(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000201900001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 4, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
VVashington. D. C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
4 February 1986
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OCR =5'
P&PD
INDO-US RELATIONS: New Delhi to Continue Testing
Washington's Commitment
Summary
Indian officials believe Indo-US ties are gradually
gaining a solid footing and that each side has a more
sober understanding of the other's goals for the
relationship. New Delhi is pleased that Washington has
come through on promises to release high technology and
to increase efforts to combat Sikh terrorists based in the
US, but other than offering US companies greater
opportunities in the Indian market, does not believe it
owes the US much in return at this point. Many Indians,
probably including Rajiv, believe that their willingness
to soften their rhetoric on contentious issues such as
Afghanistan and to shift to what they see as a position
more equidistant between the United States and the USSR
is a sufficient show of New Delhi's understanding of
Washington's views. The Indians will continue to test
Washington's commitment to a long-term relationship--a
test they see playing out over many years. We believe
that, for the foreseeable future, this will focus on the
transfer of high technology.
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
This memorandum was prepared by the South
Asia Division of the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis. It was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. Information as of 31 January 1986 was used in its
preparation. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to the Chief, South Asian Division, NESA
SEC
NESA M 86-20020
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Relations between India and the US historically have been
characterized by strain, only occasionally relieved by shows of
friendship and cooperation. The strains have been mainly a
result of differences in perceptions of the strategic environment
of South Asia. New Delhi continues to be concerned with securing
its own preeminence in the region to the exclusion of other--
particularly extraregional--powers. The Indians, though aware of
US strategic concerns in the region, have always been resistant
to viewing regional issues in east-west terms. Many members of
the Indian elite remain suspicious that US overtures towards
India in the wake of Rajiv Gandhi's ascension to power derive
more from Washington's broader, anti-Soviet, strategic interests
than from the desire to build long-lasting bilateral ties.
Moreover, most Indian officials, including Rajiv, are wary
of what they view as the US "reliability as a friend." This
deeply ingrained suspicion stems largely from the US decision to
cut off arms to India in the 1965 Indo-Pak War and is often
contrasted--even by Rajiv--with the perception that the Soviets
have stood by New Delhi steadfastly. Indian skepticism about
broader US goals in South Asia and Washington's perceived
penchant for policy vacillation form the basis for New Delhi's
attitude that the US must "go first" in demonstrating a
commitment to improved bilateral ties.
Gandhi's Technology Agenda
Rajiv Gandhi's efforts to reduce regional tensions are
designed, in part, to allow New Delhi to devote attention and
resources more fully to accelerating economic growth. He has
constantly stressed that as relations between India and Pakistan
improve, Washington will reduce arms sales to Pakistan, saving
both countries financial resources which he says should be spent
on raising the standard of living.
Gandhi's agenda for Indo-US relations is to obtain as tany
tangible economic and technological benefits from the US as
quickly as possible, and New Delhi has made it clear that it
views Washington's willingness to release high technology
material as an important first test of commitment to the
relationship. Implicit in his argument, we believe, is a view
that the US should actively support him in moving toward a less
regulated economy in which market forces play a large role.
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In Rajiv's view, the transfer of US technology, particularly
the sale of a supercomputer, is also a measure of Washington's
trust in India, symbolizing to some extent recognition of India
as a major world actor. Gandhi's frequent personal inquiries
about the issue suggest that he has invested his own prestige in
a test of the faith Washington has in him.
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From New Delhi's perspective, the increased opportunities
for US businesses in India should suffice as return on India's
interest in US technology. New Delhi views the recent Control
Data Corporation computer contract, some two hundred joint
ventures finalized over the past year, and expanded cooperation
with US business delegations and trade exhibitions as proof of
its commitment to stronger economic ties with the US.
