SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND POSSIBLE CHINESE INTERNAL DISUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R008700150004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2001
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 24, 1951
• Content Type: REPORT

littc-11-Olaroved For Release 2001/04/01 : CIA-RbP82-00457R008700150004-P
CONFIDENTIAL 25X1A
CLASSIFICATION 7coNmoL - U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY
CENTRAL NTELLIGENC AGENCY REPORT NO.
ifirORMATION AEPOIFIT CD No.
COUNTRY Chiaa/LSSP. DATEEMSTR. 24 Sept. 1951
avta Sino-Seviet Relations and Possible Chinese NO. OF PAGES 4
Internel 7Jioun1ty
25X1A
PLACE
ACQUIRED
DATE OF 25X1A
INFO.
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO 25X1X
REPORT NO.
Relations Between the Chinese Communists. end the USSR
1, The following teree pointe are the basis for cooperation between the USSR
and the Chinese Communiste:
The Soviet foreign policy in the Far East hes been mainly the same as
the foreign policy of the Chinese Communists, from the standpoint of
the Chinese Communists. The most important point is that both the USSR
and the Chinese Communists fear that Japan will revive and rearm. The
secend is thet they desire a Communist Korea. The third is that their
relations with the various other. Far East countries bordering China
as? yet shown no point of difference. It is possible that there
mieet be some difference in their relations with the United States and
Great Britkin, but temporarily they agree on this also. From these
poiats, it is seen thet it would not be possible at present for the,
USSA end the Chinese Communists to have any major difficulties in
theeer zeletions.
b. At Iresent, the Chinese Communists find it herd to feel that the Soviet
exponsLon of power into Chinese soil cerriee with it any threat of
aggeeseion. They are willingly taking slid]. RS the "help" from a bro-
theely nation. This is the only "hele" they receive, end they have no
reaeon to give it up.
e.
c. From the historical vieveoint, the USSR hes taught the Chinese Communists
to tske adventege of the nationalistic esrirations of the people and
the urge ,for democracy, and hes also taught them how to strengthen the
lhinese Communist Party (CCF) to attain victory. They are brotherly
Comeentest Parties of the Communist International, snd this tie remains
etrenge
" ASSIPCATION C9.75(11.51411 (417 fr e- re
STATE yv JX cvAvy 'IL ct? J-KCRI;- Dis-:,142
LLJ_
MR -14qvratat No.
CIriange In eIass.El
Approv
C/als. nangel To: IS S
Deciazs;ad
?4)121/04i0'' I!
t 'ELOPY
DO NOT CIRCULATE
vv.bx
Approved For ReleaR30/90191. catISPRO0457R0087001500
11'
25X1A
2. The thief differences that might develop in.Sino-Soviet relation:3 are ee
follows;
a, The USSR, already a strong nation, 13 building an iron curtain, running
the race for rearmament, and everywhere trying to etir up war end to vie
with the democratic countries led by the United Stetes, with a view to
realizing a Communist emeire. In the Far East, she follows a radically
provocative policy. The Chinese aommunists, however, twee not become
firm in their political control over China; Chine is not revtned, end
she is still a poor and backward country, urgently In need of peace and
reconstraction. These conditions, as reflected in the, nerds of the
Chinese Communist leaders, call for a fight for existence, for secur-
ity, and for strength. Now, the warlike -policy of the USSR has made the
Chinese Communists join the Koreen wee., ed she has been. Fulled along
the path of a third world wean That is the chief inconsistency in the
relations between the Chinese Communists and. the USSR.
b. Soviet help for the Chinese Communists lege for behind the pressing re-
quirements of the Chinese Communiste.
By far the greatest majority of the Chinese people long for reface and
reconstruction, and they would not he willing to follow the USSR entirely
to be enemies of the United States, Great Britain and other nations, and
further, China has traditionally tesn friendly with the Unieed States.
These factors must have had quite some effect among Chinese Communist
leaders.
d. Since pulling the ChineseiCommuniSts into the Korean WAX', the USSR fears
that the Chinese Communists might tend to fall into the esyceological
state of being conservative and mild. The Soviet advisero would netural-
ly be interfering in various ways, would be doubtful, and would not trust
the Chinese Communists. From this, there are bound to be :tone wrong de-
ductions and childish action on the part of the USSR, Sueh A state of
affairs would bring about displeasure and lose of intimacy.
