THE LEVEL OF COMBAT AND EXPENDITURE OF AMMUNITION BY COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78S02149R000200100002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: REPORT

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Ttze Level of Combat and nditure oi' Ammunition b Cozranunist Forces
in South Vietnam
The level of combat prevailing in South Vietnaaa has been estimated to be one
in which e~aeh enerr~ battalfion is engaged in combat on the average of one in thirty
days. This estimate, prepared by DIA, is based. on e, reported 6{}C VC~PNA battalion
sized actions that took place in the six month period Sept~nber 3.65-~'e`brut~,ry i.966-
During this same period the number of VC~NVA battalions avereged alraast lC?0 Pte'
month, ~.mplying a i.gvel of combat in whieh ~,ch enemy battalion engaged in combat
on the average of one in thirty c]a~ys. I't has been i'urthe~r estima-i~ed ths.t each day
a unit is in action it expends one-third of its basic load of ammunition, nn expendi-
ture based on a; combat factor oi' that of an attack on a fortified position.
The purpose of this ?memorandum is to suggest that (1) the current level of
combat in South Vietnam may be in the range of (115 to 1-2C3~ days and (2) that
each day a unit is in action it ~ be expending less than 1J3 of its basic load
of ammunition.
1. Level of Combat
In order to establish any mesanin~zl estimate on the bevel of combat prevailing
in South Vietnam it ha,s been necessary to make certain assumptions.. These assur~rp-
Lions are dictated by the lack of sufi'iciently detailed information on the type
and size o~' ene~r forces encountered. on the battlefield. Summaries of military
operations appearing in 1~~C operations _..reports, daily MAC V intelligence summat"3.r!s,
and Annear F (Significant Victories and Defeats} of MAC V Monthly Evaluations fre-
~quently note that the enemy force encountered on the battlefield. is of unknown size.
Even when information is available on the estimated strength of enemy farces within
an area of operations, reports of contact with the enemy in tetras of the intensity
~ of combat are ~"requently lacking.
~ DIA review(s) completed.
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The methodology used in this paper Par estimating the Current le~re~. ~of combat
in South Vietnam is as follows. Weekly surranaries oP selected military statistics
of Communist activity in South Vietnam were pesearched back thru 11 September 1965.
~:ese weekly summaries report the total number of battalion size or lamer actions.
attacks and small unit actionsfattacks initiated by both friendly and exlerr~ forces-
These actians;~attacks are broken dawn into total number of actiansfattacks, axed the
number aP these operations that established enemy contact. On1,Y those actions
attacks in which enemy contact was established are included in this anal-3rs~-s. ~e
total number of battalion initiated actions attacks in which enemy contact was
established were compiled on a monthly basis for the period 11 Septexuber 39&5..23
July l9E&. The overY~helming number of battalion size attacksactions which took
place during this period were initiated by friendly forces. If it is assumed that
for each Friendly battalion size initiated attackfaction -- which .establishes con-
tact with the exiemy -- an enemy force of comparablE strength is ended ixa. combat,
then, by dividing the total number of battalion} sized or 7.arge~' attacksfactions es-
tablishing enemy contact each month by the average number of enemy battalions op-
eratin~z within the same period, the average number oP days per' month an enemy batta-
liar is in combat can be derived. Of course it is very unlikely th?xt far every'
friendly initiated battalion size or larger atta.ck~action establishing enemy con-
tact, an end i'orce oP equal or comparable size is be3.x~g met on the battlePierld.
Thus, the-assumption that each enemy force is oP battalion size is uxigtxestionably
ov~e'stmting the level oP combat. But there are two other factors, and possibly e.
thix'd, which would tend to mitigate this bias. First, there are instances, where
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enemy f