SADAT'S CONCERN ABOUT LIBYA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-539-4-3-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: February 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 12, 1975
• Content Type: MEMO

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10$,002 49 25X1
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Intelligence Memorandum
Libyan-Soviet Relations
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MORI/CDF
Pages 8-27
C02858034
June 25, 1975
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NoD Dbkm A br
Background Use Onl ontrolled Dissem
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
Additional Warning
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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June 25, 1975
Libyan-Soviet Relations
Introduction
The relationship that has developed between Libya and the Soviet Union
during the last year adds a new and potentially dangerous element to the Middle
East equation. Soviet military assistance and diplomatic attention has enhanced
President Qadhafi's ability to promote radical causes in the Arab world. It may also
encourage him to expand his activities in such diverse places as Ethiopia and the
Philippines. Of immediate concern is the unsettling effect Libyan-Soviet cooperation
is having on Egypt, and the possibility that this may ultimately hinder progress in
peace negotiations.
Soviet-Libyan relations have broader implications for the Mediterranean area
and for the US. The magnitude of the most recent arms agreements-although
greatly exaggerated in most accounts-raises the possibility that Moscow will gain a
new strategic foothold in Libya. Whether Moscow is able to parlay these initial
successes into greater assets will depend on the Libyans and on Soviet ability.to treat
with them. While both sides are stjll uneasy with one another, each seems inter-
ested-if not anxious-to maintain the momentum of the recent movement toward
better relations.
This memorandum assesses the current status of the Soviet-Libyan relationship,
the motives behind it, and the direction it may take.
Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to
of the Office of Current Intelligent
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W V1. LJ. '.~..- ~ 5
Evolving Relations
The Soviets enthusiastically greeted the 1969 Libyan coup that brought
Qadhafi to power, but they soon discovered that the Libyan leader was
bitterly anti-communist and suspicious of "super power" influence in the
Middle East. Soviet overtures for closer ties were rebuffed by Qadhafi, and
the Soviets soon joined those who found him erratic, unpredictable and
irresponsible. Political ties were openly strained and characterized by frequent
ideological invective. The Libyans did buy from Moscow prior to 1974 some
$125 million in military equipment, mainly armor and other ground forces
equipment. Tripoli also sold Moscow some oil, but these deals ended when
oil prices skyrocketed in 1974.
During the last year, Libya and Moscow have begun. to move. in a new
direction. On the Libyan side, the key has been a desire to coordinate tlieik
military inventory with those of the Arab front line states. The Soviets have
wanted influence in a new corner of the Middle East and Libyan hard
currency. A commonly held antagonism to Egypt has motivated both parties
to seek better relations with each other. The Soviets also saw a chance to
gain some advantage over the US in the Arab world, particularly since the US
has been unwilling to meet Libya's minimal arms requests.
A furring point in Soviet-Libyan relations was Prime Minister Jallud's
visit to the USSR in May 1974, which led to two substantial military sales
agreements; Soviet Premier Kosygin's visit to Libya last month, the -first by a
top Soviet leader, was a follow-up to the Jallud visit. Kosygin sought to
expand military and economic dealings and establish a closer political rela-
tionship.
Kosygin's visit was only one sign of the change in a. relationship that
not long ago was fraught with misunderstanding and recrimination. Polemics
have been muted, Libya has upgraded its representation in Moscow by
replacing its charge with an ambassador, and the Soviets have established one
of their many "friendship societies" to further the idea of better Soviet-
Libyan relations. Kosygin is now letting it be known that he went home with
a changed view of Qadhafi's stability.
Nothing that happened in Tripoli, however, significantly narrowed the
substantive differences between the two countries regarding the nature of
communism, the right of Israel to exist, or the outlines of a Middle East
settlement.
