THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM - 19 DECEMBER 1967

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06752211
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: December 19, 1967

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
Top-Secret
122
19 December 1967
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Information as of 1600
19 December 1967
HIGHLIGHTS
There have been a number of indications pointing
to a forthcoming increase in Communist military activ-
ity in the southern portion of I Corps. In addition,
several reports suggest an increase in
terrorism around Saigon to mark three Communist anni-
versaries on 19, 20, and 22 December.
I. Military Situation in South Vietnam: Numerous
small unit .engagements were reported in widely scattered
areas of the country on 18 December (Paras. 1-3). A
number of reports indicate that Communist
forces are planning attacks in Quang Ngai Province
and in the Saigon area (Paras. 4-11).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: One
of Vice President Ky's advisers reportedly fears that
Police Director Loan's anti-American campaign will
have repercussions if allowed to continue (Paras. 1-3).
Defense Minister Vy appeared before both houses of
the legislature on 18 December to defend the govern-
ment's mobilization decree (Paras. 4-7). The Farmer-
Worker-Soldier Bloc has disbanded its Lower House
contingent and is apparently having difficulty keep-
ing its Upper House group together (Paras. 8-11).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam: Five
North Vietnamese - piloted MIG-21s have flown from
Meng-tzu Airfield in southwest China to Phuc Yen
(Para. 1). Two, and possibly four, North Vietnamese
MIG-17s were shot down by US aircraft on 18 December
(Para. 2).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: Vietnamese
Communist spokesmen continue to take 'a tough line on
negotiations and a settlement of the war (Paras. 1-2).
The Communists are using the anniversary of the Front's
founding to stress their resolve to continue the war
(Paras. 3-4).
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Numerous small unit engagements were re-
ported in widely scattered areas of the country on
18 December. A total of nearly 40 such clashes in
the I and II Corps areas resulted in 25 enemy killed
and seven captured.
2. On 17 December a Civilian Irregular Defense
Group (CIDG) company ran into a fight in Hau Nghia
Province about 26 miles northwest of Saigon. A
second company airlifted into the battle area also
came under heavy fire. Four helicopters were downed
and six were damaged. Allied losses were five
killed and 15 wounded, and enemy casualties came
to 42 dead.
3. The enemy force involved was probably the
Viet Cong 269th Main Force battalion. The heavy
weapons company of the 269th is reported to have
four heavy 12.8-mm. antiaircraft guns. A recent
defector reported that Viet Cong Units in Hau Nghia
were receiving training in antiaircraft fire tech-
niques at a special school located in the Ba Thu
area of Cambodia, opposite the Hau Nghia Province
border.
Communist Military Plans in Quang Ngai
4. The Communists are apparently planning to
intensify military activity in the southern �ortion
of I Corps in the near future.
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6. A recent.defector,. who claims to have been
one of the 1,000 prisoners freed in the.Viet.Cong
raid.on the Quanq Ncrai-iail in late.August, has
stated. that a combat battalion
was formed:trom-amOng 'the ax-prisoners. :The source,
a member of the Viet, Cong
stated that between December and February
the.ehtire Quang Ngairovince force" plans to at-
tack the provincial capital..
Increased Enemy Activity:Expected in the Saigon. Area
9. Three commemorative days fall in the 19th to 22nd
period. The first of these is 19 December or Na-
tional Resistance Day, .commemorating the commence-
ment of the Viet Minh resistance against the French
in 1946. The 7th anniversary of the National Libera-
tion Front is on 20 December, and 22 December is
the 23rd anniversary of the formation of the North
Vietnamese Army.
10. The Communists have used such occasions
in the past to stage dramatic attacks for a maximum
propaganda gain.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Dang Duc Khoi, newly appointed special
assistant to Vice President Ky, believes Police
Director Loan is behind the recent upsurge in anti-
American editorials in the press and has advised Ky
to restrain Loan,
Khoi reportedly met with Ky on 13 December to dis-
cuss the problem and mentioned several instances
of anti-Americanism which could be attributO to
Loan and his subordinate, Mai Den, whom Khoi de-
scribed as the "mastermind" of these incidents. One
was the series of anti-American articles which have
recently appeared in the daily Cong. Chung, a paper
generally considered to be under at least a degree
of direct control by Loan.
