(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 9, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

9 November 1983
Israel's Return to Black Africa: Progress and Prospects
Israel has been a pariah in black Africa since the 1973
Yom Kippur War when most African states broke relations. Even
so, Tel Aviv has never stopped considering the sub-Saharan
region as an important arena in which it could ease its
diplomatic isolation and ensure favorable conditions for trade
and political influence. Prime Minister Shamir has long been
among the principal supporters of an active Israeli policy in
Africa.
Zaire and Liberia have resumed diplomatic relations with
Israel during the past 18 months, motivated by their need for
the security support and technical assistance that Tel Aviv
will provide in return for recognition. Whether these moves
signal a diplomatic breakthrough for Israel, or are simply
isolated initiatives, is an important question for Tel Aviv.
If Ivory Coast's President Houphouet-Boigny carries out his
reported decision in principle to reestablish relations, and
particularly if he were joined by other Francophone African
leaders, this would bring Israel out of the periphery and
closer to Africa's mainstream.
This memorandum was requested by Noel Koch, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense, ISA. It was prepared by Regional
Issues Branch, Africa Division, Office of African and Latin American
Analysis. it has been coordinated with the National Intelligence Council
and the Directorate of Operations. This paper includes information
available as of 7 November 1983. Comments and queries are welcome and may
be directed to the Chief, Africa Division
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6 -
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
For black Africans, factors for and against relations with
Israel are fairly evenly balanced. The same pragmatism that
caused the African states to distance themselves from Israel
ten years ago is now drawing them away from their erstwhile
Arab benefactors. Africans have made it clear they are
disillusioned with unfulfilled promises of Arab economic
assistance and fearful of Libyan political ambitions in the
region. On the other hand, African dependence on Arab oil
supplies and promises by the Arabs of future aid still provide
them with leverage, while ideology, Islam, and Third World
institutions continue to pull some African countries into the
Arab orbit. Probably most important is the anger Israel's
continuing connection with South Africa raises among black
Both Africans and Israelis see a central role for the
United States in Israel's effort to develop a diplomatic
presence in Africa. Washington has played an active part in
bringing the parties together so far, and Tel Aviv will
continue to look to the United States to act as an intermediary
with African leaders and to provide financing for Israeli
projects.
In the short term, we believe widespread African
recognition of Israel is unlikely. In the long run, many of
the needy black African states will seek the side that offers
the best prospect for economic and security support. In the
meantime, Israel will continue to offer development and
agricultural assistance and military training tailored to
individual countries' requirements. It also will respond to
African needs--within its budgetary limits--short of breaking
its highly valued economic and strategic links with South
Africa.
Israel's African Policy And Its Background
Israeli policy towards Africa represents an attempt to reconcile a
number of conflicting elements:
-- Tel Aviv is trying to restore formal diplomatic ties with
black African states--as it succeeded in doing with Zaire last
year and Liberia a few months ago--by offering development and
military assistance to targeted African governments.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
-- Such offers of assistance, however, are constrained by
budgetary considerations in Israel.
-- Where relations have-been established, a gap has almost
immediately appeared between the Africans' seemingly limitless
needs and expectations and Israel's limited economic
resources, straining good will on both sides.
-- Tel Aviv's campaign to reestablish its position in black
Africa is undercut by its relationship with South Africa.
Until the early 1970s, 33 black African states had diplomatic
relations with Israel. The Africans welcomed Israel's offers of
agricultural, military, medical, and other technical assistance. Israel
developed thriving trade in the region and was able to count on African
support at the United Nations and within the Organization of African Unity
in preventing these bodies from becoming anti-Israeli forums.
African support of Israel had already begun to erode, however, before
the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 because of Arab offers of financial
assistance and of oil at below-market prices and African sensitivity to
Israel's growing ties with South Africa. This trend culminated during and
immediately following the war when almost all black African governments
severed their ties with Tel Aviv in a display of solidarity with the
Arabs--even though a number were reluctant to do so. The only exceptions
in black Africa were Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi--all of which had
close ties with South Africa.
Although Israel had no alternative to rapid disengagement from black
Africa after 1973--withdrawing most but not all of its advisers and
assistance programs--links with a number of African states gradually began
to resume on an unofficial and discreet level, notably in Ivory Coast and
Kenya. In many countries, admiration for the quality of Israeli
assistance survived the trauma of the 1973 break, as did commercial
ties. By the late 1970s, Tel Aviv again was openly courting a number of
African states--in particular, Zaire, Liberia, and the Central African
Republic--and suggesting ways to meet some of the Africans' security and
economic needs in return for diplomatic recognition.
