SALE OF LANDSAT COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86B00338R000200290002-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 28, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Union Calendar 624
98th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Report 98-1108
1108
SALE OF LANDSAT COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
FORTY-EIGHTH REPORT
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS
SEPTEMBER 28, 1984.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on
the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
38-469 0 WASHINGTON : 1984
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DON FUQUA, Florida
JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
GLENN ENGLISH, Oklahoma
ELLIOTT H. LEVITAS, Georgia
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
TED WEISS, New York
MIKE SYNAR, Oklahoma
STEPHEN L. NEAL, North Carolina
DOUG BARNARD, JR., Georgia
BARNEY FRANK, Massachusetts
TOM LANTOS, California
RONALD D. COLEMAN, Texas
ROBERT E. WISE, JR., West Virginia
BARBARA BOXER, California
SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan
MEL LEVINE, California
MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., South Carolina
JOE KOLTER, Pennsylvania
BEN ERDREICH, Alabama
GERALD D. KLECZKA, Wisconsin
GEORGE (BUDDY) DARDEN, Georgia
FRANK HORTON, New York
JOHN N. ERLENBORN, Illinois
THOMAS N. KINDNESS, Ohio
ROBERT S. WALKER, Pennsylvania
LYLE WILLIAMS, Ohio
WILLIAM F. CLINGER, JR., Pennsylvania
RAYMOND J. McGRATH, New York
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JOHN R. McKERNAN, JR., Maine
TOM LEWIS, Florida
ALFRED A. (AL) McCANDLESS, California
LARRY E. CRAIG, Idaho
DAN SCHAEFER, Colorado
WILLIAM M. JONES, General Counsel
JOHN E. MOORE, Staff Administrator
DONNA FossuM, Professional Staff Member
STEPHEN M. DANIELS, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
JACK BROOKS, Texas, Chairman
DON FUQUA, Florida FRANK HORTON, New York
ELLIOTT H. LEVITAS, Georgia JOHN N. ERLENBORN, Illinois
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California WILLIAM F. CLINGER, JR., Pennsylvania
STEPHEN L. NEAL, North Carolina DAN BURTON, Indiana
TOM LANTOS, California
RONALD D. COLEMAN, Texas
RICHARD C. BARNES, Staff Director
CYNTHIA W. MEADOW, Professional Staff Member
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, September 28, 1984.
Hon. THOMAS P. O'NEIId., Jr.,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. SPEAKER: By direction of the Committee on Govern-
ment Operations, I submit herewith the committee's forty-eighth
report to the 98th Congress. The committee's report is based on a
study made by its Legislation and National Security Subcommittee.
JACK BROOKS, Chairman.
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CONTENTS
Page
I. Summary .................................................................................................................... 1
II. Discussion .................................................................................................................. 4
A. Introduction .................................................................................................. 4
B. The uses of LANDSAT data ...................................................................... 4
C. Impact of LANDSAT sale on U.S. international relations .................. 8
D. Developments that might affect the future operations of LAND-
SAT .............................................................................................................. 10
III. Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 11
IV. Findings ...................................................................................................................... 12
V. Recommendations .................................................................................................... 12
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Union Calendar 624
98TH CONGRESS
2d Session
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES f
REPORT
98-1108
SALE OF LANDSAT COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
SEPTEMBER 28, 1984.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State
of the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. BROOKS, from the Committee on Government Operations,
submitted the following
FORTY-EIGHTH REPORT
BASED ON A STUDY BY THE LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY
SUBCOMMITTEE
On September 25, 1984, the Committee on Government Oper-
ations approved and adopted a report entitled "Sale of LANDSAT
Could Adversely Affect International Relations." The chairman
was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.
I. SUMMARY
Knowledge of the earth's surface features is extremely helpful in
improving utilization of land and water resources. Because of the
vastness of the earth's surface, acquiring such knowledge has been
a considerable challenge throughout the years.
