INDIA'S DIVIDED COMMUNISTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00875R001100130096-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2008
• Sequence Number: 96
• Publication Date: September 1, 1972
• Content Type: IR

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Ri;),y
India's Divided Communists
CIA
DOCUMENT SERVICES BRANCH
FILE COSY
DC NOT DESTROY
Secret
87
1 September 1972
No. 2063/72
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
1 September 1972
For 50 years Indian Communists, representing a wide range of ideo-
logical bents, have struggled with little success to become a major political
force. Poverty-ridden India would seem a fertile field for the Communists;
yet Communism has never been able to attract widespread support. Almost
from its inception in the 1920s, the Communist movement has been plagued
by factionalism, personality clashes, fragmentation, and the policy con-
straints arising from twists and turns in the international Communist move-
ment. Thus, during World War II, when the more powerful Congress Party
continued to follow an anti-British line, the Communists, under Soviet
direction, found themselves supporting Moscow's ally, Britain. This move
discredited the Communists in the eyes of Indian nationalists and ex-
acerbated intra-party tension as well.
After independence in 1947 the Communists remained outside India's
political mainstream. The Communists led short-lived insurrections in the
late forties against the Congress government, both in urban and later in rural
areas, most notably in the Telengana district cf the present state of Andhra
Pradesh. By 1950 these operations were 'iscontinued in the face of the
Indian Army's overwhelming strength, and the Communists, at Moscow's
insistance, decided to try the parliamentary path to power. In 1952, the
Communists participated in independent India's first general elections. Com-
munist candidates ran ir. all four subsequent national elections; despite a few
local successes, the party never secured more than ten percent of the popular
vote. This lack of sui;cess has naturally led to criticism of the leadership.
Incessant wrangling over ideology and strategy has kept the movement
splintered. India has not one Communist party but many. This disunity is a
major deterrent to substantial expansion and the acquisition of real influence
in Indian politics.
Note: This report was produced by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated
with the Office of Economic Research and the Office of National Estimates.
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0Sr aina r
Jmmu and
Kaehmlr
West Bengal
RC/CPI government
Arunnchni
Pradesh
Ruling Congress 216
Communist Party India 35
Communist Party Marxist 14
Others 15
280 seats
in assembly
Kerala Ker
RC/CPI government
Tamil
Nadu
Ruling Congress
39
Communist Party India
16
Communist Pa:ty Marxist
31 ". rivandrum
Others
53
134 seats
in assrmbly
India
O Occasional local Naxailte activity
--- - State or union territory boundary
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Party Mutations
The Congress Party's dominat;,n of Indian politics is the major road-
block for the Communists and helps explain the movement's propensity to
divide over strategy alternatives, Serious divisions date back to the ui!d-
1950s when, following Stalin's death, Moscow adopted a more conciliatory
line. Some militants failed to fall h o line, however, and chafed as leaders
loyal to Moscow retained firm control. The Communists' 1957 electoral
victory in Kerala-the first Indian state to vote a Communist government
into office-seemed to vindicate the party's parliamentary road. But in 1959
the central government in New Delhi took measures to topple the Com-
munist-led coalition in Kerala, further alienating the militants. Their frustra-
tions were translated into anti-Soviet sentiment, especially as the Sino-Soviet
split developed and eroded the strict discipline of the world Communist
movement.
Thereafter the facade of Indian Communist unity melted away, and the
Sino-Indian border dispute-which erupted into open warfare in late
1962-served as the catalyst for a decisive polarization of the movement. The
moderates, atteripting to keep in step with Indian nationalist sentiment,
strongly backed New Delhi. The pro-Chinese militants flayed the moderates
for embracing the "bourgeois government" and for allegedly collaborating in
the arrest of CPI members sympathetic to China. The formal split came in
October 1964, following a leadership succession struggle. S. A. Dange, the
right wing's leading spokesman, emerged as chairman of the Communist
Party of India (CPI). The break-away faction constituted itself the "Marxist
Communist Party of India" (CPM) and attacked the CPI as a tool of Soviet
revisionism. As time proved, the CPM was no tool of Peking, becoming
instead a separate and independent party.
Following the split, Moscow tried unsuccessfully to reunite the parties.
