LETTER TO HONORABLE ROGERS C. B. MORTON FROM ROBERT ELLSWORTH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00933R000200030008-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2001
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 2, 1975
• Content Type: LETTER

*Army and DoD reviews
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f`_ 7``5=1 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
s `,f WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
Honorable Rogers C. B. Morton
Secretary of Commerce
Department of Commerce
Washinton, D. C. 20230
2 JUL. 1975
In reply refer to.
:L-6803/75ct
(C) in accor awith the agreement reached by the Export Admirx-
istration :Review Board at its meeting in your office on October 29,
1974, we are sending you the enclosed report on safeguards for the
IBM computer installation proposed for the INTOUR.IST reservation
system. The report was prepared by an interagency task force con-
vener- by the Department of Defense. Its members were drawn from.
State, Defense, Commerce, AEC and NASA.
(C) -s is by far the most difficult and, in our judgment, the most
significant of the three large computer cases the Board has been called
on to consider, and we,must tell you that we have serious doubts as to
whether the U. S. Government should approve it. Our concerns arise
primarily because this system is more susceptible of, diversion than
either the KAMA RIVER or AEROFLOT installations, its use by the
KGB to enhance their surveillance operations substantially is both
likely and unpreventable and, by supplying an undeniable precedent.
for the release to the Soviet Union of very large, data-base oriented
computers, approval by the U. S. will undercut our efforts to main-
tain an effective system of computer export controls.
(U) To facilitate evaluation of the report by the Export Administration
Review Board, we have taken the liberty of forwarding a copy of this let-
ter and its enclosure to the other members of the Board. We have also
sent copies to the principals of the other agencies represented on the
task force.
(Ti) We 57jould be interested in hearing your views.
 ;tom;
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
CLASSIFIED BY: DIR, ST&D
EXEMPT FROM GDS OF EO 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 3
DECLASSIFY OIMT: Dec 31, 1980
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' ' ' OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT S :C3?ETARY OF DEFENSE
I JUL 1975
In reply refer to:
1-68.03/75 ct
MEMORANDUM FOR The Deputy Secretary of Defense
SUBJECT: INTOURIST Reservation System
(C) On October 29, 1974, the Export Administration Review Board
asked the :Department of Defense to convene an interagency task force
to study the feasibility of safeguards to be applied in the interest of
U. S. national security to certain large computer systems proposed
for export to the Soviet Union. This is the report of the task force on
the third and last of these cases, the IBM proposal to computerize the
INTOURIST reservation system.
CONCL S:EONS
1. (C) This is the largest U. S., and in some respects the largest
Western., computer system so far proposed for installation in the
Conn mist world.
2. (C) Because of its size and the nature of the tasks it will per-
form, it has substantial amounts of excess computing power available
for diversion to significant military uses.
3. (C) The dual configuration of this installation? its ability to be
separated into two, viable systems, the interchangeability of its cen-
tral processing units (CPU's), and the.very large number of periph-
eral memory devices it contains, combine to provide numerous
means by which substantial proportions of the system's total capacity
can be surreptitiously diverted to other than its stated purposes.
4. (C) Beyond the possibility of diversion to military purposes,
it is highly likely that some of this system will be used to enhance
KGB surveillance and control activities.
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5. (C) There are no feasible modifications of the CPU's which
will safeguard against their use for other than their stated purposes.
6. (C) A substantial reduction in the number of type-3330 disk
drives can be made without impairing the operation of the system,
at least in the initial phases, and will provide a measure of protec-
tion against their diversion.
7. (C) Restricting the number of Soviet personnel trained and the
kind and, amount of training provided in hardware maintenance, as well
as in systems and software design and development, to the 'minimum.
necessary and appropriate to the installation will limit undesirable
technology transfers.
8. (U) The safeguards outlined in Appendices I and II of this
report can be reasonably effective in deterring and detecting signifi
cant v~ime diversion of this system to military purposes and in limit-
ing un_esirable technology transfers.