Based on the promise of photographs of the earth taken by early
astronauts, the land remote sensing satellite program, known as
LANDSAT, was established under the auspices of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1972. The
LANDSAT program consists of a single operating satellite which
circles the earth 14 times a day gathering data on the entire plan-
et's surface features in several different spectral bands, with a 16-
day repeat orbit.' These data are transmitted in digital form from
' A 16-day repeat orbit means that it takes LANDSAT a total of 16 days to gather data on the
whole earth's surface. That is, once every 16 days, LANDSAT reimages the same part of the
earth's surface under the same lighting conditions.
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the satellite to ground receiving stations where this data is convert-
ed by computers into visual imagery or pictures.
Over the years, as the value of LANDSAT imagery has become
known, more and more countries around the world have begun to
use it. Over a dozen nations have either singly or jointly put to-
gether the resources needed to build LANDSAT ground receiving
stations so that they, too, can get the transmissions from this satel-
lite directly. Other nations have become frequent purchasers of
LANDSAT data from the U.S. Government's data center located in
South Dakota. Still other nations have come to use LANDSAT im-
agery with the help of the Agency for International Development
(AID). All told, there is no continent that has not already benefited
from the use of LANDSAT data. This, despite the fact that many of
the possible uses of LANDSAT data are only now being discovered
and developed.
In the years since the first LANDSAT satellite was launched,
four replacement satellites have been launched sequentially to
assure that there would be a continuous flow of data from this type
of spacecraft. The timing of the subsequent launches has generally
been based on an expected satellite lifetime of three years. Howev-
er, if the currently operating LANDSAT satellite begins to floun-
der or actually fails prematurely in orbit, the next LANDSAT sat-
ellite may be launched earlier than anticipated.
Thus, in order to ensure that there is always a LANDSAT satel-
lite operating, there should be a LANDSAT spacecraft in ready re-
serve at all times.
Early on in the current Administration, money contained in the
annual budget to build two additional LANDSAT satellites was cut.
If these two had been built, they would have been expected to
carry the program through 1994. At the time these cuts were made,
they probably did not appear to be critical to the overall viability
of the LANDSAT program, as there were then two such satellites
either under construction or in ready reserve which were expected
to carry the program through late 1988. One of these satellites was
launched on schedule in early 1982. Within a year and a half of its
launch, however, this spacecraft developed serious problems which
necessitated the early launching of the one remaining LANDSAT
satellite. This LANDSAT satellite is expected to carry the program
through March 1987. As a result of these developments, the Admin-
istration's decisions to cut the funds of the LANDSAT program and
not build any more LANDSAT satellites became highly significant.
These budget decisions meant that there is now no LANDSAT sat-
ellite in ready reserve. In addition, because it takes four years to
build a LANDSAT satellite, there is a very high probability that in
the next few years there will be no operational LANDSAT satellite
at all.
Shortly before serious problems developed with the fourth
LANDSAT satellite, the Administration changed the status of the
primary sensor on the LANDSAT satellite program from "experi-
mental" to "operational" and concomitantly transferred the re-
sponsibility for administering the overall program from NASA to
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the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).2
Within weeks of this change, the President announced his inten-
tion to sell to the private sector the LANDSAT satellite system,
along with the Nation's four weather satellites, known collectively
as METSAT.
Concerned about the effect the President's proposal might have
on the interests of the Nation, the Subcommittee on Legislation
and National Security held an oversight hearing on September 28,
1983. Because the proposal to sell METSAT had already been thor-
oughly debated and criticized, this hearing focused on the proposal
to sell the LANDSAT satellite and its ground support units, with
particular emphasis on its potential impact on the U.S. relations
with other countries.
