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AQUINO'S ASSASSINATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY IN THE PHILIPPINES

Document Type: 
CREST [1]
Collection: 
General CIA Records [2]
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP86T00302R001001600004-3
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
6
Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 5, 2008
Sequence Number: 
4
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
September 15, 1983
Content Type: 
SNIE
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP86T00302R001001600004-3.pdf [3]158.63 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00302R001001600004-3 AQUINO'S ASSASSINATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY IN THE PHILIPPINES Information available as of 15 September 1983 was used in the preparation of this Estimate. Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00302R001001600004-3 Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00302R001001600004-3 CONTENTS Page SCOPE NOTE ............................................................................................................ 1 KEY JUDGMENTS .................................................................................................... 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00302R001001600004-3 Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00302R001001600004-3 SCOPE NOTE Benigno Aquino's assassination in Manila on 21 August 1983 has triggered new concerns both in the United States and abroad about the Philippines' near-term political stability. US security interests go beyond concern about access to Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Airfield. US commercial banks have some $6 billion in loans outstanding to the country and US private investment totals $1.6 billion This Special National Intelligence Estimate focuses on the political and economic repercussions since the assassination and the ability of the Marcos government to function effectively over the next six to nine months. During this period, President Reagan is scheduled to visit Manila, and the Philippines will hold National Assembly elections.F I SECRET Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00302R001001600004-3 Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00302R001001600004-3 KEY JUDGMENTS The Marcos government has weathered the initial storm over Benigno Aquino's assassination, and its prospects for continuing to do so are reasonably good over the next few months. Aquino's death, however, will leave the domestic political environment, the country's external finances, and Philippine foreign relations unsettled for some time: - A fair contest in the May 1984 National Assembly elections would be a major step in liberalizing politics and revitalizing the center of the political spectrum. However, opposition groups are weighing plans to boycott the elections and engage in civil disobedience instead of participating. - The assassination could sour the government's already shaky external financial position, resulting in payments arrearages on the $23 billion foreign debt. Even if the government handles financial decisions adroitly during the next six to nine months, foreign debt rescheduling now appears likely. - The assassination has left government credibility severely shak- en, and a commission appointed by Marcos to investigate Aquino's death is unlikely to restore public confidence. The full story behind the assassination remains unknown. Three possibil- ities as to the responsible element are: the government itself, Aquino's enemies from his home province or the Communist New People's Arm . Ithe Intelligence Community cannot make a judgment at this time about who bears ultimate responsibility. Manila expects its relations with Washington to be adversely affected by the Aquino assassination over the short term: - Manila fears that President Reagan will cancel his scheduled November visit at a time it needs the legitimizing effects that such a visit would confer. - Manila almost certainly expects the recently concluded review of the US-Philippine Military Bases Agreement to undergo intensive scrutiny when the US Congress considers the $900 million assistance package next year. 3 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00302R001001600004-3 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00302R001001600004-3 - Manila probably expects increased Congressional criticism of its human rights policies. Ruling party officials already feel domes- tic pressure to make concessions to opposition groups, and they probably anticipate additional pressure from Washington. - Manila may intensify its recent efforts to obtain emergency balance-of-payments assistance from Washington even though senior government officials, including Imelda Marcos, have already been told that Manila does not qualify for some forms of assistance. Although the ruling party's strong political machine and the government's extensive security apparatus are capable of dealing with opposition activity and the Communist insurgent threat in the months ahead, Aquino's assassination and its aftermath have intensified long- standing concerns about the Philippines' stability: - Communists may be the main beneficiaries of the assassination. They have already stepped up propaganda efforts in an effort to capitalize on Aquino's death, and these are producing gains in recruitment among the young. Over half the population is under 18 years of age. - Marcos's health problems could recur. Even the suspicion he is in failing health will renew succession jockeying at the highest levels of the ruling party. An orderly succession thus remains in serious question. - Unless he is implicated in Aquino's assassination, General Ver will remain the dominant figure in the defense establishment. He and the military more than ever figure to be key players in the post-Marcos era. - A consequence of the country's foreign debt problems is that the economy will have difficulty recapturing its former growth momentum in the years ahead, complicating the domestic political pictured 4 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00302R001001600004-3 Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00302R001001600004-3 Next 13 Page(s) In Document Denied Iq Approved For Release 2008/05/05: CIA-RDP86T00302R001001600004-3

Source URL: https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp86t00302r001001600004-3

Links
[1] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document-type/crest
[2] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/collection/general-cia-records
[3] https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00302R001001600004-3.pdf