party is over. We are not interested in talks.
We are interested in results. I like Mr. Le Duc Tho. He is a most
impressive man, but the reason I want to see him is not for the pleasure
of his company, but to have some concrete results. All their communi-
cations always talk as if it is a favor to see us and act as if a private
meeting is a special concession to us.
So we have two requirements. The first is that the meeting cannot take
on May 6; first, because I am occupied on that day and secondly, because
that is too late, as I told your Ambassador. May 2 is the latest date I
can attend and on which private talks still make sense. But we will make
a proposal as to how to bring this about.
Mr. Brezhnev: As they write in their message, the American side is free
to make their own proposal with regard to a date.
Mr. Kissinui: That is why I think it is a solvable problem, and I will make
a concrete proposal tomorrow, but the second point is more important.
Mr. Brezhnev: It is an easier decision to make than the decision to bomb.
Mr. Kissinger: Bombing is very painful for us. In your own experience,
when a leader has necessities and a country has necessities, he must take
painful steps which he doesn't like to do. I have told your Ambassador
socially that when you have acted,' have been impressed that you have done
so massively, without looking back. These were observations that I made
as a historian; it doesn't have anything to do with a specific situation.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 25
But I agree with you, Mr. General Secretary, we can solve this problem.
(During this time Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko exchanged animated
words.)
Mr. Brezhnev: You can hear what I said. You were evidently hinting at
Czechoslovakia. I see you are a very astute lecturer.
Mr. Kissinger: And you a very good debater. But as your Ambassador
can tell you, Mr. General Secretary, I made the comment to him at the
time in a spirit of understanding, in a complimentary way, not critically.
(Ambassador Dobrynin explains to Mr. Brezhnev.)
The second point I wanted to make . . .
Mr. Brezhnev: You availed yourself of that opportunity to make a point;
because I jokingly wanted to divert you from the subject you immediately
seized on it. That is a diplomatic strategy. Although at first you said you
were not a diplomat, I see that that is not so. You are just doing it as a
diversionary tactic so you were starting an attack on me. So then it is
a matter of a counterattack on my side. So you resorted to your lecturing
tactic. So I resorted to my experience in war, though my true nature is
that of a very peaceful man.
Mr. Kissinger: The General Secretary is an expert at flanking maneuvers.
Mr. Brezhnev: War can teach you anything -- flanking maneuvers and mounting
frontal attacks. You weren't actually in the war, were you?
Mr. Kissinger: First, I was in the infantry, and then I was in intelligence.
Mr. Brezhnev: That's something I experienced from beginning to end. The
Soviet people, our people, did too.
Mr. Kissinger: It was a very heroic effort.
Mr. Brezhnev: It was an awesome thing.
Mr. Kissinger: Yes.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
, No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 26
Mr. Brezhnev: Our people are still, very sensitive to matters related to
that, and it is really something that no amount of propaganda can dull,
particularly since the generation that really fought the war is still living.
There are still hundreds of thousands of war victims, invalids, still living.
There are still millions of families who lost their dear ones in the war --
their mothers, their fathers and brothers.
Mr. Kissinger: The casualties, the deaths of the Soviet people were
unbelieveable.
Mr. Brezhnev: Entire generations of modern society have been affected ?
by the war or the results of the war.
Mr. Kissinger: Our people did not suffer anything the way you people did.
We didn't have nearly the casualties and none of the devastation.
Mr. Brezhnev: I am sure, God forbid, if your people had had to suffer
anything like the Russian people did, the post-war American foreign policy
would have been different. The average American is just not familiar with
this, has not gone through this, and his mind Is conditioned entirely
differently.
Mr. Kissinger: Except in the South, where they had an experience with
tradegy, most Americans have not experienced this.
Mr. Brezhnev: I have just developed this a little bit now. It is certainly not
a time when anyone or any people can welcome anything like what happened
before. It would do no one any good. The world is moving away from all
such concepts. And particularly with the development of civilization, the
raising of educational standards and the independent-mindedness of social
groups is growing, especially working people. The opposition to war is
mounting constantly every-where. In these circumstances it is hard for
anyone to 'justify a possible war in any way. And particularly if the clouds
of world war, or even the prospect of anything like that, drives fear into
the hearts of all people. They gird their loins to oppose such a possibility
and any proposal of that sort breeds in the people a desire to rise in self-
defense to oppose that. Perhaps these are invisible factors, but they are
a very powerful force, and something that each of us must be alive to.