Formal Ties
Apart from the three states with which Israel maintained diplomatic
relations, Tel Aviv's formal presence in black Africa over most of the
past ten years was restricted to "Interests Sections" in foreign embassies
in Togo, Ghana, the Ivory Coast (covering Upper Volta, Guinea, Sierra
Leone and Gabon), and Kenya. In the Ivory Coast, the Israeli diplomat in
charge of Tel Aviv's interests at the Belgian Embassy has enjoyed direct
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
access to President houet-Boig n with 9reater frequency than most
accredited ambassac' -s.
Policy makers in Tel Aviv hoped that many black African leaders would
withdraw their opposition to restoring full diplomatic relations once the
issue of Israeli occupation of the Sinai was settled. For months before
Israel's final withdrawal from the Sinai in April 1982, the Israeli
government--with US support--was assiduously cultivating Zaire and
Liberia, regarded by Tel Aviv as two of the most likely candidates for
recognition. In May 1982, Zaire became the first black African state to
reestablish diplomatic ties with Israel since the Yom Kippur War. Liberia
followed suit in August 1983, and Head of State Doe became the first
African head of state to visit Jerusalem in over a decade.
The desire for Israeli security assistance played a role in
Monrovia's and Kinshasa's decisions to restore formal ties. The leaders
of both states cited fears of internal instability and outside
interference, particularly by Libya, as reasons for breaking the African
consensus. Soon after the formalities of recognition were completed, both
Zaire and Liberia signed agreements providing for Israeli security
assistance and technical expertise.
In Zaire during the last year Israel has begun to:
-- Reorganize and train the Zairian Kamanyola Division, which
assists in the defense of mineral-rich Shaba Region.
-- Train the elite Presidential Brigade.
-- Provide military equipment.
-- Give assistance in agriculture and mining.
In Liberia, Tel Aviv has already agreed to:
-- Reorganize Air Liberia, give management and maintenance
training to Liberian personnel, provide two Boeing 707s, and,
under a contract for $10 million, sell the airline four Arava
transport planes.
-- Consult in health, agriculture, and construction.
25X1
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6 25X1
-- Set up a cooperative relationship between the two countries'
central banks.
-- Help Monrovia establish a shipping line.
Israel's Principal Targets
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in early June 1982 spoiled any chance
of a widespread restoration of African ties that Tel Aviv had hoped for
following Zaire's initiative. Nonetheless, during the past year, the
Foreign Ministry under Yitzhak Shamir--who now as Prime Minister has
sustained a high interest in the area--sent a number of delegations to
black African countries and targeted for special attention certain states
with regional economic and political influence. These included:
Ivory Coast
President Houphouet was one of the last African leaders to break
relations with Israel in 1973, and he allowed Tel Aviv to maintain an
interests section in Abidjan. Israel has raised the possibility of
establishing a technical assistance program with the Ivorians--who would
welcome Israeli agricultural help--if diplomatic relations are resumed.
The two countries have extensive economic ties, particularly in the
construction and agricultural sectors. Ivory Coast is Israel's second-
largest trading partner in black Africa, and several hundred Israeli
citizens live there.
The Ivorian President has so far successfully rebuffed Arab threats
to withdraw support for development projects if Israeli firms are employed
on them. Even so, promised Saudi and other Arab funding for the Soubre
Dam--the country's largest investment project--would probably not
materialize if Abidjan recognizes Israel.
Houphouet has long been friendly to Israel, but he found the Begin
government's hardline policies towards the Arabs a stumbling block to
formal recognition during the past few years. The Ivorian President
feared that he would lose status in the OAU, which includes several Arab
north African states, and in Francophone Africa if ties were renewed.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
Security considerations might play a part in leading Houphouet to
act. He is deeply concerned about Libyan trouble-making in Chad, Upper
Volta, and elsewhere in the region. He almost certainly would like
Israeli intelligence to supplement the security support France has
traditionally supplied his country.
