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THE WFHTE HOUSE
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WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM:
The Situation Room
SUBJECT: Additional Information Items
January 17. 1q75
MORI/CDF C03220986 and C03325290 '
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Peking Sees Heightened Probability of a U.S.-Soviet War: We
now have multiple indicators that the PRC leadership -- prob-
ably Chairman Mao himself -- has made,an authoritative re-
evaluation of the likelihood of war between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union. From 1969 through 1974, Chairman Mao's slogan
relating to the possibilities of war was, "Revolution is the
main trend in the world today, but the possibility of a world
war still exists." In recent weeks, however, we have re-
ceived a number of reliable indications that Peking now sees
the real prospect of a U.S.-Soviet war developing out of a
combination of the Arab-Israeli confrontation in the Middle
,-East, the oil crisis, and the more general economic and po-
Jitical weakness in the West.
At a dinner which George Bush gave for the Foreign Minister
Ch'iao Kuan-hua on December 27, Ch'iao pointedly expressed
concern that the U.S. might use force in the Middle East in
coping with the oil crisis. Ch'iao referred to a statement
by Secretary Schlesinger that the U.S. might use force. Nbre
25X1 recently, of course, has been the press play of your Business
Week interview of January 13. /
as of early January PRC Party cadre were
being brieted on China's concern about the increasing possibility
of an outbreak of world war precipitated by the present eco-
nomic crisis in the West. The briefing cited statements by
you that the U.S. might have to resort to a military occupa-
tion of Arab countries to deal with the oil problem.
Paralleling these non-public expressions of concern have been
a series of public statements and press articles predicting
the heightened prospects for a war initiated by either the
U.S. or the Soviet Union. Ch'iao Kuan-hua referred to both
the U.S. and Russians as the source of war in a toast for
the visiting Dutch foreign minister on January 3. On January
8 an km ortant People's Daily article noted that, the rivalry
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between the two hegemonic powers, the Soviet Union and the
United States, is getting sharper and sharper and is creating
the threat of a new war." The article urged the Third World
to maintain its unity and persist in the struggle against the
two superpowers. Most recently, a broadcast by Peking Radio
on January 12 asserts that "the peril of a new war is brewing"
because of acute contention between the two superpowers.
We assume that behind these private and public statements is
an authoritative re-evaluation of the evolving world scene.
Such a line is likely to be formally expressed in the docu-
ments from the present session of the National People's Con-
gress. The key question for our relations with Peking is
whether this heightened sense of the danger of war will incline
the PRC to pull back from its dealings with us (as the People's
Daily article implies) or whether Peking will hold to its
present course with us as a way of deterring the Soviets. This
is a question which will be answered, in part, by our dealings
with Peking and by our actions in the Middle East and else-
where as they imply a willingness to stand up to Soviet pres-
sures, or as they might cause Peking problems in dealing with
its Third World friends -- as would be the case with a use of
force against an Arab state.
The dynamic of our relations with Peking after the Vladivostok
summit suggests that when our relations with Moscow seem to be
improving, Peking wants to maintain their relationship with
us to avoid being isolated. It remains to be seen whether the
reverse of this argument is true -- that a period of increasing
U.S.-Soviet tensions, as we are now experiencing, will lead
the Chinese to back off from us out of fear of being drawn into
a soviet-American war. All that one can say at this point is
that private statements by senior PRC officials-such-as Chou
En-1a3. and Ch'iao Ruan-hua in the past several weeks imply
a desire to maintain their present course with the U.S. (Solon?
Peking Finally Schedules a Visit to the U.S. by its Foreign.
Trade Council: PRCLO yesterday informed Chris Phillips, head
of the National Council for U.S.-China Trade, that the Coun-
cil's counterpart organization, the China Council for the
Promotion of International Trade, will send a delegation to
the U.S. in either August or September of this year. - The -
CCP/T visit had been scheduled for 1974, but the Chinese
postponed the visit last year. The fact that they have now
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agreed to go forward with the trip -- along with the anticipated
visit to the U.S. in 1975 of the Committee on Scholarly Com-
munications's counterpart organization, the China Scientific
and Technical Association -- means that Peking is now actively
moving ahead in a number of exchange areas to project its
presence into the U.S. This should help to deflate media
speculation about problems in U.S.-PRC relations. (Solomon)
PRC Liaison Office Chief Huang Chen Now Returning to Washington=
PPCLO informed the Department yesterday that Ambassador Huang
Chen will be leaving Peking shortly and will arrive in Hono-
lulu on January 18. He will remain, there for a few days be-
fore traveling on to Washington.
