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• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84S00558R000200130003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
Oil Transport
From the Persian Gulf:
An Energy Security Issue
RECORD COP
Reti]r t. .C./ i/CB
Paragra' S31 fied by',
MASTER FILE COPY
DO NOT GIVE OUT
OR MARK ON
GI 83-10079
April 1983
Copy 3 8 4
Directorate of
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Directorate oft
Intelligence
Oil Transport
From the Persian Gulf:
An Energy Security Issue
This assessment was prepared by
of the Office of Global Issues. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Energy Issues Branch, OGI
_Seeret-
GI 83-10079
April 1983
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Secret
Oil Transport
From the Persian Gulf:
An Energy Security Issue
for over 40 percent and Japan for 60 percent of total oil imports.
Key Judgments The degree to which the non-Communist countries depend on Persian Gulf
Information available oil and the uncertain political climate in the Middle East continue to
as of 15 March 1983 underscore the potential for a major disruption of non-Communist oil
was used in this report.
supplies:
? The Persian Gulf currently supplies about a fourth of non-Communist oil
needs. This share is likely to grow because of the large reserves in the
region.
? Although US dependence on Persian Gulf oil has dropped to less than 20
percent of total oil imports, other OECD countries still rely on the region
While the present combination of surplus productive capacity, excess
stocks, and declining consumption provides considerable protection in the
near term, this cushion is likely to shrink in the years ahead, and the
market will become more vulnerable to supply disruptions. Industry
forecasts indicate that by 1990 the Persian Gulf will still contribute 10 to
11 million barrels per day (b/d) of exports to the non-Communist countries'
oil supply. A number of elements cause concern for the reliability of
Persian Gulf oil supplies, including the concentration of highly vulnerable
oil facilities, the need for most Persian Gulf oil to transit the Strait of Hor-
muz at the southern end of the Gulf, and political instability in the region.
At any time, the economic and political fallout from a major disruption-
involving Saudi Arabia or the entire Persian Gulf region-would be severe.
Because of the vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz, Gulf states have
wanted additional pipelines that bypass the strait. In 1981 Saudi Arabia
completed a 1.85-million-b/d pipeline to the Red Sea that bypasses the
strait, bringing the region's total pipeline export capacity to about
4 million b/d. The most ambitious proposal is for a 1-million-b/d pipeline
linking the oilfields of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab
Emirates to an export facility on the coast of Oman. Iraq, which has lost its
capability to export oil through the Persian Gulf since its conflict with Iran
began, is pushing for a new pipeline crossing Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea.
Iraq also is expanding the capacity of its 700,000-b/d export pipeline
through Turkey.
Secret
GI 83-10079
April 1983
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Table 1
Non-Communist Dependence on Persian Gulf Oil a
Thousand barrels per day
(except where noted)
Persian
Gulf
Total
Imports
Percent
Persian
Gulf
Total
Imports
Percent
Persian
Gulf
Total
Imports
Percent
Japan
2,708
4,625
59
Western Europe
4,078
13,120
31
Of which:
924
2,033
45
1,749
2,494
70
1,893
2,875
66
Italy
802
2,040
39
1,437
2,362
61
1,739
2,669
65
United Kingdom
357
964
37
966
1,596
61
1,793
2,749
65
West Germany
446
2,217
20
886
2,848
31
1,307
3,001
44
a Includes imports of crude oil and refined products, including
natural gas liquids.
b First half of 1982.
economic reasons in 1975. In recent years the line has
been used only to supply refineries in Jordan and
Lebanon, and shipments have averaged less than
100,000 b/d. cannibal-
ization of pumps and equipment has probably cut
Tapline's effective capacity in half. Fighting in Leba-
non also damaged both the line and the export
terminal and refinery at Sidon. Tapline recently
announced its intention to abandon the Lebanese
portion of the line, which has not been used since
1981.
Petroline, also called the East-West Pipeline, opened
in July 1981, connecting the Ghawar Oilfield at
Abqaiq to the Red Sea port of Yanbu al Bahr, 1,200
km away. The pipeline was built primarily to enhance
Saudi export flexibility by providing an outlet to
bypass the Strait of Hormuz, as well as to supply
three new refineries on the west coast. The line's
design capacity is 1.85 million b/d, but a surcharge of
$0.50 per barrel is making customers reluctant to lift
oil at Yanbu al Bahr. Throughput in 1982 averaged
only about 1.1 million b/d and so far this year has
averaged less than half that. A 270,000 b/d NGL
pipeline parallels the crude oil line, providing fuel for
the pumping stations and feedstock to a 250,000 b/d
NGL fractionation plant in Yanbu al Bahr.