The two cooperated on occasion, but in the 1967 parliamentary elections-in
which both participated-they were unable to forge a national alliance. In
some states they bitterly opposed each other. Shortly thereafter, the peren-
nial parliamentary versus revolutionary path to power argument again
erupted, this time within the CPM. The dispute reached a breaking point in
1967 when left extremists, who subscribed to Maoist doctrines, launched a
peasant and tribal revolt in the strategic Naxalbari District in northern West
Bengal. "Naxalite" soon became a household word in India, synonymous
with violence and terrorism used to overthrow government institutions.
Like-minded extremists in West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala got
together and formed a "Coordinating Committee of Communist Revolu-
tionaries," but soon after setting up this body, they fell to quarreling over
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tactics and strategy. In May 1969, the West Bengal radicals struck out on
their own and formed a third party, the Communist Party Marxist/Leninist
(CPML). Today, the CPML is on the verge of collapse and Maoist Naxalites
elsewhere in India are a demoralized lot struggling for survival,
Membership
The CPI and CPM are roughly equal in size; each has an estimated
70,000 active members. Both, however, use highly inflated figures; in 1971
the CPI carried 232,000 on its rolls while the CPM currently claims 105,000
activists. In the important 523-member lower house of parliament the two
are about evenly matched, with the CPI holding 24 seats and the CPM 25,
The CPI has the more legitimate claim to being a nationwide party, but both
tend to rely on regional pockets of strength. In general, the CPI's largest
constituencies are in West Bengal, Kerala, Bihar, Andhra ?radesh, Maharash-
tra, and Tamilnadu. The CPM, much less widely dispersed, has concentra-
tions in Kerala (reportedly 39 percent of total r7M membership) and West
Bengal (33 percent).
The CPML has, at most, only a few hundred adherents, a come down
from the party's heyday a few years back when as many as 10,000 may have
been associated with its activities.
The social and economic character of party membership varies ac-
cording to area. The bulk of Communist support comes from the poorer
sections of the population, but in some places it is drawn from the middle
classes, including the educated unemployed in both rural and urban areas. In
West Bengal, for example, Calcutta's middle-class clerical workers are tradi-
tionally moderate Communists, but radical factions have recruited heavily
among upper middle-class students, as well as from the ranks of professional
thugs. In densely populated Kerala, low-caste agricultural workers, are Com-
munists of long standing. In more industrialized states, factory labor con-
stitutes the core of Communist support.
Surveying the Future
The Ruling Congress Party's sweep of the national elections in 1971
and of the state assembly elections in March 1972 forced the Communists to
take a hard look at their own prospects for the future. Before Congress
secured a two-thirds majority in the lower house of parliament last year,
Prime Minister Gandhi had sought Communist votes. The Communists also
had some influence in local affairs. In the elections last March in 16 states
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and 2 union territories the Ruling Congress won 77 percent of the 2,727
contested seats. The CPI won a mere four percent (112 seats) on the strength
of alliances with the Ruling Congress in several states, while the CPM fell off
to one percent (34 seats), losing more then 100 seats, primarily in West
Bengal. In today's changed circumstances she has little need to cultivate the
Communists,
The CPI-Nothing New
The CPI operates within India's democratic system much like the other
small opposition parties. It is still closely linked to the USSR and generally
heeds Soviet counsel rega:rdi, a strategy. In addition to attacks from the floor
of parliament, it organizes frequent protest demonstrations against govern-
ment policies and circulates large amounts of propaganda. Its array of peace,
friendship, cultural and professional fronts attracts a small following,
particularly from the educated middle class. The Communist-controlled
All-India Trade Union Congress is probably the most influential of India's
highly politicized labor organizations. This group's affiliates are responsible
for a considerable amount of the violent labor agitation since the late 1960s.
In recent years the CPI's relationship with the Congress Party has
fluctuated, ranging from total opposition in the 1967 olecti;.ii to a number
of election alliances in the 1971 race. Many of the CPI's goals are compatible
with Mrs. Gandhi's socialist-oriented platform, but the CPI believes policies
are too conservative and the implementation too slow.
In 1968 the CPI made the pragmatic decision to seek to cooperate wit;t
the Ruling Congress, primarily because most of the coalition state govern-
ments in which the CPI, but not the Congress, participated had collapsed.
CPI policy has long advocated a united front of left, democratic forces
including the CPM, the various socialist parties, and "progressives" in the
Ruling Congress. The CPI considers India to be in the pre-revolutionary stage
when alliances with "progressive bourgeoisie" can be justified. The value of
this course was illustrated last March when collaboration with the Ruling
Congress led to some 93 of the CPI's 112 victories.
