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4 October 1955
Copy No. 100
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO 2(5
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. e"
Cl DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DAT LO
AUTH: HR 710k
DATE: 14 S. REVIEWER:
4 a
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
#
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"row'
CONTENTS
I. NASR UNYIELDING ON EGYPTIAN-SOVIET BLOC
ARMS DEAL (page 3).
2. FIRST SOVIET BLOC ARMS SHIPMENT ARRIVES IN
EGYPT (page 4).
3. YUGOSLAVIA PROMISES GREATER CO-OPERATION IN
US AID PROGRAM (page 5).
4. GREEK OPPOSITION REPORTED UNITING TO FORCE
ELECTIONS (page 6).
5. COMMENT ON INDONESIAN ELECTION RETURNS (page 7).
6. LAOS PLANS COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN EVENT OF
PATHET LAO ATTACKS (page 8).
7. COMMENT ON SHAKE-UP IN RUMANIAN LEADERSHIP
(page 9).
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�T-OP�SESCREZ
1. NASR UNYIELDING ON EGYPTIAN-SOVIET BLOC
ARMS DEAL
In a conversation with Assistant
Secretary Allen and Ambassador
Byroade on 1 October, Egyptian
prime minister Nasr reiterated his
determination to go through with his arms deal with the
Soviet bloc.
The prime minister emphasized that
the agreement with Czechoslovakia was without condi-
tions and that any unusual features were in 'Egypt's favor.
He insisted that he was as anxious to keep communism
out of Egypt as anyone and that having got rid of the
British and refused to let the Americans replace them,
he was not likely to let the Communists move in.
Nasr again spoke at length of the
threat of Israeli aggression, eventual if not immediate,
as the motive for making a deal with the Soviet bloc, and
said he was convinced the United States was trying to
keep Egypt weak.
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2. FIRST SOVIET BLOC ARMS SHIPMENT ARRIVES IN
EGYPT
A shipload of Soviet small arms,
including machine guns, arrived in
Egypt on 27 September, according to
information received by American offi-
cials in Cairo. Another shipment in-
cluding 60 "Stalin" heavy tanks is to arrive within a week.
Comment
� Small arms, not previously reported
to be a part of Egypt's deal with the
Soviet bloc, will be more immediately useful to the Egyp-
tian army than the much-publicized heavy equipment and
aircraft promised by Moscow. However, Egypt's acquisi-
tion of heavy tanks, when made effective by training in
their use, will introduce a new element into Middle East-
ern military tactics, since neither the Arab states nor
Israel has hitherto had equipment of this caliber,
Small arms available to Egypt may
filter into the hands of nationalists in French North Africa,
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NNW
3. YUGOSLAVIA PROMISES GREATER CO-OPERATION IN
US AID PROGRAM
Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy
believes that his past week's conversa-
tions with Yugoslav officials have sub-
stantially eliminated the difficulties
which had earlier caused American officials in Belgrade
to recommend the suspension of military end-item deliv-
eries. The Yugoslays agreed that the American military
assistance staff could contain at least 60 members�an
increase of approximately 20. They also promised greater
co-operation in furnishing information and allowing Ameri-
can inspection of units receiving US military goods.
The Yugoslays appear to need and want
US economic aid even more than last year as a result of
"a certain disillusionment" with their recent negotiations
with the USSR.
Murphy notes that aid to the Yugoslays
remains a calculated risk. He believes that Yugoslav
communism may become more closely associated with the
Soviet bloc, but thinks Yugoslavia will not join the Comin-
form or any similar organization. He comments that Tito's
ambitions for playing a larger role in the Balkans make the
Yugoslays a potential spearhead for some effort to disrupt
the Satellites' alignment with the USSR.
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Ur
4. QREEK OPPOSITION REPORTED UNrriNG TO FORCE
ELECTIONS
The Liberal Democratic Union and the
Democratic Party agreed on 28 Septem-
ber to unite to oust the Greek Rally
government and force new elections,
This new coali-
tion also decided to negotiate for the support of the Communist-
dominated United Democratic Left.
The combined parties' program is re-
ported to include abrogation of the Greek-American base
agreement, general amnesty for all Communist prisoners
and suspects, "a neutralist line," and rapprochement with
the Soviet Union.
Comment This combined group, led by former
prime minister Sophocles Venizelos,
represents about one third of the opposition in parliament.
Most of the rest of the opposition is, however, joining in
demanding new elections and is threatening to resign en
masse if elections are delayed.
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5. COMMENT ON INDONESIAN ELECTION RETURNS
Unofficial election returns reported
through 3 October, largely from Java
but including scattered counts from
other areas, continued the lead of the National Party and
dropped the Masjumi to fourth place. The Masjumi has
been overtaken by the Nandlatul Ulama (NU), another Mos-
lem party, which now holds second place, and by the
Communist Party.
Of the votes counted, which are be-
lieved to be about three fifths of the total cast, the approx-
imate percentage distribution for the four leading parties
is: National Party, 33; NU, 24; Communist Party, 23;
and Masjumi, 20. These percentages do not reflect the
vote for minor parties, for which no tabulations are avail-
able. The minor party vote, however, is unlikely to change
the standing of the four major parties. If the electorate's
turnout is uniformly 70 percent as estimated in areas al-
ready returned, about 12 million votes have yet to be
counted.
The relative strength of both the National
Party and the NU probably will be reduced by returns from
non-Javanese areas, where both the Masjumi and the Com-
munist Party are expected to pick up a greater proportion
of the votes. However, there appears to be little chance
that the National Party's lead will be overcome.
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6. LAOS PLANS COUNTEROFFENSIVE IN EVENT OF
PATHET LAO ATTACKS
The Laotian government will respond
with a substantial counteroffensive if
Pathet Lao attacks follow the expected
breakdown of negotiations on 10 October.
Both the crown prince and the prime minister are confi-
dent of their army's capability of driving the Pathet Lao
out of Phong Saly Province and of capturing Sam Neua town.
The prince expressed his view that in the event of Viet
Minh intervention in force, action by the Manila pact sig-
natories would be appropriate
The American embassy estimates that
the royal government troops could withstand a general
Pathet Lao attack if adequately supplied, but doubts they
could mount a successful counteroffensive.
Comment There is some indication that the
Pathet Lao is planning further local
action, although not yet on the scale of a general offensive.
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Neffol Noe
7, COMMENT ON SHAKE-UP IN RUMANIAN LEADERSHIP
The resumption of the post of Commu-
nist Party chief by Gheorghiu-Dej, the
outstanding Rumanian Communist, and
his relinquishment of the premiership reflect the renewed
pre-eminence of party over government which has become
characteristic in the Soviet bloc since the fall of Malenkov.
The shift, following shortly after Ithrushchev's visit to
Bucharest, probably does not portend any significant policy
changes or high-level purges in either the party or govern-
ment.
The simultaneous announcement that
the Rumanian Workers' (Communist) Party Congress will
be held on 23 December suggests that Gheorghiu-Dej con-
siders that Soviet bloc policy and the position of the
Rumanian party are now sufficiently stabilized to permit
the convocation f the twice-postponed party caucus.
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