This is just an aside. I am sure we all. understand it equally well. When
we do talk about military action, it is something that must be borne in mind.
TOP SECRET /SENSITIVE/ EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 27
That is particularly so for you historians -- any war has always left
a trace on human history. Conclusions have been drawn, and the wars,
of course, more recently have taught people of all the world very
important lessons. This is one digression which I wanted to make.
Mr. Kissinger: It is very important, because the overriding consideration
must be to avoid confrontation and improve the general prospects for
peace in the world.
Mr. Brezhnev: (Gesturing with his hand.) I vote for that. Our people
and our Party are wholeheartedly in favor of that, and I also mention this
because we will certainly spend as much time as possible on it in our
talks with President Nixon. This topic is bound to come up.
Mr. Kissinger: The preservation of peace.
Mr. Brezhnev: We must find principles on which to base our relationship
in this regard. It is always better to discuss this in man-to-man talk than
to set it down on paper, because, for example, if the Politburo had asked
me to write out exactly what I intended to tell Dr. Kissinger, I would have
been hard-pressed because I don't know how the talks would develop, and
how we would get along. As it turns out, these are frank and free discussions.
We do have a chance to put forth views, to speak from the heart. And that
is how it will go with President Nixon: talk about the prospects of peace.
It is wrong to formally set out positions, to abstract oneself from the
overriding problem of peace and the prospect of developing bilateral relations.
Perhaps we will not write down all that we discuss. The mere fact that we
talked about it and nodded to each other in a friendly way might sometimes
be even more important than what is written on a piece of paper.
I am again saying this because as I see it, the talks you will have here will
perhaps be more than one-half the discussions at the summit meeting.
After all if we can reach mutual understandings -- the problems we discuss
with President Nixon when he comes -- you can convey the substance to
President Nixon and then we won't have need to cover the same ground if
agreement is already reached. We will spend less time on these subjects.
Mr. Kissinger: But more time on broad perspectives.
Mr. Brezhnev: Yes, and we can then spend time on more specific and
concrete things.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: K-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 28
?Mr. Kissinger: I agree, Mr. General Secretary, that peace is not a
piece of paper but an attitude. One of the more important things that
could come out of the meeting is that, without formal obligation, we
would ask ourselves what the General Secretary thinks. And then this
rapport between the two leaders would mean that they take each other
seriously even without written commitment.
Mr. Brezhnev: I certainly have no intention of arguing with Mr. 'Nixon
about whose kitchen is better, the U.S. manufacturer or the Russian one.
(Mentions name of Soviet factory.)
Mr. Kissinger: This will not occur.
Mr. Brezhnev: Undoubtedly.
Mr. Kissinger: To get back to Vietnam, to our two difficult allies.
Assuming we solve the problem of the sequence of plenary and private
meetings, then the problem is what happens at the private meeting. We
will not be satisfied simply with the presence of Mr. Le Due Tho, much
as I enjoy his company. We will come up with some formula for that
prestige issue which we will settle.
Mr. Brezhnev: Parallel talks. It's really a procedural matter which one
shouldn't fight over.
Mr. Kissinger: We will make a concrete proposal which we find acceptabel,
and we think they will find acceptable. And what must happen at this
meeting or very shortly afterward is either a final settlement of the war,
which is probably not possible, or a definite reduction in the violence which
Will be guaranteed at least for a substantial period of time, say through
the period of this year. If this reduction of violence is achieved, we will,
of course, be prepared to reduce our activities and remove some of our
reinforcements that we have sent out.
Mr. Brezhnev: You have been sending in some reinforcements in certain
quantities? Troops?
Mr. Kissinger: We have sent in substantial amounts of air and navy.
Mr. Brezhnev: Mainly Air Force?
Mr. Kissinger: And Navy.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY 29
Mr. Brezhnev: Marines?
