Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
Body:
re/011/71711/7/14f3132ed
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for Rivleapse:. 25919/01(6/ 2.66 ti .1CO2893;50r "Zee'
SECU INFORMATION
16 April 1953
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANCE IN CLAS
I . DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
,
TOPS ET
SEC INFORMATION
17,11
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CURITY INFORMATION
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
Soviet diplomat hints at new approach on Germany (page 3).
SOVIET UNION
.7/1"
. Collective character of new regime stressed by Soviet official (page 3).
FAR EAST
Peiping seen as reconciled to nonrepatriation of some prisoners (page 4).
Chinese Communists anticipate Nationalist invasion (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Iranian Army removes controls in tribal areas (page 5).
6. Iraq will not renew defense treaty with Britain (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
. West German Socialist leader hints at reversal of party's foreign
policy (page 6).
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URITY INFORMATION
GENERAL
1. Soviet diplomat hints at new approach on Germany:
3.3(h
Maurice Thorez, French Communist leader
who has just returned from Moscow, is reported by the Paris newspaper
France Soir to have told party leaders that the Soviet Government "is
willing to make the widest concessions to prevent West German rearma-
ment at any price."
SOVIET UNION
2. Collective character of new regime stressed by Soviet official:
3
3
TC)E,SErCI"
)(2)
.3(h)(2)
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Comment The power accumulated by
Malenkov within the party was probably a more decisive factor affect-
ing Molotov's succession than the latter's age. Recent developments,
however, suggest that no one person has yet achieved sufficient power
to permit dictatorial control of the Soviet government and party complex.
FAR EAST
3. Peiping seen as reconciled to nonrepatriation of some prisoners:
The Secretary General of the Indian Ministr3.3(h)(2)y
of External Affairs believes that it would be
a mistake to try to force the Chinese Com-
munists to retract their demand for total
repatriation of POW's.
In his view, the Chinese, while recognizing
that many prisoners will remain unwilling to return, are determined to
save face by pretending that this is not true. He believes that the Com-
munists, to avoid an appearance of reversing their policy, will probably
announce that those who refuse to return are "secret agents of the
Kuomintang or the United States."
4
TOP-SRET
.3(h)(2)
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R1TY INFORMATION
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4. Chinese Communists anticipate Nationalist invasion:
3.3(
h)(2)
Comment: Other recent information concern-
ing mainland defenses suggests a growing Chinese Communist concern
over a possible invasion of Fukien.
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has stated
that the invasion and ultimate political isolation of Fukien Province is
within the capability of the Nationalist forces on Formosa. Foreign
observers do not agree.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Iranian Army removes controls in tribal areas:
On 8 April Iranian Army Chief of Staff Riah3.3(h)(2)i
ordered all army installations to withdraw
intelligence and security officers from tribal
areas because the army no longer has authority
ianl also instructed army units to cooperate fully with local
officials of the Ministry of Interior, now responsible for the tribes, and
to comply immediately with the Ministry's requests for assistance in
maintaining local order.
Comment: Prime Minister Mossadeq ordered
disarmament of the tribes stopped on 12 March. Transfer of authority
over the tribal areas was announced on 8 April.
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URITY INFORMATION
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By ending the detested army control, Mossadeq
is making a strong bid for the tribes' support. The present step is also
in line with his moves to lessen the army's power and prestige, and will
encourage further army discontent.
6. Iraq will not renew defense treaty with Britain:
3.
The Iraqi Foreign Minister is reliably report uu 3(h)(2)
to have told the parliamentary finance committee
on 11 April that the government will allow the
Anglo-Iraqi defense treaty to remain in force
until its expiration in 1957, but that Iraq will not negotiate a new one.
The Foreign Minister also declared that Iraq
will sign no agreement which calls for sending an Iraqi army abroad or
allowing foreign troops to enter the country.
Comment: Allowing the treaty to run its
course is probably the most that the West can expect. Previously, pro-
British Defense Minister Nun i Said had declared privately that the treaty
needed to be modified; he stated that Iraq would consider a broader defense
agreement with the West based on the Arab Collective Security Pact.
Any shift from the present conservative govern-
ment to a radical one could result in unilateral abrogation of the treaty.
WESTERN EUROPE
3.3(h)(2)
7. West German Socialist leader hints at reversal of party's foreign policy:
Chairman Erich 011enhauer's announcement
that Soviet 3.3(h)(2)
e care ully tested
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apparently reversed the party's foreign policy line and reportedly stirred
up strong resentment among left-wing Socialist elements. He allegedly
stated that central Europe, in view of its inability to establish a strong
third-force bloc, must collaborate with the United States to avoid disaster.
These statements run counter to the popular
Socialist view that Soviet overtures should be encouraged, particularly
those holding a promise of German unity.
Comment: This is the first indication that
011enhauer is actually taking steps to prepare his followers for the ex-
pected shift in the party's foreign policy preliminary to joining Adenauer's
Christian Democrats in a new coalition following next summer's elections.
His party, however, will probably pursue its negative attitude on EDC,
and will be disinclined to examine any Soviet proposals for German unity
too carefully until after the elections.
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