At the hearing, the Chairman of the Source Evaluation Board on
Civil Space Remote Sensing, Department of Commerce, testified
that the Administration did not intend for the Government to
build any more LANDSAT satellites. He acknowledged that, be-
cause of the absence of any LANDSAT satellites in ready reserve,
there would indeed most likely be a sizable gap in LANDSAT data
transmissions between the time that the Government's last satel-
lite stopped working and the time when a private operator could
have a new satellite in operation. He also noted that in order to
maximize the chances of disposing of LANDSAT, the Administra-
tion would place as few restrictions on the private sector operator
as possible. As a result, the Administration would probably allow a
commercial operator of LANDSAT to terminate existing LAND
SAT-related agreements with other nations, distribute LANDSAT
data on a discriminatory basis, and set whatever price it wanted
for LANDSAT products, if these actions would facilitate the private
running of the system.3
The Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Oceans and Interna-
tional Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State,
testified that LANDSAT had generated a number of foreign policy
benefits and measurable international prestige for the United
States since its inception. He noted, however, that the Administra-
tion's decision to transfer LANDSAT to the private sector did not
present any inherent obstacles for the conduct of foreign affairs.
The Senior Assistant Administrator for Science and Technology,
Agency for International Development (AID), testified that LAND
SAT has been a valuable tool in fostering the economic develop-
ment of at least forty low-income countries of the world with whom
the United States cooperates. While he was optimistic that the sale
of LANDSAT would not seriously jeopardize AID's programs, he
was concerned that AID might face problematic copyright restric-
tions with a privately owned and operated system.
2 The primary sensor on LANDSAT, the Multispectral Scanner (MSS), attained "operational"
status on January 31, 1983. The other sensor onboard LANDSAT is the Thematic Mapper (TM)
which is still considered "experimental" and continues to be under the control of NASA. The
TM is expected to attain "operational" status on January 31, 1985, and be transferred to NOAA
at that time.
'International Implications of Proposed Sale of LANDSAT Satellite, Hearing before a Sub-
committee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, September
28, 1983, pp. 90-98. See also Effects on Users of Commercializing LANDSAT and the Weather
Satellites, a report of the General Accounting Office, GAO-RCED-84-93 (February 24, 1984).
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The Director of the Resources, Community and Economic Devel-
opment Division of the General Accounting Office (GAO), testified
that while other nations were not per se opposed to the sale of
LANDSAT, they were very concerned that the sale of LANDSAT
would result in dicriminatory data distribution policies that would
adversely affect them, terminate the satellite transmissions to
their ground receiving stations, and increase prices so much that
they would have to reduce their LANDSAT data purchases.
The Director of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) testi-
fied that with respect to LANDSAT, there was a fundamental in-
compatibility between the U.S. foreign policy goals and the com-
mercial goals that would be pursued by a private operator of the
system. He noted that many developing nations of the world view
the tranfer of LANDSAT to the private sector as a hostile action
on the part of the United States. He further noted that the policy
of making LANDSAT data available to everyone on an equal basis
(i.e., a nondiscriminatory data distribution policy) was a key ingre-
dient in explaining the acceptance of LANDSAT by the world's na-
tions and was an essential element in maintaining the "open skies"
policy which allows all U.S. spacecraft to circle the globe without
restriction.
A. INTRODUCTION
Early in 1983, serious questions about the wisdom of the proposal
to sell LANDSAT had prompted Chairman Brooks to request both
the GAO and OTA to conduct thorough investigations of the possi-
ble ramifications abroad of such an action. This discussion presents
many of the results of these studies, beginning with a look at how
LANDSAT data has come to be used by various nations around the
world, followed by an examination of the possible impact that the
sale of the LANDSAT system would have on the U.S. relations
with other countries, and developments which could affect the
future operations of either a government or privately owned
LANDSAT system.
B. THE USES OF LANDSAT DATA
Since the launching of the first LANDSAT satellite in 1972, the
imagery from this spacecraft has proved to be useful in agriculture,
map-making, hydrology, geology, land-use planning, environmental
monitoring, and surveying marine and ocean resources. The GAO
investigation documented the many ways in which various nations
have reaped significant benefits from LANDSAT data. At the Sep-
tember hearing, GAO testified that LANDSAT has been particular-
ly important for developing countries where less is known about
the land and its resources than for the more industrialized nations.
