Long-Range Planning for National Intelligence Production

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-01082A000200100007-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: November 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 31, 1998
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington 25, D. C.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT: Long-range Planning for National Intelligence Production
1. In my capacity as your intelligence adviser I have become
increasingly concerned with the problem of narrowing the gap between
your intelligence production requirements and the actual. intelligence
produced by the machinery subject to my coordination.
2. It appears to me that the flow of production requirements
from national intelligence consumer to national intelligence producer
has not been adequately systematized, and that this flow consequently
tends to be characterized by irregularity and short-term emergency
requirements. Under such circumstances the producer, while able to
engage in spot reporting and estimating with full confidence in its
pertinence to national security problems, is left largely to his own
resources in appraising the long-range national requirements for his
intelligence product. As a result his efforts in the latter respect
are in danger of being one-sided, or even wasteful.
3. In view of this situation, I am directing my agency to make
careful studies of policy papers, intelligence requests, and intelligence
reports, and to derive, for each major area of the world as well as for
selected functional fields, a concise concept of the principal considera-
tions and objectives which, from the standpoint of United.States security,
should govern the planning and production of national intelligence. As
each of these intelligence concepts is completed, I intend to submit it
to you with a request for verification of its applicability to national
security problems and objectives.
4. Subsequent to your approval or modification of a series of such
intelligence concepts, it is my intention to present them in succession
to the Intelligence Advisory Committee as a basis for evolving integrated
plans of national intelligence production, designed to meet the considera-
tions and objectives set forth in the concepts. At subsequent intervals
the concepts will be reviewed to insure their continued applicability
in the light of new events.
VVI'll ILO-11 I,",
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5. The development of integrated national intelligence production
plans, based on concepts approved by you, is in my consideration the
key to coordination of intelligence production, which in turn is the
basis of coordination for all other foreign intelligence activities
throughout the governmental structure. While it is recognized that
the procedure I suggest will not eliminate the occurrence of unpredictable
intelligence production requirements, it will provide the high-level,
long-range guidance prerequisite to adequate national intelligence
planning, and will furnish standards for judging the validity of
intelligence requests not directly related to stated National Security
Council requirements.
6. Attached hereto at Tab A for your consideration is a concept
of national intelligence production on the Far East in the form of a
staff study.
7. There is also included at Tab B a proposed intelligence
production plan designed to meet the intelligence objectives contained
in the concept. This enclosure, which is still undergoing analysis
and revision by Central Intelligence Agency; is submitted merely in
amplification of the concept, and not necessarily for National Security
Council review and cgmmont, since it has not been discussed within
the Intelligence Advisory Committee,. and will not be discussed therein
until your comments upon the concept have been received.
R. H. HILLENKOETTER
Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Central Intelligence
Enclosures: (2)
Tabs A and B
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ST11FF STUDY
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1. To determine whether definitive guidance to the Central
Intelligence Agency from the national planning and policy level of
the United States Government should be obtained for the purpose of
enabling the Director of Central Intelligence, in conjunction with
the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies, to devise integrated
national intelligence production plans, in fulfillment of his
responsibility for coordinating the national intelligence effort;
and if so, what procedure should be adopted for obtaining such
guidance.
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM AND DISCUSSION
2. a, The value of national intelligence is directly proportional
to its pertinence to national security problems and objectives.
b. The relative degree of pertinence of various categories
and types of intelligence to such national security problems and
objectives can be assessed adequately by only two groups of
individuals:
(1) The national security planners, or consumers of
national intelligence, by virtue of their familiarity with long
and short-range. requirements.
(2) The national intelligence producers, by virtue of their
continuous study of information and developments.
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c. It is therefore evident that the timeliness and
applicability of national intelligence depends upon sustained
coordination between its consumers and producers.
da. The flow of intelligence production requirements from
consumer to producer has not been systematized, and consequently
tends to be characterized by irregularity and short-term
er,ergency requirements. Under such circumstances the producer,
while able to engage in spot reporting and estimating with
full confidence in its pertinence, is left largely to his own
resources in imagining the long--range requirements of his
intelligence product. As a result his efforts in the latter
respect are in danger of being one-sided, or even wasteful.
e. It may be contended that the National. Intelligence
Objectives (DCI 4/1), issued in conformance with National
Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 4, furnish adequate
guidance for the planning of intelligence production. This
contention is believed erroneous for the following reasons:
(1) The National Intelligence Objectives, although
serving as an ideal frame of reference, are in effect a
synopsis of all information desired by the United ~,'tates
Government, and are consequently of little value for
guiding a finite intelligence effort.