- ? The Arms Accord and Nuclear Agreement
.Several days after Soviet Premier Kygin's visit to Libya in mid-May,
President Qadhafi was asked whether he still regarded Moscow as an
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imperialist, atheist state. Qadhafi glibly retorted that "he could deal with
Moscow as an equal." This naive confidence combined with Qadhafi's
deepening frustration over peace negotiations are at the root of his dra-
matic-though perhaps somewhat tentative-turn toward the Soviet Union.
Kosygin's visit to Libya and news of an expansion of a 1974 military
agreement between the two sides have given rise-especially in Egypt--to
exagge ted a orts about massive arms purchases and Soviet base rights in
Libya.
it represents a
major expansion of the military relationship between Tripoli and Moscow.
According to our preliminary estimates, the arms accords since 1974 repre-
sent nearly a one-billion-dollar commitment that may be open-ended. Mos-.
cow's commitments now do not necessarily guarantee that Tripoli will
receive all of the weapons it has requested; moreover, it would take at least.
two or three years for the transfers to be completed. If the deal is fully
carried out, however, it will provide Libya with far more equipment than. it
can possibly absorb, thus providing the Soviets an opening for increasing
their physical presence in-the area.
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The two sides have also reached a number of agreements in the
economic and scientific fields that will draw them closer together. The most
noteworthy is a preliminary accord under which the Soviets have agreed to
build a nuclear research center in Libya. This agreement-which will not be
finally concluded until the end of the year-has provisions for a small
10-megawatt research reactor-similar to those the Soviets have given Egypt
and Iraq-a training program, and advisory and coordination assistance.
Libya has ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty-presumably a con-
dition for receiving the reactor-therefore, it should come under interna
tional safeguards.
If the agreement materializes, it will not significantly advance Libya's
quest for nuclear weapons, but it will enable Tripoli to take the first halting
step toward acquiring the necessary expertise.
Soviet Military Use of Libya
One major breakthrough for the Soviets is the commitment they appear
to have won on naval access to at least some Libyan ports. Until now, the
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Libyans have restricted even rt calls; no Sov
has visited Libya since 1969. U77 the admission
of the Soviet attache in Egypt indicate this will change, but the precise
nature of the new arrangement is not clear.
Our estimate is that at this stage the Libyans, in response to Soviet
urgings, have decided to grant Moscow occasional port calls for bunkering
and replenishment and will initially attempt to keep a tight leash on the
Soviet navy. The Libyans may be dangling the prospect of greater conces-
sions in return for Soviet help in building Libyan naval facilities. So far,
however, we have detected no Soviet naval vessels in Libyan waters.
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At present, Libya does not have much to offer Moscow in the way of
significant naval facilities-particularly in comparison to the dockyard Mos-
cow uses in Alexandria. Tripoli and Benghazi are crowded commercial ports
currently under extensive renovation with limited berthing space and only
minor repair facilities. Tobruk at present has only limited berthing space and
no significant repair facilities. It does have a large natural harbor and
potential for development. (Annex I contains a detailed discussion of Libyan
and Egyptian port facilities.)
If Moscow could gain unrestricted use, currently available anchorages
and bunkering in Libya would provide a suitable alternative for all Egyptian,
ports other than Alexandria. Moscow would have to make extensive use of
its repair ships and even these would be no substitute for Alexandria.
Moscow, however, would find it difficult to maintain its current level of
deployments-particularly submarines. If the ex-US air base at at Uqba bin
Nafi (Wheelus Field) were made available, it would provide first class
facilities for Soviet naval reconnaissance and attack aircraft-which the
Soviets have not had in this area since 1972.
We have examined the possibility that Moscow may use its military
shipments to Libya to preposition substantial amounts of military equip-
ment for its own forces to use in the event of a new Middle East war. This
prospect was raised the Kosygin visit, but we think it
highly unlikely for both military and political reasons.
To date, most of the Soviet equipment delivered to Libya is in the
western art of the count near T ' no" v no evidence 0 25X1
which we would
associate with Soviet units. Nor have we had any indication of adequate
numbers of Soviet maintenance or other operational personnel in Libya to
prepare equipment for Soviet forces. We would expect Moscow to seek to
keep any prepositioned equipment at a high state of readiness, and this could
only be done by Soviet forces. The Libyans, of course, would be likely to
object to any substantial Soviet combat presence.