The Iraqi Pipelines. The Iraq-Syria-Lebanon Pipeline
is the oldest export pipeline in the Middle East. First
opened in 1934, the original line was laid from the
Kirkuk Oilfield in Iraq through Syria to the Lebanese
port of Tripoli. Since then, three parallel pipelines
have been constructed, and a northern spur to the
Syrian port of Baniyas has been added. Total
throughput capacity for the ystem is 1.2 million b/d.
In recent years, operation of the line has been inter-
rupted by political differences between Baghdad and
Damascus and by unrest in Lebanon. A dispute over
transit fees closed the pipeline from 1976 to 1979, and
in April 1982 Syria shut the line in a show of support
for Iran. Sporadic incidents of sabotage occurred
during periods the pipeline was in use, although the
damage never seriously affected operations. Before its
closure in 1982, the Iraq-Syrian-Lebanon Pipeline
system carried up to about 700,000 b/d.
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Iran
Bandar-ems
'Abbas
KhOran
(Clarence Strait)
Qeshm
}
Jazireh-ye . Oeshm
Jazireh-ye Larak
Jazirat at
I ] ~
Ghananm
-Musandam,
Peninrulw
United Arab Emirates
Bathymetry
20 50 100 fathoms
0 37 91 183 meters
Geographical limit of the Strait of Hormuz
Iran-Oman continental shelf boundary
12-nautical-mile limit
Directed traffic lane
Kilometers
0
Nautical Miles
c'
al
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Secret
Middle East: Major Oil Pipelines
n Sukhnah
49 'A
Su lVed Pipeline
to Sidi llerir /Egypt/
Egypt
t-All
Sea
Yanbu
al Bahr
Rumaifa`~
Iraq-Saudi Arabia
Neutral Zone KUW
TEHRAN*
Persian
Gulf
Saudi
Arabia
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
O Oilfield Oil terminal
1.85 Pipeline capacity (million b/d)
Note: Pipeline alignments are approximate.
0 300
Kilometers
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Table 2
Persian Gulf Oil Export Pipelines
Nominal
Capacity
Effective
Capacity
Average 1982
Volumes
Low
Estimate
High
Estimate
1.2
1.05 a
0.1 b
1.2
1.2
0.7
0.7c
0.65
0.98
0.98
Tapline
0.5
0.25
0.05 d
0.1
0.5
Petroline
1.85
1.85
1.1
1.65 e
3.5
Total
4.25
3.85
1.90
3.93
6.18
a Estimated, on the basis of possible export capacity restrictions at
the port of Baniyas.
b Represents the average for the full year; the pipeline was actually
shut down in April.
c Capacity currently being expanded by 280,000 b/d.
d Tapline only exported to Jordan in 1982.
e Export capacity; figure excludes an estimated 200,000 b/d for the
Yanbu al Bahr domestic refinery, which will provide products for
Saudi internal consumption.
The effective export capacity of the Iraq-Syria-Leba-
non Pipeline may currently be limited by its two
tanker loading terminals. The nominal export capaci-
ty of the port of Baniyas is 830,000 b/d; reconfigura-
tion of berths in 1976-77 to enable Syria to import
refined petroleum products reduced this to an estimat-
ed 400,000 b/d, and it is unclear if this port constraint
has been lifted. Before the closure of the pipeline last
year, Iraqi exports through Baniyas between 1979 and
1982 never exceeded 400,000 b/d.
The port at Tripoli has the capacity to export about
650,000 b/d and is capable of handling tankers up to
300,000 deadweight tons (dwt), more than twice the
size that can be berthed at Baniyas. Even if Syria
were to open the main pipeline, however, unsettled
conditions in Lebanon could continue to keep the
The Iraq-Turkey Pipeline, running from the Kirkuk
Oilfield in northern Iraq to a Mediterranean loading
facility near Ceyhan, Turkey, is currently Baghdad's
sole export route. The six-year-old pipeline is capable
of carrying 700,000 b/d, and it has been running at
about this level since the Syrian Pipeline was closed.