9. (C) There are no safeguards which can be installed against
diver s=o=: of the system.to KGB or police-type uses in parallel with
bona fide INTOURIST functions.
10. (U) Computer installations approved on the basis of reliance
on safeguards need to be held to the minimum possible in both number
and size.
RECOMMENDATIONS
(U) The task force makes no recommendation on whether this case
should be approved or disapproved on the ground that this is a policy
matter outside its competence.
(C) What it does say is that if, after considering the risks involved, a
decision is made to approve this transaction, the following measures
to reduce as far as possible the diversion of this system are recorn-
mernded::
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1. The system will be limited to one 370/145 and one 370/158
central processor, 24 type 3330 disk drives and appropriate periph-
eral equipment, without prejudice to the replacement of the 370/145
with a second 370/158 and the addition of more disk drives when a
need for them can be demonstrated.
2. The requirements outlined in Appendices I and II of this
report be included as conditions of any license for this installation.
The INTOURIST Organization
(C) INTOURIST is the Soviet Union's . state operated travel agency
which controls all hotel, restaurant, theater, shop, train and air
bookings for non-Soviet citizens inside the USSR and for Soviet
citizens outside of the USSR. It also provides some services for
Soviet citizens inside the USSR. In 1974 INTOURIST supplied
services to 3, 447, 000 foreigners and 1, 650, 000 Soviet citizens
tray-ei ing inside the USSR and to 2, 225, 000 Soviet citizens traveling
outside the USSR.
(C) -en the nature of the Sov=iet state, with its emphasis on close
contrcl of its own citizens, wherever they are, as well f
as .~or:.a.g;,.ers
within its borders, even the most routine aspects of travel require
official approval. The result is an extraordinary degree of inflexi
bility in travel arrangements. Once a particular hotel reservation
has been made or an itinerary approved, it is very difficult to change.
To alter travel plans on short notice is well nigh impossible. Since
contingencies requiring changes are constantly arising, the Soviet
traveller, foreigner and citizen alike, regularly experiences con-
fusion, inefficiencies, uncertainties and delays. -The Soviet Govern-
ment recognizes that much of the friction could be reduced, without
sacrificing -- indeed with a possible improvement in -- official
control of the movement of people, if they had information on the
traveller, his itinerary, and requirements for various services on
an up-to--the-minute basis and could match that information against
an equally up-to-the-minute inventory of available accommodations.
It is primarily this function which the IBM computer system is intended
to serve.
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(C) The Soviets have specified that the system is to be designed to
process a 1978 peak of 11 million travellers --- both foreign and
.Soviet to deal with 1000 foreign and commercial. travel agencies,
and to keep track of and assign tourists to 500 hotels in 250 cities,
500 trains, 35 ships, rent-a-cars in 200 cities, INTOURIST cars in
250 cities, 280 theaters in 200 cities and 300 restaurants in 250
Cities.
De s crinf:ion of Equipment
(C) The computer system which IBM proposes to supply is based upon,
the airline reservation system that IBM has marketed rather success-
fully or a number of years. However, it is larger than most such
systems and contains a larger variety of functions in keeping with the
greater variety of tasks which the INTOURIST agency performs.
(C) T--e proposal calls for the linking together of two IBM 370 central
processing units (CPU's), one to process on--line interactive regCLests
for i: =rmation and for the updating of information files, and the other
to ? er. orm ancillary jobs on a batch basis while it simultaneously
serves as back up for the on-line real-time computer system. Con-
nected to these CPU's would be appropriate peripherals including 48
type-3330 disk drives.
(C) Delivery would be made in phases.. Initially, as soon as the
license is granted, an IBM 370/145 computer with a small number of
appropriate peripherals, including 8 type 3330 disk drives, is to be
delivered for instructional and program development purposes. After
about a year, an IBM 370/158 computer with the remainder of the
peripherals, including 40 additional 3330 drives, would be delivered.
