CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000100130001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 28, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

NO. 309
Ic0fEETJ11 OCI NO. 9084
ii 28 August 1953
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE. IN CLASS DECLA SWIFD
CLA53. CfH^,NC;ED TO: TS
NEX RFVIEW DATE: J
AU1 -
I
DAT j REVIEWER
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RET
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FIDEXTIAL
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
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THE SOVIET WORLD .
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SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
FRENCH ACTION IN MOROCCO CREATES NEW PROBLEMS
. . Page 4
. . Page 8
With the replacement of the sultan in Morocco
the French will be able to revamp the protectorate's
administration, but the basic conflict remains un-
resolved.
EVACUATION OF CHINESE NATIONALISTS FROM BURMA
APPEARS DOUBTFUL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Although a. few hundred of the approximately
12,000 Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma may yet
be evacuated, the Burmese government is impatient
with the present efforts of the four-power committee
in Bangkok and may be contemplating a second appeal
to the United Nations as well as renewed military
action. (SEE MAP)
THE COPPER CRISIS IN CHILE . . . . . . . . . . ?. Page 13
The Ibanez administration in Chile will be
seriously weakened by the impending loss of revenue
from copper sales and may attempt to ease its dif-
ficulties by selling indirectly to the Orbit.
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CEYLONESE GOVERNMENT CONTROLS WIDESPREAD UNREST. . . . Page 15
The widespread rioting and sabotage which. began
in Ceylon on 12 August was a result of cooperation
among the leftist parties. The'government has clearly
demonstrated its intention to suppress any further
unrest.
SOVIET AIRFIELD PROGRAM IN EUROPEAN SATELLITE AREA . . Page 17
The Soviet Union is continuing the program of
expanding its airfield complex in the Eastern Euro-
pean Satellites. There are now 82 major airfields
in :this area. compared to 62 a, year ago and 11 at
the end of World War II. (SEE MAP)
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THE SOVIET WORLD
Soviet moves during the first week of the special UN
session on Korea were aimed primarily at exploiting the
divergence of views between the US and other members on the
character and scope of the Korean political conference.
Moscow appeared anxious to block US efforts to limit
conference membership to the "two sides," with the USSR
participating only if the other side desires it.. Vyshinsky
on 25 August opposed "a restrictive construction" of Article
60 of the armistice agreement and advocated a round-table
conference open to "those countries directly concerned in
settlement of the Korean question."
While Moscow has given no explicit indication of the
questions the political conference should consider, Chou
En-lai has called for discussion of "other questions affect-
ing the Far East" after consideration of the Korean items
outlined by Article 60 of the armistice agreement. Peiping
favors New Delhi as the site of the conference. In this
connection, Peiping's views on composition and voting pro-
cedure as privately expressed on 17 August are identical with
Vyshinsky's proposals in the UN on 18 August, suggesting that
Moscow and Peiping have reached prior agreement on all im-
portant conference issues.
The Communists may seek to prolong UN debate in an
attempt to isolate the US on key issues regarding membership,
conference site, and agenda. This tactic is suggested by
Soviet encouragement of Indian aspirations to assume a more
active role in the UN debate. The Communists may also hope
to throw final decisions on political conference questions
into this fall's-Eighth General Assembly, which may have
an Indian president.
The appointment of career diplomat S. P. Suzdalev as
Soviet ambassador to North Korea marks the twenty-first shift
in the ranks of the Soviet Union's 46 top diplomatic posts
since Stalin's death. Suzdalev, a Far Eastern expert,
replaces General Razuvaev, who was last reported in North
Korea in February, a logical change following the Korean
armistice.
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Several of the new ambassadors -- notably those to
China, India, Poland and Rumania -- have in the past dealt
wholly with Soviet internal matters, and each of these
four appears to have slipped from a position of greater
prominence in Communist Party affairs.
Four of the new appointments resulted from high-level
political decisions -- the change to civilian high commis-
sioners in Germany and Austria, and the exchange of ambassadors
with Yugoslavia and Israel. While most of the other shifts
appear to be routine rotations, some of them place skilled
diplomats in those countries which are the most important
targets of the new peace offensive.
