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March
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57
Copy No. 131
REVIEWER:
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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N., x-11-"...,11.1.a 1
CONTENTS
1. SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL INCLUDES EUROPEAN
AERIAL INSPECTION ZONE (page 3).
2. USSR COMPLAINS TO EGYPT
3. HAMMARSKJOLD'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH NASR
(page 6).
4. THE SITUATION IN SY
5. THE SITUATION IN JORDAN
(page 5).
(page 7).
(page 8).
� 6. MOSLEM PARTIES STALL EFFORT TO FORM INDONESIAN
CABINET (page 9).
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Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 2
TOP SECRET
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TVIA
1. SOVIET DISA MENT PROPOSAL INCLUDES EUROPEAN
AERIAL INSPECTION ZONE
Comment on:
The new Soviet disarmament proposal
made on 18 March contains features de-
signed to show some accommodation to
previously announced US positions.
The USSR said it would accept aerial in-
spection over a zone extending 500 miles to the east and 500
miles to the west of the line dividing the NATO and Warsaw
treaty nations. The Soviet proposal of 17 November 1956,
which referred to a similar zone, promised only "to examine
the question" of employing such a method of inspection. Mos-
cow still has not precisely indicated the geographical limita-
tions of such a zone, although the Soviet ambassador in London
reportedly stated that the eastern limit of the area would ex-
tend from Riga to Odessa. A member of the Soviet delegation
to the United Nations said on 9 January that the zone would be
subject to negotiations once the "principle" was accepted. He
said the 500-mile limit was an "approximate area," that the
lines would "zigzag," and that the area probably would include
some portion of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet proposal also responded to the
United States' proposal of 14 January for the control of guided
missiles. It stated that this question "is closely connected with
the banning of atomic and hydrogen weapons as a whole," since
the danger of these weapons derives not so much from the mis-
siles themselves as from atomic and hydrogen warheads with
which they could be fitted.
Another point intended to show some move-
ment toward the US position was Moscow's offer to ban the
20 Mar 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 3
1.2i JP cVe1117"F
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'LFI. L...1 CPUs .11.1.1.1 11.
NIMO
manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons prior to their
withdrawal from national armaments and destruction.
The rest of the proposal reiterates other
Soviet proposals made during the past year, especially those
of March and November 1956 which contain features unaccept-
able to the West, such as a pledge not to use atomic and hydro-
gen weapons, a ban on nuclear tests, and the removal of bases
from foreign countries.
20 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 4
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ifJ1 LUKL I Ti
2. USSR COMPLAINS TO EGYPT
Comment on:
Moscow has again complained of Egypt's
failure to co-ordinate its diplomatic
moves with the USSR
Soviet deputy foreign minister Zorin ex-
pressed his disappointment to the Egyptian ambassador that
there have been "no official comments" by the Arab states
favoring the Soviet proposals of 11 February on the Middle
East. Seeking even partial endorsement of the proposals, he
stated that "Arab official comment can pick up what suits it
from the Soviet principles for approval."
he complained that the Soviet statement
of principles was treated by the Arab governments "on a par
with the Eisenhower doctrine."
Zorin previously requested closer liaison
between the USSR and Egypt, stating on 15 February that Mos-
cow was unfamiliar with developments in Egypt and the main line
of Egyptian policy, and lacked the information necessary t3 be
of help.
20 Mar 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 5
TOP sFcrIrT
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4111,
3, HAMMARSKJOLD'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH NASR
Secretary General Hammarskjold, who
left for Cairo on 19 March, believes
that he has three "weapons" to use in
dealing with the Egyptians. The first is
the possibility of breaking off the talks
and referring to the General Assembly the whole question
of canal settlement and the disposition of the UN Emergency
Force (UNEF). Hammarskjold doubts, however, that this
would prove effective because of the difficulty in marshaling
a two-thirds majority in the assembly.
His second "weapon" is the threat that
the UNEF may be withdrawn. Because the Egyptians know
a UNEF withdrawal would be followed by an Israeli move
into Gaza and other areas, Hammarskjold feels he has a
strong bargaining point. He stated that he had used the with-
drawal threat on Egypt three times last November "with good
effect'
His third "weapon" is the argument that
the UN is Egypt's "bridge to the world" and a stiff Egyptian
attitude toward the UNEF could alienate sympathy among UN
members. Hammarskjold implied this would be his main ap-
proach.
20 Mar 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 6
CONFIDENTIAL
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3E.,L,AL I
4. THE SITUATION IN SYRIA
Comment on:
A temporary truce between contending
rightist and leftist officer factions in
the Syrian army apparently has been
reached, probably because neither fac-
tion felt certain it could attract and hold
sufficient military support to prevail.
leaders of the rightist Nufuri and leftist Sarraj fac-
tions were summoned before Chief of Staff Nizam al-Din,
Defense Minister Azm, and other cabinet members to reach
agreement on a major reshuffle of Syrian army officers pro-
posed by Nufuri, until now G-1 of the general staff. The meet-
ing agreed the chief of staff would reappraise the transfers and
carry them out "insofar as they were for the general good."
The agreement merely glosses over violent
dissension in the Syrian army. Leftist elements probably will
soon move to strengthen their grip on the country. The Egyp-
tians appear to seek a mediating role,
while according to other reports, Saudi Arabia is backing the
rightist group and especially President Quwatli. The proposed
transfers would have sent Colonel Sarraj, Syrian strong man
who has been head of army intelligence, to Cairo as military
attach�but the ambiguous reference to the transfers in the re-
port of the truce suggests he may remain in Damascus.
20 Mar 57 Current Intelligence Bulletin
Page 7
SECRET
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3L-1-Arve, I
Nid
5. THE SITUATION IN JORDAN
Comment on:
Jordan's Prime Minister Nabulsi and
left-wing cabinet ministers feel strength-
ened as a result of recent developments,
according to high-ranking officials in
Jor n s Foreign Ministry. The Nabulsi group is now will-
ing to risk open defiance of the king since they consider that
it would be virtually impossible for a new cabinet to be formed
under present circumstances.
In conversation with Ambassador Mallory
on 18 March, King Hussain appeared "not at all certain of
his ground," despite his earlier expressions of confidence
that he could implement changes in the government after termi-
nation of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty.
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Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 8
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I. L I4ak-,
6, MOSLEM PARTIES STALL EFFORT TO FORM
INDONESIAN CABINET
Comment on:
Cabinet formateur Suwirjo's efforts to
form a new Indonesian government
have been at least temporarily blocked
by the refusal of the Nandlatul Ulama (NU)
to accede to President Sukarno's demand
that the anti-Communist Masjumi be ex-
cluded from the cabinet. Moslem unity,
if maintained, will be a serious setback
to Sukarno's plan to eliminate the Masjumi
as a political force and to increase Communist influence in
the government. The NU is also reported to be negotiating
with Sukarno to leave the Communists out of the projected ad-
visory council.
Sukarno continues to refuse to discuss any
political questions with former vice president Hatta., who is
popular with the Moslem parties and non-Javanese leaders,
and he has not invited Hatta for talks as was reported in the
Indonesian press.
Meanwhile, the army commanders' con-
ference in Djakarta, which is being attended by commanders
from most of the dissident provinces and which was scheduled
to end 18 March, has been extended for an indefinite period.
The army leaders may be standing by to play a decisive role
if necessary.
20 Mar 57
Current Intelligence Bulletin Page 9
SITRFT
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