Possible Causes for Chinese Internal Disunity
In April 19ee "iireerptenary- sessinnee f t the Chi nese Common' s t Oen tr al Co m-
mitts, there were many discussions on ChaigeeCtiMMUDifit internal disunity.
In a final report of the Chinese Communist centrel authorities, there were
put forward the following three problems
a. Production and reconstruction were the crucial problems, and the prior-.
ity in importance of cities over the villages was stressed as opposed to
the view that villages 'ere more important than cities.
b. There were two extremes in policy toward the democratic p,rt er or
cliques: The close-door policy and that to accommodate
u. The lack of confidence in production and reconstruction, and the dream
of American end British economic assistance.
From that time on, the Chinese Communists Imre won military victories and
in the process of economic improvement, it cen be seid, in geuer-1, that the
above-stated differences in views Were not breught any importent develoemant.
In November 1950, when the Chinese Communists were about to join the Korean
war. Chinese Communist documents emphatically pointed out that tnere were
people opposed to the participation in the Korean war, these peoele reasoned
that China, should have closed her doors in order to de reconstruction work,
and that the United States would not tke the opportunity to invade Man-
churia, at least nut so early. Some said the CHU Te, LIU Foecheng and TUNG
Piewu were Against participation in the Korean wer,, but it he net been
verified.
En Upon taking part in the Korean war, the Chineee Commanitts hee dene a series
of things to frustrate friendly relations between China and the Melted States,
so as to prove definitely the necessity for joining the war, Theugh such
propaganda produced eprrectsble remits, the arge member of earlaItiec sus-
tained by the Chinese Communists at the Korea e front, coupled with the ine
creased threats of a great war, have actually intensified peoelees fear of
war, and the internal disquiet of the Chinese Communists.
7. .01 PoVed tilat RtgiOalge 23/496110404i901AIRDP82106457R0981700i5017041)3
agressor. the. Chinese Communists strongly- opeosed Japanese reernament,
4LCRET/C0o:LAOL P 3 6 OFFIC ,LS OtILY 25X1 A
Approved For Release 2001/04/01 : ClARDP8200457R0087001500flA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCil AC,ENCT
-3-
to link up her anti-Japanese and aati-American campaigns. At the same time,
the Chinese Communists silenced the propaganda to drive the Unieed Nations
troops out of Korea and into the see This might be an indication that the
Chinese Communists have learned a lesson from the Korean war, amd that they
? might be waiting to use the 38th Parallel as the basis for eettlement.
S. The Chinese Communists here not slowed down their strules at home as a
result of the Korean war. On the contrary, they heve been "taring out the
counter-revolution movementen and vigorously proceeding with land reform
end with interflow of goods to keep sound their economy Kvernvilare they
agitate against tolerance. rightism, end the desire for peaee. Such heavy
war pressure and the tense atomoephere farther increased diseuiet among the
Communists and especially among the democratie parties or cliques.
Previous History Concerning Sino-Soviet Relations and Chinese Communist Unity
In the period of cooperation between the Nationalists and the Chinese Com-
munists, the Chinese Communists, from MAO Tse-tung down, believed from the
bottom of their hearts, that the fundamental policy of cooperation between
Chinese Nationalists and Chinese Communists was right. However, at thet
early stage, the Communist International looked down upon the strength of the
Chinese Communists and did not help them to develop tally Alter losing
many chances to get prepare, it was hastily decided to make the Chtneee Content
-
tete fight with the Chinese Nationalists for eepremacy in China. This was
the cause of the failure that they faced.
10. After the split between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists,
the Chinese Communists leaders believed that their stern opeosition to
Chiang Kai-shek's Government was the correct fundamental poiiey. However,
the Communist International should be held res-ponsible for guerrilla war-
fare and the Leftist blind-folded LI Liesants Line in the time of the Sov-
iets that grew up during the period of armed -riots.
11. During the war Against Japan, the Cotton-Moot International had given little
interference in the affains of the Chinese Communists, apart from making
political suggestions. We, therefore, could not see any split in the
relations between the Chinese Communists and the USSR.