The timing of the East German visit to Moscow, the
nature of Malenkov's speech, and the promised return of
prisoners of war, all indicate an attempt to defeat Chancellor
Adenauer in the 6 September Rest German elections. The longer-
range purpose of the extensive economic concessions is appar-
ently to make the Soviet zone a more dependable and contented --
if less immediately profitable --.satellite.
In a major policy speech on 22 August, Premier Gheorghiu-
Dej announced a liberalization of :Rumania's economic policies.
He stressed the need for giving increased attention to the
private peasant and admitted that Rumania has previously
placed too great an emphasis on heavy industry.
Belgium has informed COCOM that it is considering a
three-year trade agreement with the USSR which will triple
annual trade over the ]952 level. Soviet exports will in-
clude magnesium ore and other "strategic" raw materials, while
the only Soviet imports of possible strategic importance are
10 small refrigerator ships.
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FRENCH ACTION IN MOROCCO CREATES NEW PROBLEMS
Although the French government's replacing of the sultan
in Morocco will enable French authorities to revamp the pro-
tectorate's administration, the basic conflict between Moroc-
can desires for home rule and the French wish to maintain ab-
solute control remains unresolved. American air bases in the
area may be endangered.
On 20 August the French cabinet finally yielded to pres-
sure from the Residency General and French vested interests
in Morocco and approved the removal of Sidi Mohamed ben Youssef
as sultan of Morocco, replacing him with an aged cousin,
Moulay Mohamed ben Arafa, who will be only a figurehead.
The latter, who had been declared the religious ruler of Moroc-
co by tribal chieftain El Glaoui six days earlier, precipitating
the latest crisis, was confirmed as sultan by religious elders
on 21 August.
French-proposed "reforms," alleged to be the point at is-
sue between the former sultan and French authorities, will
almost certainly be approved by the new sultan, These measures
superficially modernize the local government by imposing a
facade of quasi-democratic institutions. Theoretically they
provide for separation of executive, legislative, and judicial
power. Actually they legalize centralized direct French ad-
ministration in the protectorate.
France's gains through ousting the sultan are far out-
weighed by its prospective losses, however. Replacement of
the able and moderate Ben Youssef has won some political sup-
port from feudal tribesmen and seekers of political plums, but
will probably alienate the growing middle class, which includes
the bulk of the Western=educated and politically conscious
Arabs and Berbers.
The allegiance of El Glaoui, who spearheaded the anti-
sultan movement, cannot be depended on. Having won a personal
victory, his demands will probably be excessive and his ac-
tivities cause the French more trouble.
Dethronement of the popular sultan will increase the ani-
mosity toward the French among the approximately two million
Arabs and Berbers who sympathize with the nationalist Istiglal
party, which has about 100,000 hard-core members. The Istiqlal
party may now abandon moderation and resort to underground
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terrorism, Although it is nct known to have any military
equipment and could not now stage a full-scale rebellion, it
can be expected to try to obtain foreign support, secure
weapons, and subvert native troops. Despite extensive security
measures, isolated incidents of violence are already taking
place.
France's policy is assured of the indirect support in the
UN of other colonial powers, particularly the United Kingdom,
Spain, which holds a protectorate over northern Morocco, is
not likely to grant approval so long as Madrid continues its
policy of rapprochement with the Arab states. The immediate
denunciation of France by the Arab-Asian bloc and its request
for Security Council action will probably be supported by the
anticolonial nations.
The removal of the sultan worsens the position of the
United States in Morocco. Anti-American feeling among the
natives in general and the nationalists in particular will
grow because they hoped that the US would intercede with France
on their behalf.
The four operational American air force and naval air
bases in Morocco may be targets for sabotage if local Communists
or nationalists resort to terrorism,, At the same time, French
settlers and vested interests in Morocco, which are highly sus-
picious of American intentions, may put pressure on Paris to
prolong the delays in building the other two bases provided for
in a French-American agreement of December 1950.
