CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1955/07/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03448343
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: September 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Publication Date: July 22, 1955

Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343
TOP SECRET
;/%/7 //07/
22 July 1955
Copy No.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. 26
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
H DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2o/0
AU TH: HR 70-2
IihicTO, REVIEWER:
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3.3(h)(2)
99 3.5(c);;
o#�
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343
A .#LN %.+1 � LI A
`NOr IMO
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1.
Tokyo current China policy
(page
2.
South Korean
instructions to break off
talks (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3.
4.
Indonesian government may face early vote of confidence (page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5.
Comment on Greek decision to resubmit Cyprus issue to UN
(page 5).
LATIN AMERICA
6.
Comment on Argentine political situation (page 6).
22 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 2
TO
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343
I Lir I
FAR EAST
1, Tokyo
current China policy:
Japan is not considering recognition of
Communist China and will continue co-
operating with the free world as the key-
note of its diplomatic policy,
Japan intends to continue friendly relations with National-
ist China and will withhold all comment on possible direct talks
between Communist China and the United States on the Formosa
problem.
Japan would
observe Western controls on ra e wi ommums na. He as-
serted that neither trade nor Japan's approach to Peiping on the
repatriation of Japanese detainees involved recognition of the Com-
munist regime.
Comment: A majority of Japanese be-
lieve that their nation
Communist China.
There have been indications the Japanese
government is considering steps to ease existing trade controls. In
view of the above statement of policy it would appear that the Japa-
nese proposals will be designed for action within the COCOM frame-
work.
2. South Korean
instructions to break off talks:
22 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
tr n OEVIDE"r
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343
Approved for -2-079/09/16 C03448343
Rheets orders to break off the talks, which
to date have not been acted on, may have been intended for American
intelligence consumotion in a maneuver to force United States con-
cessions.
Similar threats to reject
aid and institute austerity measures were leaked into American in-
telligence ch n e s during negotiations over the terms of aid a year
ago.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3.
4. Indonesian government may face early vote of confidence:
The American embassy in Djakarta re-
oorts that the focus of action in the Indo-
iesian political crisis appears to be
22 July 55
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343
Page 4
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03446343
doh
shifting to parliament, where debate on
a no-confidence motion is scheduled to
commence on 22 July. According to lo-
cal press reports, the government will
ask that a vote be taken that same even-
ing.
The embassy hesitates to predict the
outcome of such a vote, pointing out that although the All govern-
ment has been "massively discredited," opposition parties are re-
luctant to assume the responsibilities of government prior to the
general elections.
All's future is in the hands of the smaller
parties supporting his government.
Comment: Three of the parties in the
government coalition reportedly called on All to resign as of 21
July. If these parties vote with the parliamentary opposition on the
no-confidence motion, All's chances of obtaining a favorable vote
will be slim. It is possible that the cabinet may resign rather than
face a confidence vote.
Should the cabinet fall or resign, Vice
President Hatta would probably request Ali to continue in a "care-
taker" capacity until President Sukarno returns in early August.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Comment on Greek decision to resubmit Cyprus issue to UN:
Greece has decided to resubmit the Cyprus
_ssue to the United Nations and has instructed
its UN delegation accordingly. Foreign Min-
ister Stephanopoulos has announced that
this step was taken on direct order of Prime
Minister Papagos.
The prime minister's action was probably
motivated by increasing distrust of London's intentions in scheduling
the Anglo-Greek-Turkish conference on Cyprus to open on 29 August--
22 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 5
TriP CT? F T
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343
-
II,
nine days after the deadline for the submission of items for the UN
General Assembly's agenda. Papagos probably also feared that his
government's position would be imperiled unless it took immediate
action on the Cyprus issue.
Recriminations over the conference open-
ing date, which the British and Turks agreed on in advance and pre-
sented to Athens on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, are likely to inten-
sify distrust among the three powers. Presentation of the issue to
the UN decreases the prospects of a successful conference.
LATIN AMERICA
6. Comment on Argentine political situation:
Another revolt may be attempted in Argen-
tina at any time
..t...aEno.u.c Action groups" are still not satis-
fied with the changes since the 16 June re-
volt and want Peron ousted. Naval officers
reportedly have been providing civilians
wan arms, and anti-Peron student groups have been organizing into
armed cells during the past week.
The government's announcement on 20 July
that fleet units had left Puerto Belgrano for "maneuvers" adds to
the uncertainty of the military situation, since there is some doubt
that the navy is under government control. Under ordinary conditions,
maneuvers at this time of the year would not be unusual.
Meanwhile, Peron may have been setting
the stage for his resignation when he told Ambassador N-ufer on 19
July that he was not resigning "for the time being," and that he did
not intend to resign "unless his resignation proved a sine qua non to
the success of the pacification movement." He said he felt confident
that the "pacification movement would not fail." He added, however,
that if he did resign, it should not be taken to indicate disillusionment
with the turn of events and that he would continue to act as head of
the Peronista Party.
22 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 6
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 003448343
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343
v....
400.4 ;14
Peron's bid for "coexistence" among all
political groups has not been accepted by the Radicals, the largest
opposition party. However, there is no unity among leaders of this
badly splintered party or of the embryonic pro-church parties.
Peron told Nufer that he was holding
Peronista organizations under wraps for the time being, and that
the powerful labor confederation would call a general strike if he
asked it to.
22 July 55 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 7
WIT> CPWRFT
Approved for Release: 2019/09/16 C03448343