Nigeria
Nigeria is Israel's largest trading partner in black Africa and
Africa's most populous state. Nigeria also is of major interest to the
Israelis because of its potential influence with other black African
states. It is the prime mover behind the Economic Community of West
African States, West Africa's largest economic organization, and is the
region's principal oil producer. The Israelis would like Nigeria to
guarantee oil to those African states that fear economic reprisal from the
Arabs if they resume relations with Israel
Nigeria was reluctant to break diplomatic ties with Israel in 1973,
but since then Tel Aviv's continued political and economic ties with
Pretoria and Nigeria's desire to secure Arab support for African efforts
to end white minority rule in South Africa have hardened Lagos's attitude
towards Israel. Nigerian President Shagari is also concerned over the
likely domestic consequences of any move to restore diplomatic ties with
Israel. In particular, he does not want to risk losing support among
fellow Muslims who dominate his National Party and represent over 50
percent of the population.
There is a substantial Israeli commercial presence in Nigeria on
which Tel Aviv hopes to build, although the Israelis have been hard-hit by
Nigeria's current economic downturn. Israeli exports to Nigeria--mainly
chemicals, medicines, agricultural products, and technical expertise--
totaled $43.1 million in 1982. The Israeli government recently agreed to
sell Nigeria some $5.4 million worth of paramilitary and riot control
equipment.
Israeli construction firms secured $1 billion worth of contracts in
1981 alone. One of the largest Israeli companies, Solel Boneh, whose
earnings in Africa totaled about $500 million last year, has signed
agreements with a number of Nigerian states and recently was awarded a
substantial contract to work at Abuja, Nigeria's new federal capital.
Although encouraging significant commercial ties with Israel, Lagos
has taken a firm stand against resuming diplomatic links at this time .
We believe Lagos would not regard
25X1
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for R
elease 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85
T00287R000500110001-6
25X1
the prospect of Israeli security assistance to be as compelling a quid pro quo
for recognition as do the smaller, weaker African states.
25X1
Kenya
During the presidency of Jomo Kenyatta (1964-78) Kenyan relations
with Israel were warm, despite the rupture of formal ties in 1974. The
connection has cooled considerably, however, under President Moi. During
his chairmanship of the OAU, Moi has concentrated on expanding Kenya's
ties with the Arab states, and the OAU has roundly condemned Israel for
its policies in the Middle East.
According to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv, Israeli officials still are
hopeful that recognition by Kenya lies further down the road. They point
out that Kenya is one of Israel's largest trade partners in black
Africa. Israeli exports to Kenya in 1982 were over $10 million, according
to IMF figures. Tel Aviv hopes Moi will turn towards closer ties with
Israel now that he is divested of his OAU responsibility and his hand has
been strengthened domestically in September's national elections.
We believe other factors make this prospect doubtful. Moi forced
Israel's longtime main advocate in Kenya, Constitutional Affairs Minister
Charles Njonjo, out of his government this summer. Moi also recently
visited Saudi Arabia in quest of aid. Kenya probably is content to
maintain lucrative commercial ties with Israel without changing the
diplomatic status quo.
Ethiopia
The other major sub-Saharan African state with which Israel has a
long history of political ties is Ethiopia. In the eyes of the Israeli
government, the Horn of Africa is of major strategic importance because of
Arab control of the Red Sea and Israel's need for guarantees for its ships
to pass the Bab al-Mandeb and its commercial airline to overfly Ethiopian
airspace on flights via Nairobi to and from South Africa. The Israeli
government is concerned also for the well-being of Ethiopia's 20.000-
member Jewish community.
25X1
25X1
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
 ' Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
25X1
We believe that Ethiopian diplomatic recognition is unlikely,
although the Israeli government continues to hope that Addis Ababa
eventually will reestablish formal ties. The present regime's close links
to the Soviets, who are adamantly opposed to an Israeli political presence
in Ethiopia, suggest that a change in policy is unlikely anytime soon. On
the other hand, Ethiopia's longstanding ties with Tel Aviv and its anger
over Arab support for Eritrean dissidents are factors that could work in
Israel's favor over the longer term.
If any one of these important sub-Saharan African states resumed
relations, Tel Aviv believes that others would follow. Because Israel's
prospects are best in Ivory Coast, we believe other moderate Francophone
states are the most likely candidates.
Central African Republic
The CAR severed diplomatic relations with Israel in October 1973.
Although the pro-Western government in Bangui is not dependent on the
Arabs for oil--its main supplier is Gabon--it is in dire economic straits
and has hesitated to jeopardize present and future levels of Arab
assistance by reestablishing formal ties with Israel. Moreover, Bangui
does not want to give Libya a pretext for stepping up subversion within
the country. On the other hand, Tel Aviv has campaigned strenuously for
CAR recognition, Minister of Defense Sharon visited there in 1981, and
President Kolingba would welcome Israeli assistance. As a result, during
the last year the CAR has seemed on the point of recognition several
times. At present, however, Kolingba seems content to explore the
possibility of expanding Israeli construction activity and other
commercial and economic links--but nothing more.