Libya would not be a desirable location for such a force. Tripoli 'ls
almost 1,200 difficult road miles from the Suez Canal; Tobruk is 450 miles
from Cairo. If the Soviets wanted to preposition a force in the Middle East,
it would seem more likely they would try to do so in'Syria-which is now
Moscow's closest Middle East ally. (See Annex II for a detailed discussion of
the possibility of prepositioning.)
Soviet Interests and Intentions
In responding to Libyan arms requests, the Soviets appear to have had
one eye on making a fast buck. Soviet officials have commented on the
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financial windfall opened up by Moscow's arms transactions, and certain
aspects of the sales bear the earmarks of sharp trading. The Soviets, for
example, apparently are charging Libya full price for the weaponry, in
contrast to the concessionary prices they have offered other clients. Moscow
may also be trying to trade the Libyans up to more advanced and higher
priced weapons.
Political objectives, however, were almost certainly controlling. It is
hardly coincidence that the Soviets began to make progress with Tripoli at
the same time that its relations with Egypt were becoming more difficult.
The Soviets want to put Sadat on notice that they have other options open
to them and want to contrast their military generosity in Tripoli with their
stinginess in Cairo.
While Moscow wants to send Sadat a message, there is no evidence that
the Soviets have directly encouraged Tripoli's campaign against him, and it is
doubtful that they have taken the risky step of directly colluding with._,
Qadhafi against the Egyptian president. Indeed, the comments of some
Soviet officials suggest that Moscow does not want Libyan-Egyptian. friction.
to become so bitter as to complicate its ability to maneuver between both.
Soviet efforts in Libya are also part of Moscow's more general efforts to
win a place of influence in the Middle East, and the Soviets would have
responded to overtures from Tripoli even if their relations with Cairo were
better. Closer relations with Libya enable Moscow to keep. one foot in the
camp of Arab "rejectionists." This could prove useful to the USSR if it
wants to switch- tracks and try to obstruct a Middle East settlement. In the
meantime, this threat forces the US and Egypt to give Soviet interests in a
settlement serious consideration, particularly when a new round of step-by-
step diplomacy is in prospect.
The Soviets seem to recognize, however, that they have few ideological
allies in the Libyan body politic. Furthermore, they do not overrate Libya's
political significance and certainly do not see it as an influence in the Arab
world comparable to Egypt-or even Syria or Iraq.
Libya's strategic location on the southern rim of the Mediterranean
could be of considerable advantage to the Soviet fleet if it is shut out of
Egypt. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Soviets have any expectation of
making significant use of Libya any time soon. The fact that the Libyans
inserted their usual rhetoric opposing foreign bases in the Mediterranean into
the communique ending Kosygin's visit will help keep Soviet hopes in
perspective.
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If the Soviets have gotten Libya to drop its opposition to Soviet naval
visits, however, they will be encouraged to press for more. They will
certainly seek to put their access to Libyan ports on a regular basis, similar
to what they now have in Syria.
The substantial inflow of Soviet arms into Tripoli is not without
problems for Moscow. For one thing, apprehension in Tunis has already
caused Moscow to seek to allay Tunisian concerns. It also opens Moscow to
potential Western accusations that Soviet actions destabilize the Middle
Eastern situation and violate the spirit of detente. We do not think, however,
that these considerations have given Moscow much pause.
Nor has concern over the use Qadhafi might make of Soviet weapons,
such as bombers and submarines, inhibited Moscow from promising them.
The Soviets probably are uncertain about Qadhafi's intentions. Grechko
once described him as a "madman on top of a pile of gold," and Moscow was
irritated when Tripoli gave the SA-7 to fedayeen. But Moscow is certain that
Libya cannot master all of its weapons without Soviet assistance. In any
event, the Soviets do not hold themselves responsible for the use to which
their weapons are put.