Periodic sabotage attacks have closed the line several
times since the Iran-Iraq war began, but the flow of
oil has not been stopped for long, and it does not
appear that the damage has affected pipeline capaci-
Iraq's internal "North-South" Pipeline is also a major
link in the country's export system. The pipeline links
the Iraq-Syria-Lebanon line at Al Hadithah in west-
ern Iraq to the southern oilfields near Al Basrah, and
Tripoli spur closed.
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Table 3
Major Middle East Crude Oil Pipelines
as of 1 January 1983
Point of
Export
Capacity
Diameter Length
Number
Date
Export
Storage
Maximum
Origin
Terminal
(million
(inches)
(km)
of Pump
Opened
Terminal
Capacity
Tanker
b/d)
Stations
Capacity
(million
Size
(thousand bbl)
b/d)
(thousand
dwt)
Iraq-Syria-Lebanon
Kirkuk Tripoli,
Oilfield, Lebanon
Iraq
0.05
12
856
7
1934
645
1.4
300
Kirkuk Baniyas,
Syria
0.35
30-32
891
1952
830
5.6
120
Iraq-Turkey (BOTAS)
Kirkuk, Iraq Ceyhan,
0.70
40
981
5
1977
1,000
7.0
300
Turkey
(mini-
mum)
Iraq Strategic Pipeline
Al Hadithah, Rumaila,
Iraq Iraq
0.98
(south)
42
655
3
1976
0.88
(north)
Trans-Arabian
Qaisumah, Sidon,
0.50
30-31
1,213
8
1950
500
4.1
150
Pipeline (Tapline)
Saudi Arabia Lebanon
(mini-
mum)
Abqaiq, Yanbu al
1.85
48
1,202
11
1981
3,700
11.0
500
Saudi Arabia Bahr,
(mini-
Saudi Arabia
mum)
Suez-Mediterranean
Ain Sukhna, Sidi Kerir,
1.60
2 by 42
320
2
1977
1,700
7.5 (both
285 (both
(SuMed)
Egypt Egypt
(estimat-
ed)
terminals) terminals)
Remarks
Original Middle East long-dis-
tance pipeline.
Parallels 12-inch line; utilizes
same pump stations and export
facilities.
Parallels 12- and 16-inch lines
for 795 km, utilizing their pump
stations.
"Loops" on original 32-inch line
connected to form second 32-
inch pipeline, raising total sys-
tem capacity to 1.2 million b/d.
A 30-inch spur to Tripoli was
constructed alongside the 12-
and 16-inch pipelines.
Pipeline capacity being expand-
ed by 280,000 b/d by mid-1984.
Connects Iraq's northern and
southern oilfields; crude oil can
be pumped in either direction.
Lebanese section closed and
possibly will be abandoned;
pipeline is open to Jordan, sup-
plying about 50,000 b/d. Ta-
pline's effective capacity may be
only about 250,000 b/d.
1982 throughput approximately
1.1 million b/d.
Connects Red and Mediterra-
nean Seas, bypassing Suez Ca-
nal; minor modifications could
increase capacity to 1.9 million
b/d.
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it is capable of pumping oil in either direction. The
line's capacity is 980,000 b/d pumping south, and
880,000 b/d north. Until April 1982, crude oil from
Iraq's southern oilfields was being fed into the
Syrian pipeline system for export through Baniyas
about 280,000 b/d. The expansion is scheduled to be
completed by mid-1984 at an estimated cost of $100-
140 million financed entirely by Iraq.
and Tripoli.
Egypt's SuMed Pipeline. Egypt's 1.6 million b/d
pipeline from the Gulf of Suez to the Mediterranean
(the SuMed Pipeline) facilitates the movement of
Persian Gulf oil from the Red Sea to southern
Europe. The pipeline cuts approximately 13,000 km
off the alternate route around the Cape of Good Hope
and reduces costs by allowing the movement of oil to
and from Egypt in ultralarge crude carriers that
cannot transit the Suez Canal. In 1981 and 1982 the
SuMed Pipeline operated slightly above capacity,
although early projections for 1983 indicate that
throughput may be only about 1 million b/d this year.
Despite this, Egypt is apparently proceeding with
plans to place an additional loading buoy at each end
of the SuMed Pipeline to increase capacity by about
300,000 b/d this year
Expansion of Middle East Pipelines
The vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz has led
Persian Gulf oil producers to consider ways to in-
crease their export flexibility. The closure of Iraqi
export terminals in the Gulf because of war damage
in the fall of 1980 and the threat posed by Iran to
exports from the rest of the Gulf added urgency to
these efforts. With the recent softening of the oil
market, however, much of the momentum behind new
projects is quickly being eroded.