GAO cited several examples-in particular, how Brazil, Peru, Thai-
land, and India have used LANDSAT data.
Brazilian officials said that LANDSAT had proven especially
valuable for monitoring sugar cane-an important crop used
both as food and in manufacturing synthetic fuels. Brazilian
space agency officials said that the satellite data was needed
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because Brazil's large land area made the use of aerial photog-
raphy for surveying the crop impractical.
Peru has acquired LANDSAT data from Brazil and the
United States to produce its first nationwide topographic map.
Peruvian officials said that the nature and location of the na-
tion's natural resources are not fully known, because about
two-thirds of the nation has never been accurately mapped.
The officials said mapmaking through aerial photography is
too expensive and that flying in remote regions of Peru is too
dangerous. The officials added that the speed with which
LANDSAT provides information is especially important in a
country like Peru, where natural disasters such as earth-
quakes, droughts, and floods can rapidly change roads, rivers,
and agricultural conditions.
Thai officials told GAO that increasing population has
caused more and more land to come under cultivation. The
impact of this expanded farming was not clear until LAND
SAT images showed deforestation occurring at an alarming
rate. Ground surveys and aerial photography had not disclosed
the full dimensions of the problem. After seeing the LANDSAT
pictures, the Thai government strengthened controls on the
clearing of forests.
In India, LANDSAT's images of shrinking lakes provided
graphic evidence of the effects of recent droughts and contrib-
uted to government decisions to provide relief to affected
areas.4
The Committee notes with concern that GAO investigators dis-
covered that little, if any, effort had been made on the part of the
U.S. Government to keep LANDSAT user nations around the world
informed about the contemplated changes in the status of LAND
SAT or to discuss their concerns over the proposed sale with them.
The Committee notes that while the decision to sell LANDSAT or
any other Government-owned item which has international utility,
may ultimately be a purely domestic decision, the U.S. Government
should show more consideration toward user-nations as it considers
policy options. The U.S. Government must not forget that these na-
tions have invested considerable resources in acquiring LANDSAT
capabilities, and that any decision which affects the future of
LANDSAT is of definite concern to them.
Many of the world's nations are not able to derive benefits from
LANDSAT without technical and/or financial assistance. Because
these are the developing nations that stand to gain the most from
LANDSAT over the years, AID has provided the required assist-
ance to these countries. To date, AID-assisted LANDSAT user na-
tions are: Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil,
Cameroon, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
Haiti, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Paki-
stan, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Somalia,
Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Upper
Volta, and Zaire.
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AID characterized the assistance it has provided to these nations
as technology adaptation, operational monitoring, and/or institu-
tion building. Through technology adaptation, AID has primarily
helped Third World nations to make crop production estimates to
begin to deal with the problem of how to feed the over one-half bil-
lion people in the world who are on the brink of starvation.
Through operational monitoring, AID has helped a number of
countries to assess their total land resources and document
changes that are occurring in land use. One of the most significant
forms of operational monitoring which LANDSAT facilitates con-
cerns the tracking of the destructive process whereby deserts en-
croach on fertile land. Through institution building, AID has begun
the process of taking LANDSAT technology to the Third World
people who actually use it. As a result, LANDSAT imagery is be-
coming a type of technology that is understandable and usable by
residents of many nations throughout the world independent of
U.S. resident expertise.
The following map shows the many nations that either have
LANDSAT ground receiving stations or have used LANDSAT im-
agery with the assistance of AID. These nations do not necessarily
include those that have purchased LANDSAT imagery from the
U.S. Government data center in South Dakota.
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All the potential uses of LANDSAT imagery are not yet known.
The Committee notes, however, that each year the LANDSAT pro-
gram has been in existence, more and more uses for its imagery
have been discovered and more nations have come to use it.