The Soviets probably recognize that the Libyans will seek to use their
arms stockpiles to influence Arab politics. It may be that Moscow thinks the
impact of arms deals on the Arabs will be positive from their point of
view-once again underscoring that only Moscow can provide the where-
.withal to challenge Israel.
The Soviets do not appear concerned over. the possibility that Libya
will transfer arms to other countries. Although the Soviets will retain a
handle through control of spare parts, ammunition, and training, the Soviet
equipment already in Libya gives Tripoli an impressive inventory. In the
event war breaks out, the Libyans would have to depend on Soviet or other
Arab air and sea transport to move rapidly substantial amounts of equip-
ment-particularly SAMs and armor-to the Arab belligerents. Furthermore,
Moscow has probably incorporated in its agreements standard clauses pro
hibiting arms transfers without Soviet consent. Moscow may think this will
give it some influence over Libyan attempts to send arms to other Arabs.
Qadhafi's Motives
President Qadhafi, who once offered Egypt generous inducements to
expel the Soviets, is now expanding his own ties with Moscow for political
purposes that apparently transcend his. anti-communist convictions. We do
not believe Qadhafi has softened his ideological opposition or lost his basic
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distrust of the Soviets; on the contrary, his contempt for them may ulti-
mately disrupt the liaison. His motives are more opportunistic, stemming
mainly from his desire to challenge Israel, its supporters, and those Arab
leaders willing to accept a negotiated settlement.
Qadhafi believes negotiating with Israel is dangerous and doomed to
eventual failure. He, therefore, wants a well-equipped arsenal, which must be
Soviet-made to augment those of Arab nations that will fight a war he
believes is inevitable. In the meantime, he plans to use his newly acquired
weapons to unnerve Israel and to try to block peace negotiations. In this
campaign, President Sadat and Egyptian policy are his primary targets.
Qadhafi hopes that a large flow of Soviet weapons into Libya will
create unrest in the Egyptian military-based on envy and fear-and thus put
pressure on Sad at to alter his negotiating stance. The Libyans are aware that
some of Sadat's advisers are worried about deficiencies in Egypt's military
inventory and troubled by Sadat's turn away from the Soviets. Qadhafi
intends to play on these fears and appeal to the young, pro-Nasir audience in
Egypt that he has usually been able to influence. The change in emphasis of
the Egyptian media over the last week from personalized attacks on Qadhafi
to serious consideration of his actions and their implications suggests anxiety
that his strategy will succeed.
Qadhafi also yearns to recapture the influence he had during the years
when Libya was setting the pace of Arab oil policy and planning a union
with Egypt, the most powerful country in the Arab world. In the two years
since then, Qadhafi has come to realize that his prospects are now almost
exclusively dependent on his ability to re-establish an alliance with Cairo. He
may, in fact, be hoping eventually to use Soviet arms to buy his way into
another unity project with Egypt. Qadhafi's fixation on unity with Egypt
often matches his desire to defeat Israel, and in his mind, the former may be
a necessary first step in achieving the latter.
Another unity bid is not necessarily inconsistent with Qadhafi's current
campaign against Sadat. Although the Libyan leader would prefer another
partner and is working toward that end, he has tried privately to reach a
reconciliation with Sadat, believing that the Egyptian president eventually
will .see the error of his ways.
While waiting for the right opportunity, Qadhafi might try to use his
arms to bargain for Egyptian concessions on lesser issues-a meeting with
Sadat, for example, or a firm declaration of Egyptian support for the
Palestinians.
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While we doubt that Cairo and Tripoli have a secret agreement pro-
viding for the supply to Egypt of Soviet equipment being delivered to Libya,
we do not rule out the possibility that the two
sides have discussed this question during past lulls in their feud, or that they
might in the future agree on terms for such an arrangement. We assume,
moreover, that whatever the state of his relations with Sadat, Qadhafi would
feel duty-bound to support the Egyptian military fully in the event of
renewed hostilities with Israel. He had no trouble doing so during the 1973
war, despite his fury over Sadat's rejection a month earlier of union plans,
and he is likely to give generously again.