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EVACUATION OF CHINESE NATIONALISTS FROM BURMA APPEARS DOUBTFUL
The committee of American, Burmese, Chinese Nationalist,
and Thai representatives meeting in Bangkok for the past three
months has not succeeded in arranging the evacuation of any
of the approximately 12,000 Chinese Nationalist troops in
Burma, although a few hundred may yet be removed.
Although the committee was successful in devising an
evacuation plan on 21 June, implementation has been thwarted
by the loose Nationalist control over the troops involved and
Taipei's delaying actions, which contrast with its repeated
assurances of cooperation.
Taipei has not yet even approved the evacuation plan
because it makes no provision for the disposition of 200 to
300 Chinese civilians imprisoned by the Burmese on charges of
collaborating withthe Nationalist forces. Although the
Burmese claim that this issue is outside the committee's
competence, the American embassy in Rangoon believes that they
might accept a compromise on this question if convinced that
it will lead to an over-all agreement.
Several field commanders under General Li Mi, who is in
Formosa but still in nominal command of the troops in Burma,
have been in Bangkok since June and have consistently hampered
the committee's work by refusing to cooperate. Their actions
reportedly caused Chiang Kai-shek personally to instruct Li Mi
on 3 July to order his subordinates to cooperate, and re-
sulted in the dispatch to Bangkok a few days later of Li's
deputy in Formosa. This emissary, however, proved to have no
real authority and was unable to persuade the leaders at Mong
Hsat, the Nationalist headquarters in Burma, to change their
attitude.
The next maneuver involved the recall on 29 July of the
ranking field commander to Taipei for consultation. He re-
turned to Mong Hsat in early August accompanied by Shao Yu-lin,
a personal representative of Chiang Kai-shek, to "explain"
the necessity for evacuation. In addition, the Nationalist
foreign minister indicated that orders had been issued to
evacuate 2,000 to 3,000 troops, and that Li Mi would dissolve
the "Yunnan anti-Communist national salvation force,"
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The committee in Bangkok was informed on 20 August that
Shao hopes to evacuate 400 troops by the end of August if
the committee can obtain a Burmese commitment to a cease-fire,
provide neutral guards for safety ,one at Thakilek, and arrange
air transportation to Formosa (see map, p. 12). While this
report may presage a positive achievement, the demand for a
cease-fire is a question on which the Chinese and Burmese have
never agreed. Moreover, Li Mi has expressed an intention to
retain the Mong Hsat headquarters even after the "evacuation."
This, coupled with indications that the Nationalist forces are
continuing to receive supplies by both air and land, strongly
suggests that any withdrawal will be no more than a gesture
on the part of Taipei.
Whatever the Nationalist intentions may be, Burmese
impatience has been mounting perceptibly. Rangoon insists that
the removal of all of the Nationalists is the only acceptable
solution. General Ne Win, the Burmese commander in chief, has
stated that Burma's representatives in Bangkok will be recalled
when the next regular session of the UN General Assembly con-
venes on 15 September unless definite results are obtained.
There is evidence that the Burmese are considering at
least three future courses of action. Some reports suggest
that Burma may request the UN to brand Formosa an aggressor
and to unseat its delegation.
The American army attache in Rangoon reports that the
Burmese are building up their forces for new, large-scale
military operations against the Chinese. He does not expect
this campaign to begin, however, until the issue has been
discussed in the UN.
Finally, Burma's acting foreign minister has expressed
his doubts of the UN's ability to solve the Nationalist affair
and indicated that he was considering the possibility of an
agreement with Peiping under which Chinese Communist troops
would enter Burma to assist in the elimination of the Nationa-
list forces. While the Burmese goverment has heretofore been
wary of Chinese Communist involvement in the problem, such a
step has been previously alluded to by the progovernment press
and other officials, and cannot be dismissed as an idle threat.
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THE COPPER CRISIS IN CHILE
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The Chilean government's decision, announced on 21 August,
to end all its predecessor's restrictions on "foreign, political,
and trade relations" highlights the severe financial crisis
facing it as a result of the drop in the world demand for copper.
The Ibanez administration will be seriously weakened by the
impending loss of revenue and, though still unwilling to flout
the Battle Act directly, may attempt to ease its difficulties
by making copper sales in which the metal is ultimately destined
for the Orbit.