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(2) The National Intelligence Objectives can in no
sense be interpreted as sustained coordination between the
consumers and producers of national intelligence.
(3) No matter how carefully the National Intelligence
Objectives may be designed or revised, they can have little
reality until based upon National Security Objectives,
which have yet to be produced at the national planning
level.
f. In view of the nature of the National Intelligence
Objectives, and in the absence of systematized guidance from
the planning echelon of government, the national intelligence
production and coordination machinery follows in the wake of
national planning, instead of constituting a basis for its
formulation.
g. Because of heavy and time-consuming responsibilities,
it cannot be presumed that the National Security Council will
in the near future institute a procedure for systematic guidance
to intelligence producers. Nevertheless, the importance of such
a procedure to the security interests of the government is so
.apparent that the National Security Council can. hardly refuse
consideration of reasonable proposals from a responsible official
such as the Director of Central Intelligence.
h. With this thought in mind, the Office of Reports and
Estimates has developed an approach for stimulating guidance
from intelligence consumer to intelligence producer in such
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manner as to make the consumer's contribution relatively easy
and acceptable. The approach would be based on a careful
study by the Office of Reports and Estimates of policy papers,
intelligence reports, and intelligence requests pertaining to
a sole, ted region or field of interest. From this study would
be derived a concise intelligence concept, which may be defined
as an oppression of the principal considerations which, from
the standpoint of Uhitcd States security, should govern the
planning and production of national intelligence on any given
area of the world. This concept would then be presented to
the National Security Council for verification of its applicability
to ''national security problems and objectives. Following its
approval'or modifibat ion by the National Security Oouncil, the
concept v oiuld be used as a basis for developing a comprehensive
plan of intelligence production designed to meet the considerations
,and objectives set forth in the concept. At subsequent intervals,
the concept would be reviewed to insure its continued applicability
in the light of 'heir developments.
i. Th.e-derivation and submission of concepts:, as well as the
development of implementing plans, should be examined in relation
to the following principal functions of the Director of Central
Tntell.igonco:.
(1) Chief Intelligence Officor and Adviser to the
National Security Council.
(2) Coordinator of the National Intelligence effort.
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In his first capacity, it is assWned that the Director of Central
Intelligence can, without prior consultation with the Intelligence
Advisory Committee, approach the National Security Council on
any intelligence matter which does not involve commitments,
responsibilities, or prerogatives of the members of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee. Conversely, the Director of
Central Intelligence, in his second capacity, is required by
National Security Council Intelligence Directives to obtain
Intelligence Advisory Committee comment on proposals directly
affecting the activities of its members.
J. It is believed that the Office of Reports arid Estimates
approach mentioned in paragraph h above not only supports the
two principal functions of the Director of Central Intelligence,
but also serves to clarify the fundamental distinction between
those functions, as follows:
(1) An intelligence concept, upon which an intelligence
production plan can be based, is an ideal expression of
intelligence goals or objectives,. unencumbered by the
limitations of actual collection or production facilities..
It is the step which must logically precede intelligence
planning, and should therefore be verified by the National
Security Council before presentation to the Intelligence
Advisory Committee as a basis for planning. Such a procedure
would permit the Director of Central Intelligence to
function initially as an adviser by presenting concepts to
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the National Security Council, and subsequently as a
coordinator by presenting approved intelligence goals to
the Intelligence Advisory Committee for planning action.
(2) If, however, the Director of Central Intelligence
were to negotiate intelligence concepts with the Intelligence
Advisory, Committee before presenting them to the National
Security Council, it is believed that he would be abrogating
the role of principal intelligence adviser to the National
Security Council, and would be engaging the efforts of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee in directions which might
prove erroneous after consideration by the National Security
Council.
CONCLUSIONS
3. That sustained coordination between the consumers and producers
of national intelligence should be established as an activity bearing
directly upon the national security.
4. That the National Intelligence Objectives, because of their
sweeping inclusiveness and remoteness from concrete security problems,
are unsuitable for providing sustained guidance or coordination.