At this point, the proposal calls for the commencing of actual
INTOUB.,IST operations with the 370/158 computer serving as the real--
time, or on-line, computer upon which the reservations are normally
transacted. -The 370/145 computer would be utilized as the off-line
computer to produce the large number of ancillary reports and sum-
maries including statistical and general management information
required to make the system function effectively. It would simulta-
neously serve as the back up for the on-line function should the
370/158 fail.
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(C) When the work load on the real-time machine becomes sufficiently
high that the 370/145 could not properly serve as the back up, or when
the batch load for the 370/145 becomes too large for it to handle, IBM
proposes to replace the 370/145 with a second 370/1.58. At that time the
dual system would be transformed into two 370/1581s, and the 370/145
then being surplus presumably would be moved out of the system.
(C) The peripherals specified include the 48 type-3330 disk drives
already mentioned of which approximately 30 are for the primary data
which is to be available on line, 10 for off-line inventories, 5 for
systems residency and libraries and the remainder as spares. In
addition, 8 type 3420-5 high-speed tape drives, each with an effective
bit transfer rate of 1. 6 Mb/sec, are to be supplied, along with two
dual-access controllers. A pair of front-end communication pro-
cessors, Model 3705-Al, are included for the interconnection of a'
large namber of terminals through the system. The. proposed termi-
nals, r_ ,;;Lbering 187 in total, include 140 Model 4505 alpha-numeric
display terminals for use by booking agents. In addition, a number
of per-iheral units for the handling of cards and printed output are
associated with the system.
(C) The software to support the reservation system.is designated
IPAP,.S. ,dditional batch processing procedures above and beyond
those already included in IPARS are performed under the standard
IBM batch operating system designated OS/ VSI.
Diversion Potential .
(C) The risk that a computer system may be diverted to an unauthorized
use is present to the extent that the. system has a significant amount of
excess capacity available and contains the means, either through hard-
ware or software, for tapping that capacity surreptitiously. With this
in mind, the proposed IBM system as a whole as well as each of its
major elements has been examined.
(C) The first fact that needs to be noted is that this is a very large
system which far exceeds the limits set by COCOM for approval on
other than exceptional grounds. For example, the processing data
rate (PDR) of the 370/145 is 14. 8 and the PDR of each of the two
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370/158's is 43. (The. COCOM normal limit is set: at a PDR of 32. )
Thus, except for the initial learning phase when only the 370/145 is
,in place, the total installed computing power is quite large. For this
reason, the diversion of a relatively small portion of this system to
unauthorized purposes would be of much greater significance then
would be the case were it smaller.
(C) S h:ile the significance of any diversion tends to be a function of
size, it is the configuration and design. of the system which tends to
govern the extent to which the potential for diversion is present. In
the INTOURIST system, the potential varies depending on whether on-
line or off-line operations are being considered.
On-Line Operations
(C) The nature of the traffic which must be handled on-line is such that
in order to accommodate appropriate high volume activity during the
course of a normal working day with reasonable responsiveness,- the
amount of computing power provided by a 370/158 tends to far exceed
the actUal average needs. For somewhat different reasons, which will
be dealt with later, there is also considerable excess information
storage capacity in the 30 type-3330 disc drives assigned to on-line
operations'. These features, when coupled with the fact the IPARS
system under which the on-line operations are carried out can be.
easily modified or augmented to utilize this excess capacity for
additional tasks, gives rise to a system in which there is a possibility
of substantial diversion.
Off-Line Operations
(C) In total computing power and in its.dual CPU configuration (which
is a requirement for any installation which must be operable at all
times) this system is similar to that recently approved for AEROFLOT.
However, a -significant difference is that the INTOURIST system can be
separated into two viable computers, each able to perform substantial
computing functions. Thus, in this case, it is imagineable that during
the course of a day, the standby off-line computer could be put to a
clandestine use with very little chance of detection, if one considers
only external observation. Moreover, since both central processors
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are interchangeable the 370/145 could be switched to the on-line reser-
vation function, and the 370/158 utilized on off-line batch work at least
50% of the time. In addition, a minimum of 16 type-3330 disc drives
are available to the off-line CPU, which means that the 370/158 when
diverted to off-line operations would be able to perform very sub-
stantial scientific or information retrieval tasks.