Mr. Kissinger: We have sent in Marine Air Force. We have not yet sent
in ground forces. I can only repeat, Mr. General Secretary, as a state-
ment of objective fact, that if we are confronted with a continuation of
major military operations, first we will have to take very drastic military
steps, but secondly we will have to depend on people domestically that
we would rather not choose to work with. So as I said, we have two
problems -- one the sequence of meetings, and second to bring about at
least an interim result to the meetings.
Mr. Brezhnev: Well, as I understand the position of our Vietnamese
Comrades, they too are prepared to resume the Paris negotiations and
also seem to agree to the holding of a private meeting. The question is
which comes before which.
Mr. Kissinger: That we will resolve.
Mr. Brezhnev: It should not be a stu.mbling?block when dealing with
the all-important issue of war. In any negotiations, for example on matters
of commerce and trade, people also barter and agree on sequence of steps
to take and there is sometimes haggling. But in matters relating to war,
resumption of negotiations, particularly as far as a private meeting is
concerned, should not be affected by the prestige of either side.
Mr. Kissinger: We will make a concrete proposal tomorrow and solve the
problem, even though we have been trying to set up a meeting since March 15
and our confidence in North Vietnam is not exactly overwhelming. We agree
with the General Secretary on which comes first. We will make a proposal
tomorrow, and I think you will find it reasonable. We won't treat it as a
prestige question. What is important is what happens at the meeting. This
is a matter of great importance.
Mr. Brezhnev: Well, as I see it Dr. Kissinger will have the appropriate
powers to conduct constructive discussions with Le Duc Tho.
Mr. Kissinger: Yes, but will Le Duc Tho?
Mr. Brezhnev: That honestly I can't say. Well, that will probably depend
in some measure on the proposal you come up with tomorrow and on what
you want us to convey.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
30
Mr. Kissinger: Our proposal tomorrow will only be procedural, how
to get the talks started.
Mr. Brezhnev: But you probably have some plan in your mind as to what
to endeavor to do whenever the meeting is finally organized.
(Ambassador Dobrynin to Dr. Kissinger: I just recalled what you told
me recently.)
Mr. Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, I want to be honest with you. If
North Vietnam follows their usual practice -- I don't know how they talk
to you -- but if they follow the usual practice, they have a document
with points, eight points, five points, etc., and each point says "you must."
Then I say something, and they say you are not yet "concrete." Not being
"concrete" means that we do not agree with them. If I accept one of their
points, they say now I am concrete, and we go to the next point. In other
words, they give a series of ultimatums. This will under no circumstances
be acceptable. If this process is maintained, we will act unilaterally, at
whatever risk to whatever relationship. I say this not as a threat but as our
objective policy so that there is no misunderstanding.
I can give you tomorrow, if you are prepared to consider it, our idea of
what steps should be taken this year to reduce the level of violence without
giving up principles. I can give it to you tomorrow. If they proceed in normal
fashion, it will be a very difficult session.
Mr. Brezhnev: Just by way of putting some lining in there at that point, let
me comment that sometimes Americans find life too dull. Rock and roll is
dull, and there are no domestic problems, so let's start a war in Vietnam.
Mr. Kissinger: With the most difficult people in the world.
Mr. Brezhnev: Now you complain. That was just an aside. Later certainly
we will set out our views in detail on the Vietnam problem as a whole. But
go on.
Mr. Kissing_er: I said essentially what I have to say. As I said, there are
two problems. First, the start of the talks on which we will make a proposal
tomorrow and which is soluble. Second, how to make the talks fruitful in
a brief period of time. On that we could make some suggestions. I would be
glad to have your ideas.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
IP IP
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
31
It is a matter not only of Vietnam but a question really of the whole
international situation. If it is not resolved, events will happen domestically
and internationally -- and basically for nothing. We don't want to stop there;.
we want to get out. You don't want to go in. For us to run the risk of a
conflict in an area where neither of us have any vital interests left would
be an historical absurdity.
Mr. Brezhnev: On Vietnam we will certainly continue our discussion
tomorrow, perhaps in the context of concrete considerations and observations.