Copper sales are a government monopoly in Chile, and
estimated receipts from copper operations comprise some 20 per-
cent of the income anticipated in the 1953 budget, Lagging
exports caused by lessening world demand and Chile's insist-
ence on a price roughly six cents per pound above the world
price of about 30 cents have created a stockpile of approximately
70,000 tons, or one sixth of the country's annual copper
production.
Under present conditions, a drop of one cent per pound
in price means an $8,000,000 annual loss in government revenue,
although attempts will almost certainly be made to make the
copper producers absorb at least part of any price reduction.
There are indications that in the absence of United States
assistance on this problem Chile might move to nationalize
the American-owned copper companies with their investment of
over $500,000,000, or sell to the Orbit, either directly or
by transshipment. Finance Minister Herrera has told Ambassador
Bowers that in his opinion sales in Switzerland or Italy would
not contravene the Battle Act despite Chile's knowledge of the
copper's ultimate destination.
Neither nationalization nor sales to the Orbit would
actually solve the government's problem. Chile lacks the
capital and the know-how to operate the industry effectively,
and the Orbit probably does not need more than one fourth of
Chile's annual production. Furthermore, the Orbit countries
probably would refuse to pay higher than world prices inde-
finitely and would soon seek to pay in other than the dollars
Chile needs.
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Moreover, it does not seem probable that Chile'would
risk losing all United States aid by initiating direct trade
with the Orbit at this time. The sums immediately involved
in any termination of American aid would be approximately
$15,000,000 in military aid, $8,000,000 in unspent Export-
Import credits, and a $1,000,000 balance on Point IV assistance.
Nevertheless, the Ibanez administration is under heavy
pressure to seek some solution for its growing difficulties.
Inflation is severe and the government's expenditures are
exceeding its income. Ibanez lacks majority support in either
house of the legislature, and the 75-year-old president's
ability to cope with the situation is weakened further by
his failing health.
Available information indicates that Ibanez himself is
opposed to copper sales to the Orbit. On 23 August Foreign
Minister Fenner stated publicly that there will be no sales
to "European firms" as long as the copper negotiations in
Washington are in progress. However, Chilean nationalists,
Communist groups and fellow travelers, and substantial numbers
of the people insist that the copper be sold, if necessary
even to nations behind the iron curtain.
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CEYLONESE GOVERNMENT CONTROLS WIDESPREAD UNREST
The widespread rioting and sabotage which began in
Ceylon on 12 August in protest against the government?s
reduction of food subsidies was a result of the most
successful cooperation achieved in recent years among
the three small but vocal Ceylonese leftist parties. The
government, though faced with the difficult problem of
dealing with a newly united opposition at the same time
that highly unpopular, stringent economy measures are
mandatory, has clearly indicated its intention to suppress
any further unrest.
The cooperation of the leftist parties, which hold only
13 of the 101 parliamentary seats, apparently resulted mainly
from their ability to capitalize on popular opposition to
the new austerity budget for 1953-54. This marked the first
decisive government effort to readjust the national economy
following the end of the Korean war boom. The budget
reduces the expenditures of government ministries, restricts
other spending, and lowers the food subsidy by nearly 85
percents Since the withdrawal of food subsidies directly
affects the vast majority of the population by almost
tripling the price of rice, the leftist opposition has
directed most of its activities against this move.
A Communist-led protest demonstration and march on the
parliament building on 23 July, when the budget was presented
to the parliament, reportedly was planned during June and
July, following hints from government officials that a
reduction of subsidies would figure in the new budget. The
Ceylon Communist Party, with its satellite Lanka Sama Samaj
(Revolutionary) Party, attempted to elicit the direct co-
operation of other opposition factions, particularly the
Trotskyites, to plan this demonstration. There is no indica-
tion that they cooperated in its planning, however, though
elements of most opposition parties participated in the
protest. Police and army personnel successfully dispersed
the demonstrators.