Use by KGB
(C) Ordinarily the question of diversion arises in connection with the
use of a computer for military purposes. The INNTOURIST proposal
embodies an additional basis for concern, namely, the extent to which
this system will enable Soviet authorities, including the KGB, to more
fully automate. their ccntrol over foreign visitors throughout the Soviet
Union as well as over their own citizens traveling both at home and
abroad. Although INTOURIST is not a KGB controlled instrumentality,
there. are close links and- well-established worldng relationships between
the two organizations. Several Deputy Directors and a number of
INTOURIST representatives abroad have been identified as KGB officers
or a gee-ts over the years.
(C) The KGB is responsible for combating intelligence activity by
tom gists and for the recruitment of tourists as agents. It also runs
an extensive network of agents and informants among INTOURIST
interpreter-guides and other employees of this organization. Not all
INTOURIST interpreter-guides are recruited KGB agents or informants,
but all must submit daily reports on the tourists.under their care as
part of their job. These reports are passed to KGB officers who relay
them to appropriate KGB elements which decide what operational
activity will be undertaken. When necessary, instructions are passed
back to the interpreter-guides through these oicers.
(C) Requests for tourist visas for foreigners, whether submitted
through local travel agencies or INTOURIST offices abroad, are all
forwarded to INTOURIST Headquarters in Moscow, which, in turn,
forwards them to KGB where they are reviewed for operational leads.
Since 1961, the KGB has received a daily machine listing of all tourists
who entered the USSR the previous day. These listings, as of 1964,
contained the name, date and place of birth, and planned length of. stay
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for each tourist. There was also a much shorter list identifying
Americans who had made previous trips to the USSR, setting forth
the number of trips made, dates, and the names of KGB officers
who had worked on these cases.
(C) It can be assumed that this proposed INTOURIST computer system
when working at its designed performance level will enhance KGB sur-
veillance capabilities. Its huge memory, instant recall, and ease of
access through its remote terminals will provide an instrument of
unparalled usefulness for their purposes.
Safeguards Against Diversion
(C) After identifying the several ways this system could be diverted,
the -ask force attempted to devise means to eliminate or reduce to
acceota.ble levels the risk of use of this equipment for other than its
stated purpose. We began by considering the central processing
Units.
The Ce_t_-al Processor (CPU's)
(C) One of the attributes of a CPU which enables it to do advanced
scientific and mathematical computations, such as are required in
weapons design calculations, is floating point capability. The task
force, therefore, examined the possibility of completely disabling
or degrading this capability in the INTOURIST CPU's, as well as a
number of other ways of limiting their mathematical computation
capabili ies. In each case, however, the engineering changes which
would be required turned out to be either prohibitively costly to the
vendor or easily reversible by the Soviets. (Details are given in
the Appendix to this report. )
(C) The task force concluded that there are no safeguards to be found
in feasible modifications of the CPU hardware.
Disk Drives
(C) , To :meet the requirements specified by the Soviet customer, the
IBM proposal has allocated a very large amount of disk space for the
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data base files. As a consequence, the total of 48 type 3330 disk drives
they propose to furnish is a very large number -- much larger than any
system heretofore supplied to the Soviet Union by a VTestern manufacturer.
(C) The concern with the type 3330 disk drive begins with the fact that it
is a high-performance device embodying
1.7 advanced technology and ideally
suited to large data base oriented systems with military applications.
It is also two generations better than anything the Soviets are known to.
be producing. Moreover, since it is easily transported, physical
diversion to another computer system is relatively simple. One safe-
guard against such a possibility is.frequent inventory of the drives at the
computer site. A more effective one is to insure from.. the outset that
no drives are being supplied in excess of the legitimate needs of the
computer system.
(C) Given the large amount of data which the Soviets have specified is
to be manipulated, the file space is not inordinately large if the clas
sical I13 ME mechanisms for solving such problems are taken into account.