2. Khoi expressed the fear that, while the
Loan - Mai Den campaign has not yet reached serious
proportions, continued free rein for them capuld
damage US-Vietnamese relations and even hurt the war
effort. He therefc5re :._ advised,
that Ky persuade Loan to dismiss Mai Den and
s op pu lication of Cong Chung. Ky reportedly prom-
ised to talk to Loan but said he would have a diffi-
cult time persuading him to let Mai Den go. Ky said
he had tried this once before to no avail.
3. Khoi said he had already discussed the
situation with Loan. Although Loan agreed that the
Americans posed no real long-range threat to Viet-
namese sovereignty, the two could reach no common
ground on how to lessen shorter range frictions which
result from the massive American presence. Loan
reportedly told Khoi that Mai Den was a dedicated,
clever intelligence officer who had done nothing
worse than criticize the US. Loan therefore felt
it would be incongruous to fire his subordinate
while others about whom Loan had evidence of some
wrongdoing were kept on by their superiors.
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Mobilization Decree Defended Before Assembly
4. Defense Minister Nguyen Van Vy met with both
houses of the National Assembly on 18 December to de-
fend the government's partial mobilization decree of
24 October. Although Vy's performance appeared to
have been satisfactory, according to press reports
the Upper. House meeting on 19 December voted over-
whelmingly to reject the government's justification
of its decree. Preliminary indications are that the
government's position may be supported by the Assembly.
There is at least one report that three members of the
Lower House are circulating a draft decree to substitute
for the government's decree.
5. Vy met with members of the Upper House for
about four hours in an open plenary session attended
by all 60 members. He read a statement outlining the
government's position, and defended the former Directo-
rate's action in promulgating the decree as legal under
Article 111 of the Constitution. Vy maintained that
promulgation in October was necessary in view of an
anticipated 1968 requirement for 64,000 additional men
and because of the need to give those who will be af-
fected as much time as possible to meet the eventuality.
He also argued that lowering the draft age from 20 to
18 was a logical course for a nation at war. He added,
however, that l8-year-olds will not be called up be-
fore the end of 1968. Student deferments, he noted,
would be flexible, allowing superior students to
continue their studies. Those who want to study abroad
will be required to pass .special examinations, and
they will have to pursue studies that will benefit
the nation.
6. The question-and-answer period in the Senate
was generally, orderly and without rancor. Vy answered
questions touching on such subjects as the rates of
desertion and draft evasion (both down 30 percent in
1967 from 1966); postponement of certain parts of the
mobilization decree until the National Assembly has
the opportunity to legalize the order (there is no
longer a question of amending or suspending the decree--
the important thing is to apply it fairly); and the
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III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. At least five North Vietnamse - piloted
MIG-21 fighters flew from Meng-tzu Airfield in
southwest China to Phuc Yen on 17 December. Some
18 to 20 North Vietnamese MIG-21s had flown to
Chinese airfields since 30 June of this year. The
17 December flight marks the first detected return
of MIG-21 aircraft to North Vietnam.
2. There are believed to be about eleven
MIG-21s and possibly seven or eight MIG-17s at
various airfields within North Vietnam. At least
two and possibly four MIG-17s were shot down by
US aircraft cannon fire on 18 and 19 December.
/19 December 1967
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subject of draft deferments (no favors should be given
to sons of wealthy or prominent families and a crack-
down should be made on students who use their studies
to evade the draft).� Another question touched on the
point of why the draft age was lowered if only a 64,000-
man increase is needed (replacements are needed for
casualties and discharges as well as to increase the
size of the military--as only 40 percent of army's
needs will be met by conscription in 1968). Suspicions
were voiced that the government used the mobilization
of specialists as a.way to control oppositionists (de-
fense requirements are the only consideration for
drafting specialists--the main need will be for doctors
which are in particular short supply).