C. IMPACT OF LANDSAT SALE ON U.S. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Before the potential impact of the sale of LANDSAT upon U.S.
international relations can be assessed, the effect that the estab-
lishment of the LANDSAT program has already had upon these re-
lations must be examined.
After over a decade of operation, the clear consensus is that the
LANDSAT program has had a positive impact on the U.S. relations
with other countries. The witnesses at the Subcommittee's hearing
described the LANDSAT program in such terms as a builder of
considerable good will abroad (GAO); a generator of foreign policy
benefits (State); a benefit to both the United States and developing
countries (AID); and a significant contribution to U.S. foreign
policy and international relations (OTA).
The Committee is concerned that by transferring the LANDSAT
program to the private sector, the Government could be losing a
valuable foreign policy tool. While the possible range of assistance
that might be given to various developing nations by the United
States is quite broad, few programs appear to match the ability of
the LANDSAT program to simultaneously foster self-sufficiency,
technological competence, and national pride. Even though only a
U.S. company or individual would be allowed to take over the
LANDSAT system under the Administration's proposal, the Com-
mittee believes that the U.S. Government can continue to reap no-
table foreign relations benefits from the LANDSAT system only if
it retains considerable control over the system.
While LANDSAT now generally appears to be a popular pro-
gram among the nations of the world, its acceptance was not imme-
diately forthcoming at its inception. Some nations did not take
kindly to having satellites take pictures of their terrain when they
had no control over what was photographed within their borders,
or who could obtain the finished pictures. Several nations argued
in the United Nations that LANDSAT not be allowed to photo-
graph their countries unless they had given the United States per-
mission to do so.
No LANDSAT system could be practical if permission had to be
obtained from every nation in the world over which the satellite
happened to pass. Recognizing that such a situation was untenable,
but entirely possible if the concerns of the various nations were not
addressed, the United States decided to adopt a policy of nondis-
criminatory data distribution with respect to LANDSAT imagery.
This meant that any nation or individual in the world would have
the same access to all imagery generated by LANDSAT, and that
fees would be kept to a minimum so as not to disadvantage less
wealthy nations. No one would have preferential rights to any
LANDSAT imagery, not even the nation that was being imaged. By
adopting this policy, the U.S. Government helped to squelch the
fears of developing nations that some private investor might obtain
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knowledge about a nation's resources that the nation itself did not
possess, and then attempt to exploit that information.
Thus far, the nondiscriminatory data distribution policy has been
most successful in assuaging fears about LANDSAT. In addition,
witnesses at the hearing noted that the nondiscriminatory data dis-
tribution policy for LANDSAT has been a key ingredient to the
maintenance of the "open skies" policy which permits all U.S. sat-
ellites to circle the globe without restrictions.
The Committee is concerned that any deviation from the nondis-
criminatory data distribution policy for LANDSAT could have seri-
ous negative repercussions for the United States abroad. There are
still nations that object to LANDSAT taking images of their ter-
rain. Their arguments have not prevailed to date, however, because
the U.S. Government has fought hard to sell and enforce the non-
discriminatory data distribution policy. If the U.S. Government is
no longer the major party in control of the LANDSAT system, the
relationship of trust that has grown between the U.S. Government
and developing nations with regard to the LANDSAT program will
not necessarily transfer to a private owner of the LANDSAT
system. A simple sale of LANDSAT to the private sector, as OTA
testified at the hearing, is viewed as a hostile action on the part of
the United States by some nations. In addition, OTA stated:
In view of the continued importance of the "open skies"
principle to the use of space, it is important for Congress
to consider carefully the implications of this potentially
radical change of policy upon other issues, both civilian
and military.5
The Committee is concerned that any change in the control of
the LANDSAT system be as nondisruptive as possible to existing
international arrangements between the United States and other
nations. In light of the significance of the nondiscriminatory data
distribution policy to the success of the LANDSAT program, as
well as the maintenance of the "open skies" policy, the Committee
believes that retention of this policy should be a permanent, non-
negotiable part of the LANDSAT program regardless of the sys-
tem's ownership or control. The Committee wishes to emphasize
the importance of this matter, since the Administration stated at
the hearing, as well as in other forums, that it would prefer to
permit a private operator of the LANDSAT system to dispense
with the nondiscriminatory data distribution policy, if doing so
would facilitate the commercial objectives of a privately owned
system. 6
On this particular matter, as OTA noted at the hearing, the com-
mercial objectives of a private owner and the foreign policy goals of
the United States may appear to be fundamentally incompatible.7
With the desire to make a profit the driving force behind a com-
mercial operator, it is obvious that selling LANDSAT data on a
preferential basis to the highest bidder might appear to be the best
way to run the system. With international good will, trust, and the
5 Ibid., p. 14
6 Ibid., pp. 98. See also Effects on Users of Commercializing LANDSA T and the Weather Satel-
lites, p. v.