Although the overall storage algorithms and procedures could be more
efficient:, IBM has organized a procedure which appears.to work for
most c )-Z current customers even though it is not the most efficient
system -imaginable. Assuming the need for maintaining all these files,
the task force finds that a requirement for 48 type 3330 disk might be
established.
(C) Nevertheless, from a program standpoint, not all these files appear
to be necessary. Duplication of some for speed of retrieval. clearly
could be dispensed with, at least initially. Other files can be con-
tracted and possibly eliminated. By so doing it appears possible to
reduce the number of required disk drives by something like. 30% with-
out in any substantive way affecting the performance of the system,.,
at least in the initial stages. It may even be possible initially to
reduce the number by as much as 50% but it is unlikely that reduc-
tions could be made much beyond that point without redesigning the
whole IPARS system.
(C) The task force considered the question of substituting a lower
performance disk, such as the 2314, for the 3330 but judged that it
would not be a viable alternative. The 2314 disks are not'
ot a current
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IBM production item and although it is probably possible to find such
disks, it certainly would not be normal IBM business procedure to
find and supply them. In addition, there are some technical problems
which would have to be dealt with if 2314 disks were used. Further-
more, even if the substitution were made, the total amount of storage
supplied will not change materially and if this system is going to be
allowed at all, it appears appropriate to allow it to go with 3330's.
Other Equipment
(C) Although most of the other peripherals associated with this
acquisition are quite modern by themselves, none of them gives rise
to worrisome diversion questions provided some standard safeguards
are employed. The only remaining question would be the fate of the
370/145 when and if the second 370/158 is delivered. Of course, the
370/145 with a PDR of 14. 8 is not an enormous addition to the Soviet
computing capability, but it would be appropriate to make sure that
it not be transferred to some unknown or unapproved end-use or
end-use-T%
SofttAr a?e
(C) In the software area IBM will be transferring their most recent
general purpose batch operating system OS/VSI and also their highly
specialized and effective, -but not highly sophisticated, IPARS
reservation system. The on-line reservation computer will normally
have the_ IPARS system resident in it. With that system there is no
way in which an agent's console could be used to enter batch jobs into
this computer or for that matter into the off-line computer. In that
sense, the on-line computer is safe. However, as pointed out earlier,
the IPARS system itself can be modified to enable the on-line computer
to do additional significant information processing tasks.. The off-line
computer on'the other hand will normally be operating under OS/VSI, a
general purpose batch processing system. As configured presently,
remote batch processing is not possible. Nevertheless, the computers
can be used for batch jobs by terminals located within the computing
rooxp. The batch processing could, of course, be bona fide INTOURIST
activities. On the other hand,. a mix of other jobs could certainly flow
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through the system if the Soviets are so inclined. However, it is
possible to place systems management accounting programs to monitor
the activity in the off-line, and to a lesser degree in the on-line systems.
The Soviets appear to be amenable to this and with such systems
management accounting programs, along with the kind of safeguards
reporting devised for the AEROFLOT system, it should be possible to
monitor the operation in such a way that any substantial diversion of
off-line computing time would stand some chance of being detected.
A more secure system of safeguards is possible. It would, however,
be more elaborate and, among other things, would involve continuing
U. S. Government costs for processing data obtained for monitoring
purposes from the daily operations of this installation. However,
diversion of the on-line system to other purposes such as those of the
KGB probably could not be detected by any system of procedures.
Technology Transfer
(C) In the technology transfer area the whole system is a very large one
and represents current state of the art computing technology in the
United States. Although in one form or another the Soviets have seen
and = -!so have all of the technology represented here and although it
.rep-resents the same level as the K,AMA, and AEROFLOT cases
previously approved, this will give rise to one of the largest concen-
trations of such equipment in one location. It is, therefore, inevitable
that sorne amount of technology will be transferred simply by the delivery
of this system.