We will be ready tomorrow to listen to any proposal you can state, and perhaps
something practical will result. On the whole I would like to say that we would
favor that. Of course, it's a very complex problem. I don't want to delve into
the history of the Vietnam conflict except to say that it was not ourselves who
started the war. It is the United States who started the war, the U.S. who
intensified it when Kosygin visited Vietnam. Of course, the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam is a socialist country, and we fulfill our international
duty of solid support for a socialist country. We make no secret of our
support for the victims of aggression and the people who uphold independence
and freedom.
What is the United States defending in Vietnam? It doesn't matter anyway.
I doubt anyone would understand that the United States is truly defending that
country. The war has been going on eight years, but for what sake? For
what sake is money being squandered, for what sake are so many Americans
being killed and thousands of Vietnamese? Has the war brought the United
States anything positive? Surely nothing. For eight years this shameful
war brought on the United States nothing but the wrath of the peoples. We
did not engineer it. It is not something we are engaged in or directly
involved. It is people's feelings corning to the surface. You know better
than we the strong protests in the world against the war raging in Vietnam.
This evokes all over cries of imperialism all over. All this is on. the
shoulder's of the present United States Government. Certainly this is a
subject that you know better than we. Bombing is not a solution to any
problem. Bombing will not solve the problem. It never has. Sometimes
it will soften the opposition, then again there will be new fighting. Then
what if there is another period of bombing, surely that is not the path for the
United States to win new glory in the world.
If we take the situation today, the bombing at this time has particular
consequences because it takes place at a time when we are preparing
major steps forward to improve the world climate through the summit meeting
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
32
between the leaders of our two countries. This will be a meeting which
has significance not only from our point of view but great significance in
the view of all public opinion. In the meetings we hope to affect the attitude
of the world and attract the sympathy of the people all over the world to
such decisions as we might take during the meeting.
I certainly don't think that the bombing at this time will help President
Nixon get elected. I know he wants to have a successful election. We
take no position in any way to prevent his re-election. That is why we
are going to the summit meeting at this particular time -- surely on our
part this is the best assistance to the President. The best policy is for
both of us to look at the problem from the standpoint of casting aside all
negative things and for an attitude on all positions that will help ease and
resolve this problem.
From some remarks that you made I tend to draw the conclusion that
you feel we are in part to blame for the escalation of the fighting, for the
offensive in Vietnam. Surely you do not dispute that you are fighting, not
we. Is this your method of bringing certain indirect pressures to bear
upon us? I feel that both perhaps President Nixon and yourself have been
misled and deluded in this regard. There are certain forces in the world
who by their activity try somehow to obstruct the American-Soviet summit
meeting. They would be very gleeful and would gloat to see the Chinese
meeting come off while with the Soviet Union no meeting would come off.
We take a very firm decision about the meeting with the United States --
we are taking no steps to prevent it, but it is not easy.
As regards Soviet assistance in Vietnam, I wish to say very clearly
and openly that in the recent period there have been no additional agree-
ments with regard to Soviet supplies, and I am sure you are aware that
throughout the history of the Vietnam war we have nothing to do with the
planning of the war. This is up to the North Vietnamese themselves. They
never ask us to take part in the planning or ask for our acceptance. They
know about wet and dry seasons. They know when to act in war.
Mr. Kissinger: They know too well.
Mr. 'Brezhnev: I for one, never having been there, would not have the slightest
idea when things are best.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 33 ?
Mr. Kissinger: It took me two years to learn the rainy and dry seasons,
because every region is different.
Mr. Brezhnev: And secondly, I take the sequence of events that preceded
the offensive. President Nixon travelled to Peking and before he visited
Peking Chou En-lai went to Hanoi and there was no offensive.
Mr. Kissinger: I thought that was after his visit.
Mr. Brezhnev: No, before.
Mr. Kissiner: I get it.
Mr. Brezhnev: There was no offensive during President Nixon's visit to
China. Then after his visit Mr. Chou. En-lai went again and then came the
offensive.
Take a look at the Chinese press concerning Vietnam. It is now saying
that the Soviet Union is now rendering immense assistance to Vietnam. They
never said this before. They always said that our assistance was negligible.