Nonetheless, a militant minority in the CPI opposes such cooperation,
arguing that it circumscribes the CPI's agitational potential and muddies its
ideological position. The majority, however, favor strengthening links with
"radical democratic sections" of the Ruling Congress.
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MRS. GANDHI'S TWELVE ELECTION PLEDGES
From the 1971 Election Manifesto
The twelve election pledges, which the All India Con-
gress Committee has directed the new c overnment to im-
plement, are to:
1. Continue the advance to socialism through demo-
cratic process and devise an administrative system capable of
speeding implementation;
2. Put down the forces of violence and disorder so that
all our citizens can live in peace and harmony;
3. Defend secularism and safeguard the interests of the
minorities and the weaker sections of the community, par-
ticularly the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and the
other backward sections so that they may attain "equality of
status and opportunity and fraternity assuring the dignity of
the individual";
4. End anachronistic privileges such as privy purses and
reduce glaring disparities of income and opportunity;
5. Accelerate efforts to provide basic requirements to
our people by undertaking a systematic programme of agri-
cultural development by the application of science and tech-
nology and thereby usher in a new phase of rural prosperity,
which will improve the condition of small farmers, farmers in
dry areas, the landless, artisans, and others who eke out their
existence through diverse skins;
6. Provide fresh avenues of employment and thus widen
the participation of our citizens in nation-building activities;
7. Enlarge the role of the public sector and improve its
performance;
8. Give scope to the private sector to play its proper role
in the economy, while curbing the concentration of eco-
nomic power and wealth;
9. Control prices and ensure to the people the supplies
of essential commodities at reasonable rates;
10. Launch upon a programme of child welfare to
provide nutritious diet to pre-school children;
11. Provide elementary education to all children and
reshape secondary and higher education to suit the needs of
the country; and
12. Effect for these purposes such amendments of the
constitution as may be necessary.
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Shortly after the elections last March, CPI leaders endorsed a new
national campaign to "Implement the People's Mandate." This is simply a
new label for time-worn demands to eliminate landlordism, monopoly
capitalism, high prices, inflation, and unemployment.
The CPI envisions the formation of a broad-based mass movement,
supported by leftist sympathizers in the Ruling Congress, that will push the
government toward socialism. Their immediate aim is to force quick action
on the ruling party's commitment to radical socio-economic reform and to
prevent back-sliding under pressure from right-wing elements. Specifically,
the CPI wants speedy enactment of stringent land reform legislation forcing
the states to cut the ceilings on how much land an individual can own, to
scrap the exemptions given land used for particular "plantation" crops, to
close loopholes that enable landlords to evade the ceilings, and to give only
token payment to former holders of expropriated excess land. The party also
supports ceilings on urban property holdings and favors a substantial tax
squeeze on big business and the rural rich.
While the CPI endorses India's federal system with its strong central
government, the party espouses expanded state powers, particularly in eco-
nomic matters. The CPI's remedy to the nation's inequitable tax system
includes a broadened tax base and more state control over locally collected
revenue. The CPI also wants New Delhi to force state legislatures to levy a
higher tax on agricultural income, a move New Delhi is loathe to take
because it fears alienating rural political support.
As a further means of curtailing central involvement in state affairs, the
CPI proposes abolishing centrally appointed governors. One of the best-
known means of national government intervention in the states lies in the
governors' power to withhold assent to state legislation. Among the CPI's
most vociferous demands, however, is an end to the practices of sending the
Central Reserve Police into a state without the state's consent and of
dissolving unstable state ministries and imposing direct control, called Presi-
dent's Rule, from New Delhi.
The CPI I I probably makes
some effort to infiltrate the government. On balance, there probably are few
active Communists in the basically conservative state civil services or en-
trenched national bureaucracy. A sprinkling of prominent advisers close to
Mrs. Gandhi are well known for their leftist persuasions and mirror her own
attraction to Marxism. Their views, however, are fairly well balanced by
moderates.
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In the international sphere, the CPI places a premium on its well-
publicized relationship with the Soviet Union and adheres to the Soviet
foreign policy line. It looks to Moscow for approval of its policies as well as
financial patronage. Party leaders, for example, went to Moscow for talks
with Soviet officials on 20-28 June and received endorsement of the CPI's
campaign to rally India's "democratic forces." The special Indo-Soviet rela-
tionship, which warmed even more with the signing of the friendship treaty
in August 1971 and the Soviet support for India during the Indo-Pakistani
war, is gratifying to the CPI up to a point. They do raise justifiable
apprehension in the CPI that the Soviets are primarily interested in seeing a
stable Ruling Congress government remain in power and support for the CPI
is a secondary consideration. Thus, in the few states where the CPI ran
against RC candidates last March, Moscow reportedly directed Indian com-
panies with substantial Soviet trade to reduce their kickbacks to the CPI.