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Even so, the United States can expect the competition for
high-tech sales to India to be stiff. While many Indian
officials, particularly scientists, have been trained in the US
and are favorably inclined toward US equipment, some will want to
guard against the risk of being tarred as pro-US. A significant
number of Indian officials will oppose almost a7, purchases from
the US purely for political reasons. 25X1
Moreover, Gandhi is after the best for the
will not necessarily buy from the United States
particular items have been cleared for export.
expected to use increased access to US products
European and Japanese suppliers--both on access
least cost, and
merely because
New Delhi can be
as leverage with
and price.
The undercurrent of Indian opposition to purchasing US high
technology is most likely to surface with regard to defense
technology. The military procurement process is controlled or at
least strongly influenced by civilians like Minister of State for
Defense Research and Development Arun Singh and Science Adviser
to the Ministry of Defense V. S. Arunachalam who are favorably
inclined toward US equipment for its superior quality. Many ?
serving Indian military officers have spent their careers with
Soviet-supplied hardware, however, and have resisted moving away
from familiar systems and supplier networks. Moreover, Gandhi
has said that he was not yet in favor of an arms supply
relationship until the broader foundations of bilateral ties had
stood some other tests. The US can also expect stiff competition
on military sales from Western European countries who got their
foot in the market in the late 1970s when New Delhi began te)
diversify its arms purchases.
Other Economic Issues
New Delhi has attached importance to other economic issues
such as concessional financing but does not seem to view them as
the tests that technology transfer is. In part, this is because
Rajiv and his new leadership promote a vision of India as a self-
sufficient, technologically advanced nation, not as a dependent
aid recipient. The US position on multilateral loans could
become a more important test if, as we expect, India's foreign
payments deficit continues to grow. New Delhi will probably try
to make an even closer connection between US economic philosophy
and India's need for capital and favorable treatment for exports
to underwrite its modernization drive.
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Terrorism and Narcotics
The greatest growth in Indo-US relations has come in coping
with issues such as terrorism and narcotics control which the
Indians have traditionally underplayed or viewed through a
politically-charged prism. In the face of a rapidly expanding
terrorist threat from Sikh extremists, New Delhi has welcomed
such practical cooperative measures from the US as upgrading
airport security in Bombay, training sky marshalls, and help in
investigating the Air-India crash off Ireland.
In addition, the Sikh threat and Washington's prompt
response in containing Sikh activity in the US has contributed to
an evolution in Indian policy and elite opinion toward terrorism
over the last several months. India's decision not to criticize
publicly US sanctions against Libya--despite pressure from Arab
states and radical members of the Nonaligned Movement-- and the
increasingly critical tone of Indian press toward terrorism
contrast sharply with India's traditional practice of excusing
Arab-sponsored terrorism. New Delhi has also supported bilateral
and regional efforts in South Asia to combat hijackings and
curtail cross-border movements by suspected terrorists. Several
Indian editors are beginning to condemn terrorism across the
board, specifically questioning past Indian policy of
differentiating between "who's a terrorist and who's serving a
national liberation movement."
US suggestions for increasing cooperation on the narcotics
front have coincided with a growing awareness over the last few
years in New Delhi of the expanding role India is playing in the
drug trade. Since last summer, the Indians have welcomed
increased US technical assistance, raised the domestic penalties
for narcotics violations with US encouragement, and backed
cooperative efforts initiated at the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
Pakistan and Sri Lanka
The Indians have not made US-Pakistani relations a make-or-
break test of Washington's commitment to Indo-US ties. In part,
this reflects their recognition that the US will not abandon
Pakistan to improve relations with them. The Indians are well
aware, however, that Indo-Pakistani rapprochement is a major US
regional goal. They have argued quietly that the US should
reward their efforts to reduce tensions with Islamabad by
helping to meet key Indian policy goals vis-a-vis Pakistan--
leveling off or reducing US military assistance to Islamabad and
a more active US role in blunting Pakistan's nuclear weapons
program.
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The Indians are skeptical about Washington's role in
blunting or stopping the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. In
part, this stems from their approach to the issue--they want
Washington to use its perceived leverage on Islamabad but they
have been cool to US efforts to nurture dialogue between the
Indians and the Pakistanis. Their approach also reflects
difficulties within Gandhi's higher councils in formulating a
response to Islamabad's many proposals for resolving the issue,
and Gandhi's subsequent frustration at being unable to regain the
public relations initiative.
