(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86T01017R000403530001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 10, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
10 March 1986
The Netherlands: Election Politics and Prospects for INF
Deployment 25X1
Summary
Ratification of the US-Dutch basing agreement by
the lower house of parliament has removed another
obstacle in the path of INF deployment, but actual
emplacement of the missiles remains in doubt. If the
Labor Party enters government after the election in
May--which polls suggest remains a possibility--it
almost certainly will try to revise the INF decision.
Deployment is not completely assured even if the
current center-right government remains in power. The
Dutch are not scheduled to deploy cruise missiles until
1988, leaving ample time for new events--such as an
attractive Soviet arms control offer--to emerge as an
excuse for delay.
Preelection Outlook
The opposition Labor Party undoubtedly will make INF a
principal issue in May's election, but it faces a difficult
battle in dislodging the Christian Democratic-Liberal coalition
that has held power for all but two of the past eight years. A
public opinion survey in January showed that the coalition would
at that time receive 76 out of 150 seats in the Second Chamber of
Parliament, compared to 58 seats for the Labor Party. The survey
This memorandum was prepared byl (Office of European
Anal Questions and comments are welcome and may be addressed to
Chief, West European Division,
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results suggest that the government's decision in November to go
ahead with deployment did little damage to its electoral standing
and that the importance of INF as a public issue is declining.
Although polls show a majority of Dutchmen continue to oppose
cruise missile deployment, a survey last fall revealed that
"disarmament" was no longer among the top ten policy issues for
voters. Even prominent peace movement leaders have acknowledged
to US officials that popular interest in INF is waning.
The government is also benefitting from an upswing in the
economy and from the Labor Party's inability to overcome intra-
party strife and develop an effective alternative economic
program. Moreover, Labor's aging candidate for Prime Minister,
Joop den Uyl, has far less voter appeal than energetic Christian
Democratic Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers. Indeed, Christian
Democratic strategists have told US officials a key to the
campaign will be contrasting Lubbers with "yesterday's man," den-
Uyl.* A strategy of emphasizing a popular incumbent worked for
Prime Minister Martens in Belgium last year and Dutch Christian
Democrats are counting on the same thing.
The government's currently favorable standing in opinion
polls could still decline, however, as a result of the
increasingly bitter dispute between the coalition partners over
euthanasia and budget issues. A vigorous campaign by the
opposition for dual control of cruise missiles based in the
Netherlands--a demand rejected by the government but shared by
many leftwing Christian Democrats--could also divide the
coalition.**
To maintain its electoral edge, the center-right coalition
is anxious to avoid any issues that might revive peace movement
activity. Dutch officials, according to US diplomats, are
concerned that Washington might stir controversy by announcing a
less strict interpretation of the ABM and SALT II treaties.
Foreign Minister van den Broek, in a recent meeting with US
*Den Uyl apparently recognizes this problem, and recently hinted he will
step down as Labor leader sometime after the election even if the party reenters
the government. 25X1
**Provincial elections on 19 March will be an important preelection test of
the government's voting strength. In 1982, these elections accurately predicted
the victory for the Christian Democrats and Liberals in the parliamentary
election. 25X1
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officials, emphasized that "further abrogation" of SALT II would
have drastic consequences for Dutch public opinion. In our view,
this wariness about voter reaction also probably means the Dutch
government will not sian an aareement with Washington on SDI
before the election.
Implications of Different Election Outcomes for INF
If the Christian Democrats and Liberals receive slightly
less than a majority of seats in the next election--say between
70 and 75 seats--they probably will initially try to enlist
support from the small left-of-center Democrats '66 (D'66)
Party. Although the D'66 is ideologically closer to the Labor
Party, party leader Hans van Mierlo may agree to collaborate with
the Christian Democrats and Liberals in exchange for concessions
on economic and social issues, such as higher public expenditures
for low-income groups.
The D'66 has opposed INF in the past, but a recent party
congress decided not to demand cancellation of the US-Dutch
basing accord once it was approved by parliament. D'66 leaders
did, however, make clear that they would try to renegotiate
unspecified parts of the INF agreement with Washington. D'66
acquiescence in INF in any case will continue to depend almost
entirely on the personal views of Van Mierlo, who holds a
dominant position in the party. The party relies on him to
restore lost popularity and appears ready to go along with his
views on INF. Should Van Mierlo become more hostile to
deployment, D'66 would quickly reverse its more accommodating
stand.
If the D'66 refuses to participate in a center-right
government, Lubbers might turn to the small rightwing religious
parties--such as the Reformed Political Federation or the
Reformed Union--that are likely to win about 9 seats. Even
though these parties are basically in tune with the current
government on INF, they probably would not consider a coalition
with the Christian Democrats and Liberals if the latter continue
to press for legalization of euthanasia--a policy morally
unacceptable to the small religious parties.
If the center-right total falls below 70 seats, we think the
Christian Democrats will find it very hard to avoid a coalition
with Labor. In the.post-election coalition-building negotiations
-- and after formation of a new cabinet--the Labor Party probably
would try to make good its pledge to reverse the INF
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basing agreement.* The Christian Democrats almost certainly
would reject demands for unilateral abrogation of the basing
accord, but leftwing Christian Democrats might support
renegotiation of the agreement, especially on questions of
command and control of cruise missiles. Although most leftwing
Christian Democrats have not openly challenged the party
leadership's position that Dutch sharing in the control of INF
missiles is unnecessary, there
is considerable sympathy for "dual key" control of INF based in
the Netherlands. Defense Minister De Ruiter, for example, has
consistently argued for a more explicit Dutch role in command and
control.