Now in one month's time all has changed in the Chinese press. And what is
more, the American opposition press is writing in unison with the Chinese
press. They too are writing that the Soviet Union has given North Vietnam
such great assistance, not only to overrun South Vietnam but to go as far
as India. That certainly shows that both the Chinese and opposition press
are writing in parallel. They are acting to prevent, to block the summit
between the Soviet Union and the United States.
I mention all this and list all the arguments because I feel they are weighty
proof in opposition to what you said concerning Soviet arms in the offensive.
Before our meeting, because of the continued talk aba ut Soviet weapons and
planning in Vietnam, I asked my people to draw up a special list of all
weapons sent to Vietnam during recent years. I have it before me. Look
at it. It definitely concludes that it is certainly not the Soviet Union who
has organized the latest offensive in Vietnam. It is not the right time
to show it to you. But you would see the point. It proves whether the
Soviet Union is instrumental or not in organizing the offensive.
I say also that you should bear in mind that powerful forces in the
world are cut to block the summit meeting. It certainly would be quite
a big gift to the Chinese if the meeting did not come off. It would only
help China.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
34
(Dr. Kissinger, noticing that Mr. Brezhnev is standing up, comments
that he did not wish to keep him from his next appointment. Mr. Brezhnev
looks at his pocket watch and indicates he still has time.)
I don't know whether President Nixon and yourself grasp Chinese
philosophy. It is certainly centuries old and goes back in age. But
China today, the country, does not really have a principled policy of its
own, no consistency. First they took advantage of the international
Communist movement to build hegemony. On other occasions they use
accusations: "Social imperialsts", they call us.
Mr. Kissinger: I thought they called you "revisionists."
Mr. Gromvko: That was in the past. They use stronger words now.
Mr. Brezhnev: "Revisionists" is old hat. They use "social Imperialists"
now. For me they have ordained an honorable death. They plan to shoot
me. Mr. Kosygin they plan to hang, and Mr. Mikoyan they will boil alive.
At least I have an honorable fate, not like Mikoyan, like those who will be
boiled alive. Just last year that country beheaded their own people, which
is what is to be expected at a time of the so-called Cultural Revolution.
It is a very strange country indeed. First, they called our assistance
negligible and now they call it tremendous. I don't know if you have studied
their minds. They are certainly beyond the capacity of a European mind
to fathom. (Mr.. Brezhnev says to Mr. Gromyko: "beyond my European
mind. ")
We are in no way against the improvement of U.S. -China relations. I
am not personally opposed, nor is the Communist Party. As I said publicly,
we regard this as a natural process, provided it is not prejudicial to the
interests of any third country. That is the position of our Party and Government.
The main thing you must understand is that nothing is accomplished by
bombing. It can only spoil the atmosphere in light of forthcoming events.
It objectively can lead to a situation where for President Nixon the trip
might be impossible, just as events might confront us with a very difficult
situation for the summit meeting.
I don't know the impact on U.S. society. That is up to you. I know
the President wants to preside over an honorable expression of your 200th
anniversary. You realize -- we don't know what kind of celebration, but it
would not be a good celebration, a happy holiday, if it comes at the time of
unfriendly relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
, No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYESTNLY 35.
Before we end the meeting, I would very much like you to convey to
President Nixon that I can confirm and reconfirm our view and the desire
of our government to have a Soviet-American summit meeting. We attach
immense importance to it. We believe it can be not only historic but
epoch-making. We believe it is in the American interest and the Soviet
interest, in the best interests of the Soviet and American peoples. We
believe both our sides can exert a beneficial influence on all world affairs.
On that I will end this meeting. We believe the main issue between
our two countries is the relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union, our two countries. To this end I would like to leave a document '
with you. It is entitled "Foundation of Mutual Relations between the United
States and Soviet Union." This is a very important document, because we
have several other suggestions about decisions that could be taken as to
the outcome of the summit meeting with President Nixon. But I will announce
this in our subsequent meetings.
This bears no relation to our previous discussions, but just last year
I found a document in Leningrad, a document drawn up in 1894 by a
certain geographer who lived near China. His name was Ma:d.mov. He
was evidently a most intelligent man, and he gives a character study on the
Chinese. I will read this later. Let me say that I don't think either your
scientific institutes or ours studying China could produce anything better
about China today. This is just a piece.