"Only in West Bengal and Kerala do we have the strength of numbers to
launch powerful mass movements. In other ,:tes, we can only petition
and pray. "
P. Sundarayya, CPM General Secretary, June 1972
At the time CPI leaders were conferring in Moscow last June, the CPM
convened its ninth party congress at Madurai in the south Indian state of
Tamilnadu. The tone of the meeting was subdued and defensive, reflecting
the CPM's loss of power in its only two strongholds, Kerala and West Bengal,
as well as the dim prospe~:s for an early comeback. The CPM leadership had
to answer charges of complacency, failure to foresee the extent of the Ruling
Congress resurgence, and neglect of organizational problems. Despite these
setbacks the CPM hierarchy hewed closely to previous programs.
The session endorsed continued participation in the parliamentary
process, overriding a minority that considers this approach ineffectual.
According to General Secretary P. Sundarayya, the CPM will not resort to
violence or go underground on a nationwide basis as long as the Indian
Government permits it to function openly. He maintains that the parliamen-
tary path is still a useful "auxiliary form of struggle to help the main struggle
forward." The session pledged the party to attack the government on
economic and political issues and instructed local units to launch a "patient"
political struggle, educating the masses through a systematic campaign and
exposing the superficiality of the Ruling Congress' "left and radical" prom-
ises. The session issued a rather hollow appeal for unity among leftists
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CPM Moderate Jyoti Basu (left) Versus
Militant Hare Krishna Konar (right)
opposing Mrs. Gandhi's "one party dictatorship" and called for the
withdrawal of repressive legislation and a basic revision of the Indian con-
stitution.
Realizing the necessity of expanding their ranks, the Marxists agreed to
back regional causes. For instance, they are now backing the concept, which
has been growing in popularity of transferring powers from the Central
government to the states. While the Marxists oppose any state's secession
from the Indian Union, they are now willing to support regional parties like
Tamilnadu's Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam with its autonomy plank. In
addition, the Marxists now emphasize the idea that India is multinational
and demand equal treatment for all linguistic, cultural, and ethnic groups. In
particular, tb y back the demand for an end to discrimination against
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Muslims, untouchables, and tribesmen-disadvantaged groups from which the
CPM hopes to attract support. In the past, the CPM had focused on the
relatively small industrial labor force, particularly in West Bengal.
As for external ties, the CPM no longer seeks to curry favor, in the eyes
of either Peking or Moscow and has rejected Moscow's urgings for a reunited
Communist Party. At Madurai, the CPM reaffirmed its independence and
harshly criticized both Moscow and Peking for dividing the Communist
movement and, thereby, encouraging US imperialism. It further chastised
Peking and Moscow for holding summit meetings with President Nixon. The
CPM did not, in fact, invite any foreign Communists to Madurai, but it did
affirm f.aternal relations with the four ruling parties known for their
"independent" line-North Korea, North Vietnam, Romania, and Cuba.
CPML-On the Skids
India's youngest and most extreme
Communist party, the CPML, beset by
schisms and official harassment, faces ex-
tinction after a brief life of only three
years. On 16 July, ailing Charu
Mazumdar, until then the party's only top
leader at large, was arrested in Calcutta.
He subsequently died in a prison hospital.
The 56-year-old veteran revolutionary
gained national notoriety in the mid-
1960s as the key organizer of the Naxal-
bari revolt and went on to become the
founding father of the CPML in 1969. His
party quickly splintered over tactical and
organizational issues and became a vehicle
for individual acts of terrorism and per-
sonal vendetta.
Mazumdar leaves, at most, a few
hundred hard-core followers in West
Bengal. His chief lieutenant, Kanu Sanyal,
CPML leader Charu Mazumdar talks
to press shortly before his death in
Calcutta in July.
was recently murdered and the head of a
rival faction, Ashim Chatterjee, was arrested last November. Although there
may be a few potential leaders among a number of capable young Naxalites
still on the loose, anyone who tries to replace Mazumdar and his dead or
jailed colleagues faces an uphill fight. Indian security forces have become
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increasingly proficient in uncovering the self-styled Maoists. West Bengal
police are aided by a three-year extension of the Maintenance of Internal
Security Act that permits them to detain suspects for a year without trial.