(C) While the furnishing of the IPARS system to the Soviets does represent
a transfer of modern technology, the ideas are not new. The implemen-
tation is useful but not so significant as to make its transfer a matter
of major concern. The off-line monitor OS is a more sophisticated
general operating system, but the Soviets have earlier versions of this
operation system and, in that sense, this will not be new material' for
them. Nevertheless, the transfer of information might be minimized
here by suppressing the source code.
(C) The primary transfer of technology will be in the education and
training of the Soviet technicians and engineers who operate and
maintain. the system. Although there are already competent computer
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technicians in the Soviet Union, this acquisition like any other single
large sophisticated installation will give rise to yet another group of
highly trained individuals in areas of sophisticated computer tech-
nology. Under these circumstances, controlling the transfer of this
kind of technology translates into a need to limit the number of people
trained by the contractor and the amount and kind of contractor provided
training to the minimum necessary to make the installation. viable.
Reliance on Safeguards
(C) In the past few years the idea has gained acceptance that the export
of militarily significant computers to Communist countries can be
approved as long as appropriate "safeguards" against diversion are
imposed. Depending on the size and nature of the ..installation, these
safeguards may include residence of the vendor's engineers on the -
site for a specific period of time, accounting for and reporting on the -
use and operation of the computer system, and a number of other'
-
procedures designed to detect and thus deter physical removal or
diversion of the equipment from its stated purposes. However, what
tends to he overlooked is the fact that safeguards provide no guarantee
agains diversion; they only reduce its likelihood to what in a given
instance is regarded as an acceptable level. This means that the
more installations there are in which reliance is placed upon safeguards
the greater the probability that significant diversions will take place
undetected.
(C) The task force points this out simply as a reminder that, quite -
apart from the acceptability of safeguards in a given case such as the
-
INTOURIST proposal, it is a matter of some importance to hold - -
installations requiring the application of safeguards to the minimum,
number and size possible.
10
Maurice ;d Mountain
Chairma, Interagency. Task
Force on Computer Safeguards
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Modification of INTOURIST Central Processor Units (CPU's
(C) One of the attributes of a CPU which enables it to do advanced
scientific and mathematical computations, such as are required in
weapons design calculations, is floating point capability. The task
force, therefore, examined the possibility of completely disabling
this capability in the INTOURIST CPU's. Such a procedure could
almost completely eliminate the use of this system for any significant
scientific or mathematically oriented computations. At the same time,
it would not at all hamper the on-line functions of the reservation
system, which have no use for floating point operations. However, it
would remove the ability to do some marginally useful but nevertheless
legitimate off-line batch operations. The cost of making this modifi-
cation has been estimated by IBM as about $50, 000. While this is not
a prohibitive amount, and may in any event be somewhat high, one
difficulty with this solution is that it would make the central processing
units this installation into one-of-a-kind machines.
(C) T `_-e significance of this is that it is normal practice in the computer
Indus-rv for the manufacturer to supply free of charge to each customer
any c.-es or modifications subsequently developed for his rr_achi?r..e
throughout its life. Since one of the characteristics of the IBM 370
series floating point capability, the software designers and engineers
spread ,-through the IBM organization take this feature for granted when.
they develop modifications. . Moreover, such modifications are distri-
buted automatically to all 370 series owners. With their floating point -
capability removed, either the INTOURIST machines could not benefit
from such changes (which would mean that the Soviets would have to
accept computers whose operational efficiency would be essentially
frozen as of the date of their delivery), or IBM would have to set up
a special group to rework for the INTOURIST installation modifications
which all other 370 series machines would accept. Since IBM would
regard such a special arrangement on updates for one. installation as too
costly, the question turns on whether the Soviets would accept a system
on which the vendor's customary update support would not be provided.