The one puzzling aspect of Huang's return is that appears to
be occurring while the National People's Congress is still in
progress. Huang was a delegate to the third session of the
NPC back in 1964, and we have presumed that he was remaining
in Peking to attend the current fourth session. It is not
necessarily the case that Huang is a delegate to the present
session, and thus he might be free to return even though the
meetings are proceeding. Another possibility, however, is
that the current NPC session will be quite brief, and that
Huang will depart Peking in the next day or two when the
meetings are completed. A third possibility is that while
Huang is a delegate he is not staying for the entire session.
We will know more about his relation to the NPC when the
formal name list and the dates of the Congress session are
made public. (Solomon)
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*MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
NSC review completed pages 4-6
URGENT
INFORMATION
January 27, 1975
SECRETARY KISSINGER
RICHARD H. SOLOMON
Is the Period of Immobilism in Peking
Over? Some Comments on the Current
State of U.S.-'PRC Relations
? A nuiriber of recent developments suggest that with the conclusion of
the National People's Congress (NPC) in Peking earlier this month,
the air of immobilism in the ?RC's leadership which we have sensed
for some time is now dissipating. The Chinese have taken a number
of steps in their dealing with us in recent days which suggest an interest
in moving ahead in developing a more active and visible relationship.
At the same time, the campaign of stimulated press sniping about dis-
satisfaction in Peking with the state of U.S.- PRC relations seems to
have been turned off.
This memorandum highlights the indications of a change in mood in
Peking.
Publicizing President Ford's Letter of Congratulations to Premier Chou
The Foreign Ministry called John Holdridge today and asked for permis-
sion on an urgent basis to publish the text of President Ford's letter of
congratulations to Chou En-lai upon his reappointment as Premier by
the NPC. A few hours after this permission was cabled to USLO, the
text of the letter was released to the public by NCNA. It may only be
accidental that the Chinese asked for this "urgent" permission and re-
leased the President's letter on the second anniversary of the signing of
the Paris Agreement on Vietnam, but my own sense is that Peking
wanted to give some visibility to the fact that its relations with the U.S.
have gone beyond the Vietnam stage -- or hope that they have. One can
speculate about how they would like this letter to be read in Hanoi, or
Moscow, but it does seem clear that Peking wants to give heightened
visibility to its relationship with Washington.
State Dept. review completed pages 4-6
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Publication of the Ford letter may also be intended by Peking as a sign
to the U.S. that in the wake of the NPC it is in a position to move ahead
more actively in its dealing with us, and maybe able to give Sino-
American relations greater visibility now that its contentious leadership
meetings are over. (In this regard, I might mention that a review of
your discussions with Teng Hsiao-p'ing last November gives the clear
impression that Teng did not want to get off into any detailed discussion
of the normalization issue. Indeed, he seemed almost relieved to be
able to go on to other subjects.)
Chou En-lai Back in the Action?
-
Another implication of publication of the Ford letter is that Premier
?Chou is back in a more visible leadership role. This development, of
course, was more directly suggested by Chou's reappointment as Pre-
mier, despite his illness, and by his more active pattern of public
appearances in the last three weeks. Indeed, I have a sense which is
more intuitive than documentable that much of the "sour" quality of our
dealings with Peking in 1974 was as much attributable to the predominant
role of the dour Teng Hsiao-psing in foreign policy matters a s to the
domestic political campaign. If Chou has indeed reasserted himself
more actively in the leadership process in the context of the NPC this
may now be evident in a new atmosphere more consistent with the
Premier's personal style.