Like most ideologues, Qadhafi can rationalize the bending of one
principle, for example, nonalignment, to serve a higher purpose-in his case,
the restoration of Arab Palestine and greater Arab unity. His swing toward
Moscow is made easier by what he sees as Washington's unresponsiveness to :
Tripoli's recent diplomatic overtures, its foot-dragging on the release of
US-manufactured and licensed arms, and its threatening posture toward Arab.
oil fields.
Whether Qadhafi fully appreciate s the risks ibecoming closet
involved with Moscow is problematical.
he has warned the Soviets that he wi no use e o er ra .
His behavior during the Kosygin visit suggests that he intends to remain
aloof, leaving the task of dealing with the Soviets primarily to Jallud, who is
more sympathetic to them. Qadhafi wants to hold the line on the number of
Soviet advisers and technicians in Libya and is willing to sacrifice efficiency
and perhaps a great deal of equipment to do so. With the deep-seated
xenophobia of the Libyan people working for him, he will continue to
isolate Soviet personnel wherever possible.
Despite this caution, the parallel between Qadhafi and his mentor,
Nasir, is striking as well as paradoxical, given Qadhafi's outspoken opposition
to Nasir's relationship with Moscow. Over the years, Qadhafi has fervently
adhered to Nasir's teachings, mimicked his tactics and style, and--perhaps
finally-lost sight of his mistakes. Unlike Nasir, Qadhafi does not need Soviet
arms for Libya's defense; moreover, he has a bargainer's financial independ-
ence. Nevertheless, the Libyan leader's brash confidence, impatience, and
near blindness to some political realities may leave him vulnerable both to
his own actions and to his new patron.
Elements in the Libyan military-the major prop of the regime-are .,
reportedly concerned about the new Soviet connection. The issue apparently
has also divided the ruling military council. Qadhafi will probably ignore
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these danger signals as he has so often ignored others in the past. If he listens
to anyone, it will probably be Prime Minister Jallud, who seems to be eagerly
identifying himself with Tripoli's new policy toward Moscow.
We see few effective constraints-other than Qadhafi's own disdain for
Moscow and tenacious sense of independence-on his policy toward the
Soviet Union.
Egyptian Anxiety
Egypt fears the Libyan-Soviet liaison. Sadat already believes that Libya
has attempted subversion in Egypt and that it was directed specifically
against him. He also knows that the Soviets would like nothing better than
to be rid of him, and he therefore fears that the coalition on his western
border increases the danger to his position.
Sadat's anxiety also extends, more significantly, to the implications of
Libyan-Soviet cooperation in the broader context of the Middle East and the
Arab-Israeli conflict. This cooperation threatens to negate Sadat's efforts to
limit Soviet influence throughout the Middle East. Sadat seems convinced
that Qadhafi is clinically insane or at best dangerously erratic. In Sadat's
view, Qadhafi's fervent nationalism and anti-communism are not enough to
ensure against the establishment in Libya of the kind of Soviet tutelage that
formerly existed in Egypt. Sadat knows from bitter personal experience the
ease with which Soviet political influence followed Soviet arms during
Nasir's rule.
We doubt
a secret Egyptian-Libyan
agreement providing for the continuing transfer to Egypt of virtually all of
the Soviet arms to be delivered to Libya. But we do not doubt that the
Egyptians asked for immediate or eventual access to Soviet arms delivered to
Libya last year. From the Egyptian standpoint, such a transfer would benefit
Egypt and in the long run hurt both Libya and the Soviets-itself a benefit
for Egypt. The Egyptians would not feel politically indebted or even .any
friendlier toward Libya; they would delight in being able to undercut the
Soviet effort to keep Egypt on a short leash as far as.arms deliveries are
concerned.