Capacity Increases in Existing Lines. While most
existing pipelines have been considered for expansion
since 1979, work has begun only on the Iraqi line
through Turkey. Baghdad has signed contracts with a
West German firm to supply pumps for five new
pumping stations, and with a Turkish company for
construction of new pipeline segments. Three of the
stations are to be located in Turkey, and two in Iraq.
In addition to new stations, existing pumps will be
replaced and the construction of 75 km of parallel
pipeline will enhance flow in uphill sections, increas-
ing the pipeline's present 700,000 b/d capacity by
Preliminary feasibility studies to expand other Middle
East pipelines have also been conducted. These stud-
ies conclude:
? By adding pumps at existing stations, Iraq could
increase the capacity of the Syrian pipeline by
200,000 b/d. Political differences between Baghdad
and Damascus make this action unlikely even if
Syria does reopen the line.
? Addition of a pump station could increase the
capacity of Saudi Arabia's Petroline by 500,000 b/d
within two years. Construction of a parallel pipeline
would double capacity to 3.7 million b/d but would
take at least four years to complete.
? Addition of another pump station to Egypt's SuMed
Pipeline could increase throughput to 2.1 to 2.3
million b/d.
Construction of New Pipelines'
Several new pipelines are now under consideration.
An Iraqi line across Saudi Arabia, which has recently
been approved by Riyadh, appears the most likely to
be undertaken. A feasibility study completed in 1981
examined a proposal for a 1.6 million b/d pipeline
costing an estimated $3.6 billion. Of several alternate
routes contemplated, the most favorable would run
west of Kuwait and join Petroline in western Saudi
Arabia. The pipeline would then follow Petroline's
right-of-way over the mountains to the Red Sea. To
avoid overcrowding at Yanbu al Bahr, a new export
terminal would be constructed about 25 km south of
the city. Construction could be delayed by cash-flow
problems in Iraq.
Other pipeline projects have been proposed within the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which includes
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, Bahrain, and
Oman. The most ambitious would link Kuwait, Saudi
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Middle East: Proposed Crude Oil Pipelines
Turkey
Jordan
'Armistice
/ Line --
Ethiopia
Iraq-Saudi Arabia;
Neutral Zone
bouti
- - Proposed pipeline Existing pipeline
CD Oilfield Oil terminal
1.6 Proposed pipeline capacity (million b/d)
Note: Pipeline alignments are approximate.
o 490
Kilometers
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Soviet Union
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Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE to the southern coast of
Oman by way of a 1-million-b/d pipeline. Iraq has
expressed an interest in tying into this system with a
1-million-b/d pipeline to Kuwait, but according to
various embassy reports there is little enthusiasm
within the GCC for this proposal.
Construction of pipelines to export terminals on the
Arabian Sea have also been proposed in Saudi Arabia
and the UAE. The Saudi line has been considered
several times in the past decade, most often in con-
junction with development of the Shaybah Oilfield in
southeastern Saudi Arabia. While development of this
field could make a line across Oman economically
attractive some time in the future, the sharp decline in
demand for Saudi oil has made such an undertaking
unlikely at least over the next several years.
In 1981 the UAE studied a 1.6-million-b/d pipeline
from Abu Dhabi to the Gulf of Oman that would
remain entirely within the Emirates, but no serious
consideration has been given to the actual construc-
tion of such a line.
Until recently, Iran had considered constructing an oil
pipeline across Turkey to the Black Sea. The possibili-
ty was raised last year in connection with a proposed
natural gas pipeline running through Turkey to West-
ern Europe. The scheme for the gas pipeline was
originally proposed by the Shah in the late 1960s, but
it was shelved until recently. Renewed European
interest in natural gas prompted a second look at the
project, but according to press reporting the proposal
has been shelved because neither pipeline is now
considered economically viable.
Prospects for the Future
If past trends are any indication, few if any of the
newly considered projects will be completed. With oil
revenues plummeting, Gulf producers are reluctant to
allocate funds to construct new oil pipelines across
Saudi Arabia or Oman. Even expansion programs are
becoming costly. The US Embassy in Jidda reports
that raising the capacity of Saudi Arabia's Petroline
by 500,000 b/d would cost an estimated $1 billion,
while the original price for the pipeline was only
$1.6 billion. Despite recent discussions within the
GCC, a pipeline to Oman appears no closer to serious
consideration now than in the past. Construction
would be expensive, and, with a capacity of only
1 million b/d, the added flexibility provided would be
marginal.
