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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOC;i.;;`,".7..IT NO.
NC
[
CLASS. G;-iANC.,ED -la 13
NEXT 1:EVIENN DATE:
AUTH: 411 ii-20FAL
DATE. 0 � ,EVIEWER:
Copy No.
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
VP I
67
TOP SIXRET
SECURI INFORMATION
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SECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
I. New Rhee moves against political rivals may be imminent
(page 3).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
2. Iranian prime minister gives informal Battle Act assurances
(page 3).
3. Comment on the Arab League Defense Council meetings
(page 4).
WESTERN EUROPE
4. Embarrassment to US seen in British reduction of occupation
forces in Austria (page 4).
THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE ADDED ON 7 SEPTEMBER
Comment on Tito's 6 September speech on the Trieste dispute
(page 5).
Comment on the West German elections (page 6).
6 Sept 53
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
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SECURITY INFORMA I ION
3.5(c)
FAR EAST
1. New Rhee moves against political rivals may be imminent:
American officials in Tokyo believe that
t he arrest of the allegedly Communist
adviser to Liberal Party leader Yang
U-chong may be the first step in a new
move by President Rhee to reduce the influence of the Yi Pom-
sok faction of the party. They note that Yang is Yi's foremost
supporter and that Rhee may now feel this faction has become
too strong during the past six months.
Meanwhile, evidence continues to mount
that Rhee is planning to move against political opponents outside
his party.
Current extrav-
agant statements by South Korean officials on the growing Com-
munist threat may also be a warning of impending internal political
action.
Comment: A move to undermine Yi, now
considered Rhee's probable successor, would be consistent with
Rhee's past tactics against any political leader who gains too much
power. The government, through police intimidation, has vir-
tually eliminated all overt political opposition to the president.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
2. Iranian prime minister gives informal Battle Act assurances:
On 3 September Iranian prime minister
Zahedi verbally assured Ambassador
Henderson and Point IV director Warne
that Iran would not sell to the Soviet
Orbit those commodities which the United States considered to be
strategic materials under the provisions of the Battle Act.
- 3 -
TOP SF2RET
6 Sept 53
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
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SECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
Zahedi added that Iran probably also would
not sell to the USSR some of the goods provided for in the Iranian-
Soviet trade agreement signed earlier that day.
Comment: Two days earlier Zahedi had
asked to be informed of any commodities Iran might send to the
USSR which America considered to be strategic materials.
The terms of previous Iranian-Soviet trade
agreements have rarely been met by either party.
3. Comment on the Arab League Defense Council meetings:
The meetings of the Arab League Defense
Council, which opened in Cairo on 4 September, are likely to achieve
little progress toward the establishment of an effective regional de-
fense organization. The council, composed of the ministers of war
of the league states, is reportedly studying the recommendations
of the Arab chiefs of staff conference which ended 1 September.
It is doubtful, however, that any final deci-
sions were reached by the chiefs of staff. Discussions reportedly
concerned the establishment of a unified Arab military command,
standardization of arms, and joint training plans.
Egyptian efforts to assert leadership over the group resulted
in friction, particularly with the Iraqi delegation.
WESTERN EUROPE
4. Embarrassment to US seen in British reduction of occupation forces
in Austria:
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
The US ambassador in Austria sees a pos- 3.3(h)(2)
sibility of serious embarrassment to the
American position in Austria in the British
decision to reduce its occupation forces.
The ambassador fears that in the event the French follow suit, the
USSR may make a partial withdrawal of its forces to Hungary.
- 4 -
6 Sept 53
TOP SECRET
3.5(c)
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Niair
SECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
Comment: Following the 30 July announce-
ment that the USSR would assume its occupation costs, the British
on 19 August announced their intention to end Austrian occupation
payments for their token 4,000-man force by 1 Ianuary 1954.
The French have been under considerable
pressure from the Austrian press to reduce their forces. The French
high commiSsioner stated on 31 July that he intended to recommend
that the 9,000 French occupation troops be reduced to a token force.
THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE ADDED ON 7 SEPTEMBER
5. Comment on Tito's 6 September speech on the Trieste dispute:
Marshal Tito has reverted to an ostensibly
uncompromising position by proposing that the city of Trieste be
internationalized and that the remainder of the Free Territory go to
Yugoslavia. By substituting this plan for previous compromise sug-
gestions for a condominium or division of the territory he hopes at
the least to prevent further concessions to Italy in Zone A.
This move probably also is intended to
Improve his chances of pushing the US and Britain into imposing a
new solution on Italy. If he does not attain such an objective, he can
continue to sit tight and employ the threat of annexing Zone B to
block concessions in Zone A.
As of 7 September, no Yugoslav troops have
been moved to the frontier from other areas. Tito apparently recog-
nizes that the current dispute would become dangerous if he took such
action. In his speech, he implied that none will be moved unless there
is an Italian-inspired incident.
3.5(c)
Such an incident, in the form of pro -Italian
riots in Trieste, is an ever-present possibility./
3.3(h)(2)
The Italian Foreign Ministry has
as yet made no official comment on Tito's speech.
- 5 -
T0P)E IC4T
7 Sept 53
3.5(c)
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SECURITY INFORMATION
3.5(c)
6. Comment on the West German elections:
The overwhelming plurality achieved by the
Christian Democratic Party in the 6 September West German
election is attributable to the direct appeal of Chancellor Adenauer
to the center and right, which upset the traditional German voting
pattern of supporting parties rather than personalities.
With his own party alone commanding almost
exactly half of the seats in the new Bundestag, Adenauer should have
no difficulty forming another coalition like his last. He could pro-
bably also command the two-thirds parliamentary vote required to
amend the constitution if this proves necessary to permit German
rearmament. Because the victory represents a personal mandate,
Adenauer may, however, become increasingly independent and more
difficult to deal with.
The failure of the Social Democratic propa-
ganda against EDC is likely both to give a new impetus to the
concept of European integration and to cause extensive changes in
policy and leadership within the party itself.
6
TOP,SECIET
7 Sept 1953
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
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