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Soviet Prospects
The course of Soviet relations with Egypt will have significant influence
on Soviet policy in Libya. The Soviets recognize that Egypt is still the
country of paramount interest and influence in the Middle East. Even if
Moscow were confident it could establish a firm footing in Libya, which it is
not, Moscow would think it a poor second to a similar relationship with
Egypt. Despite their deep problems with Sadat, the Soviets have not wanted
to force an open break and foreclose the possibility of a restoration of their .
position in Egypt. The Soviets will be given pause by Sadat's restrictions on
Soviet naval access to Egyptian ports in response to Kosygin's visit to Libya.
While it seems unlikely that they will knuckle under to this pressure, they
may want to avoid a further intensification of friction. with Sadat. This
suggests that they will go slow in developing their Libyan ties, unless
relations with Sadat go further downhill.
The recently concluded arms deal already gives Moscow more influence
than it has ever had in Libya. If Qadhafi is to make effective use of Soviet
supplied equipment, he will need more Soviet support. The reported
doubling of the number of Soviet military technicians permitted in Libya
indicates.the pressures that will be on him to increase his dependence on
Moscow. Furthermore, control of resupply, spare parts and training will give
Moscow important leverage.
But Moscow also faces powerful obstacles in Libya. Suspicion of the
Soviets is strong, and Qadhafi remains xenophobic, nationalistic, and anti-
communist. The heavy-handed Soviets have not been able to establish a good
working relationship with more moderate Arabs-much less any with
Qadhafi's volatile characteristics. The .relationship is based on opportunism.
rather than shared interests, and friction over their conflicting approaches to
a Middle East settlement can erupt at any time. Moscow must remember that
if the Libyans become dissatisfied with the Soviet performance, they have
the financial resources to send the Soviets packing and to seek alternate
sources for their essential military needs.
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Libyan Trouble-Making
Soviet cooperation with Libya may also encourage. Tripoli's adven-
turism elsewhere in the Middle East and in the Muslim world. The feda-
yeen-already beneficiaries of Libyan financial and military aid-are regarded
by Qadhafi as an important anti-Israeli instrument. Some of the Soviet -arms
going into Libya are, therefore, likely to end up in terrorist hands. A less
immediate but more ominous possibility is that Qadhafi will revive a now
moribund program for recruiting and training an Arab "liberation" army
with terrorist components. At its peak in mid-1972, this program involved
several thousand trainees from all parts of the Arab world.
Libya has already complicated Lebanon's current government crisis by
encouraging with money and weapons Lebanese leftists and radical Pales-.
tinians in their feud with conservative Phalangists. In addition, Qadhafi has
tried to promote concerted Arab pressure on Beirut to accept military
assistance in order to protect itself from Israeli incursions. Fortified with
more equipment than he can possibly use at home, Qadhafi may now try to
channel more arms to Lebanon.
The Soviet-Libyan liaison may bear less directly on Qadhafi's interests
beyond the derailment of Middle East peace negotiations. Libya's advocacy
of a specifically Islamic Arab revolution has involved political meddling,
financial aid, and in some cases low-level military support-all of which
Qadhafi is fully capable of undertaking on his own. Soviet aid may, however,
encourage Qadhafi to greater activism and enhance the allure of his ability to
provide benefits to his clients. For example, Prime Minister Jallud's threat
last week of military intervention in support of Omani rebels suggests that
Tripoli was, indeed, emboldened by Moscow's. endorsement a few weeks
earlier. We do not take these threats seriously at this stage. But, we do
expect a step-up in Libyan aid to the Dhofar rebels and their supporters in
South Yemen and an intensification of Tripoli's propaganda campaign
against Iran's military presence in the area.
? Tripoli has provided assistance to assorted other clients who may now
seek renewed or increased support.
Libya has in* the past supported Moroccan dissidents and is now
probably giving aid to one or more liberation groups in the Spanish
Sahara.
