THE IG'S CUBAN SURVEY AND THE DD/P'S ANALYSIS OFTHE CUBAN OPERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001900160009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: January 26, 1962
• Content Type: MF

/06 : CIA-RDP80BO1676R001900160009-8
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26 January 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Kirkpatrick
SUBJECT : The IG's Cuban Survey and the DD/P's
Analysis of the Cuban Operation
1. The scope of the IG Survey is briefly and clearly stated
in the Introduction. The Survey's intent was to identify and
describe weaknesses within the Agency which contributed to the
final result and to make reconmendations for their future avoidance.
The IG had no authority to conduct a survey of the machinery for
making decisions and policy at other levels of government. This
field was covered by the group headed by Gen. Taylor. The Survey
expressly avoided detailed analysis of the purely military phase of
the operation.
2. Much of the DD/P's Analysis is devoted, however, to a
discussion of governmental decision-making and to a rehash of the
military operation. It criticizes the Survey for insufficient
attention to these matters, putting the major blame for the opera-
tion's failure on factors beyond the control of the Agency.
3. The Analysis attempts to refute most of the weaknesses
described by the Survey. The few which it admits were, it contends,
not significant to the final result. It rejects the Survey's
statements that intelligence was inadequate and misused and that
staffing was inadequate. It blames the failure of the air drops on
the Cuban reception crews and air crews. It states that small boat
operations
that other been because they were
it states
not the decisive reason for failure.
4. There is a fundamental difference of approach between the
two documents. While the Analysis is preoccupied with interdepart-
mental policy-making and military strategy, the Survey is mainly
concerned with the failure to build up internal resistance in Cuba
through clandestine operations. The Analysis fails to shed any
further significant light on this fundamental issue.
LL Lu
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 or Release 2003111.106 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001900160009-8
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Approved For Release 2003/11/06: CIA-RDP