7Ibid., p. 11.
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future of other civilian and military space programs at stake, the
perspective of the Government should take precedence; LANDSAT
data must continue to be available at minimal prices on a nondis-
criminatory basis. The Committee believes that making this re-
quirement a condition of sale should minimize the adverse impact
that the sale of LANDSAT might have on relations between the
United States and other nations.
The Committee is pleased to note that in Public Law 98-365, the
Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, enacted on
July 17, 1984, the Congress has ensured that dissemination of
LANDSAT-type data from private firms will be on a nondiscrimini-
tory basis.
D. DEVELOPMENTS THAT MIGHT AFFECT THE FUTURE OPERATIONS OF
LANDSAT
While the United States is currently the only nation in the world
to have a satellite-based land remote sensing system, this will most
likely not be the case for much longer. France, having recognized
the value of such a system, plans to launch its own land remote
sensing satellite late in 1985. In anticipation of this event, France
is already engaging in an active promotional marketing campaign
to line up potential customers for its satellite's data.
The Committee recognizes that the arrival of a competitor in the
land remote sensing arena will most likely have a profound impact
on the LANDSAT program. No longer can the marketing of LAND-
SAT data be secondary to the development of land remote sensing
technology. If the United States intends to continue to reap the
benefits of providing other nations with land remote sensing image-
ry, the United States will have to offer a product that is competi-
tive in both quality and price with that offered by the French.
A desire to better market LANDSAT data appears to be at least
partly responsible for the Administration's decision to turn the sat-
ellite system over to the private sector." The testimony of the Ad-
ministration's representative from the Source Evaluation Board
clearly indicated that the Administration believes that the private
sector knows more about the marketing of products such as LAND
SAT imagery than does the U.S. Government. The Committee does
not take issue with this assumption, but it is concerned that the
rush to better market LANDSAT imagery not jeopardize the long-
term survival of the system.
At the hearing, the SEB testified that it would be anywhere from
5 to 15 years before the market for LANDSAT data would be large
enough to support a commercial venture. GAO agreed, noting,
It is premature to talk about a commercial market for
LANDSAT because up to this point in time we have been
talking about a research and development type activity.
The market is just not established commercially.9
Consequently, any plan to turn LANDSAT over to the private
sector must take account of the present small size of a commercial
market for LANDSAT imagery. If the plan does not provide for
8lbid., pp. 100-101.
9lbid., p. 60.
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adequate subsidy in the early years, it will not be a transfer plan
at all, but a plan to kill the LANDSAT program. Even if the pri-
vate sector is better at marketing LANDSAT data than is the U.S.
Government, it cannot generate a market overnight.
The French recognize this fact and are prepared to turn their
system over to the private sector gradually over a ten-year period.
As OTA testified at the hearing, however, even then the French
system may not actually be privately run because the French Gov-
ernment is a part owner of the company to which the French
system will ultimately be turned over.