Gabon
Pro-Western Gabon cut off diplomatic relations with Israel in October
1973 in response to Arab demands. As black Africa's second largest oil
producer, Gabon is less vulnerable than most African states to Arab
pressures. Although a nominal convert to Islam, President Bongo is
interested in expanding Israel's role in Gabon's economic development.
Gabonese-Israeli trade has increased over the past few years, and Bongo
would welcome increased investment and agricultural development. While
claiming that his government is one of the most moderate in Africa on
Middle East questions, Bongo has said that Israel's military presence in
Lebanon makes resumption of relations in the near future virtually
impossible. Bongo supports the Camp David accords, but he also has
criticized Israel's position on the Palestinian issue and Jerusalem.
25X1
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
Guinea
Guinea, where Islam is the official religion, severed relations with
Israel in reaction to the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. In the late 1970s,
however, President Toure, once one of Africa's most radical leaders, began
to seek alternatives to his links with the Eastern bloc. The Guineans
recently have indicated interest in the possibility of an Israeli
agricultural assistance program. Guinea has only limited trade relations
Factors Working In Israel's Favor
Disillusionment With The Arabs
A number of factors continue to work in favor of Israel's return to
black Africa. Probaby most important is the general African
disillusionment with unfulfilled promises of Arab aid. African leaders
expected the OPEC countries to compensate them during the 1970s for a
four-fold increase in oil prices in return for cooperation against Israel
and in the spirit of Third World brotherhood. The Arab states failed,
however, to provide significant economic assistance to most African
countries or to make concessions on oil prices. As of 1983, Arab donors
altogether account for only ten percent of total capital inflows to the
region and rank well below Western sources of official assistance. They
have concentrated their aid in a few states with sizable Muslim
populations--among them Somalia, Senegal, and Guinea--and channeled it
mainly into sectarian projects. such as the construction of mosques and
Fears of Libyan subversion also have enhanced the Israeli position as
a supplier of internal security assistance, particularly in West Africa.
When Liberian Head of State Doe visited Jerusalem this summer, the
Israelis cultivated Monrovia's apprehensions about Libya. A number of
other African governments with similar fears--including Togo, Central
African Republic, and Zaire--have also shown interest in Israeli military
Informal Ties
Tel Aviv has long encouraged trade and investment by private Israeli
business as alternatives to official assistance. As a result, the
businessmen/entrepreneurs
has replaced the diplomat ec nica assistant in the s a tthe
principal representative of Israel in Africa. The heads of Israeli firms
in African capitals often have served as informal representatives of the
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
Israeli government, meeting regularly with political leaders and
diplomats.
Several thousand Israeli citizens, mostly businessmen, are living in
Africa with their families. In Nigeria alone, the Israeli community is
estimated to be as high as 4,000. Kenya, Gabon, CAR,,Ghana, Cameroon,
Togo, Ivory Coast, and Upper Volta also have large numbers of Israeli
residents.
Israel's trade union organization, the Histadrut, has had an
important role in maintaining and developing extensive ties in more than
20 African countries and in filling some of the void in diplomatic
commnunications. The union's Afro-Asian Institute has trained some 6,000
Africans since its inception in 1958 and is now focusing particularly on
the younger generation of African labor leaders.
Israeli trade with black Africa has more than doubled in recent years
and includes dealings with nearly 30 states. According to official Israeli
statistics, Tel Aviv's total trade with black Africa was over $100 million
in 1982. Israeli exports to Africa include electronic equipment,
industrial parts, fertilizers, chemicals, and a variety of agricultural
products. African goods imported by Israel include coffee, cocoa, timber,
minerals and seeds.
Overshadowing this expansion in trade has been the role of Israel's
construction industry--a major beneficiary of expanding commercial ties
with Africa. Contracts between Israeli firms and African governments for
1981-84 totaled $2 billion, most of them for road, agricultural and hotel
construction
Africa offers a limited market for Israeli arms sales, which focus on
advanced technology and training. Sales to sub-Saharan countries are a
small proportion, however, of worldwide Israeli arms sales. Israel's
largest black African customers are Kenya and Zaire.