12. In general, there has not been any split between the leaders of the Chi-
nese Communists and those of the USSR. However, from the historical view-
point, there were differences in the mew actual policies, Taus we may
say that the Chinese Communist leaders are not without conditiorl_ in their
admiration of the Soviet leaders,
13. In the past, when the representatives of the communist International inter-
fered with the internal affairs of the Chinese Communists, the Chinese
Communist leaders often rediculed them for their ignorance of the conditions
in China. Pro-Russian elements such as CH'U Chu-pal were often ridiculed
as ncompradoreen. Mif was usually looked down upon by the Chinese Commun-
ists, CH EN Shao-yu and CHANG Wen-tien were singled out as belonging to the
Soviet-returned cliqne.
14. Within the CCP and its armed forces, the cadres fall into various groupings,
namely, those of the First, Second, and the 'Fourth Armies, those of the Long
March, and those recruited since the war against Japan. Amnon n the techni-
cians there are these of the Northeast clique and those of the Non-Northeast
olive. Northerners are a majority among the local cadres. Besides, there
are also returned students from the United States and Europe, and the fight-
ing among the various cliques that took place in the peat. These are the
potential factors of split,
15. In conclusion, within the CCP there is yet no sign of any social democratic
ideology or that of democracy as opposed to Comnunissn nor Is there any sign
of the formation of an international clique an opposed to a nationalist cli-
que. Complicated differences in rims, have been neny, and these may pos-
sibly lead to development of factions.
Possibilities of a Split among CCP Leaders
16. The various views held by CHOU En-lai, CHU Te,LIN Tew-han, LIU Po-cheng.
and TUNG Pi-wu may possibly be milder, from the point of view of the Korean
war or as regards to internal military and political policies, Howeter,
pou En-letap nerepnal %temple
qkPAr(POP Mrtekeefftai ittigUNANAli 1.1164Wdb6/6d4r5156164t2re-
11 U.VT:11 M., Wait 25X1A
,Approved For Releaseci90)41/A691p6R12340457R0087001500
17. The views held by CHIN Shao-yu, CHANG Wen-tien, WANG Chia-hsiaeg, LI Liesan,
and others may be more radical, from the viewpoint of inte7nal policy or from
that of foreign policy. Their important backing es their intiwate relations
with the USSR. However, LI:Li-san is not ie agreement or on good terms with
CHIN Shao-yu, nor with CRANts Wen-Tien,
18. MAO Tse-tung LIU Shao-chi, CHEN Tun, eIN Piao, ?ENG Chen are possibly
in between those two groups. They have never had relations with the USSR.
However, the prestige and strong personality of MAO Tse-tung hes bad de-
ciding effects on the formulation of Chinese Communist Parey policies.
19. In the pas,t, MAO Tse-tung and CHOU En-lei had some far-reachtnf controversies,
and both LI Li-inn and CRFN Shao-yu were once defeated by MAO Tse-tang,
LE141112-RILLIZEItla
20. A serious split may develop within the CCP about the degree of the leaning-
to-one-side policy, relations with the United States and Great Britain, the
question of the Korean war, end the iseue of peace and war. Aside from all
these, there is yet no sign of any major split on other tomes. The growth
of a split of this type requires a considerable length of time.
2/. The problem of China and that of Asia are levolred with a large number of
complications that grew up in the peat:. There are certain differences in
opinion among the democratic nations and within the major countries them-
selves. The American China Policy is, in general, an accurate end cautious
one. However, in the eyes of the Asiatics, the democratic countries have not
yet bed the Asiatics establish a concise and explicit policy to build up a
democratic Asia that commande the sympathy of the Asiatics.
22. In connection with the problem of China, one may say that in the implemen-
tation end explanation of her policy, the United States seems to have not
drawn a rigid line of demarkation between the Chinese Communeste and the
Chinese people, with the aim to make carefule and patient attempts to win the
sympathy of the Chinese people.
23. To isolate the Chinese Communists, to deliver blows to the Chinese Commu-
nists, and at the same time to win the sympathy of the Chinese eeople, and
then to bring about the growth in Chiraof an independent democratic force
are no doubt the most important points for democratic forces in the present
day situation in China.
1"71/21141TI1XL
Approved For Release 2001/04/01 : CIA-RDP82-00457R008700150004-3
GOMIT/CONTROL U S. OFFICIALS ONLY