The Indians see the US response to events in Sri Lanka as a
test of Washington's willingness to stay out of what New Delhi
views as a local problem and to support their regional
aspirations. Gandhi and other senior Indian officials have
welcomed US diplomatic support for India's initiative, but will
watch closely for signs of US intervention if negotiations break
down or fighting escalates.
Finding Middle Ground Between the US and the USSR
New Delhi continues to view relations with the US and the
USSR in large part as a mirror image of Washington's perspective
toward relations with India and Pakistan--India wants to improve
relations with Washington but will not do so at cost to its close
ties to Moscow. Gandhi made a commitment early in his tenure "to
mend fences with the United States" and to correct the impression
that New Delhi has a "special connection" to Moscow and, in our
view, he believes he has taken tangible steps to move New Delhi's
foreign policy to a position more equidistant between Washington
and Moscow. In his view, he has balanced his visits to the two
countries, has demonstrated his willingness to hear out US views
on disarmament, and welcomed high-level officials from both
countries to India.
As a result, New Delhi has for the most part, turned aside
US efforts to establish "tests" of the new bilateral relationship
that it perceives are driven by the US-Soviet rivalry. On ?
Afghanistan, Gandhi has offered to be a messenger between the US
and the USSR and has shown a greater willingness to hear out the
US position than his mother. Otherwise, he has stayed clear of
irritating Moscow on the issue, and New Delhi has stuck to its
pro-Soviet position on Afghanistan in the UN.
Although Foreign Secretary Bhandari hinted to Under
Secretary of State Armacost last spring that Washington would see
a change in Indian's overall voting pattern at the UN, we believe
he was promising more than he could deliver. Since then, New
Delhi has in effect turned the tables by saying its voting record
in the United Nations need not stand in the way of closer ties
with the United States. There is little question that while many
Indian officials believe their UN voting pattern reflects India's
"independent" views and its position with the Nonaligned Movement
majority, in many ways the votes remain a touchstone of New
Delhi's continued loyalty to Moscow.
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The Indians are skeptical about Washington's role in
blunting or stopping the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. In
part, this stems from their approach to the issue--they want
Washington to use its perceived leverage on Islamabad but they
have been cool to US efforts to nurture dialogue between the
Indians and the Pakistanis. Their approach also reflects
difficulties within Gandhi's higher councils in formulating a
response to Islamabad's many proposals for resolving the issue,
and Gandhi's subsequent frustration at being unable to regain the
public relations initiative.
The Indians see the US response to events in Sri Lanka as a
test of Washington's willingness to stay out of what New Delhi
views as a local problem and to support their regional
aspirations. Gandhi and other senior Indian officials have
welcomed US diplomatic support for India's initiative, but will
watch closely for signs of US intervention if negotiations break
down or fighting escalates.
Finding Middle Ground Between the US and the USSR
New Delhi continues to view relations with the US and the
USSR in large part as a mirror image of Washington's perspective
toward relations with India and Pakistan--India wants to improve
relations with Washington but will not do so at cost to its close
ties to Moscow. Gandhi made a commitment early in his tenure "to
mend fences with the United States" and to correct the impression
that New Delhi has a "special connection" to Moscow and, in our
view, he believes he has taken tangible steps to move New Delhi's
foreign policy to a position more equidistant between Washington
and Moscow. In his view, he has balanced his visits to the two
countries, has demonstrated his willingness to hear out US views
on disarmament, and welcomed high-level officials from both
countries to India.
As a result, New Delhi has for the most part, turned aside
US efforts to establish "tests" of the new bilateral relationship
that it perceives are driven by the US-Soviet rivalry. On ?
Afghanistan, Gandhi has offered to be a messenger between the US
and the USSR and has shown a greater willingness to hear out the
US position than his mother. Otherwise, he has stayed clear of
irritating Moscow on the issue, and New Delhi has stuck to its
pro-Soviet position on Afghanistan in the UN.