*` Muslim dissidents. in Ethiopian Eritrea have received Libyan sup-
port, which apparently has been increased since the outbreak of serious
fighting in January.
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. Libya has aided southern African liberation groups through regional
organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity.
o Tripoli has boasted about support to the Irish Republican Army,
although we have been able to confirm only one instance of Libya's
indirect involvement in an arms shipment to the outlawed group.
is in the, Philinnines have received some money and
small arms from the Libyans,
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EGYPTIAN AND LIBYAN PORT FACILITIES FOR
SOVIET NAVY USE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Alexandria is the only port providing major repair support to Soviet
naval ships in Egypt. Mersa Matruh and Port Said have limited facilities
which have provided some supplies but no repair support to the Soviet ships.
The Gulf of Sollum near the Libyan border has been used by the Soviets-
solely as an anchorage.
Alexandria has an improved natural harbor of some 1,400 acres and has
extensive commercial and naval facilities. Fuel, provisions, and water
bunkering are available, and considerable berthing and anchorage space also
are present. In addition to large commercial facilities, Alexandria is the site
of the headquarters of the Egyptian navy which has its own support and
operational facilities in the port.
Soviet navy ships use the Al Qabbari shipyard which was built by the
Soviets in the mid-sixties. It can accommodate surface ships and submarines.
Among the more important facilities are two large drydocks (850' and 550'),
marine railways which are used to move ships to one of four open building/
repair ways, a covered repair way, and extensive machine ships. Floating and
railway cranes also are available.
Port Said has extensive, unprotected anchorage space, but only limited
naval berthing. Limited amounts of fuel and water and some provisions
probably are available. Repair of the extensive damage caused by Israeli
air strikes during the 1973 war has been the major task of the Egyptian
government in this area. Few, if any, Soviet ships have been supported by
the port since the war. Port Said has no major repair facilities available for
the Soviet navy. A small Egyptian naval base is located at Port Said.
Mersa Matruh had provided limited quantities of water and perhaps
provisions for Soviet ships anchored in the Gulf of Sollum, but the port has
little else to offer, The harbor is shallow except for a small man-made
channel, and very limited berthing space, and only shallow-draft anchorages.
Little storage and no significant repair facilities are available..
LIBYA
Libya has three ports that might be used by Soviet warships, but none
has facilities approaching those at Al Qabbari in Alexandria. Indeed, except
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?U1' si (J1t.h;1 W
for anchorages and bunkering, Tripoli, Tobruk, and Benghazi could provide
little in the way of support and virtually no significant repairs.
Tripoli has an excellent natural harbor, but only limited berthing space
and protected anchorage space. Minor repairs to small craft and a variety of
floating and wharf cranes are the only repair support available. Although
Tripoli is the headquarters of the Libyan navy, it lacks any significant naval
facilities of a size comparable to those at Alexandria. Anchorage is available
outside the harbor and considerable amounts of fuel, as well as provisions
and water bunkering facilities, are also available.
Benghazi harbor encompasses about 360 acres, but has very ,limited
berthing space and no significant repair capability. Unlimited, unprotected
anchorage is available as are limited amounts of fuel, water, and provisions.
Benghazi probably could furnish more of these supplies than the Egyptian
port of Mersa Matruh, but Soviet ships would still have to rely. on auxiliaries
for maintenance.
which could be safely used for most of the year because of the relative calm
of. the sea. The size of the harbor and the, location of Tobruk make it a
better candidate for Soviet development than Tripoli. Tobruk has potential
for development, but currently has little in the way of naval facilities.
Tobruk has a large natural harbor of some 1,200 acres which has not
been developed extensively. Only limited berthing and protected anchorage
spaces are available, and virtually no significant repair facilities. Some water
and fuel are available. Extensive, unprotected anchorage space is available
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/02/15: LOC-HAK-539-4-3-6
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2011/02/15: LOC-HAK-539-4-3-6
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