The project most likely to proceed is the Iraq-Saudi
Arabia Pipeline. According to Embassy reporting, the
urgency with which Baghdad views the construction
of the line was evident in recent talks with Riyadh,
when King Fahd finally gave his consent to go ahead
with the project. Given current cash-flow problems for
both countries, however, it is doubtful whether the
nearly $4 billion needed will be forthcoming. In
addition, since construction alone is estimated to take
four to five years, the line probably could not operate
before 1987, even if started this year
Implications for the United States
By the end of the decade, the West will still require
some 10 to 11 million b/d of oil from the Persian
Gulf. While US imports from the region are likely to
remain at a low level, continued dependence of US
allies on Gulf oil will link US interests with the free
flow of oil from the region. An interruption in Persian
Gulf supplies would result in a tighter market for
foreign oil, higher oil prices, and possible enactment
of the IEA's emergency oil-sharing plan.
With the capacity of oil export pipelines from the
Persian Gulf not likely to undergo a major expansion
by the end of the decade, the vulnerability of Persian
Gulf oil to disruption probably will not be significant-
ly moderated. We believe that by 1990 the capacity of
export pipelines from the Persian Gulf will not be
much greater than 4 million b/d. The non-Commu-
nist world, therefore, will continue to ship a minimum
6 million b/d of oil from the Gulf through the Strait
of Hormuz, making it still the most important oil
transport route in the non-Communist world.
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Appendix A
Iraq's Export Pipelines
Iraq-Syria-Lebanon
The Middle East's first crude oil export pipelines
opened in 1934, linking Iraq's northern oilfields to
ports in the eastern Mediterranean. The two 12-inch-
diameter lines had a capacity of 45,000 b/d each. A
northern line crossed Syria and terminated at the
Lebanese port of Tripoli, while the southern line
passed through Jordan and Palestine to an export
terminal at Haifa. This latter pipeline operated from
1934 until 1948, when it was permanently closed after
the formation of the state of Israel. Portions of the
line in Jordan are still in use distributing irrigation
water and some petroleum products throughout the
The Tripoli export terminal has three deepwater
loading buoys able to handle tankers up to 300,000
dwt, and a smaller berth closer to shore. Gravity flow
provides oil to the berths by way of submarine
pipelines from 15 storage tanks with a total capacity
of 1.4 million barrels. The port's nominal throughput
rate is 645,000 b/d. At Baniyas, shallow water allows
accommodation of tankers only up to 120,000 dwt,
although the terminal has a nominal throughput
capacity of 830,000 b/d. Because of low-lying terrain,
the oil must be pumped through submarine lines to
the four offshore loading buoys. The 28 storage tanks
at Baniyas have a total capacity of 5.6 million barrels.
country.
Expanding oil production from Iraq's Kirkuk Oilfield
and loss of the southern 12-inch line spurred construc-
tion of a second northern pipeline. In addition to a
parallel 16-inch line, new and more powerful pumps
were installed at each of the seven pumping stations.
When modifications were completed in 1949, the
line's capacity was boosted to about 150,000 b/d. F_
Through 1980 the export capacity of Baniyas was
limited to 400,000 b/d because one of the loading
berths had been reconfigured to import gas-oil for
domestic use. Expansion of the Baniyas refinery was
to have eliminated this restriction, although it is
currently not known if the port is capable of exporting
at its rated capacity. Use of several of the crude oil
storage tanks to hold petroleum products for the
refinery, however, could still hamper full-scale export
This expansion was already inadequate when complet-
ed. Construction of a third pipeline, 30 to 32 inches in
diameter, was completed in 1952, boosting capacity to
500,000 b/d and adding a second export terminal at
Baniyas, Syria. The system was closed by sabotage
during the Suez Canal crisis in 1956; plans for a
further capacity increase were initiated when it was
reopened in 1957.
By altering pumping arrangements and laying parallel
"loops" of pipe in areas with greater-than-normal
uphill grades, an extra 250,000 b/d of capacity was
added over the next three years. By 1961 the individ-
ual "loops" had been connected, creating a second
parallel 32-inch pipeline. A second set of pumps was
provided at each station to service the new large-
diameter line, and capacity reached 1.2 million b/d.