(C) A more telling reason against following this course is that the
floaEing point operations are actually implemented with a micro-
program control store. This micro-program control store is
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loaded from a small master disc furnished with every CPU in this
series :(and thus easily obtainable by the Soviets from some other
installation if they had to) and selected by a simple hard-wire con-
nection at the time the system is installed. Put another way, the
system comes with all its options present. Only those options the
customer chooses are activated by the installation engineer, but
all of them remain present in the system and can be. activated by
reloading the micro-program store which is made possible by a
slight change in the wiring. What this means is that even if the.
floating point operations were disabled, it would be a fairly simple
thing for the Soviets to restore them.
(C) Another alternative considered by the task force was the possi-
bility of. degrading without totally removing, the floating point capability.
Here the thought was that by reducing the processing data rate (PDR)
of the 370/158 to at least the level of the 370/145 the updating difficulty
would be overcome and even though the scientific usefulness of the
CPU was not removed, it would be reduced to a tolerable level. . The
snag encountered here was the judgment on the part of IBM that while
it =rv ild be possible to do this by removing the accelerator board and
one of the registers the. cost of reworking the software to enable
the r-navhine to function without them was estimated by IBM to be about
$3, 000, 000.
(C) A number of other possibilities of limiting the mathematical
computation capabilities of the CPU's were considered and explored
with IBI,Mf experts, including changing the micro-program store to a
"read-o:aly" type, but in each case the engineering changes which
would be required turned out to be prohibitively costly. With regard
to the information retrieval operations for which the on-line system
is designed, no way was found to reduce the excess capacity through
changes to the CPU's. . The task force concluded that there are no
safeguards to be found in feasible modifications of the CPU hardware.
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ANNEX I
Computer System Safes cards for the Intourist Reservation System
A - A responsible representative of Intourist will furnish to IBM
a signed statement describing the end use and certifying that:
(1) The equipment will only be used for civil applications;
(2)
The equipment will not be re-exported or otherwise disposed
of without permission of the. U. S. Government;
(3) I.B.M. will be notified of any significant change in application
or other facts on which the license was based;
(4)
(5 )
;esponsible Western representatives of IBM will have the
right of free access at all times to the computer facility ar_d
all associated equipment wherever located; T7- representatives will be resident at Intourist for a period
of at least three years after installation and acceptance of
the IBM 370/158 and until the computer system is dedicated
at least 75% of the time to the functions of Intourist.
(6) IBM representatives will be furnished information as required
demonstrating continued Intourist application of the equipment
including access to all programming documentation p^rtai.~ing
to Programs being run on the computer and information on the.
operation of the computer system;
(7)
The computer system will be run under IBM's supplied operating
system which will provide standard accounting information and
will,not be modified nor a different operating system used without
I.BM authorization;
(S) IBM representatives will be permitted to monitor and control
the utilization of spares and return to IBM all replaced major
assenzblies;
(9) The information required by Section B, below, will be reported
monthly to the U. S. Governn-mcnt;
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(10) IBM representatives will be permitted to report to the U. S,
Government the other information required below.
B - Until such time as the computer system is dedicated at least 75%
to the integrated operational functions of INTOURIST, a representative
of INTOURIST will prepare and submit monthly to the U. S. Embassy in.
Moscow a report, countersigned by a responsible IBM representative,
? covering for each CPU separately where appropriate the computer
time utilization, including:
(1) Total clock time for the period of the report;
(2) Total computer on time;.
(3) The total computer on time that IBM personnel were at the
computer facility;
(4) Computer on time devoted to hardware and software main-
tenance with IBM personnel involvement;
(5) Other time devoted to maintenance;
(6) Computer on. time devoted to software development or system
integration used by IBM personnel or with IBM personnel
:i3 volvement;
(7) Other time devoted to development or integration;
(8) Computer on time devoted to scheduled INTOURIST use with
IBM personnel involvement;
(9) Other time devoted to scheduled INTOURIST use;
(10). Idle computer on time;
(11) Computer off time devoted to hardware maintenance under
IBM supervision;
(12) Other off time devoted to hardware maintenance;
(13) Other off time.