Outside West Bengal, a number of independent Maoist groups sprang up
after 1967, but attempts to cooperate on a widespread or sustained basis
have failed. In a last gasp the "All India Coordinating Committee for the
Unity of Communist Extremist Groups" was established last year, but there
is no evidence it is having any more success than previous efforts to forge a
national extremist movement. Even in its 1969-70 heyday, the Naxalite
movement was highly fragmented. It is difficult to estimate total member-
ship, but the number of active iadihals today is probably only a tiny fraction
of the some 10,000 who in 1970 were associated in some way with the
Naxabte cause. Nonetheless, a few disparate extremist bands are still advo-
catiig armed guerrilla actions and the annihilation of "class enemies"; others
emphasize the need for greater preparation for the eventual revolutionary
uprising. In either case the potential for growth or influence is small.
Local Successes, at Times
Of India's 21 states, West Bengal and Kerala are the only ones in which
the Communists ever secured sufficient votes to head coalition governments.
In West Bengal, the CPM has fallen on hard times, and today is skulking in
the background, while the CPI participates in the congress-dominated gov-
ernment. In Kerala; the CPI/CPM game of musical chairs goes on, with little
actual effect on government policies. But in both states the Communists
have popular support and remain a factor in local politics.
West Bengal
The 1967-70 period was a nightmare for the Congress Party in West
Bengal. In 1967, 20 years of unbroken Congress Party domination was
abruptly terminated by the voters, and the CPM took up the task of ruling
this difficult state. Three times the CPM headed coalition governments of
short duration, enough to prove to Bengali voters that the CPM had no magic
for alleviating the state's economic problems or curbing lawlessness. By
March 1972 the CPM was out of office, perhaps for good.
In March, the alliance of the Ruling Congress and the CPI captured 90
percent of the state assembly seats, leaving the CPM no course but to
denounce the election.as rigged and boycott the assembly. The winners did
resort to strong-arm tactics, in some cases hiring Naxalites 1?o fight CPM
members in the streets. The landslide did reflect Prime Minister Gandhi's
popularity-even in a regi('n where north Indians, like her, are generally held
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In disdain. It also reflected popular approval of the resolution of the
Bangladesh problem, and a well-organized door-to-door campaign under-
taken by enthusiastic youth groups.
The shock to the CPM naturally intensified the internal squabbling and
could eventually result in a split along the customary moderate/militant
lines. The moderates, led by old-time Communist boss Jyoti Basu, had been
strengthened by CPM success in the 1967 and 1969 elections and establish-
ment of CPM-led coalitions, The party's gradual decline in subsequent years
tended to bring into prominence a militant faction favoring development of
an underground in preparation for armed revolution in the countryside. The
militants under Hare Krishna Konar argued, albeit unsuccessfully, against
entering the 1972 election, The resulting debacle led them to see even less
chance of reaching power by parliamentary means, given the increasing
prestige of the Ruling Congress and its student (Chatra Parishad) and youth
(Yuva Congress) wings, as well as its successful forays into the Communist-
dominated trade union field. CPI proposals for reuniting the two Communist
parties are considered by hard liners to be a ploy to lure moderates back to
the CPI and thereby isolate the hard liners.
Politics in West Bengal are fluid. Frustrated and bitter, CPM leaders are
searching for strategies that will not only meet the current political situation,
but also pacify discontent within the party and hold on to the constituency
that gave it a still impressive 27 percent of the popular vote in March. ~
There are indications that CPM and CPML elements in West Bengal,
Bihar, and Tripura have established some contacts with their fragmented and
poorly organized Communist counterparts across the border in Bangladesh.
Bangladesh have reached extremist hands in West Bengal, and Indian officials
have alerted Dacca to the danger of allowing a cross-border relationship
among radicals to flourish. Capable Indian security forces, armed with
special powers of arrest and detention, are intensifying efforts to intercept
trans-border smuggling. Beginning in S"ptember, the two countries will
require passports and visas forernssing the border.
small amounts of ammunition and weapons from
The southern coastal state of Kerala was the first Indian state to be
ruled by Communists. It still has one of the nation's largest percentages of
Communists. In addition, it is India's most densely populated and most
literate state. Widespread education and 44 daily newspapers help cultivate a
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populace with an exceptional degree of political consciousness. Competition
among four distinct population groups-caste Hindus, non-caste Hindus,
Christians, and Muslims-gives rise to unusually complex communal and
regkonal problems that breed persistent political instability.