The nationwide general strike, which developed on 12
and 13 August into the most serious rioting in Ceylon since
World War II, was planned immediately after the 23 July
protest. The Communists apparently were successful in
obtaining the full cooperation of the Trotskyite group in
preparing for the strike, and possibly encouraged the par-
ticipation of individuals from other opposition parties.
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The government, which was fully prepared for the strike,
acted quickly and firmly to end the violence. Armed troops
and police were called in when unrest flared into arson and
rioting. A dusk-to-dawn curfew was enforced and a state of
national emergency was declared, giving broad police powers
to the government. On 17 August, following an 18-hour
session, parliament passed a bill empowering the government
to promulgate emergency regulations and make preventive
detentions in anticipation of such public emergencies.
Armed with its new powers, which appear to be more
extensive than necessary, the government will probably be
successful in enforcing the unpopular measures. outlined in
the current budget as well as in controlling any further
outbreaks of violence on the part of the opposition. If
Ceylon's currently slightly favorable trade balance con-
tinues throughout 1953, the government may be able to
stabilize the economy with the savings achieved by decreased
food subsidy payments and with only a slight rise in the
cost of living. Its success in this effort, however, will
be directly conditioned on Communist China's continued
provision on schedule of its commitment of 270,000 metric
tons of rice per year under the current five-year Ceylon-
China trade agreement.
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SOVIET AIRFIELD PROGRAM IN EUROPEAN SATELLITE AREA
The Soviet program of expanding air facilities in the
Eastern European Satellites, as well as the Soviet zones of
Germany and Austria, has resulted in the completion of 82
major airfields in this area (see map, p. 19), compared to
62 a year ago and 11 at the close of World War II, A major
airfield by definition has a hard-surfaced runway of 6,000
feet or more and can support sustained jet fighter and light
bomber operations. Of 82 such fields, 47 are now capable
of supporting sustained heavy and medium bomber operations
and the others could be rapidly converted to such use.
A Soviet intention to continue the expansion program
is evidenced by the fact that at ]Least 20 additional major
fields are currently under construction in Eastern Europe.
Soviet air capabilities in this area are increased by more
than 250 lesser airfields, built for the most part during
World War II, which can support operations in varying degrees
by conventional fighters, light bombers and transports.
The most extensive construction has taken place in
the Soviet zone of Germany, where 26 major fields have been
completed since 7.948. The .roar^.rn there appears to be
tapering off, with only one major airfield under con-
struction now.
An unusual development in the western part of the Sov4ot
zone of Germany, however, has been the so-called "forest
clearing program," begun in late 1951, whereby at lea..t four
areas about 9500x1750 feet have been cleared of trees, leveled,
and planted with grass. Stocks of pierced-steel planking,
a prefabricated airfield surfacing material, have been ob-
served at one of these sites. These sites may be intended to
serve as auxiliary airfields or for restaging in airborne
operations. They may also eventually be converted to major
airfields.
Poland has been next in importance in the Soviet program,
with 21 major fields completed and six others under construc-
tion. Extensive airfield construction and rehabilitation
have also been carried out in the other Satellites with the
exception of Albania, where work on the first major airfield
has only recently been reported,
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In addition to the construction of longer, hard-surfaced
runways, the Soviet Union has also concentrated on improving
short runways and natural surface landing areas, constructing
personnel accommodations and aviation fuel storage facilities,
and to a lesser extent, improving hangar, workshop and ware-
house facilities. Night lighting and radio aids to navigation
have also been installed at many military fields.
Enough aircraft revetments have now been built at 30
airfields in Poland, Hungary, and the Soviet zones of Germany
and Austria to take care of approximately 55 percent of all
combat aircraft assigned to the Soviet air armies in these
areas. This construction work began in July 1952 and is con-
tinuing.
This improvement of air faciliLties, which are located as
much as 450 miles west of the USSR, significantly increases
the offensive capabilities of Soviet aircraft. Most of Western
Europe and part of the United Kingdom are within light bomber
range. Additional forward bases are available for medium and
heavy bomber operations against they United Kingdom and important
Allied peripheral bases and lines of communications. This air-
field network also increases the security of the Soviet Union
from air attack,
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MAJOR AIRFIELDS IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
JULY 1953
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