As the system now exists, the 30- to 32-inch pipelines
run to Baniyas, while a 30-inch-diameter section
parallels the 12- and 16-inch lines to TripoliF_~
operations at the oil terminal.
The Turkish Pipeline
Currently, the sole operating Iraqi oil export route is
the 981-km-long pipeline running from the Kirkuk
Oilfield in Iraq to the Turkish Mediterranean port of
Ceyhan. The 40-inch-diameter pipeline has five
pumping stations, three of which are in Turkey. One
of two main control centers for the line is located at
Ceyhan, while the other is at the initial pump station
in Iraq. The line opened in 1977 and is currently
capable of carrying 700,000 b/d.
Storage at the export terminal consists of seven
1-million-barrel storage tanks gravity feeding four
tanker berths at the end of a 2-km-long jetty. The port
can handle tankers up to 300,000 dwt.
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The capacity of the pipeline is currently being ex-
panded to 980,000 b/d. The $100-140 million project
will replace all pumps at existing stations and add five
new pumping stations-two in Iraq and three in
Turkey. Also, 75 km of new pipe "looping" the line in
critical areas will be added. Construction is to be
completed in mid-1984. In the meantime, injection of
chemicals to enhance flow reportedly should be able
to increase current flow rates by as much as 130,000
b/d.
The "Strategic" North-South Pipeline
Addition of the North-South Pipeline between the
Iraq-Syria Pipeline system at Al Hadithah (pump
station K-3) and the southern oilfield at Rumaila
significantly increased the flexibility of the Iraqi oil
export network. The three pumping stations along the
42-inch diameter line allow movement of 980,000 b/d
of crude oil to the south, or 880,000 b/d northward.
The southern end links with the Rumaila-Fao Pipeline
leading to the Persian Gulf offshore loading termi-
nals. After both sea islands were destroyed at the
beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, the North-South
Pipeline allowed Iraq to produce and export up to
700,000 b/d of crude through Syria from Iraq's
southern oilfields. Closure of the Syrian Pipeline by
Damascus in April 1982 terminated crude oil exports
from Iraq's southern fields. The 42-inch crude oil
pipeline is paralleled by an 18-inch natural gasline.
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Appendix B
Saudi Arabia's Export Pipelines
The Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline)
When finished in 1950, Tapline was one of the world's
first large-diameter, long-distance pipelines. At 1,213
km, it is still the longest line in the Middle East. The
30- to 31-inch diameter line has a nominal capacity of
500,000 b/d and is driven by eight pumping stations,
seven in Saudi territory and one in Jordan. Tapline
supplies crude oil feedstock for Jordan's Zarqa Refin-
ery and the Medreco Refinery adjacent to the pipe-
line's export terminal at Sidon, Lebanon. This facility
has storage for 4.1 million barrels of crude oil in 23
tanks. Crude flows by gravity through submarine
pipelines to three offshore tanker berths
Use of Tapline as a major export route ended in 1975,
when transportation economics began to favor super-
tankers operating from the Persian Gulf. The line
remained partially open, however, to support the two
refineries, carrying 50,000 to 100,000 b/d annually.
In the years since Tapline has been closed for exports,
cannibalization of equipment needed to keep the line
operating may have cut its effective operating capaci-
ty in half.
Since 1981 military action in Lebanon has damaged
the pipeline, the storage tank farm, and the Medreco
Refinery. The impact of the damage on the line's
export capacity is not known, although the refinery is
once again operating, and Tapline's terminal and tank
farm are being used to import and store crude oil
feedstock. However, the Trans-Arabian Pipe Line
Company-still wholly owned by the four Aramco
partners (Exxon, Texaco, Chevron, and Mobil)-has
recently announced its intent to abandon the Leba-
nese portion of the pipeline. It apparently will contin-
ue supplying Jordan with about 50,000 b/d. With no
commitment to repair the damage in Lebanon, and
with only a modest operating and maintenance bud-
get, Tapline's use as an export route from the Persian
Gulf is apparently over.
Petroline-The East-West Pipeline
Concern about the vulnerability of its Persian Gulf
export facilities in the mid-1970s led Riyadh to
construct Petroline, the 1,200-km-long East-West
Pipeline to the Red Sea port of Yanbu al Bahr.