Barriers to Recognition
Arab Pressures
Notwithstanding African disappointment with the overall level of Arab
aid, one --f Israel's major handicaps in Africa is the leverage that Arab
oil and promises ur tuture assistance still provide. Fear of retribution
by Arab states--upon which most black African states depend for their
oil--remains a strong disincentive to reestablishing ties with Tel Aviv.
Although many states indicated in the early 1970s that they would renew
diplomatic ties once Israel had withdrawn from Egyptian territory, they
continue to balk because of recent trends in the Middle East--the Israeli
10
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
25X1
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
invasion of Lebanon last year, the continuing Israeli military presence
there, and the failure to resolve the longstanding issue of a Palestinian
homeland. We believe that for some states --particularly in West
Africa--these are merely excuses, reflecting Arab pressure.
On the heels of Israel's recognition by Zaire and Liberia, the Arab
states began a campaign to dissuade other African countries from following
suit. The Khartoum-based Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
(BADEA), which had given $411.4 million between 1974 and 1981 to Zaire out
of a total of $774.1 million in all of Africa, has suspended its
activities in black Africa. The Gulf Cooperation Council of Foreign and
Economic Ministers (GCC), which includes representatives of Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait,.Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and the UAE and has supplied approximately
$2 billion in aid to African countries, voted recently to sever all
relations--including economic--with governments that resume ties with
Israel.
When Head of State Doe announced plans to locate the Liberian embassy
in Jerusalem, Arab countries called for reprisals against Monrovia. They
threatened to boycott Liberian registered shipping, which transports oil
from the Persian Gulf and earns Liberia some $12 million annually.
African Disapproval of Tel Aviv's South African Ties
Israel's relations with Pretoria complicate its campaign to rebuild
its diplomatic presence in sub-Saharan Africa. African leaders usually
cite this relationship as the principal reason for continuing non-
recognition.
The widespread African rejection of Israel in 1973 created a backlash
in Tel Aviv that was conducive to closer ties with Pretoria. Tel Aviv
evidently concluded that it had little to lose by cultivating this
relationship. Under Israeli governments since then, particularly that of
Prime Minister Begin--who was once president of the Israel-South African
Friendship League--bilateral military, scientific, and economic links have
grown.
Black Africans tend to believe the worst about the Israeli-South
African connection. They widely assume, for example, that scientific and
military exchanges between Israel and South Africa include cooperation in
nuclear technology for secret nuclear weapons programs in both
countries.
For most black African leaders, Israel's economic relations with
South Africa are also a continuing provocation. South Africa is Israel's
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
leading commercial partner in Africa, although in overall terms for either
country the estimated $245.2 million trade between them is relatively
Israel's Domestic Economic Constraints
Israel's technical assistance budget for Africa has been severely
downgraded in recent years because of Tel Aviv's economic problems. Only
Kenya, Malawi, Lesotho, and Swaziland--and now Zaire and Liberia--are
included; in each case, the programs are small and have onl a few
technical assistants assigned to them.
Tel Aviv has succeeded in expanding the scope of its assistance somewhat,
however, by providing technical expertise for projects funded by third
countries, such as Canada, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
The same economic constraints apply to military assistance, although
Israel is still able to provide training to local security services.
Rifles have been offered to the Botswana police, but costs and internal
Botswanan politics seem to have stalled the program. Military equipment
has been delivered to Zaire, some purchased by Kinshasa and some given by
Israel. Israel now faces a very real budgetary dilemma, however, in
trying to fulfill its commitments to equip Zaire's Kamanyola Division in
Shaba Region. Kinshasa has made several requests for US financial support
for this program. Tel Aviv's inability to meet Mobutu's expectations for
free training and equipment risks souring the relationship, according to
US Embassy reports from Tel Aviv.
Outlook
The Israeli government views the reestablishment of formal relations
with large numbers of African states as a long term goal. In the short
term, the Israelis will focus their efforts to regain recognition on a few
target countries, such as those in the Francophone community where there
is the highest coincidence of political importance, trade potential, and
strategic location. They will try to avoid a widespread exchange of
commitments with Africa's small, neediest states, although they will
welcome recognition from any quarter--and provide whatever incentives they
Although a number of Francophone states in West Africa--Ivory Coast
in particular--have seemed on the verge of recognition over the last few
months, the Israelis have no assurance of success. There are many
examples of discussions between Israel and African governments collapsing
abruptly after months of steady progress. Moreover, fear of Libyan
12
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
retaliation, pressure from the Arab League and the Saudis, or heavy-handed
Israeli military actions in the Middle East could lead President Houphouet
or any other African leader close to recognition to reconsider. Senegal
may look back with regret at the-loss of the excellent technical
assistance Israel provided in the past for agriculture, but economic and
religious ties with the Arab world probably will act to prolong its break
with Israel indefinitely.
