Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP86T00302R001001600004-3
Body:
Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00302R001001600004-3
AQUINO'S ASSASSINATION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY
IN THE PHILIPPINES
Information available as of 15 September 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
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CONTENTS
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SCOPE NOTE ............................................................................................................ 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 3
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SCOPE NOTE
Benigno Aquino's assassination in Manila on 21 August 1983 has
triggered new concerns both in the United States and abroad about the
Philippines' near-term political stability. US security interests go beyond
concern about access to Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Airfield. US
commercial banks have some $6 billion in loans outstanding to the
country and US private investment totals $1.6 billion
This Special National Intelligence Estimate focuses on the political
and economic repercussions since the assassination and the ability of the
Marcos government to function effectively over the next six to nine
months. During this period, President Reagan is scheduled to visit
Manila, and the Philippines will hold National Assembly elections.F
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The Marcos government has weathered the initial storm over
Benigno Aquino's assassination, and its prospects for continuing to do so
are reasonably good over the next few months. Aquino's death,
however, will leave the domestic political environment, the country's
external finances, and Philippine foreign relations unsettled for some
time:
- A fair contest in the May 1984 National Assembly elections
would be a major step in liberalizing politics and revitalizing the
center of the political spectrum. However, opposition groups are
weighing plans to boycott the elections and engage in civil
disobedience instead of participating.
- The assassination could sour the government's already shaky
external financial position, resulting in payments arrearages on
the $23 billion foreign debt. Even if the government handles
financial decisions adroitly during the next six to nine months,
foreign debt rescheduling now appears likely.
- The assassination has left government credibility severely shak-
en, and a commission appointed by Marcos to investigate
Aquino's death is unlikely to restore public confidence. The full
story behind the assassination remains unknown. Three possibil-
ities as to the responsible element are: the government itself,
Aquino's enemies from his home province or the Communist
New People's Arm .
Ithe Intelligence Community cannot
make a judgment at this time about who bears ultimate
responsibility.
Manila expects its relations with Washington to be adversely
affected by the Aquino assassination over the short term:
- Manila fears that President Reagan will cancel his scheduled
November visit at a time it needs the legitimizing effects that
such a visit would confer.
- Manila almost certainly expects the recently concluded review
of the US-Philippine Military Bases Agreement to undergo
intensive scrutiny when the US Congress considers the $900
million assistance package next year.
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- Manila probably expects increased Congressional criticism of its
human rights policies. Ruling party officials already feel domes-
tic pressure to make concessions to opposition groups, and they
probably anticipate additional pressure from Washington.
- Manila may intensify its recent efforts to obtain emergency
balance-of-payments assistance from Washington even though
senior government officials, including Imelda Marcos, have
already been told that Manila does not qualify for some forms
of assistance.
Although the ruling party's strong political machine and the
government's extensive security apparatus are capable of dealing with
opposition activity and the Communist insurgent threat in the months
ahead, Aquino's assassination and its aftermath have intensified long-
standing concerns about the Philippines' stability:
- Communists may be the main beneficiaries of the assassination.
They have already stepped up propaganda efforts in an effort to
capitalize on Aquino's death, and these are producing gains in
recruitment among the young. Over half the population is
under 18 years of age.
- Marcos's health problems could recur. Even the suspicion he is
in failing health will renew succession jockeying at the highest
levels of the ruling party. An orderly succession thus remains in
serious question.
- Unless he is implicated in Aquino's assassination, General Ver
will remain the dominant figure in the defense establishment.
He and the military more than ever figure to be key players in
the post-Marcos era.
- A consequence of the country's foreign debt problems is that the
economy will have difficulty recapturing its former growth
momentum in the years ahead, complicating the domestic
political pictured
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