Mr. Kissinger: I would love to have it.
Mr. Brezhnev: It is just a piece of literature.
Mr. Kissinger: Could I get it?
Mr. Brezhnev: I will read it first.
It is in Russian and an unofficial translation into English. (Mr. Brezhnev
hands over the document "Foundation of Mutual Relations between the United
States and Soviet Union." to Dr. Kissinger. Attached at Tab A.)
Mr. Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we will read it with great care
and give you our preliminary reactions certainly while I am here.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
. . No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY 36
Mr. Brezhnev: We would certainly welcome any chance to reach a
preliminary understanding or a final understanding while you are here.
If you want to make it stronger, not weaker, we would welcome that. If
you weaken it, we will make a public statement and say we had a very
fine draft to improve relations on which we wanted help and wanted to adopt
it, but Dr. Kissinger was against it, and he refused it. We would go on
and say that since we were not willing to complicate relations with President
Nixon, we were forced to accept a weaker document, but the blame lies
squarely with Dr. Kissinger.
But if you strengthen the document, I will find equally strong words to
praise you. I will then say that our Foreign Minister was very poorly informed
about the conciliatory mood of Dr. Kissinger and therefore submitted a weak
document and we are indebted to Dr. Kissinger for having strengthened it.
Mr. Kissinger: We will study it with great sympathy and try to reach a
preliminary understanding.
Mr. Brezhnev: I trust you will take a serious view of it. It is a considered
proposal of our government and the Central Committee, not just a man-to-man
document.
As I said, I will not be able to give you more time today.. We can meet
tomorrow, Sunday and Monday if necessary.
Mr. Kissinger: I am prepared to stay through Monday if that turns out to be
necessary. If I don't get home by Monday night, they will all think I have
a new girl friend.
Mr. Brezhnev: That's not so bad. We hand out prizes for that, especially
concerning men as old as I. If that were to happen to me I would get a medal.
After 65, one gets the "order of the badge of honor" for one's ability.
So what do say about a meeting tomorrow?
Mr. Kissinger: Any time.
Mr. Brezhnev: I am taking into consideration the fact that your body clock
is at 5:00 in the morning.
Mr. Kissinger: No, that's okay.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
? No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Mr. Brezhnev: So I think 11:00.
Mr. Kissinger: Any time. It can be earlier.
Mr. Brezhnev: Let's aim for 11:00.
37
Mr. Kissinger: I know, Mr. General Secretary, that today is a solemn
day for you to celebrate the birth of one of the great figures in history.
I would like to extend the best wishes and the respect of President Nixon
and the American people on this occasion.
Mr. Brezhnev: Thank you very sincerely.
And I will see you tomorrow. I, for one, am satisfied with our
discussions today. I am satisfied with the frankness with which we speak
and the general method of discussing these questions. Let us try to look
back on our experience today and work better tomorrow so that the
President on no account will be angry with you, and I will not be criticized
by the Central Committee. Both of us must take that into account. Both of
us are charged with responsible duties and risk of being scolded.
Mr. Kissinger: I run a greater risk of having the President scold me
th: ) the Central Committee scold you.
Mr. Brezhnev: Perhaps. I wouldn't like you to get into hot water either.
We will in large measure affect the considerations of the President. He
has to take our opinions into account. He is not all-powerful. The two of
us will outvote him.
Mr. Kissinger: I have been pleased to meet you.
T'I1 Trr I er`l?TCVIITITT7 I VT1 T .V W.VPS ONLY
- No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
/zt
Irnofficial translation
FOUNDATIONS OF MUTUAL RELATICNS
BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
. AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the
United States of America,
Guided by the obligations assumed by them under
the Charter of the United Nations and by a desire to
strengthen relations of peace with each other and to place
them on. the firmest possible basis, in which the Soviet and
American peoples are equally interested,
Aware of the neccessity of making every effort
to prevent the threat of the outbreak of nuclear war and
to create conditions promoting detente, in the world and the
strengthening of universal security and international co-
operations
Believing that the improvement of Soviet - America
relations and their mutually advantageous development in
areas including the economic, scientific and cultural fields
will meet these objectives and contribute to better mutual
understanding and business-like co-operation, without in any
way prejudicing the interests of third countries,
Have agreed as follows:
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
. ?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
11, .2
First. The Parties will unswervingly proceed
from the recognition of peaceful co-existence as the sole
acceptable and essential basis of their mutual relations.
