(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000400310001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 13, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

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en ra n e igence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
13 April 1983
Liberia: Prospects For Civilian Rule by 1985
Summaru
7'he US Embassy reports Head of State Samuel Doe remains
committed to returning Liberia to civilian rule b A riZ 1985 as he
promised three years ago. Doe
recognizes that his military regime is iZZ-equipped to reverse
deteriorating economic conditions, and that movement toward civiZiar,
rule helps. keep social disconter.?t from boiling over. We believe
that--barring r~idespread public unrest or an unforeseen coup in the
next trio years--Doe grill return the military to the barracks on
schedule, and that US interests would be better served by the
installati
on of a more economicaZZy-talented civilian government.
We concur with the US Embassy's jud
ment th
t
g
a
progress toward
civilian rule is contingent on adroit political maneuvering by Doe,
rvho_faces an undercurrent of military plotting, and continued large
doses of US economic assistance. In our vier, Doe's confidence in
the country's ability to raeather the transition to civilian -rule is
sustair?ed by his belief that Washington will continue underr~riting
the economy. Providing US aid levels do nvt decline significantly,
rye beZiez~e Liberian-US relations are ZikeZy to remain or, an even
keel with no threat to valuable US communications and navigation
;'aciZtities o~nifi.cant opportunities for Soviet or Libyan
~ zrnnr7o
Political and Economic Overview
Since the coup in April 1980, the military governrent, in our view, has
consolidated its political position under Doe's leadership and imposed a
West/East Africa Division, Office of A r2car. and Latir.? AmericanrAraZysasch~It
mas ccordirated ~i.thin the Directorate of Intelligence and the National
Intelligence Council. Information available as 12 AprtiZ ryas used in its
preparation. Comments are r~elcome and may be directed to the Chief, West/East
Division.
~~x1
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degree of relative stability. The US Embassy reports Doe has purged or .
intimidated opponents within the ruling council, installed a more competent
cabinet, and forcefully limited public protest. But Doe has..-.not been able to
deliver on post-coup promises to improve living conditions and reduce
corruption, and, in our judgment, the regime's popularity has peaked.
_ _.
Although Doe has not-..been threatened by serious public dissatisfaction so far,
the US Embassy believes peaceful acceptance of future economic hardships
depends in part on fairly regular salary payments to government workers and
the _mi l.i tary.
World prices for Liberia's iron ore and rubber exports have plummeted in
recent years with no improvement likely before 1985, according to the US
Embassy. American multinational firms continue to retrench; Firestone has
closed one of two plantations and the major iron ore mining firm, LAMCO, in
which Bethlehem Steel has an interest, has cut its labor force by one-third.
Doe has imposed austerity measures, including government salary cuts,. to try
to curb fiscal irresponsiblity and to reduce large oil, payroll, and debt
payments. Even so, the regime lurches from crisis to crisis each month and
only survives on substantial annual US aid and IMF credits.
Pressures to Proceed toward Civil Rule
US Embassy officials report Doe recognizes that while his government is
running out of promises it can fulfill, continued movement toward civil rule
lends legitimacy to his regime. Embassy reporting indicates that public
anticipation of civilian rule has so far helped temper frustration with poor
economic conditions and government maladministration, because it is assumed
that they are temporary and that civilian leaders will have the financial and
managerial expertise to deal effectively with Liberia's economic crisis.
Doe's conversations with US officials suggest he recognizes that reneging on
civil rule would risk alienating an increasingly impatient public and
heightening the potential for serious instability.
/ We
believe the longer the military stays in power with few tangible benefits to
its credit, the more vulnerable the regime will become to civil disorders.
In our view, significant momentum has built fora return to civilian rule
and it would be difficult to reverse, even though the US Embassy reports Doe
has made elections contingent. upon providing adequate housing for the
military--US-funded barracks should be completed by 1985--and progress toward
solving Liberia's economic difficulties. Anew civilian-drafted constitution
was submitted last month for approval by a future civilian constitutent
assembly and the ruling council, and Doe used the occasion to renew publicly
his pledge to hold elections by 1985. He has also promised to complete a
census by next February to help draw up future electoral constituencies. ~~ 25X1
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Outlook and Implications For The US
We concur with the US Embassy's judgment that progress toward civilian
rule over the next two years will require continu.ng.nl~ble political footwork
on Doe's part ,and essential economic support. from the United_.States. As Jong
as Doe remains in power, we believe that his proven political savvy, desire to
withdraw the military from power, and conviction that Washington is committed
to preventing Liberia's economic collapse will keep the country moving toward
civilian rule by 1985.
In our judgment, however, the period leading up to the 1985 turnover will
be marked by potentially serious economic strains that. could .affect Liberian-
US relations. The US Embassy reports that Liberian officials seem unwilling
to accept US domestic constraints as a factor limiting increases in US aid.
If anti-government unrest develops over continued economic deterioration, the
'
s commitment.
Doe government may begin to question Washington
We be iev.e._th.at a_..f.ailure by .Washington to meet Liberia's expectations
for future bailouts--while unlikely to lead to a dramatic reversal of
relations--could cause Liberia t.o use what leverage it has on the United
States. The Doe government could try to demand more economic assistance as a
condition for continued American access to presently rent-free US
communications and military staging facilities. In addition, Monrovia could--
as it has in the past--publicly threaten to establish better relations vrith
the Soviets and Libyans in the hope Washington would seek to protect its
position in Liberia by providing more funds.
In the unlikely. event Doe decides to renege on his promise to restore
civilian government and chooses to retain power indefinitely, the US would
face other difficulties. We believe his regime would become more ineffectual
and corrupt over time and require even higher levels of US assistance to
sustain itself. In our view, the United States woul~ d become identified with
an increasingly unpopular and repressive regime.
A successful coup by the lower ranking military would pose many of the
same challenges to US interests as did Doe's takeover. We believe such a
government would probably prove difficult for the US to deal with initially,
usher iri a period of considerable instability, and offer at least short-term
opportunities for Moscow and Tripoli to ingratiate themselves with probably
naive and directionless leaders. In our judgment, a coup would also provide
critics of US policy in the region another opportunity to question
1ashington's reliability, particularly because of Liberia's long-claimed
"special relationship" with the US and the implicit, strong US commitment we
believe most of Liberia's neighbors feel that relationship entails.
US Embass reporting indicate Doe's strong
~_- _.
suspicio'-~n~ol='- ommunism and Liberia s eavy epen ence on Washington for
financial assistance have so far limited opportunities for the Soviets and
their allies to gain influence in Liberia while he has been in charge.
Official reporting from Monrovia indicates that relations with Moscow and
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Tripoli have remained cool since 1981 when Monrovia drastically reduced .t he
Soviet Embassy staff and expelled the Libyan mission for alleged espionage
activities. In our judgment, the Soviets and Libyans will continue to
maintain a distant relationship, hoping that a future change in government--
either by the election of civilian leftists or a coup by populist enlisted men
vulnerable to manipulation--would increase their presently limited
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