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SEC INFORMATION
CO2869419 ,
30 September 1953
Copy No. b
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO 16
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE. .2a as
AUTH: FIR 70-2
DATE:49.4ZZ7,2__ REVIEWEF
Office of Current Intelligence
3.5(c)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SECURITY INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. New Georgian leader appears to be Khrushchev appointment
(page 3).
2. Soviet defense industry to produce agricultural machinery (page 3).
FAR EAST
3. Rhee insists on permanent exchange rate (page 4).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4. Burma's need for arms indicated (page 4).
5. Indonesian army fears Darul Islam attempt to seize capital (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
t./v Iranian premier apparently preparing for oil settlement talks (page 5).
IX British may change views on compensation agreement on Iranian oil
(page 6).
8. Moroccan tribesmen reportedly still loyal to deposed sultan (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
9.
10. Comment on the death of West Berlin mayor Reuter (page 7).
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SECURITY INFORMATION
SOVIET UNION
1.
New Georgian leader appears to be Khrushchev appointment:
3.5(c)
The choice of V. P. Mzhavanadze as
first secretary of the Georgian republic's party organization is
apparently another move by Moscow to terminate the conflicts
In that republic's leadership. During the past two years Georgian
politics have been characterized by purges and counterpurges of
seemingly pro- and anti-Beria elements.
Mzhavanadze, though of Georgian ex-
traction, is an outsider to the Georgian political scene. He
gained his political experience in the Ukraine when Khrushchev
was that republic's party leader. He attained the rank of lieu-
tenant general in 1944 and was the top political officer for the
Kiev Military District from 1946 until at least 1950. In April
1950 he was elected to the Ukrainian party's Organizational Buro.
Party leaders in Georgia are now prob-
ably controlled directly by Khrushchev, the first party secretary
In Moscow, who has no native ties and is not likely to .11.eddle in
Georgian affairs for sentimental motives as did Stalin and Beria.
2. Soviet defense industry to produce agricultural machinery:
The 26 and 29 September decrees of the
Council of Ministers directing the Ministry of Defense Industry
and the Ministry of Aviation to produce tractors and other types
of agricultural machinery underscore the priority now being given
to the new Soviet agricultural mechanization program.
The Ministry of Defense Industry has
never produced tractors and the Ministry of Aviation has not pro-
duced agricultural machinery since the immediate postwar years.
The bulk of new agricultural machinery production, however, is
still to be handled by the industrial ministries.
The defense ministries have been ordered
to produce only small quantities of agricultural machinery, and this
production could be offset by increases in productivity or capacity
without reducing the current high level of Soviet military production.
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FAR EAST
3. Rhee insists on permanent exchange rate:
President Rhee has stubbornly rejected 3.3(h)(2)
American proposals for establishing a
realistic and flexible exchange rate�
according to American economic advther
Wood. Without a permanent rate, Rhee insists, the American aid
program to Korea will be valueless and Korean recovery impossible.
He now plans to write President Eisenhower requesting United States
agreement to a fixed rate of exchange.
Wood believes that Rhee's attitude stems
not from a desire to drive a bargain with the United States, but
from a "deeply felt erroneous conception" that repeated rate changes
in the past caused inflation.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
. Burma's need for arms indicated:
American service attaches in Rangoon
are convinced that the Burmese armed
forces could effectively use much more
military equipment than is being supplied
to them by the British Service Mission.
Ambassador Sebald comments that the
British apparently are unaware of the resentment caused by their
practice of controlling Burma's arms supply as a lever to influence
the government. He believes that this British policy is the chief
reason for Burma's threat to terminate the mission.
The ambassador states that Burmese
resentment is now directed also against the United States, which
is closely associated with Britain in Burmese eyes.
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Comment: The Burmese have repeatedly
attempted to procure arms from the United States and elsewhere all
over the world, including areas behind the iron curtain. Their re-
quirements will become increasingly acute as their campaign against
the Chinese Nationalists gains momentum.
5. Indonesian army fears Darul Islam attempt to seize capital
Indonesian army troops in Djakarta have
been ordered to carry arms at all times
because of the fear that the Darul Islam,
an insurgent Moslem organization, will
try to seize the city from within,
Comment: The government may fear
Darul Islam disturbances as a gesture of support to the Moslem
dissidents in North Sumatra. The American air attache in Djakarta
reported on 29 September that virtually all of the extreme northern
end of Sumatra was held by rebel forces. Some units from Djakarta
have been included among the reinforcements dispatched to Sumatra.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
6. Iranian premier apparently preparing for oil settlement talks
Prime Minister Zahedi's blunt public
announcement on 29 September that Iran cannot embark on its
much-needed economic development program without an oil
settlement is his first step toward opening discussions with
Britain. By exaggerating the deteriorated condition of the oil
Installations, the prime minister may have been attempting to
prepare the Iranian public for possible compromises.
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The prime minister has given no hint,
however, as to how he intends to approach the oil problem. Strong
public sentiment gives him only limited opportunity for compromises
within the framework of Mossadeq's oil nationalization law.
7. British may change views on compensation agreement on Iranian oil:
The American embassy in London has
learned that with the departure from the
cabinet of Lord Leathers, said to be the
foremost proponent of settling compensa-
tion for the loss of Iranian oil through international arbitration, a
change may occur in British views on this problem. London may
now seek an interim marketing agreement which would put the com-
pensation issue at least temporarily into the background.
Comment: For almost a year Britain has
Insisted that any agreement with Iran provide for settlement of the
compensation question through international arbitration.
8. Moroccan tribesmen reportedly still loyal to deposed sultan:
3.3(h)(2)
3.3
in Rabat that the vast majority of tribesmen
are "now completely disillusioned with France and are steadfastly
loyal to the deposed sultan.
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only the sultan's restoration could bring genuine calm. He
declared that if French vigilance is ever relaxed, the Moroccans
will rise up and oust the French.
Comment: Although French officials
continue to claim that the tribesmen are loyal to France,
French un-
popularity among the nativeshasharpLythreasecrin the past
two months.
WESTERN EUROPE
10. Comment on the death of West Berlin mayor Reuter:
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The death of Mayor Ernst Reuter poses 3.5(c)
a serious problem for the stability of the West Berlin government
since there is no one of his stature to replace him.
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Prior to Reuter's death there had been
considerable opposition to the existing coalition of Socialists
and Free Democrats which he headed, and growing agitation
from Christian Democratic and Free Democratic leaders for
a West Berlin government reflecting Chancellor Adenauer's
election triumph.
The Christian Democrats are believed
to be in a position to dominate the next West Berlin government.
Although Berlin Christian Democratic chairman Robert Tillmanns
has been prominently mentioned as a successor to Reuter, the
final choice will probably be left up to Adenauer.
Reuter's death also removes potentially
powerful opposition within the Social Democratic Party to its
present anti-Western integration foreign policy. Reuter reportedly
never sully agreed with Socialist foreign policy and immediately
after the 6 September elections pushed for changes in the party's
policy.
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Approved for Release: 2019/07/10 CO2869419