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C - IBM will insure that equipment deliveries will be made incre-
mentally consistent with system iniplei-rientat:ion needs. A
responsible IBM representative on site will certify by signing
the report called for in B, above, that he was present at the
time of its generation, that it is based on computer-generated
accounting information, was processed by the IBM provided
program and generated as a result. of that process.
D - If the monthly report called for in B, above, indicates that for
either CPU more than 25% of the total computer on time I ,lvi
personnel were not at the computer facility, IBM will report
whether the computer was either idle or was used for approved
purposes. In the event that more than 25% of the total computer
on time is, in the judgment of the U. S. Government inadequately
accounted for, a representative of Intourist.wvill provide I131".I with
information as agreed in A (6) above along with approval for its
transmittal to the U. S. Government. In addition, the U. S. Govern
rnent may request IBM to monitor the operation of the computers
am.or?e closely, and/or exercise its right of access more frequently
at times its personnel are not normally at the computer facility and
report its findings.
E - I3 is representatives will he resident at the Intourist installation
for a period of at leas-t three years after installation and acceptance
of the IBM 370/158 and until the computer system is dedicated at
least 75% of the time to the functions of Intourist. During this
period, IBM's Western representative will prepare and submit
monthly to the U. S. Government a report covering:
(1) The status of training of Soviet personnel;
1 '0'
(2) The status of development of the major application programs
for the computer systems;
(3) The total clock time that IBM personnel were at the
site;
,(4) Any change in disposition of the e.cported computer equip'
mer_t or accountability of spare parts;'
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- L'
(5) Any significant change in facts on which approval of this
case was based and whether in their judgment the computers
continue to be used for approved purposes at the authorized
location.
F - After the time that IBM has demonstrated that the computer system.
is dedicated at least 75% of the time to the functions of LYtourist,
IBI%Vs Western representative will make monthly visits and submit
monthly to the U. S. Government a report covering items E (l),.
(3), (4) and (5) above and whether the computer system continues
to be dedicated at least 75% of the time to the approved. use.
G - IB:N ti; ill limit the quantity of spares on-site, after the one-year
warranty period, to that necessary for supporting the.. computer
for a r_-ia.ximum of four months.
H - In vh event that, any of these provisions is contravened or the U. S.
Government has' reasonable ground for suspicion. that significant
diversion to strategic purposes has taken place and no satisfactory
el-.pia.nation is forthcoming, the U. S. Government will take appro-
priate action which may include requiring IBM to remove all per..
sor el from the facility and to stop all support (provision of
ecuipment or .spares from the West or from depots or similar
computer facilities in the Soviet Bloc, training, maintenance,
software, etc.) of the facility.
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e~A~ ~t.~ewLF9~ `d
ANNEX II
Measures to Limit Technology Transfers for the Intourist Reservation System
IBM will limit the transfer of technology to the minimum level for the
installation, operation and maintenance of the computer system.
A - Maintenance engineers will be limited to the training and information
necessary to maintain the equipment provided,
B - Analysts and application programmers will be limited in number
and to the training and information necessary to develop the application
programs not the responsibility of IBM.
C = The total number of system programmers will be limited to six and
their training and information 'will be limited to that necessary to
maintain the operating systems and support software to be provided;
The train=.-n,- of the system programmers will be delayed until the
appropriate time prior to the computer system being 75?%o dedicafed
to the ~integ-aced functions of Intourist.
D - IBM vv-?l'l l mit the provision of the operating system and their standard
library programs to those necessary and appropriate to. the Intourist
applications.
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UNCLASSIF1ED CONFIDENTIAL SECRE
E.XECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
TO:
I
DCI
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
2
DDCI
3
S/MC
I A
DDS&T
5
DDI
DDA
7
DDO
8
1 D/DCI/ICI
i 9
D/DCI/NIO
10
GC
11
LC.
12
IG
13
Compt (
14
D/ Pets
15
D/g
16
DTR
17
Asst/ DC
131
AO/ DC
- --
---
-
39t
20
21
22
SUSPENSE
Da?v
T'A Execut've Sec>eta
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c~ar~-
?637 '(1-751