As black Africa's most powerful state--and one on which the Arabs
have little economic leverage--Nigeria could be the key to any regional
rapprochement with Israel. Were Lagos to restore diplomatic ties, the
rest of West Africa probably would follow. President Shagari has made it
clear, however, that until Israel changes its policies in Lebanon, Nigeria
will have no interest in recognition. Even then, South African-Israeli
ties will remain a stumbling block.
The Israeli economic situation will compel Tel Aviv increasingly to
seek third party participation in development schemes and multilateral
funding for projects in which its technical expertise can be applied.
This could limit Israel's options and reduce the effectiveness of the
Israeli tactic of offering technical and military support in exchange for
recognition.
Israeli-black African commercial ties will probably also suffer from
the worsening economic conditions in Africa. Heavily committed Israeli
exporters already are feeling the results of Nigeria's recession, for
example, and are having trouble collecting several million dollars in
debts. Israeli businessmen facing similar problems in Zaire will be
reluctant to expand their investments without capital-repatriation
guarantees from the Israeli treasury, which they may not receive given
Israel's own budgetary constraints.
Ties with South Africa will continue to complicate Israel's future in
black Africa. Indeed, over the long run, Israel may have to choose
between its interests in South Africa and any hope of a substantial
diplomatic presence in black Africa.
Implications for the United States
Israel wants US diplomatic help in restoring its position in black
Africa. Tel Aviv will ask US diplomatic missions to continue to serve as
channels of communications for it with African governments, as they did
during negotiations with Zaire and Liberia over the past two years and are
currently doing with President Eyadema of Togo. Tel Aviv will also ask
the United States to encourage other states, such as France and Egypt, to
support the establishment of diplomatic ties between Israel and the
Africans. Moreover, Tel Aviv will look to the United States to be active
13
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
on its behalf among black African states during the yearly ritual of Arab
and radical Muslim challenges to Israeli credentials before the United
Nations and other international organizations.
According to the US Embassy in Tel Aviv, Israeli officials will seek
US support for joint assistance programs in Africa that could combine US
resources and Israeli expertise. Israel will request US financing for
development and agricultural projects it hopes to provide key African
states, particularly Nigeria, Ivory Coast, CAR, and Zaire.
The close identification of Israel with the United States in the eyes
of many black African leaders will have a positive effect on US-African
relations where it is associated with welcomed forms of bilateral
assistance, as in Zaire and Liberia, although unrealistic expectations
could cause strains. For some moderate states, Israel's strong connection
with the United States may in itself be a persuasive argument for
establishing closer ties with Tel Aviv.
The close identification of Tel Aviv with Washington is less useful
when Israeli activity can be linked with South Africa or anti-Arab
politics. In states like Nigeria and Senegal, both Islamic ties and anti-
South African views play major roles in foreign policy formulation. In
such states as Zambia, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, Tel Aviv's close ties with
South Africa are probably the decisive factor in opposition to Israel. In
both cases, Washington's identification with Israel can provoke criticism
of the United States in international forums and, under certain
circumstances could damage US bilateral relations with these African
states.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6
SUBJECT: Israel's Return to Black Africa: Progress and Prospects
Original - Noel Koch, Department of Defense, ISA.
1 - Frederick L. Wettering, Director, African Affairs, NSC
1 - Chester A. Crocker, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 - Jim Bishop, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 - Robert Cabelly, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 - Rear Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, Political Military
Affairs, Department of State
1 - Miles Pendleton, Director, NEA/IAI, Department of
State
1 - Leonardo Neher, Director INR/AF, Department of State
1 - Peter Spicer, DIO/AF, Defense Intelligence Agency
1 - C/NESA/AI/I
1-
1 - DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - SA/DCI/IA
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - DDO/Africa
1 - NIO for Africa
1 - NIC Action Group
1 - PDB Staff
1 - ILS
1 - C/DDI/PES
1 - D/ALA
2 - ALA/PS
1 - ALA Research Director
4 - OCPAS/IMD/CB
2 - ALA/AF
2 - AF/RI
4 - ALA/RI
ALA/AF (9 November 1983)
15
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500110001-6