Prime Minister Lubbers--who probably would head a Christian
Democratic-Labor coalition--almost certainly would try to fend
off leftist pressure for renegotiation of the US-Dutch agreement-
by offering concessions on some social and economic issues, but
we doubt that Labor could ever be induced to endorse deployment
unconditionally--Labor's current identity is tied too closely to
opposition to INF. If forced to govern with the Labor Party,
Lubbers might ask Washington to agree to some change in the
agreement--for example, reducing the period after which the INF
accord can be reviewed from five years to a shorter period.
Lubbers might also try to deflect pressure to backtrack on
deployment by agreeing to review the decision only if the Soviet
SS-20 total dropped below 378--the ceiling Lubbers set in 1984 as
a condition for forgoing deployment in the Netherlands. If
Washington refused to make concessions, Lubbers might then try to
placate Labor and the leftwing of his own party by stalling on
the implementation of the cruise missile agreement.
Alternatively, Lubbers might try to win support from the
Christian Democratic leadership for withdrawing from coalition
wih Labor and calling for a new election by emphasizing Labor's
inflexibility and anti-NATO stance. Lubbers presumably would
calculate that a new election could return the Christian
Democrats and Liberals to power because of the voters' desire for
governmental stability and realization that center-left
coalitions are inherently unstable.
*During parliamentary ratification debates, Labor spokesman cited changes in
the US-Dutch tax treaty by Congress as justification for unilateral abrogation of
cam+.. ...L.;~L.
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the of
would rule on the legality of abrogation, would accept Labor's stand. 25X1
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Arms Control Temptations
We believe INF deployment is not completely certain even if
the present center-right coalition is reelected. An attractive
Soviet arms control proposal, for example, always has the
potential to revive anti-INF sentiment among leftwing Christian
Democrats--who may again hold the balance of power in parliament
if the center-right returns with only a small majority--and
increase public pressure on the government to delay cruise
missile deployment.
Thus far, The Hague's reaction to Gorbachev's most recent
proposal has been cautious. The government has emphasized that
new elements in the Soviets' position deserve careful analysis in
NATO forums, but it rejected opposition demands to postpone
ratification of the INF basing agreement. Nevertheless, we
believe Lubbers continues to hope for an interim accord on INF
before 1988 which could make Dutch cruise missile deployment
unnecessary. During his visit to Moscow this spring he may probe
Soviet flexibility on INF despite repeated assurances by The
Hague to US officials that the Dutch deployment decision would
not be discussed. If the Soviets hinted that new concessions
might be forthcoming to enable an early agreement, we think
Lubbers would consider delaying construction of permanent INF
basing facilities at Woensdrecht, set to begin this April.
The prospects for successful INF deployment in the
Netherlands, we believe, also are related to Dutch perceptions of
US arms control efforts. The recent US proposal for the complete
elimination of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and Asia may
improve Washington's "peace image," but it may also strengthen
Labor Party arguments that INF deployment in the Netherlands is
unnecessary. Even the Labor Party, however, would find it
difficult to maintain its unconditional opposition to INF if a
US-Soviet interim accord called for limited cruise missile
deployment in the Netherlands. Perceptions that Washington
insists on stricter verification procedures or intends to ignore
the limits set by the SALT II and ABM treaties almost certainly
would make it more difficult for Lubbers to ignore suspicions
within his own Christian Democratic Party that the United States
continues to place greater emphasis on a military buildup than on
an arms control agreement.
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SUBJECT: The Netherlands: Election Poems and Prospects
for INF Deployment
Distribution:
External
1 - Tom Troy, EUR/PP, Room 6221-A, State
1 - John Hostie, INR/WEA, Room 4742, State
1 - Bowman Miller, INR/WEA, Room 4742, State
1 - Steve McGann, EUR/NE, EUR, Room 4513, State
1 - Ronald Bartek, PM/TMP, Room 7428, State
1 - Harry Gilmore, EUR/CE, Room 4232, State
1 - Ray Caldwell, EUR/RPM, Room 6227, State
1 - Henry Myers, INR, Room 6531, State
1 - Ty Cobb, NSC, Room 368, EOB
1 - Leo Michel, Room 1E760, Pentagon DoD
1 - Raymond Firehock, ACDA/USIA, Room 6510A
1 - Robert Ashdown, ACDA/USIA, Room 6510A
Internal
1- DDI
1 - NIO/WE
1 - ACIS
1 - C/PES
1 - D/ALA
1 - D/OCR
1 - C/OCR
1 - D/SOVA
1 - D/OEA
1 - D/OGI
1 - D/OIA
1 - D/NESA
1 - D/OSWR
1 - D/EURA
4 - IMB/CB
2 - EURA Production Staff
1 - C/EURA/WE
1 - EURA/WE/BBC Production File
1 - EURA/WE/BBC
ORIG: EURA/WE/BBC
(7 March 1986)
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