Completed in 1981 at a cost of $1.6 billion, the 48-
inch-diameter pipeline has a capacity of 1.85 million
b/d. The crude oil line is paralleled by a 26- to 30-
inch-diameter natural gas liquids (NGL) pipeline with
a capacity of 270,000 b/d. This line fuels'the 11
pumping stations and also feeds an NGL-fraction-
ation plant in Yanbu al Bahr. In an emergency, the
pump stations are also capable of using crude oil from
the main line.
The deepwater export terminal at Yanbu al Bahr
consists of a three-berth pier that can handle tankers
up to 500,000 dwt and a tank farm with 11 million
barrels of storage. In addition, the port's NGL plant is
capable of producing 250,000 b/d of liquefied petro-
leum gas (LPG) and natural gasoline for export. Two
refineries are also under construction; a 170,000-b/d
refinery for the domestic market nearing completion
and a 250,000-b/d export refinery scheduled to be
finished in 1984. The refineries are to be served by a
separate loading pier capable of handling product
tankers up to 150,000 dwt.
Expansion of Petroline has been discussed but does
not appear imminent in view of cutbacks in Aramco's
capital investment budget. As currently configured,
the line's 1.85-million-b/d capacity is achieved by
using two of the three pumps at each of the 11
pumping stations. The pipeline should be capable of
pumping 2.35 million b/d using all three pumps at
each station but has never been tested at this rate.
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Petroline has been tested to 1.9 million b/d with no
problems. With the addition of one pumping station
and parallel 48-inch "loop" lines in sections with
severe grades, nominal capacity could be raised by
500,000 b/d. At an estimated cost of $1 billion,
however, this is not an attractive option at present.
Plans for a second crude oil line were included in the
initial construction, and a parallel trench for the
future line was dug in those areas that required
extensive excavation or blasting through bedrock.
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Appendix C
Other Pipeline Proposals
The Iraq-Saudi Arabia Line
Baghdad is intensely interested in constructing a
pipeline through Saudi Arabia; US Embassy report-
ing from Baghdad indicates that the pipeline was one
of the primary issues raised in recent talks with
Riyadh. King Fahd is reported to have agreed to the
project, and Iraq has publicly announced its intention
to begin work soon. Financial considerations, how-
ever, could prevent an early start. Given the length of
time needed for engineering and route development
and construction, it is unlikely that the line could be
finished before 1987 at the earliest, even if the project
is initiated soon.
The preliminary feasibility study completed in 1981
concluded that a 48-inch-diameter pipeline carrying
1.6 million b/d could be constructed in four and a half
years, at a cost of $3.6 billion. Of the four alternate
routes studied, the most financially attractive one
runs southwesterly across Saudi Arabia, joining the
Petroline right-of-way to cross the mountains in the
western section of the country. The pipeline would be
1,240-km long, with 10 pumping stations, and would
end at a new export terminal on the Red Sea approxi-
mately 25 km south of Yanbu al Bahr
The "Trans-Oman" Pipelines
Recent conversations within the Gulf Cooperation
Council concerning a 1-million-b/d pipeline appear to
have been initiated by Muscat and have attracted
little enthusiasm from other members. The Japanese
are reported to have done a preliminary study in 1977,
and Aramco was tasked to prepare an economic
assessment in 1981. Nothing apparently has come of
either effort
Separately, Aramco is in the midst of exploration and
delineation drilling in the Shaybah and Ramlah Oil-
fields in southeastern Saudi Arabia, which could be
tied into a pipeline to Oman. In the absence of
development, however, Riyadh is unlikely to partici-
pate in a pipeline to Oman strictly on security
grounds.
it is unlikely to be resurrected soon.
Lingering animosity between the UAE and Oman
makes the Emirates unenthusiastic about a joint
pipeline. The UAE has, however, expressed interest in
building its own line to the Gulf of Oman entirely
within UAE territory. In 1981 a feasibility study
reportedly was initiated on a 48-inch-diameter,
1.6-million-b/d-capacity pipeline running from Abu
Dhabi to the Emirate of Fujairah, which lies on the
Gulf of Oman outside the Strait of Hormuz. The cost
was estimated at approximately $1 billion, and only
one year would be needed for constructing the 300-km
line. There has been no recent reporting on the
scheme, and-in view of the current soft oil market-
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Main Oil Movement by Sea-19829
1.2 Number indicates oil supply (million b/d) at point of origin.
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