The CPI and CPM have taken turns at heading the government. Today
the CPI leads a two-year-old united front with a wafer-thin majority. The
inclusion of the Ruling Congress in this coalition represents a landmark, for
this is the first time the party has agreed to participate in a coalition
government in Kerala. Many members, and particularly the youth wing,
argued against the decision, maintaining the Ruling Congress should try to
win its own majority, unblemished by government decisions that prove
unpopular. Meanwhile, the CPM leads the opposition and is looking for ways
to recapture the power it lost with the collapse in October 1969 of the
government it had dominated. The CPM's latest tactic, a land-grab campaign,
is floundering almost to the point of embarrassment.
A small number of Naxalites are still active in Kerala, but the police
have been largely successful in containing them. During the height of
Naxalite activity the province harbored at least five extremist factions with
about 4,000 members. The remnants have shown little interest in coopera-
tion with extremists in other states, since they prefer armed attacks to the
prevailing trend toward organization, recruitment, and training.
A Patchy Outlook
The threat of violent revolution led by Communist extremists-a
specter that troubled Indian authorities a few years ago and caused major
disruption in Calcutta.-has dissipated. Small radical fringe groups in West
Bengal, Bihar, Kerala, the Pujab, and in the hills of northeast Andhra Pradesh
continue to plot revolution, but have little chance for success. Barring
widespread despair over the lack of economic progress or unforeseen politi-
cal turmoil, the extremists probably will be limited in the next several years
to debating strategy and basic organizational work, with only an occasional
armed foray against a "class enemy" or a rival left-wing group.
Neither the CPI nor CPM has the capacity to make a serious grab for
national power. New Delhi's intelligence apparatus has penetrated both
parties and monitors their activities closely. The police and army are well
disciplined and have little difficulty in containing Communist-inspired
disruptions or agitation. Nonetheless, the CPI and CPM are capable of
embarrassing the government on specific issues. In 1970, for instance, the
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CI'1, following the Naxalbari revolt, organized a land-grab campaign and
succeeded in attracting considerable public support. The widely publicized
scheme probably prodded the Ruling Congress into giving more serious
consideration to the problem of rural poverty and perhaps to tailoring its
1971 and 1972 election campaigns around the issue. At the same time, the
Communists play a counter-productive role in the labor field. Communist-
backed strikes arising from often unreasonable demands on management
have done little more than heighten labor unrest and reduce industrial
production.
In the coaling months, the CPI and CPM will do what they can to
exploit Mrs. Gandhi's public commitment to reduce poverty. Their search is
f
or issues. Much of the
hue and cry arising
from the land-ceiling
issue stems from left-
ists. The government
tried to procrastinate
by shunting this sticky
problem from com-
mittee to committee
and finally offered a
watered-down pro-
been instructed to en- --1 !'MA
laws by the end of At every press conference I am asked
1972 in accord with when are you going to begin as if it is a
these guidelines, but curtain which you can lift and throw away or
this seems an almost something like that. These are programs
impossible deadline which have begun; many of them have already
and binding enforce- shown results and the others, month by
ment is a long way off, month are progressing forward and they have
Despite her campaign made a tremendous difference to the country.
rhetoric, Mrs. Gandhi I do not think there is any doubt about it at
is responsive to politi- all.
cal pressure from the
large landowners who Prime Minister Gandhi
fill party coffers and 12 July 1972
enjoy unprecedented
profit from the bountiful new strains of wheat and rice. The Communists
will doubtless raise a cry for ceilings on urban property as well. So far,
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SECRET
several states have passed legislation for the redistribution of "excessive"
urban holdings, and others have taken steps to check the transfer of property
prior to imposition of ceilings.
The Communists' best hope is that the Gandhi administration will fail
to deliver on its promises to reduce disparities in income and opportunity,
provide more jobs, and improve the lot of the little man by controlling prices
and curbing concentrations of economic power. Mrs. Gandhi claims her
anti-poverty campaign is under way, but so far few Indians have seen much
tangible change. Food prices have risen 11 percent in a year, jobs are no less
scarce, and many are cynical about the likelihood of divesting the powerful
of their wealth.
In New Delhi, the spotlight is on the economic ministries, with public
demands for much higher performance. A minor cabinet shuffle in late July
was designed principally to enhance economic performance. A number of
younger, left, intellectual, -and technocratic individuals were given greater
responsibilities. In addition, six cabinet members in charge of economic
ministries i ave set up an informal committee to accelerate implementation
of economic policies. The Communists will be watching the results closely.
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