7. Vy appeared before a closed session of the
Lower House on the afternoon of 18 December. Accord-
ing to two Lower. House officers, Vy's performance was
as good as the. one he.gave.before the Upper House.
After reading a prepared statement, he replied to some
120 questions. Inquiries reportedly fell into-three
broad categories: 1).those.challenging the constitu-
tionality of the decree itself; 2) those questioning
the fairness of the. decree; and 3) those relating to',
what action the. government might take if the National
Assembly "rejects" the decree or requests that its
application be suspended. Vy, in responding to the
questions posed, stressed the need for the immediate.
application of the decree. He declared, however, that
the government would follow another, mobilization law
if one were passed ..by the assembly.
Farmer-Worker-Soldier Bloc on the Downswing
8. The Lower House contingent of the Farmer-
Worker-Soldier Bloc has reportedly decided to disband
for lack of active participation. The Upper House
contingent may also be near dissolving.
9. five mem-
bers of the Lower House group made the decision to
disband on 10 December, following a series of meetings
which went almost unattended. The five reportedly
attribute their group's demise to the diminishing
popularity of the bloc's leaders, most of whom are
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senators. Senator Dang.Van Sung and Tran Quoc Buu,
president of the Vietnamese Confederation of Workers,
they say, are too pro-American, while Senator Ton
That Dinh is too pro-Buddhist and antigovernment.
The five also believe that Tran Van Don, president
of the bloc, is a good man but not politically astute.
10. The bloc is losing prestige in the Upper
House, according to Senator Nguyen Gia Hien, leader
of the Senate's. National Democratic Socialist Bloc.
Hien reportedly claims that both Don and Dinh are
primarily military men, uninterested in politics or
political party formation. He claims that they can
find no common ground with members of other Upper House
blocs and will not discuss practical politics.
11. Although Hien's attitude may be slightly
colored because of Don's refusal to go along with a
proposal that their two blocs merge, there are other
indications of Don's political ineptitude. This may
hurt not only his bloc, but also his chances for
election to the Upper House chairmanship. Hien has
said that his bloc's votes will go to Senator NgUyen
Van Huyen, despite Don's appeal for Hien's support.
President Thieu, in addition, has reportedly indicated
his preference for Huyen over Don.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. North Vietnamese spokesmen abroad continue
to take a tough line on the question of settling the
war. They insist that an unconditional cessation of
the bombing must precede any negotiations and that
a settlement must be in accordance with their terms.
2. In a lengthy interview with a western jour-
nalist last week, Tran Viet Dung, counselor of the
North Vietnamese mission in France, refused to con-
sider any suggestions for achieving a settlement ex-
cept on the basis of well-known Communist positions.
He placed the blame for the war squarely on the US
and claimed that the American aim is to destroy North
Vietnam's sovereignty and bring it into the US "sphere
of influence." Dung also claimed that the Liberation
Front is much stronger than the "Saigon clique" but
was unable to agree to or to even comprehend a pro-
posal that the US and North Vietnam withdraw and
leave a compromise government in the South.
Liberation Front Anniversary
3. The Vietnamese Communists are using the
occasion of the seventh anniversary of the founding
of the Liberation Front to voice their determination
to press on with the war. At a meeting in Hanoi,
Front and North Vietnamese officials spoke of their
resolve and determination to continue the struggle.
One spokesman portrayed the coming period as "one
of violent and fierce battles," but claimed that the
people will not shrink from any sacrifice or trial
and that the North abides by the slogan, "everything
for the fraternal south."
4. Similar statements were made at a gathering
of Front officials in a "liberated area" in the South.
Nguyen Huu Tho, head of the Front presidium, addressed
high-level members of the Front and denounced what he
termed "deceitful US peace negotiations." According
to an 18 December broadcast, he also set forth "the fu-
ture trend of the tasks of the Southern Armed Forces
and People."
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