The Press Sniping Alvea s to Have Ended
Another sign that the "old Chou" approach to dealing with the 13 . . may
be reasserting itself is the apparent drying up of the stimulated cam-
paign of press sniping which we saw begin at about the time of your
November trip to Peking. Since Phil lla.bibis December 24 demarche
to Han Hsu on this subject, there has been sufficiently noticeable a shift
in the tone of PRC public and semi-public statements on the U.S. and
5/no-American relations
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Moving Ahead with Exchanges
-9
Another sign that Peking may be taking steps to pump life into its rela-
tions with us is that in the past two weeks PRC trade organizations have
informed the National Council for U.S.-China Trade that the long-delayed
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visit of its counterpart organization, the China Council for the Promo-
tion of International Trade, will take place later this year (in August
or September), and that they will be sending a delegation of specialists
to the U.S. in late February to survey the textile market. This is the
first such industry-oriented delegation that Peking has sent to the U.S.
(Because of the political sensitivities for us in the textile problem, Bob
liormats and I are working with State, Commerce, and the National
Council for U.S.- China Trade to structure the visit of this delegation
so that it doesn't set off domestic and international textile producers,
and does not alienate the Chinese through a simple recitation of our
problems with textile imports.)
In sum, at the moment there seem to, be a. number of signs that Peking
wants to move ahead with the U.S. in a positive direction. The only
question about this trend -- if it is sustained -- is whether it will
create more of a sense of momentum than suits your sense of timing
or that of the President.
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MEMORANDUM OP
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: The Situation Room
SUBJECT: Additional Information Itns
antary 30 1975
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PRC Leaders Eagerly Await Ford Visit: On June 2, Vice Premier
Teng Hsiao-ping told a delegation of American newspaper editors
that he welcomed President Ford's forthcoming visit "whether
he has anything substantial to discuss or not." Concerning
the problem of Taiwan, Teng said the U.S. must adjust to the
PRC-position. He implied, however, that even if the issue
was not resolved during the visit, there would still be time
to reach an agreement. Similar views.were recently conveyed
by Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua. Chiao stated that Sino-
U.S. relations were proceeding smoothly, and he expressed
confidence that President Ford would continue to implement
former President Nixon's policy toward developing normal re-
lations with China. He also noted that a recent PRC study
has concluded the U.S. genuinely intends to carry out the
terms of the Shanghai communique. Presumably, Chiao was re-
ferring to the PRC interpretation that the communique repre-
sents an agreement by Washington to a "one-China" policy and
to the principle that Taiwan is a domestic Chinese problem.
In addition, he maintained that American statements about
living up to commitments to Taiwan are only to placate domestic
pro-Nationalist elements. Chiao emphasized that Peking was
patient and did not intend to take any unilateral action to
resolve the question. Turning to Indochina, Chiao said recent
events there have contributed to closer Sino-U.S. relations.
He explained that the end of U.S. involvement removed one
element of disagreement between Peking and Washington. In
addition, Chiao claimed that the:two countries now share a
common concern over Soviet designs on bases in South Vietnam.
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THE NvIIITF, 110USE
WASHINGTON
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
October 11, 1975
THE PRESIDENT
HENRY A. KISSINGER
Information Items
Chinese Leaders Meet with Their American Peoples Front Group:
In a clear example of Peking playing symbolic politics, the
New China News Agency reports that on October 10 -- the
Nationalist Chinese National Day -- PRC Vice Premier Teng
Hsiao-p'ing met with leaders of the "U.S.-China Peoples
Friendship Association." This organization, ostensibly
formed spontaneously by American citizens supportive of
Peking's positions on many political issues, is, according
to FBI sources, a front group for the Revolutionary Union, a
semi-covert American Maoist organization
Peking ha25X1
E,
been giving increasing publicity to the "U.S.-China Peoples
Friendship Association" over the past year, in contrast to
their efforts to down-play the role of the broad-based pri-
vate "facilitating" organizations we have relied upon to pro-
mote Sino-American cultural and scientific contacts. The
PRC action in giving the U.S. "friendship" organization such?
high-level treatment as a reception by Vice Premier Teng thus
constitutes a bit of nose-thumbing at both the U.S. and the
Republic of China.
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