PROSPECTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR USSR OF GANDHI ASSASSINATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001300170004-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intelligence Agency
The assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has cost the
USSR one of its most important allies in the Third World. Nonetheless, over
the short term the USSR is likely to maintain its position as the predominant
outside influence in New Delhi. The two countries share common security
concerns about China, the US, and Pakistan as well as common fears about the
spread of Islamic fundamentalism. In view of the. significant military and
economic ties between Moscow and New Delhi, the Soviets will be well placed to
manipulate India's heightened security concerns in the aftermath of the
assassination and to establish good working relations with Indira's successor,
her son Rajiv. Nonetheless, the Soviets' ability to manipulate Indian
internal affairs is limited, and over the long term New Delhi could became a
less forceful advocate for Soviet positions in Nonaligned and Third World
forums.
Although fhe Soviets have worked painstakingly to institutionalize the
relationship, .Gandhi's role in forging the present close relationship has been
pivotal. No other leading Indian politician is as well disposed toward the
'1f~is msnorandtan was prepared by the Third World
Activities Division, Office of Soviet Analysis. Yt has been. coordinated with
the Office of Near East and South Asia Analysis. ?~stions-and caanents are
welccxoe and may be addressed to the Q~ief, Third World Activities, 90VA on
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USSR--notably licensed production rights for advanced Soviet military
pment--that have been provided to no other Soviet Third World client.
Moscow appreciated Gandhi's ersonal role in the re ations ip: as
year or so especially, Moscow was concerned about 25X1
Indira Gandhi's declining domestic support an --as a result--timed high-level
visits and agreements t sition before the elections that are
scheduled for January. 25X1
The Soviets did not take seriously Gandhi's effort to promote her younger
son Sanjay as her successor but did not make the same mistake when Rajiv
became the heir apparent after Sanjay''s death in 1980. In 1983, he was
invited to Moscow for a two- week visit and given treatment normally reserved
for chiefs of state. He had meetings with all the senior leadership
(including Defense Minister Ustinov and all the service chiefs) except General
Secretary Andropov. In his public pronouncements after the visit, he echoed
his mother's anti Wrestern biases, particularly her charges of Western and
Pakistani involvement in Indian internal affairs.
The Soviets clearly anticipated that Rajiv would succeed his mother; the
first Soviet condolence message to the Indians was sent by General Secretary
Chernenko to Rajiv Gandhi in his capacity as General Secretary of the Congress
Party, not to Zail Singh, the constitutional head of state. In view of their
misgivings about the possible influence of Rajiv's Italian wife and his
sympathies toward the West prior to his entry into politics, the Soviets will
presumably spare no effort to incrratiate themselves with Rajiv in order to
advance Soviet interests.
None of India's other non-Corcm~unist political parties have had the same
commitment to~close Indo-Soviet ties over the years as the Congress Party and
no other Indian politician in the Congress Party has as good a chance as Rajiv
to ensure continued Congress domination of Indian politics. Memories of the
1977-79 Janata coalition, when Indian foreign policy was more even-handed
toward the US and the USSR and there was talk of abrogating the Indo-Soviet
Friendship Treaty, are still fresh in Moscow and probably an important factor
in Soviet calculations.
Continued differences with Pakistan will ensure that India requires
strong links to the USSR in any event. Moreover, the Soviets probably will do
what they can in the coming weeks and months to strengthen Rajiv's internal
political position and to try to ensure that his commitment to the Indo-Soviet
relationship becomes as firm as his mother's. The Soviet delegation to the
funeral, probably headed by Premier Tikhonov, will take steps to show Moscow's
approval of the secession. Part of the effort will involve attempting to fan
.Indian suspicions of the US and Pakistan; Soviet propaganda organs already are
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charging that Gandhi's assassins got their ideological inspiration from CIA.
The new Indian Defense Minister was in Moscow at the time of the assassination
for talks on further defense cooperation between India and the USSR. The
Soviets will use that relationship to try to buttress ties with the Indians
and underscore the USSR's key role as India's major arms supplier. Economic
aid and trade relationships will also be manipulated to underscore Moscow's
commitment to India's economic development under Rajiv.
Whether this succeeds depends primarily on Rajiv's leadership -
abilities. If Rajiv can keep the lid on internal retribution against the
Sikhs and use his mother's assassination to strengthen the Congress Party or
if the opposition fragments in the absence of Indira as a unifying force, the
Soviets could merge with their influence enhanced and the relationship on a
more secure footing.
If, on the other hand, Rajiv--as many Indian experts believe--proves to
be a weak and ineffective leader, and an opposition coalition manages to
defeat Congress, the Soviets could be dealing with a much different Indian
leadership six months from now than they have been accustomed to over the past
four years. Such a leadership probably would .not move quickly to dismantle
the important bilateral economic and military relationships--which would
remain important to any Indian leadership--but it could distance itself from
the Soviets on such international issues as Afghanistan, the Indian Ocean,
Kampuchea, and India's relations with its neighbors. Opposition politicians,
for example, have criticized Gandhi for her support of the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan and her hegemonistic attitude toward dealing with India's
neighbors.
Implications for the US
Overt and covert Soviet efforts to implicate the US and Pakistan will
have credibility in some circles in India. The Pakistanis fear--probably on
good grounds--a sharp deterioration in their bilateral relations as India
seeks scapegoats for Gandhi's assassination. Any worsening of relations with
India will bring General Zia to the United States for additional military
assistance. The Soviets, on the other hand, probably fear that Washington
will signal support to the new government in India and, in doing so, will try
to loosen Indo-Soviet ties. The Soviets will presumably try to manipulate
Indian internal affairs to prevent any improved role for Washington.
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SUBJECT: Prospects and Implications for USSR of Gandhi
Assassination
External Distribution
Admiral John M.' Poindexter
Military Assistant, National Security Affairs
White House
Ambassador Jack Matlock
Senior Staff Member, USSR-Eastern Europe
Room 368, Old EOB
Geoffrey Kemp
Senior Staff Member, Middle East
Room 351, Old EOB
State Department
Michael Armacost
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Room 7240
Stephen Bosworth
Chairman, Policy Planning Council
Room 7311
Phillip S. Kaplan
Staff Director, SP
Room 7316
Robie M. Palmer
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs
Room 6219
Thomas W. Simons, Jr.
Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs
Room 4217
David Satterfield
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 6244
Victor Tomseth
Director, INS
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 5251
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SUBJECT: Prospects and Implications for USSR of Gandhi
Assassination
t
External Distribution (Continued)
State Department
Hugh Montgomery
Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Room 6531
George S. Harris
Director, Office of Analysis for Near East and
South Asia, INR
Room 4524A
Robert H. Baraz
Director, Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union
and pastern Europe, INR
Room 4758
Department of Defense
Richard Armitage
Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs
Room 4E809, Pentagon '
Admiral Arthur S. Moreau, Jr.
JCS
Room 2E782, Pentagon
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Major General Edward Tixier
Room 4D675, Pentagon
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Noel C. Koch
OSD/ISA
Room 4E813, Pentagon
DIO, European and Soviet Political Affairs
Room X238, Pentagon
DIO for NESA
Room X238, Pentagon
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SUBJECT: Prospects and Implications for USSR of Gandhi
Assassination
External Distribution (Continued)
Department of Defense
Ron Zwart
OSD/ISA/NESA
Room 4D765, Pentagon
Captain Robert G. Anderson
JCS/PPD/FESA
Room 2D973, Pentagon
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