5. That the Director of Central Intelligence, as intelligence
adviser to the National. Security Council and as coordinator of the
national intelligence effort, is required to recommend methods for
sustaining coordination between the consumers and producers of national
intelligence.
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6. That coordination can most readily be achieved by submitting
poriodically for approval or modification by the National Security
Council, concepts of intelligence production for each major area of
the world.
7. That integrated national intelligence production plans should
be developed by the Central Intelligence ;agency in collaboration with
the Intelligence Advisory Committee agencies, based upon the intelligence
concepts approved by the National Security Council.
8. That the Director of Central Intelligence approve the foregoing
conclusions.
9. That, if approved, the conclusions be initially implemented by
forwarding the attached memorandum with onclosures'to the National
Security Council.
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TAB
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COPY NO. ?
STAFF STUDY
A Concept of National Inte1ii ence Production
on the Far East
1 December 199
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1. To determine the principal considerations which, from the
standpoint of United States security, should govern the planning and
production of national intelligence on the Far East.
2. a. Assumptions
For the purpose of this discussion it is assumed:
(1) That United States security objectives and
interests in the Far East are largely influenced by a
world-wide struggle for power with the USSR.
(2) That, unless a basis for mutual accommodation
is found, this struggle for power will result in:
(a) Armed conflict of major proportions; or,
(b) The gradual accumulation and exercise by
one protagonist, on terms short of war, of elements
of power, including limited armed force, which
eventually nullify the otherts will. and capacity to
resist.
b. Significance of the Far East
The Far East is a region of large material and human
resources possibly capable of being controlled and organized
by an unfriendly power in such manner-as to pose a crucial
threat to the security of the United States. This possibility
was recognized by Japan and planned in terms of the Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere
illiterate and unsophist.-.Lcatea popuia-clons, suoJec-C. Lo
deprivation and uncertainty, and desirous of improving their
conditions. There is, moreover, the particular susceptibility
of those abler individuals who, released by the weakening of
customary social mechanisms, seek expression, status, and pottier,
and frequently identify their aims with nationalistic or
progressive goals. Taking full advantage of these circumstances
is a vigorous international communism admittedly devoted to
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acquiring domination of the Far East as part of its
objective of world domination. The dynamic nature of
communism, its ability to exploit professedly nationalist
movements, the constantly shrinking portions of the Far
East not under its power, and the difficulty of retrieving,
by Western democratic methods, any area once lost to it,
all indicate the importance of estimating the remaining
prospects for increasing or lessening control in the Far
East by either side in the US/USSR struggle.
dl. Potentials of the Far East
An assessment of the human and material potentials
of the Far East is of continuing moment to whomever may hope
to achieve a position of influence or control over all or
parts of that region. On the basis of an enduring world
struggle between the United States and the USSR, on terms
short of war, the respective contenders must recognize and
strive to control, within whatever limitations their
principles impose, those elements of human and material power
in the Far East w rich will ultimately help to weigh a world
balance in their favor. Since,, however, the threat of war
always exists, it is more urgent to take immediate and
continuing stock of existing potentialities for war of all
or parts of the Far 'E'ast. Of particular importance to
United States security in this respect is the question of
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the growth in the Far East of a comprehensive war making
complex independent from, but in support of other centers
of Soviet power.
CONCLUSIONS
3. That the principal considerations which, from the standpoint
of United States security, should govern the planning and production
of national intelligence on the Far East are as follows:
a. Possibilities for control in the Far East, to include:
(1) Vulnerability of the Far East, area by area, to
control unfavorable to the United States.
(2) Capabilities for the acquisition, exercise, and denial
of control in the Far East by parties to the US/USSR struggle.
b. Potentialities of the Far East in War and Peace, including:
(1) The possibility of the formation of a comprehensive
war-making complex in the Far East, independent from, but in
support of other centers of Soviet power.
(2) The existence or emergence in the Far East of
elements of power employable by the major contenders in a
protracted world struggle on terms less than war.
t. That the National Security Council approve the foregoing
conclusions, or indicate necessary modifications.
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That the Director of Central Intelligence be authorized to
use such approved. or modified conclusions as the basis for developing,
in collaboration with the Intelligence Advisory Committee, a comprehensive
plan for national intelligence production on the Far East.
NOTE: The attached map portrays in white the Far East as the term
is used in this study..
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