Although Foreign Secretary Bhandari hinted to Under
Secretary of State Armacost last spring that Washington would see
a change in Indian's overall voting pattern at the UN, we believe
he was promising more than he could deliver. Since then, New
Delhi has in effect turned the tables by saying its voting record
in the United Nations need not stand in the way of closer ties
with the United States. There is little question that while many
Indian officials believe their UN voting pattern reflects India's
"independent" views and its position with the Nonaligned Movement
majority, in many ways the votes remain a touchstone of New
Delhi's continued loyalty to Moscow.
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SUBJECT: INDO-US RELATIONS: New Delhi to Continue Testing
Washington's Commitment
Internal Distribution:
1 - DDI
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - C/PPS/NESA
1 - C/SO/D/NESA
1 - C/AI/D/NESA
1 - C/PG/D/NESA
1 - C/IA/D/NESA
1 - DDO/NEA/INS
1 - DDO/NE/SAO
1 - C/OSWR/TTAC
1 - PDB Staff
1 - NID Staff
1 - CPAS/ISS
1 - CPAS/ILS
4 - CPAS/IMD/DB
2 - NESA/PS
1 - C/NESA/SO/S/Branch
1 - C/NESA/SO/P/Branch
1 - C/NESA/SO/A/Branch
1 - C/NESA/SO/I Branch
1 - SO/S Transcript File
DDI/NESA/SO/S
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SUBJECT: INDO-US RELATIONS: New Delhi to Continue Testing
Washington's Commitment
External Distribution:
Mr. Walter Andersen
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State, Room 4636
Major General Kenneth D. Burns
USAF, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
Room 4D765, Pentagon
Ms. Sandra Charles
Director, Near East South Asia Region
International Security Affairs,
Department of Defense, Room 4D765, Pentagon
Captain Edward Louis Christensen, USN, Chief, South Asian
Regional Plans and Policy Branch, Department of Defense, Room
2E973, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301
Dr. Stephen Cohen
Policy Planning Staff,
Department of State, Room 7311
Mr. James P. Covey
Special Assistant to the President
and Senior Director,
Near East and South Asia Affairs,
National Security Council,
Room 351, Old Executive Office Building,
Mr. Robert Dean
Deputy Director
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State, Room 7428
Mr. Donald R. Fortier
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Room 38.1, Old Executive Office Building
Lt. General Philip C. Gast, USAF
Director of Defense Security Assistance
Department of Defense, Room 4E841
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Mr. Charles W. Greenleaf, Jr.
Assistant Administrator for Asia and Nea East Bureau
Agency for International Development
Department of State, Room 6212
Mr. Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs,
Room 381, Executive Office Building,
Washington, DC 20520
Mr. Charles A. Hamilton
Director, Office of Strategic Trade Policy
Defense Technology Security Administration
Department of Defense, Room OSD 400 AND
Mr. Byron Jackson
Office of Intelligence Liaison
Department of Commerce, Room 6854
Mr. Jerry W. Leach
Deputy Director, Office of Strategic Technology
Affairs, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of State, Room 7815
Mr. Ralph Lindstrom
Director, Office of Economic Analysis
Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Department of State, Room 8722
Mr. Ron Lorton
Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
South Asia Division,
Department of State, Room 4636A
Mr. Hugh Montgomery
IO/UNA
Department of State
Room 6333
Mr. Douglas Mulholland
Special Assistant to Secretary
Department of Treasury, Room 4324
Mr. Marc Palovitz
Special Assistant for South Asia,
International Security Affairs,
Near Eastern-South Asian Region
Department of Defense, Room 4D765,
Pentagon
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Mr. Robert A. Peck
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
Department of State, Room 6244
Mr. Christopher Ross
Director, Regional Affairs, Bureau of
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Department of State, Room 5254A
Mr. Grant Smith
Director, INS, Bureau of Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs
Department of State, Room 5251
Mr. Darnell Whitt
Intelligence Adviser to the Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy,
Room 3E-228, Pentagon
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