Differences in the socio-political structures and ideologies
of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.. are not an obstacle to the
development between them of normal international relations
based an the principles of sovereignty, equality, non
interference in internal affairs and mutual advantage.
,
Second. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. attach
'important significance to preventing the occurrence of
situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of
relations between them and will act in sucha way as not to
allow a military collision, and to preventing situations
capable of causing an aggravation of the international
situation. To these ends they will invariably display in
their mutual relations a will to negotiate and to settle
e
differences by peaceful means.
The necessary prerequisites for maintaining and
strengthening relations of peace between the U.S.S.R. and
0*.
the U.S.A. are the recognition and implementation of the
principle of the equal security of the Parties and the renoux
ciation of the use or threat of force.
Third. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. intend to
widen the legal and treaty basis of their mutual relations
and to exert the necessary efforts so that bilateral
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
1." 3 " IIP
?
agreements concluded between them and multilateral treaty
acts to which they ax,e parties are unswervingly translated
into life.
Fourth. The Parties will continue their efforts,
both on a bilateral and on a multilateral basis, with a
view to limiting armaments, particularly strategic armaments,
In those instances when this becomes possible ,concrete
agreements aimed at achieving this purpose will be concluded,
The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. consider the ultimate
objective of their efforts to be the solving of the problem
of general and complete disarmament and the ensuring of an
effective system of international security in accordance
with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Fifth. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. reaffirm
their readin6ss to continue the practice of biliieral
exchanges of views on problems of interestto them and,
where necessary, to carry out exchanges of opinions on the
highest level, including meetings between leaders of the
two countries.
The widening of contacts between representatives
of the legislative bodies of the two countries will be
encouraged.
Sixth. The Parties consider Soviet - American
trade and economic ties as an important and necessary
element in the strengthening of bilateral relations and
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
?
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06 : LOC-HAK-536-12-4-
?
- 4 -
will.actively promote the strengthening and growth of such
ties. The Parties will facilitate co-operation between the
, interested organizations and enterprises of the two countrieE
and the conclusion of appropriate agreements and contracts
between them, including long-term ones.
The Parties will contribute to the improvement
of navigation and air communication between the two countries
Seventh. The Parties consider it topical and
useful to develop with one another contacts and co-operation
in the field of science and technology.
Where suitable, matters of concrete co-operation
'between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. in the above-mentioned
Lie] ds will be regulated by appropriate agreements7the76a67_
:O1iisi6n7of' which Will be-enCoUre.:ged-blhe..Parties.
Eighth. The Parties reaffirm their intention to
deepen ties with one another in the field of culture and to
widen possibilities for the fuller famitratisation Of each ,
other with their cultural values. The Parties consider
their objective to be to facilitate the creation, of appropri-
ate conditions for cultural exchanges 'andtourism. NO,
Ninth. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. will seek
to ensure that the ties and co-operation between them on
all the above-mentioned lines, and on other lines which will
correspond to their mutual interests, are built on a firm
and long-term basis.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9 .
- 5 -
?
Tenth. The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. do not claim
for themselves and do not recognize the claims of anyone
else to any special rights or advantages in world affairs.
The development of Soviet - American relations
is not directed against third countries and their legitimate
interests.
Eleventh. The provisions set forth in this. . .
(name of the document) do not affect the obligations with
regard to third countries earlier assumed by the U.S.S.R.
and the U.S.A.
Twelfth.
Each Party will take all the necessary
measures to ensure conditions fully corresponding to the
norms and customs of international law for the functioning
on its territory of the diplomatic and other accredited
missions of the other Party.
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
,"7t
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
ILLEGIB
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
ILLEGIB
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/12/06: LOC-HAK-536-12-4-9
ILLEGIB