The Committee believes that assuring the survival of the LAND
SAT system is of paramount concern because U.S. Government
agencies are currently the major users of land remote sensing tech-
nology, and to permit the U.S. Government to become dependent
on other nations for this data could present problems. Consequent-
ly, any plan to turn the system over to the private sector must be
flexible enough to provide for unforeseen contingencies. To provide
the necessary flexibility, the U.S. Government should remain an
active participant in the LANDSAT program. This would also
enable the U.S. Government to reap the maximum possible foreign
policy benefits from the LANDSAT program. On this point also,
the Committee notes with pleasure that Public Law 98-365 pro-
vides for the continued involvement of the U.S. Government in any
LANDSAT-type program as the licensor of land remote sensing sys-
tems.
The Committee also believes that in light of the advent of foreign
competition in land remote sensing, it would be wise for the Ad-
ministration to encourage competition among U.S. companies for
the land remote sensing market. To do so would maximize the pos-
sibility that the United States will continue to lead the world in
the field of land remote sensing and avoid the problems incumbent
in the creation of state-sanctioned private monopolies.
III. CONCLUSION
The satellite-based land remote sensing program known as
LANDSAT has proved to be quite useful in acquiring knowledge of
the earth's surface features. This information has been useful not
only to the United States, but also to developing countries that are
trying to assess their nations' land and water resources.
To date, over 40 developing nations have used LANDSAT image-
ry with the assistance of AID. More than a dozen other nations
have singly or jointly built ground stations to receive LANDSAT
data directly. Still others have purchased LANDSAT data products
from the U.S. Government data center in South Dakota.
The U.S. Government has reaped immeasurable international
benefits from the LANDSAT program. Despite this fact, the Ad-
ministration has proposed to transfer the LANDSAT system to the
private sector. The Committee is concerned that in making such a
transfer, the U.S. Government could be losing a valuable foreign
policy tool.
The crucial element in the widespread acceptance of LANDSAT
has been the U.S. policy of distributing LANDSAT data in a non-
discriminatory manner at minimal prices. This policy has also been
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the cornerstone of the "open skies" policy which permits all U.S.
spacecraft to fly without restriction around the earth. The Commit-
tee is deeply concerned that any plan to transfer LANDSAT to the
private sector not alter the nondiscriminatory data distribution
policy, in violation of Public Law 98-365, and thereby jeopardize
the "open skies" policy.
IV. FINDINGS
1. The LANDSAT program has had significant, positive foreign
relations benefits for the United States.
2. LANDSAT imagery provides the only available information on
the surface conditions of certain parts of the world.
3. The key to LANDSAT's acceptance thus far and its develop-
ment in the future is the unrestricted availability of its products at
minimal prices.
4. The U.S. nondiscriminatory data distribution policy for LAND
SAT information is the key to the maintenance of the vital "open
skies" policy that allows all U.S. spacecraft to circle the globe with-
out restriction.
5. Any deviation by the United States from our longstanding
nondiscriminatory data distribution policy for LANDSAT informa-
tion is likely to be viewed as a negative action by many foreign na-
tions.
6. It will be an estimated 5 to 15 years before a large enough
market for LANDSAT products will develop that would completely
support a privately owned and operated LANDSAT system.
7. The Administration's efforts to inform other nations with
LANDSAT ground receiving stations of commercialization efforts
that would directly affect them have been inadequate.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Our Nation's longstanding nondiscriminatory data distribution
policy should be continued regardless of LANDSAT's ownership, in
accordance with the provisions of Public Law 98-365. Our reaffir-
mation of this policy should be communicated to all the nations of
the world.
2. Consistent with Public Law 98-365, the U.S. Government
should remain an active participant in the LANDSAT program to
assure its continuation and to assure that the United States as a
nation reaps the maximum foreign relations benefits from this pro-
gram.
3. Every effort should be made to inform other nations with
LANDSAT ground receiving stations of developments in any at-
tempt to commercialize LANDSAT, to honor our expressed and im-
plied LANDSAT related commitments to such nations, and to ac-
commodate their concerns regarding LANDSAT's future as much
as possible.
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